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STUDIES 
András SAJÓ- Legal Status of the "Terminally 111" 
Judit SÁNDOR under Hungar ian L a w 
1. The purpose of this study 
This paper surveys the legal status of various conducts inconsistently and inaccurately 
labelled as "euthanasia" in medical ethics, and suggests a possible way of resolving the 
contradictions and insufficiency of this regulation. 
As suggested by the complicated title of this paper, and as demonstrated by the 
analysis of the concepts and rules of law below, the language of the Hungarian law, in 
accordance with the Health Act of 1972 (hereinafter: HA) is uncertain in connection with 
incurable patients. Hungarian medical and ethical practice, like in several other countries, 
attributes diverse meanings to this term including both permitted and forbidden forms of 
medical practice. 
From the viewpoint of the legal regulation, we shall address only the practices most 
frequently referred to under the name of "euthanasia". These questions unavoidably 
exceed the limits of the regulation of medical conduct. Naturally, modern medical ethics 
does not regard euthanasia as merely the problem of the doctor, but interprets it in terms 
of the relationship between doctor and patient. The legal regulation, in addition, should 
(and in fact does) enforce general constitutional and social aspects, and furthermore, it 
has to take into account the consistency and coherence within the legal system. Therefore, 
the considerations guiding the legislator or the judge do partly differ from those of pure 
medical ethics. 
Under Hungarian law, the regulation of "euthanasia" does not attain the constitutionally 
desired level of predictability of law, and this would render it insufficient even if consider-
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ations of medical ethics resulted in a total ban on euthanasia. The present medical 
practices in the treatment of incurable patients, however, also include behaviours which 
could be illegal at any time without specific prohibition. As a consequence of the 
uncertain language of the present law, even if one applies a notion of euthanasia 
according to which a behaviour is not to be regarded as being a case of euthanasia still 
the possibility of a criminal charge against the doctor remains open. The Constitutional 
Court did not yet determine the exact scope and content of the constitutional requirements 
in this area of law, so that it remains uncertain in many respects; there are nonetheless 
interpretations of the constitution, under which—provided a legal framework exists 
offering proper guarantees—the medical practices aimed at relieving the sufferings of a 
terminally ill person may conform with the constitutional principles. 
2. The current definition of "euthanasia" in Hungarian law: reasons for 
the elimination of the notion of euthanasia in legal analysis 
In current Hungarian statute law1 "euthanasia" is mentioned eo nomine only once: in Art. 
20 para. 1 of the Order No. 11/1972. of the Council of Ministers of June 30, 1972, 
implementing the HA. Here euthanasia includes the "extinction of life in case of an 
incurable illness".2 The Order mentions in giving examples of legally prohibited medical 
activities, i.e. it suggests—and it only suggests—that it governs exclusively the activity of 
the doctor. To perform what is popularly called "euthanasia" (i.e. "good death") is 
generally regarded as a behaviour identical with the prohibited activity, but the scope of 
"euthanasia" under the legal definition covers only medical behaviours. It is a conceptual 
1 Here we will not tackle unlawfulness in private law. As far as private law is concerned, the request for 
euthanasia is a question of interpretation of the principle of violenli non fit iniuria, which principle presently 
acknowledges self-determination only to the extent to which it does not hurt or endanger social interests. 
(According to this principle, assent excludes delict in private law.) 
According to Section 75 para. 3 of the Civil Code, "Individual rights are not injured by any behaviour the 
entitled party has consented to, provided that the granting of the consent does not violate social interests, or 
that the general waiver is void". 
2 Although we should abstain from giving an overall definition of euthanasia, from among the possibly 
permissible medical practices connected to death all such cases or definitions, which are related to the devastation 
of people of a "reduced value", must be excluded as obviously impermissible ones. The case of an incurable, 
cltronic disease causing permanent suffering, but not of a fatal outcome, does not fall into the same category, and 
is unadvisable to discuss together with euthanasia. Possibly, the doctor's behaviour is to be changed in this 
respect, too, regarding the consideration of the patient's wish of "suicide", and medical attitude will considerably 
resemble the attitude manifested in the case of incurable, terminally ill patients. In spite the possible similarity 
of the doctor's behaviour, there is a significant difference in legal respects between the two cases on the part of 
the patient and the illness. In the scope of euthanasia the cause of death is the disease it.self. 
Naturally, distinctions are never perfect. Regarding non-healing, but not fatal diseases, a borderline case 
resembling the situation of euthanasia is possible, especially when the patient will never be able to regain 
consciousness again. In such cases some of the principles related to incurable and terminally ill patients without 
sufficient mental ability, as well as those related to their doctors can be governing. 
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element of euthanasia under this definition—simply resulting from the fact that it is 
included in the HA as an example of a way of conduct prohibited to doctors—that it is 
realised by a doctor. In principle, separate treatment is justified by the doctor ' s special 
standard of professional liability and profession-scientific nature of the legal regulation.3 
The presumption that euthanasia would take place because of an incurable disease, is 
obviously inaccurate: this is only a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of medical 
assistance into death. The word "extinction" ("kioltás" in Hungarian) itself is somewhat 
misleading although, undoubtedly it avoids the difficulties of tenm "causing death" which 
implies active participation on behalf of the medical personnel. Reference to the 
difference from chronic diseases is left out of the definition. 
The legal definition given in the Order apart, the acts of "helping" an incurable 
patient "into death", at least in certain circumstances are qualified as acts contrary to the 
law only in the case of a rather complicated interpretation of the law. Under a certain 
interpretation of the law, the conducts falling within this scope conflict not only with the 
HA, but with the Criminal Code, too, so that they are criminal offences. These 
interpretations cannot be excluded, and sometimes they are the most obvious ones, which 
means that in legal terms the present medical practice can be legally questionable at any 
time; the legal uncertainty in this subject is intolerable both in social, and in medical 
respects. A bitter and furious relative and an attorney agreeing with him (or her) can, at 
any time, initiate a criminal procedure with a reasonable prospect of success. 
2.1. The regulation of "euthanasia" in Hungarian health law 
The governing rules are found in paras 1 and 2 Section 43 of the Health Act. para. 
1 states: 
...within the given possibilities the patient has to be provided with a treaunent 
corresponding with the current status of medicine, with the individual faculties of the 
patient, as well as with the stage of his disease ... and the most effective therapeutic 
methods 
have to be applied. Furthermore para. 2 states that 
...a doctor is obliged to treat with utmost care even a patient he regards as incurable. 
In an optimal case this could mean that, with respect to the individual faculties of 
a terminally ill patient—if the stabilisation of his condition is no longer possible 
according to the current status of medicine—the treatment is to be chosen on the pure 
basis of medical ethics, which may as well mean in some cases also the termination or 
3 For example, in the case of mercy killing by a relative the influence of Ulis action on the trust in doctors, 
who are indispensable for curing, need not be reckoned with. 
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withdrawal of the treatment. In cases where the patient 's condition can be stabilised 
at least temporarily, this interpretation will not help. In order for this kind of inter-
pretation to work, an unambiguous legal position would be required regarding the 
meaning and scope of "suitable treatment". The special rule related to the case of a 
patient regarded as terminally ill (which, as a special rule, has priority over the general 
rule according to the general principles of interpretation) does not prescribe that 
keeping the patient alive at any price would be a doctor's professional duty. The contents 
of the term "utmost care" is to be determined partly by relying on the professional 
opinion, in the lack of any further (unfortunately missing) legal guidelines. When 
determining the standard of "utmost care", however, as in the case of all measures of 
care, social opinion, as well as constitutional requirements must also be taken into 
account. "Utmost care" itself can also be interpreted in such a way that it means the 
fullest relief of pain, the ensuring of a better actual physical condition, irrespective of its 
possible effect of shortening the expectable length of the patient's life. As opposed to 
this, according to Section 43 para. 3 of the HA, the doctor is still responsible for 
"neglecting the measures necessary in the interest of the treatment of the patient". 
Accordingly, the abandonment of the treaünent would be unacceptable, except when it 
were clear that the meaning of "medical treaunent" differs from the general meaning in 
the case of an incurable patient. 
Given the present legal background it is not clear at all what is the legal effect of the 
wish of a terminally ill patient expressed in a clear state of mind, according to which he 
wants to withdraw himself from medical treatment, e.g. "he wants to go home to die". 
If, for example, according to his wish he is disconnected from dialysis, which is applied 
due to a complication, the doctor performing this clearly violates Section 43. On the other 
hand, one might ask, in the case of a moribondus permitted to go home, is the doctor 
obliged—due to his professional duties and legal responsibility-prevent direct life-danger 
by connecting the patient to a medical appliance in the case of the patient's indisposition 
or loss of consciousness? 
According to another way of interpretation, however, the relationship between paras 
1 and 2 is not that between a rule and an exception, but rather para. 2 is just the 
application of the rule given in para 1 to a special situation. In this case, the two 
paragraphs could be interpreted in such a way that they do not conflict with each other. 
Yet the overall result will not differ too much, since according to the first paragraph, 
the given possibilities, and the stage of the illness have to be taken into account, and 
a treatment corresponding with them has to be provided. It is conceivable that under 
certain given circumstances the "most effective" solution is just the abandonment of 
certain life-prolonging medical treatments: this depends on the determination of the 
objective of the medical treaunent in the case of a terminally ill patient. Such an 
objective can be 
(a) the prolonging of the patient's life as far as possible; 
(b) the ensuring of the "normal" length of life in the case of the given disease, only 
offering symptomatic treaunent; 
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(c) death by causing the least suffering (disregarding the time within which the 
death occurs); 
(d) a good death in the sense that the patient may not lose his dignity during his 
dying. 
According to Section 44 para, l b of the HA, the doctor may not apply such a 
treatment "of which risk is greater than the risk involved in the lack of the treatment 
or procedure" . Since the risk of healing is (ex hypothesi) out of question in the case 
of a pat ient regarded as incurable, it is maximum the risks—or, more precisely, the 
burdens—of suffering and the shortening of life, that are hardly comparable directly, 
which can be compared. The HA, however , does not even raise the question of the 
patient 's sufferings, since in 1972 the prevailing attitude at least in Hungary was still 
totally doctor (and treatment) oriented, i.e. paternalist. The question of informed 
consent, disclosure of information to the patient is raised in the Act in connection with 
agreement to operation at the most, but not in the case of other medical treatments. 
While in the case of an operation the principle of consent is mentioned—although rather 
vaguely—the law does not recognize the right of the patient to chose in respect to his 
death. Th i s incoherence seems to be undeniable. On the one hand, the patient has the 
right to re fuse the operation; on the other, in case of a terminal illness, the operation 
required for the "prevention of direct life-endangennent"—in the words of Section 47 
para. 4 of the Act—can be excluded a priori, since there is no operation which could 
prevent l i fe-endangennent in a situation of incurability, i.e. where the patient is by 
definition in on the verge of death, so being constantly in "l ife-endangerment". 
However , using the same legal expression and wording, its a professional duty of a 
doctor to keep the patient connected to a life-sustaining equipment even without the 
patient's consent, since it is regarded as a therapy, which is applicable only at 
institutions for in-patients, and which prevents, or so it is supposed, imminent death. 
In this sense the cases of euthanasia both by disconnecting the patient, or by not 
connecting him to the life supporting equipment are both breach of professional duties. 
However , according to Section 75 para. 1 of the Act, the citizen has to be treated—in 
the f ramework of public health service—according to his state of health, and in the 
most up-to-date way available. From this it can be concluded at least that special rules 
of t reatment can be applied to a terminally ill patient, as to a special condition, and 
direct l i fe-endangennent is possibly not taken into account in such cases, since the 
patient will die within a foreseeable, short tenn and for a foreseeable reason. This 
definition, however, is insufficient in itself. It would obviously be unacceptable if a 
helpless patient suffering from AIDS, who still insists on life, were denied laryngotomy 
in the case of dysphasia. Even the case, when direct l i fe-endangennent is in direct 
causal relation with the terminal basic disease, does not provide a satisfactory result. 
The consideration of euthanasia—in case it is pennissible—can take place depending on 
the pat ient 's condition in the light of his personality, in addition to the-above condition 
of the disease (clinical pattern). If the patient 's condition violates, or even directly 
endangers , his personal dignity, i.e. if h is status approaches that of an object rather 
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than that of a person, such considerations can be raised, especially if his own earlier 
decision enables the performance of euthanasia. 
Moreover, Section 75 raises another problem. It regulates and envisages the 
treaunents and devices available in the given situation. For the law, which endeavours 
to give general rules applicable to a great number of different cases irrespective of any 
other consideration, a strange paradox results from this: the practice of euthanasia 
depends under the general rule on the facilities available in the particular case, e.g. 
whether or not there is a possibility of applying life-supporting facilities at the given 
place. If they are not available in the case the question of resuscitation, dialysis, etc. is 
not raised at all, nor (therefore) the abandonment or stopping of such treatments, which 
means that euthanasia becomes a problem depending on chance (and equipment at the 
disposal of the hospital). Criminal law, however, can (and at any rate should) only work 
with general fact-descriptions and euthanasia (as the denial of treaunent) may not 
merely be a case of chance. All this also conflicts with the constitutional requirement 
of equality, since it is unacceptable in principle that a dying patient's "right" of 
euthanasia would depend on the contingent fact that in his case there is no possibility 
and, accordingly, no obligation of certain life-prolonging treatments.4 This is a clear 
violation of the consülutional principle of equality, requiring that similar cases should 
be treated similarly. Although the HA basically leaves the choice of treaunent to the 
doctor within the framework of the current state of science and law, it seems that in the 
above cases the question is not merely the professional choice of the doctoi^-especially 
regarding the purpose of the ueaünent—but the rules of law (as seen from this analysis) 
do not provide the required framework and guideline. 
2.2. The state of criminal law related to certain actions-within the scope of 
"euthanasia" 
2.2.1. Homicide (Section 166 of the Criminal Code). In Hungarian law the act of killing 
is qualified as "intentional", even if the perpetrator does not directly intend the 
consequences of his behaviour, but acquiesces to them (Section 21 of the Criminal 
Code); it is the case of the so-called "eventual intention". 
For example, the doctor who performs a risky operation according to the status of 
medicine, does not commit a crime, not because by performing the operation he has 
acquiesced himself to the possible death occurring during the operation (by assuming 
the risk his intention also covered the probable consequence and in this sense he could 
4 Cf. with the problem emphasized by József Kovács, that, in fact, euthanasia will be the means for others 
to get facilities of treatment. The principle of the HA related to the assumption of the risk of treatment seems 
to gel the meaning of the risk of die same therapy applicable to one patient at the cost of another, instead of 
the risk of two therapies compared to each other. KOVÁCS, J.: Eutanázia és bioetika [Euthanasia and 
Bioethics], Világosság. 1995. 7, 28-41. 
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be regarded as having acquiesced himself with the likely consequence),5 but because, 
by acting in accordance with the HA, he acted lawfully, so that the criminal 
unlawfulness is missing—since the behaviour is lawful according to another legal rule. 
One, the most frequent activities of a doctor is when he gives analgesics in an 
increasing dose to mitigate suffering, but also assuming the risk of death caused by the 
analgetic. This can also be considered as unlawful conduct under the Criminal Code but 
may be regarded as an activity prescribed by professional standards. While ethicists are 
inclined to accept this behaviour on the basis of the "double effect" principle,6 criminal 
lawyers regard rather the lack of unlawfulness as decisive. According to Professor Tibor 
Horváth,7 the doctor 's consciousness covers the consequences of his behaviour, and a 
relation of causation between the act of the doctor and the death of the patient also 
detectable. It is legally recognized that the doctor has the freedom of choice (i.e. 
positive law recognises the assumption of risk by the victim and excludes unlawfulness 
on that ground, especially in the form of occupational rules). With this reasoning one 
concludes that the act of the doctor causing death lacked unlawfulness; which would 
seem to allow a conclusion to the lawfulness of euthanasia falling within this scope. 
Hungarian law, however, as seen from the HA, is obscure in this respect, although it 
does not clearly exclude this possibility of interpretation. Since in other cases of 
homicide, and in criminal law in general the rule of the eventual intention is accepted 
with a good reason, the judge would hardly exclude automatically a case of causing 
death—which might be justified on the basis of the double effect principle from the 
position of the medical ethics so that it is not regarded as euthanasia—from among the 
actions qualified as homicide. For this it would be necessary that the law—in our case, 
the HA—expressly states its lawfulness. 
In other cases, homicide (and occupational endangerment) is discarded because the 
lack of causality can be referred to. Paradoxically, this is the situation popularly called 
5 Per analogiam, a person, who kicks a pregnant woman ' s belly, is responsible for hurling the embryo, 
although his intention was not necessarily aimed at abortion. 
6 The Catholic Church has supported medical behaviour according to the principle of double effect since 
Pius XII until the latest (1995) encyclicals. Accordingly, the doctor 's intention is related to the mitigation of 
suffer ing instead of causing death. In legal respects, however, litis is inapplicable, partly because in litis form 
the enforcement of the ethics of intention can be a source of abuse, and partly due to the criminally accepted 
principle of the potential intention. A separate legal provision is required for any deviation f rom litis. 
7 H O R V Á T H , T.: Eutanázia és büntetőjog [Euthanasia and Criminal Law], Állam- és Jogtudomány, 1972. 
Although Horváth, who represent the still prevailing criminal law doctrine, accepts the "overdosage of 
morpliine", but considers [all other sorts of] euthanasia as homicide punishable, since the legal norm has a 
guaranteeing and general nature, therefore, the distinction of life on a qualitative basis is unacceptable. This is 
because law can only word general facts of a case, and may not declare that life is useless under certain 
circumstances. Titus, since the task of the law is the protection of abstract social values, it must protect all lives 
in all cases. According to the supplementary argument, the permission of euthanasia undermines trust in the 
doctor, and is the source of abuses. 
Although all this was expounded during the prevalence of socialist interpretation of the law, it can be 
influential, or possibly decisive even today, on the basis of the objective etliics of value, as we shall see during 
the survey of the standpoint of the Constitutional Court. 
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"disconnecting", which is frequently regarded as active euthanasia, where the 
termination of the life-sustaining treatment can be regarded as an act not being the 
cause of death, but only letting the patient die\ since in such cases the death is caused 
by the diseases (e.g. on termination of dialysis). But does the doctor have the right to 
let a patient die once he has to provide medical treatment according to the HA? If one 
adopts a delicate distinction in the meaning of the expression "life", the artificial 
extension of life can be subject to a different judgement.8 This, however, depends on 
the judgement of the Constitutional Court, or of the legislator on the basis of the deci-
sion of the Constitutional Court.9 In the case of the cessation of lengthening of 
life—once the difference of lengthening is normatively recognized—the view that the 
action is not in causal relation with death, and there is no crime in the lack causality can 
possibly be argued legally. 
According to the prevailing Hungarian interpretation, homicide can be interpreted 
only as "shortening of the length of life by forceful intervention, the indirect earlier 
occurrence of death by the effect of force and by the natural consequence of them 
which together result in death".10 However, under the current interpretation of criminal 
law negligence and passive behaviour, or the omission of doing something (in non-
euthanasia cases), on equal footing with active behaviour, are regarded as directing to 
prohibited effect. Moreover, the decisions on whether a life supporting system should 
be disconnected or not, supposes an activity and not a simple omission (instruction, 
"switching o f f ' , the pulling out of the needle). On the other hand, disconnecting the 
respirator of a non-tenninally ill patient (moreover, leaving an akinetic person alone in 
a snow desert, taking his car away) are indisputable cases of homicide. But even if the 
doctor's conduct were not considered as homicide, still it would qualify as "occupational 
endangering" (leading to death) and remain still an offence; therefore, at all events, a 
medical-professional, or legal regulation is required in order to assure the proper 
handling of such situation. 
2.2.2. Assisted suicide (Section 168 of the Criminal Code). It reads in its operative part: 
Anyone, who persuades someone else to commit suicide, or provides assistance in 
committing it ... 
If the doctor terminates any treatment which maintains life functions upon the request 
of a terminally ill patient's and it causes death, a situation at least close to suicide took 
place. This case may be considered as assisted suicide although the cause of death does 
8 The definition of "artificial lengthening" is possible either on a purely professional basis or the ground 
of medical ethics, or both—but the solution can be legally acceptable only if it exists. 
9 See para. 3 below. 
10 EDVI ILLÉS, К.: Anyagi büntető törvények [Substantive Criminal Laws). Magyar Törvénytár, Grill. Bp. 
1909. 439. 
Legal Status of the "Terminal ly III" under Hungarian Law 9 
not directly result from an act by doctors's own hand, but from the dying patient 's own 
decision. The facts of the case are indisputably realised if, for example, a medicine 
accelerating the patient's death is made available to the patient upon his request. 
Paradoxically, the ethically more questionable (because of the lack of self-determination) 
case, when the "overdosage" of analgesics becomes the direct cause of death together 
with a symptom of the disease, does not conflict with this rule of the law and it will 
qual i fy just as a "treatment of utmost care", in the case of which unlawfulness is 
missing for this reason. The special treatment of terminal condition is justified by the 
following paradoxical situation: if the patient receives poison upon his own request and 
takes it, it is suicide, and Section 168 of the Criminal Code should be applied, while if 
a l ife supporting medicine is no longer given to the patient upon his own request this 
is out of question, since the death is not caused by the patient's own hands. 
It is worth mentioning that the Hungarian Criminal Code of 1878 (Section 282) 
created a special provision for cases when the perpetrator "was persuaded by someone's 
serious wish to kill [the requesting person]", as a separate crime. In practice, however, 
this provision had been applied mainly the joint attempts of suicide for motives love, 
but not in case even remotely similar to euthanasia. 
2.2.3. The offence of causing danger by violation of professional rules is committed by 
a person Section 171 (paras 1, 2, 3 of the Criminal Code) 
[w]ho exposes the life/lives of someone else/others to direct danger out of negli-
gence by violating the rules of his profession ... if the crime ... causes death. If the 
perpetrator causes the direct danger purposefully, ... he will be sentenced to 
imprisonment for two to eight years. 
This section gives direct criminal support to the HA too, since the professional rules in 
case of a doctor are obviously those set out in the provisions of the HA, while in case 
of homicide, or assisted suicide the criminal offences are based on general (as opposed 
to professional) rules of conduct. 
2.2.4. The crime of'failure to provide assistance' can be applied to the most passive 
fo rms of euthanasia. According to Section 172 paras 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code, 
(1) anyone, [w]ho does not provide the assistance expectable of him to an injured 
person, or to a person whose life or bodily condition is in direct danger, commits 
a misdemeanour ... (2) The punishment is up to three-year imprisonment for the 
crime, if the offended party dies, and assistance could have saved his life. 
T h e application of para. 2 again depends on what the judge regards as the cause of 
death—the incurable disease, or the cause of death avoidable by the concrete, active 
intervention (e.g. the neglect of resuscitation, that can be performed). The viewpoint that 
the intervention would not have saved the patient's life can also be represented. But 
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even in this case, the possibility of applying paragraph (1) exists. Here the question is 
what can be expected from the doctor if a patient's life is in direct danger and regarded 
as incurable. In respect of criminal law, standard of care involves the possibilities of the 
doctor in the given, specific situation (if he is not a surgeon, or if there is no operating 
theatre, he does not have to operate). When determining the professional duties of 
persons having other professions (i.e. not doctors) judicial practice also takes into 
account the professional expectations. As in all cases, at this point, too, we encounter 
the lack of clear professional expectations of behaviour, instead of which the rather 
contradictory custom is available as a norm at best. Although wiuiesses (that is, mostly 
colleagues) and experts can be heard regarding this question, but there is no guarantee 
that a court will accept or consider the views represented by them (which might be 
presumably quite contradictory, too) as governing, just as it is not guaranteed that in the 
question of euthanasia. A uniform and calculable practice satisfactory for curing work 
and also accepted socially will develop "by itself ' ." 
It follows, the extinction of an incurable patient's life is prohibited by various acts 
of commission, not only in the scope of the word "extinction", which refers to direct 
causing. 
On the other hand, the above expressions can be interpreted in the following way: 
promotion of "good death" can be lawful and the doctor's participation in it can be 
permitted. 
Thus, according to the current law, die state of the medicine and its professional 
rules are decisive, although a legal rule may specify the relevant framework (in 
accordance with Section 43 para. 3 of the HA). According to the opinion of the 
Constitutional Court, in our case, this legal rule can probably be only an act, since the 
question is the restriction of a fundamental right, i.e. the right to live. 
As far as homicide is concerned, certain forms of euthanasia do not fall within this 
category if the judge takes the view^which is justified by the interpretation of the 
11 Such a uniform standpoint can be established in connection with individual cases, but it is improbable that 
the courts will decide in a larger number of cases of euthanasia in the forthcoming years. Furthermore, it is also 
possible in principle that the Supreme Court would offer guidance in a principle for the interpretation of the 
sections referred to. Tltis is also improbable, however partly because the courts in Hungary refuse open juris-
diction (apart from the Constitutional Court), since they do not wish to share in its responsibility (and they are 
not entitled to do so). Such a viewpoint is also absolutely unlikely in technical respects, since it is basically 
applied to solve problems related to the unity of the law and, if there are no cases, the establishment of unity 
in the viewpoint of the courts is not necessary. 
The settlement of tire question is not expectable at all from the ordinary courts, and especially not of 
criminal courts. The disadvantage of the development of case-law is that it is possibly casuistic, not general, 
and very slow, and until some solution is established the varying judgements keep the society in uncertainty 
and tension—wlrich is superfluous, at least in our case. Undoubtedly, the lawsuits can have a socially mobilizing 
effect. Both in the Netherlands and in die United States a few spectacular lawsuits aroused the public interest 
in euthanasia. Due to the peculiarities of common law, however, in (he United States tile courts still 
continuously review the legislative decisions in connection with euthanasia, as a result of which regulation 
becomes uncertain, overcomplicated, and unbearably expensive. 
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law—that the cause of the occurred death was not the termination of the given treatment, 
or the failure of providing a given treatment, but the cause of death was the incurable 
disease itself. The termination, or failure of the application, of dialysis gives place to the 
natural process occurring as a result of the given incurable disease. 
This example clearly shows that the traditional distinction between active and passive 
euthanasia, or the connection of responsibility to this distinction is inapplicable at least 
in some of the cases, mainly in the case of terminating life functions by switching off the 
equipment As opposed to some ethicists, the lawyers speak about active euthanasia if the 
doctor (the person providing the treatment) contributes to the occurrence of death by 
active behaviour. Therefore, it is justified to determine one by one the typical acts 
regarded as euthanasia in terms of legal and professional respects, as well as to judge 
them separately in legal terms, even if regulation is casuistic. 
The legal rules analysed above can be interpreted in such a way that the extensions 
of an incurable patient's life is unnecessary, thus, the omission of the extension is not 
unlawful, moreover, it is also possible that such a treatment of an incurable patient, which 
shortens his life, may be qualified as lawful. 
The behaviours and methods of treatment falling into this scope, however, apply only 
to a smaller, and rather occasional group of the cases discussed in the disputes on 
euthanasia. Although such an approach can be a small, necessary step in the overall 
handling of the problem, but it is basically wrong, since it practically avoids facing the 
problem, it excludes the possibility of conscious social and individual choices, it does not 
provide a clear guidance for the doctor, so that it makes medical procedure uncertain and 
is the source of distrust and attacks and, in an extreme case, it threatens the doctor even 
with an incalculable criminal liability. 
3. Is the current legal regulation of "euthanasia" constitutional? 
T h e current constitution includes some important sections applicable to euthanasia, 
but without giving an unambiguous guidance. According to Section 54 of the Consti-
tution: 
(1) ... everyone has the inherent right to life and to human dignity, of which no one 
may be deprived arbitrarily. 
(2) No one may be ... subjected to brutal, inhuman, and humiliating treatment. 
We will survey the nature of the right to life and to dignity, taking into account the 
standpoint of the Constitutional Court. In connection with para. 2, however, it has to 
b e noted that, even in the case of life sustaining treatment the way of treatment is 
brutal and humiliating, it is unlawful . On this basis, therefore, the ret icence of the HA 
related to the therapeutic method—which we have discussed already—should be inter-
preted in the spirit of the provision of the Constitution. This would again just ify the 
abandonment of at least certain methods of therapy, but the legal question is, the 
question is who is to judge what will be regarded as a brutal, inhuman, an humiliating 
12 András Sajó—Judit Sándor 
treatment: is it the person concerned, or the socially accepted, general norm that counts 
(possibly with a correction "of the order of the profession")? In the law, "technical 
solutions also show the trends towards a mean protection of personal rights",12 The 
general tendency, therefore, is the application of social norms, from among which the 
norm of the accepted medical practice is of extreme significance—especially if, 
according to social opinion, medical science is destined for deciding what a humiliating 
treatment i s . " Since, however, in accordance with the Constitution, the protection of 
the rights is the obligation of the state as a whole (Section 8), it is unlikely that this 
could be a purely medical-professional question.14 We come to the same conclusion 
from the professional side as well, since—for example, according to international 
documents, too—the correct treaünent by a doctor is built on the concept of dignity, 
which actually takes into account the patient's aspects (e.g. the declaration of 1982 on 
Patient 's Rights). 
The Constitutional Cour t has come close to the interpretation of what the right of 
life and of dignity means regarding euthanasia, mainly in its decision in abortion case 
64/1991. It has to be noted in advance that, according to interpretation in the narrow 
sense, the right of life only means that no-one may be deprived of it arbitrarily 
Thus, such an interpretation is possible in principle, according to which the treaünent 
terminated upon agreement, or the assistance in dying offered upon an express request 
do not conflict with the prohibition of arbitrary deprival, especially as in the case of 
euthanasia in the narrow sense of the word, where nature will deprive the patient of 
12 SÓLYOM, L. : A személyiségi jogok elmélete (The Theory of the Personality Rights). Bp. 1982. Although 
in til is book Chief Justice Sólyom suggests that it is not the concrete personality which is protected in law by 
virtue of tiie protection of personality rights. According to the standpoint expounded in Iiis book, the question 
of life and death is a "borderline case" of personality rights (i.e. it does not involve whether it is lawful for the 
state to intervene—for the purpose of protection—into this question, too, wltich is stated with resignation in the 
case of other personality rights). 
13 In the Conroy-case a New Jersey court recognized the individual's absolute right of self-determination 
(right of refusing the treatment) against the doctors. 
14 "Although when establishing the contents of the regulation the legislator is obliged to take into account 
the acliievements of the various specialized branches of science, the regulation system of the law is sovereign 
to the extent that it is not obliged to accommodate to them mechanically ... When the law consciously deviates 
from the opinion of a specialized branch of science, it does not mean the refusal, or supervision of the latter, 
but only expresses that during the establishment of legal regulation it is not exclusively the acliievements of 
a specialized branch of science but, in addition to them, ... the behaviour tolerated, or required by the law at 
the given development level of society has to be determined, also considering social, economic, technical, etc. 
aspects." 
Justice Géza Kilényi's separate opinion 64/1991 [Az Alkotmánybíróság határozatai (Decisions of the 
Constitutional Court), 1991. p. 321. — (hereinafter ABH) all references to the resolutions of the Constitutional 
Court apply to this series.] 
15 In the United States, due to the wording of the constitution, the central constitutional question in 
euthanasia is whetlier or not the procedure of the deprival of life (e.g. disconnecting at a relative's request) 
is a due process. Cf. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Departments of Health US 110, SCl 2841, 111 L. Ed. 2d 
224. 
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l ife at all events, within a foreseeable term, and for a foreseeable cause of disease. A 
similar, and even more radical liberalisation of euthanasia results from the right of 
human dignity,16 if the fundamental right of self-determination connected to the 
existence of the personality is meant by dignity. The meaning of dignity, however, is 
not necessarily identical with self-determination (meant as autonomy), it can b e 
considered, fo r example, as a need for being respected by others, or use in a manner 
other than use of an object (and the right of self-determination is only a case of that) . 
But even the interpretation of dignity in the spirit of autonomy (self-determination) 
does not mean the acceptance of the right of suicide for everyone (not even for K a n t 
himself). 
The Hungarian Constitution does not entail the interpretation of dignity as self-
determination, and the decisions of the Constitutional Court do not consistently and 
inseparably connect dignity to self-determination either.17 It is true that the decision of 
the Constitutional Court on death penalty mentions the right of life as the person's own 
disposal of life. But the right of self-determination (in the classical liberal sense) is not 
among the preferred arguments of the Constitutional Court, partly because it a lways 
emphasises that, in addition to individual rights and values, other constitutional objectives 
must also be taken into account (among which they give way to social arguments as 
well). Some members of the Court (Justice Lábady and Justice Tersztyánszky) do not 
regard at all the right of dignity as a directly interpretable right, but they believe that the 
"right of life and dignity" only "exists in an imaginary way", "before the law".18 
Right f rom the beginning, however, the Constitutional Court derived from dignity 
die general personal rights, as from a core right, which is applicable in a subsidiary 
manner. If certain specified rights serving for the protection of the personality a re 
missing, the Constitutional Court may establish a basic right connected to the perso-
nality, as a part of the protection of the personality. In principle, the right to "good 
death" could also be specified as such a personality right—which Chief Justice Sólyom 
called it earlier "the borderline case of personality rights" in his article ("the quest ion 
of life and death") . Even if the borderline case fell within the scope of the personality 
rights, it would not mean the person's absolute right of disposal but, as in the case of 
the personal rights in general, it would mean a socially accepted and general protection 
of the individual taking into account the individual's will only occasionally, within the 
limits of the law, i.e. it would mean regulated and restricted euthanasia. 
Although a change of this kind, or the qualification of such a regulation as 
constitutional cannot be excluded according to the aforesaid, the statement of the 
Constitutional Court most closely related to euthanasia shows another tendency, 
16 One of the numerous inaccuracies of wording of the effect ive Constitution is that it suggests as if 
in a constitutional state anyone could be deprived of his inherent right of d igni ty in a non-arbitrary 
process. 
17 At least this was the original and express opinion of Chief Justice László Sólyom. Dignity "is a core of 
autonomy, and of individual self-determination withdrawn of everyone else's disposal". 
18 Decision No. 23/1990 by the Constitutional Court. Separate opinion. 
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expressly indicating that euthanasia (and death penalty placed in the same package") 
is subject to other principles than abortion. 
The qualification of death penalty as unconstitutional in more and more countries 
takes the development, that anyone should have the right to full legal and human 
status merely resulting from his quality as a human being, closer and closer to 
fulfilment. This will take place when the unconditional character of the right of life 
and dignity is also recognised, in addition to that of legal capacity. As opposed to this 
process, on the basis of individual criteria (guilt, the quality of life, mental and 
physical condition), the still existing death penalty and permitted euthanasia in the 
individual countries regard the rights establishing the specific human legal status as 
rights that can be deprived and restricted. Accordingly, the basic question of death 
penalty and euthanasia is the unconditional character, or possibility of restriction, of 
the right of life and dignity.20 
According to this, in the case of death penalty and euthanasia, "development"21 in the 
world would be characterised by the recognition of the full human, legal status, and 
19 This unfortunate linkage the Constitutional Court has been struggling with since the qualification of death 
penalty as anticonstitutional is based on a fundamental misunderstanding. Notably, while in the case of death 
penalty, it is the stale which takes away the given person's life, in the case of euthanasia il is die state health 
organization at die most—but not necessarily—that assists in the process. The question is whether die state has 
fulfilled its constituhonal obligation related to the protection of the right of life, if it permits diis under, or 
without, proper condidons. Legal protection is not an absolute constitutional obligation, but it is enough if 
protection is suitable in abstracto. Whether or not the Constitutional Court is entitled to decide on die efficiency 
of legal protection is a question of great dispute nowadays, in wliicli the Constitutional Court itself formally 
takes the standpoint that it is not entitled to such a supervision, because this kind of judgement is the privilege 
of legislation. 
In principle, therefore, the state can also fulfill the protection of the right of life and dignity if it 
institutionalizes by legal regulation the restriction of the practicing of these rights for a proper constitutional 
reason. (The present reguládon does not correspond with the constitutional obligation of the protection of life 
even if it resulted from the Constitution dial the right of life is absolute.) 
The substandal contents of a fundamental right according to the Consdtudon may not be restricted even 
by a law, and (he permitted restrictions are passible in the interest of another fundamental right, or constitutional 
objective according to the Constitutional Court (or possibly, because of another constitutional interest, or 
purpose of law according to some resolutions). Therefore, die right of life and dignity could not be restricted 
at all, since a) such rights either exist or not, therefore, restriction, or legally permitted death in some 
excepdonal cases, is a conceptual impossibility; b) the right of life and dignity is superior to any other right, 
etc. (if only because it is dieir precondition), so there is nothing in the name of wldch restriction would be 
possible. A possible answer to the reasoning of a) is that the question is not the possibility of restricting die 
specific individual right, but that of the legal institution. In the case b) as well the possibility of restriction exists 
in the protection of another life (lawful self-defense). 
20 Im. 307. 
21 Tlds is a very strange assumption. Numerous member-states of the USA support death penalty and permit 
euthanasia at die same time, while in Europe each western country prohibits deadi penalty (some of diem, since 
the past century) and recently more and more of them permit euthanasia to a restricted extent. 
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this—the impossibility of restricting the law—would be desirable, which has been declared 
as a constitutional obligation in the case of death penalty. 
All this, however, is only an indication of anti-euthanasia mood and not a conclusive 
argument against the liberalisation of euthanasia including proper guarantees. This part 
of the reasons in the decision on abortion, which part does not belong to the main line 
(i.e. it is said obiter), is not more than just an indication of mood because in this case not 
less than five separate opinions were elaborated, which means that the opinion of the 
judges differ regarding the reasons. We do not know what sorts of behaviours they regard 
as euthanasia, furthermore, if they wish, they can regard what they said about the sanctity 
of life in connection with death penalty as things not applicable to this case, since—as 
opposed to death penalty—, in this case the question can be the incurable patient 's right 
of self-determination. An interesting analogy to this case the recognition of the mother 's 
rights even against the right of life, consideration of the mother's rights as acceptable 
even against the embryo's right of life. At the same time, in accordance with decision 
No. 23/1990 of the Constitutional Court, Section 8 para. 2 of the Constitution (the 
substantial contents of a fundamental right may not be restricted) conflicts with Section 
54, which does not include the absolute protection of human life and dignity (and which 
does regard the deprival of life in a non-arbitrary process as excluded). In the case of 
death penalty, however, "the substantial contents of the fundamental right are not only 
restricted, but ... its total and irretrievable elimination is permitted." The Constitutional 
Court regarded Section 8 as applicable, and in this context it declared the right of life as 
unconditional. From the unconditional right to life declared regarding death penalty, 
however, it is not concluded that life is subject to the same judgement (protection) in the 
case of euthanasia since, on the one hand, the quality of life is different (in the shade of 
death) and, on the other hand, the restriction of the right of life results from the given 
individual 's own, personal disposal, which means that the right of life is opposed to the 
enforcement of an equivalent constitutional value (personality rights). 
The decision No. 23/1990 of the Constitutional Court on the abolishment of death 
penalty declares: 
Human life and human dignity constitute an inseparable unity, and are the greatest 
values preceding everything else. The right to life and human dignity is also an 
indivisible and inviolable fundamental right constituting an unity, which is the source 
and condition of numerous other fundamental rights.22 
They may make a distinction and may permit the enforcement of the right to self-
determination, referring to the fact that the right of life—even if it is an absolute right—is 
given a different meaning in the light of approaching and unavoidable death which will 
occur within a foreseeable short time, if the patient's condition involves suffering and 
22 ABH, 1990. 93. 
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hinders dignified life. This means that they do not attribute merely a biological sense to 
life, and they use a "legal concept of life" in the case of life close to death, i.e. they 
disregard the absolute protection of the otherwise evident "biological life". This is an 
effective solution if otherwise they insist on the unconditional character of the right to 
life.23 In this case, only life with dignity is unconditional, but otherwise life may be 
restricted in the interest of dignity (it is at least the subject of self-restriction and self-
determination). 
It is also possible that finally the tactical solution pursued in the case of abortion will 
be chosen. In that case life (even the embryo's life) was regarded as a fundamental right 
protected by the Constitution, but not in die sense of a civic (subjective) right, but as a 
right to be given objective protection. This means that die state has to make institutional 
rules of protection, i.e. it may not disregard the protection of the embryo's life and may 
not be indifferent to abortion at the general level, but has to prevent, moreover, to hinder 
it. The state, however, is not responsible for the birth of die individual embryos. Due to 
the reticence of the Constitution, it would have this kind of responsibility only if the 
legislator unambiguously regarded the embryo as a human being (in the legal sense, 
having legal capacity). Although this reasoning of the decision was apparently endorsed 
by each judge-promising to such a law a glory more than to the liberadon of slaves—and 
there was a separate opinion as well, according to which the embryo is also a human 
being, die Constitutional Court, at least so far, has not questioned the legislator's 
constitutional capacity to adopt a law which only serves for the protection of the 
embryo's objective (and not a subjective) right to life. 
A similar observation can be made in connection with euthanasia as well, i.e. it 
would not conflict with the Constitution and would not be inconsistent with the decisions 
made, if the Constitutional Court did not undertake the decision on the merits of the case 
and would leave it to the legislation, irrespective of the personal sympathies of the 
judges. The Constitutional Court can declare that it is both constitutional if the legislator 
does not protect the lives of incurable patients as an unconditional right, as well as the 
opposite. In the previous case (moreover, possibly in the second one as well), the Court 
would probably emphasise the necessity of die objective legal protection, i.e. that 
euthanasia (or certain sorts of it) may only take place for constitutional reasons, with 
sufficient guarantees. More precisely, this means that, according to the principal rule an 
incurable, dying person has the right to life. (It has to be determined whether tiiis means 
life lasting as long as possible, or the right to life involving the least possible pains. 
23 In his separate opinion appended to the decision No. 23/1990 of the Constitutional Court, Chief Justice 
Sólyom expressly refers to die fact that the Constitutional Court may interpret the right of life (i.e. it is not a 
biological faculty), and this interpretation "can influence the decision on other disputed cases of the disposal 
of life (e.g. abortion, euthanasia)". 
In tills separate opinion Chief Justice Sólyom indicates that the qualification of a right as inalienable and 
inviolable does not give any guidance in tlie question of the possibility of restriction — since it is the repetition 
of a specific solution of the 18th century as if it were a magic word. (Justice Lábady's opinion is just the 
opposite.) 
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Possibly in this case, too, the patient's decision prevails.24) Such a position could be 
made compatible with the standpoint of the Constitutional Court related to the neutrality 
of the state regarding religion and conscience (decision No. 4/1993). In case euthanasia 
is an ideological question, this solution would directly result from the demand for such 
a neutrality. Accordingly, "the state may not force anyone into a situation that would 
make the given person come into conflict with himself, i.e., which situation is 
incompatible with his substantial conviction determining his personality".25 In a given 
case, the fundamental conviction related to dignified life (the thought that the person does 
not wish to live in humiliating defencelessness) can be qualified as such a conviction, and 
in this case, the state may not force the given person to bear this offensive condition. 
(Naturally, the state may not force anyone to participate in euthanasia either against his 
conscience.) 
4. The preferred constitutional solution in the present state of medicine 
and social consciousness 
In our opinion, the present legal regulation of the acts falling within the scope of 
"euthanasia" are not conform with the constitutional requirements and with those of a 
constitutional state. The present regulation is defective, and not transparent furthermore, 
al though fundamentally it is against euthanasia, and expressly prohibits or punishes 
certain forms of it, it does not correspond with the constitutional obligation of the state 
related to the objective, and institutional protection of the right to life. This is because 
mos t of the relevant rules are missing. Eventually, the professional opinion in 
connection with the different forms of euthanasia cannot be avoided. The death 
24 In a given case this kind of handling of the question merely as a right is socially unacceptable in a society 
with limited resources, where—as in Hungary, too—public health care, which is almost f ree of charge for the 
patient, is decisive. Even if it is the question of rights or, in a given case, that of unconditional and 
unrestrictable rights, the law has to face the fact that the practising of the right of life may hurt other's rights 
of life, e.g. because there are not enough appliances for maintaining life functions. No matter how tragic the 
choice is, a public and surveyable system excluding abuses and financial differences, which recognizes die 
possibility of restricting the otherwise unrestrictable rights against another person's unrestrictable right, is better 
than a secret practice institutionalizing abuses. No matter how close we get in this way to the comparison of 
incomparable life qualities, (Iris is not identical with the eugenic principle of life quality of a reduced value, 
where the quality of life, and the condition of the ill person are compared to some absolute norm. As opposed 
to this, it is obviously impermissible (among other things, because it results in unacceptable pressures) that the 
terminally ill patient is disconnected from the sustentation equipment when a patient of a prospective status 
needs the sustentation equipment. In tire case of the decision following the generally determined principle, the 
general condition of health care could be taken into account. This again is not identical with the consideration 
of the costs of keeping a patient connected to the equipment. The following aspect, which is ediically 
impermissible in itself, although it is probably not anticonstitutional, is when certain treatments of incurable 
patients were excluded f rom the scope of obligation of the state related to (free) health care. Naturally, 
constitutionality does not render anything as acceptable in respect of medical ethics. 
25 ABH, 1993. 51. 
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occurring directly as a result of analgesics is a risk that seems to accompany, and be 
inseparable from, the doctor's practising of his obligations (relief of pain). This practice 
can conflict with the (arguably inviolable and unconditional) right to life, which requires 
objective protection, i.e. at least the exclusion of the possible abuses. This rule could 
only be of a statutory level, as all restrictions of fundamental rights. Such a rule is also 
in the doctor 's interest since it exempts him from any possible and subsequent calling 
to account, and possibly from the moral dilemma as well. The scarcity of health 
resources and the fact that this phenomenon becomes public will probably also urge the 
disconnection the life-sustaining equipment of terminally ill patients in a vegetative 
condition if only by referring to the superfluity of the treaünent, and professionally 
withdrawing the procedure from die taboo of euthanasia. In this case, a similar 
constitutional obligation comes into being. 
In addition, assuming that the forms of doctors' conducts classified as euthanasia 
in the case of incurable patients are in abstracto acceptable constitutionally, it is worth 
examining what sort of regulation is desirable from point of view of medical ethics, 
constitutional law, and from that of the constitutional state. These arguments are valid 
mainly if , as according to the Constitutional Court, the Constitution is neutral regarding 
euthanasia, i.e. the permission of procedures not hindering, and accelerating the 
occurrence of death is not prohibited constitutionally, nor constitutionally obligatory in 
itself, based on a relevant request, or in the case of a "proper" condition. (The latter 
view is not excluded even if the right to life would mean free disposal of life in the 
shade of death.) 
In addition to the prudential considerations mentioned before (the reasonable 
utilisation of health care facilities), in this situation, other constitutional arguments 
(ideological neutrality, the protection of individual choice and private autonomy) justify 
a certain legalisation of euthanasia for the legislator. 
It may only be statutory regulation (since a fundamental right may be restricted only 
by an act of parliament). Naturally, the legislator may also adopts a framework law, 
leaving regulation on the judgement of the professional practice, to the state of 
medicine, and to the professional guidelines, while the legislator fulfils its incumbent 
constitutional obligation by providing a procedural guarantees (e.g. what kind of a 
committee can make a decision, in the question of whether a condition can be regarded 
as incurable; what are the formal requirements of the validity of consent). Foreign 
practice and certain comments of the Hungarian Constitutional Court permit in general 
the determination of the degree of risk assumption in connection with life at a level 
lower than the statutory level, on the basis of the current scientific-professional 
aspects.26 This, however, is not identical with the present situation, since in this case 
the question is not a socially acceptable, general risk, but a decision related to the 
concrete life, i.e. the concrete restriction of a concrete right. But the statutory level is 
26 See (he case of (he German Kalkar nuclear power plant and Kilényi 's separate opinion referred to 
above. 
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also justified by the pragmatic medical aspect, notably, that if the decision in these 
questions would completely pass into the hands of the profession, it would surrender the 
professional standpoint to judicial supervision, which pursues non-professional aspects. 
And the legislator would not act correctly from the point of view social need to 
regulation if it imposes a casuistic determination of the permitted cases of euthanasia 
on a self-governing forum of the medical profession, since in such a decision social 
needs exceeding the competence of the medical profession and that of the health care 
organisations should be enforced (first of all, the interest of the potential, terminally ill 
citizens, and secondly, economic aspects, and cultural values). Legislation, however, has 
to ensure that decisions may not be made against the curing medical aspect (which 
usually means the impairment of the interest of the patient as well). 
In the legislation patient 's right to self-determination has to be enforced on 
constitutional reasons (not only because of the his personal right but, for example, on 
the ground of the freedom of thought and conscience); furthermore, the doctor 's 
freedom, and mainly his freedom of conscience, have to be respected, too. As far as the 
latter is concerned, the Constitutional Court has clearly explained this aspect in its 
decision in the abortion case. Although in pursuing a profession the professional 
prescriptions are to be observed, a doctor may not be obliged to provide euthanasia (but 
he is obliged to the unconditional relief of suffering), even if this were a permitted 
professional practice. This is because in this case there is no question of any absolute 
professional duty related to the elimination of direct life-endangerment, but rather the 
restriction of a constitutional right (freedom of conscience). 
As far as the patient's right to self-determination is concerned, in this case the law 
has to provide all the guarantees that ensure the prevalence of the real will. This partly 
means the inclusion into the law of the circumstances of the statement of the will, and 
the accurate rules related to the control of the given person's mental status, and partly 
the control of the medical decision-makers (teams of independent doctors, or of doctors 
and laymen, judicial approval). 
The precondition of the right to self-determination is that the patient 's right to 
information may be ensured. All this can be enforced as a general rule only if the 
conditions provided by the health care system necessary to it exist, which means 
that—if the legislator decides in this direction—it will be a quasi-constitutional obligation 
of the state to establish the institutional conditions. On the other h a n d - a n d also from 
pragmatic-prudential considerations—the establishment of the system can be only 
gradual. The condition of gradualness is even stronger in the most difficult case of 
euthanasia of the greatest practical significance, when the fate of a person incapable 
of stating his will has to be decided on. An especially cautious procedure has to be 
pursued in the case of persons incapable of expressing their will, when their will is 
"substi tuted", since in the given case the relative, or the person taking care of the 
patient can be an objectively an adversely interested party. Euthanasia may not take 
place at any event if any close relative protests against it. Due to the considerable 
uncertainty and the resulting difficulty of establishing the guarantees, it might be 
justified to exclude this form from liberalisation. 
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The living wiW helps with solving the problem of expressing will, in connection 
with which it is justified that the legislator gives all assistance for applicability (the 
elaboration of printed forms for stating the living will, making the procedure duty-free), 
actively offering the possibility of making such a "testament" on the occasions when the 
citizen gets in connection with state administration (e.g. the obtaining of the driving 
licence, joining the army), possibly during admission to a hospital, although the latter 
is worse and more depressing in all respects. 
So far we have not spoken of the sort of assistance in "good death" that will be 
permitted under the constitutional solution advanced here. As we have mentioned, 
various conducts labelled as "euthanasia" overlap each other, and it is very difficult to 
create legal concept encompassing all of them. A legislative or medical opinion 
according to which euthanasia—i.e. helping the patient into death—will be permitted from 
now on, can be interpreted as a indication for the society, and even for the medical 
profession. This is a message that should be avoided. Social and medical acceptance is 
facilitated by the approach—that is recommendable in respect of legal policy as well—, 
which permits very precisely determined behaviours, under very precisely specified and 
controllable, or compulsorily controlled conditions.28 By the formation of medical and 
social opinion the scope of these acts can be extended, but considerations of legal policy 
suggest that it would not be advisable to begin liberalisation with radical, active 
euthanasia, e.g. with the permission of requesting for killing out of mercy, for a relative 
incapable of expressing his will. 
It is worth examining separately what role can be given to persons other than doctors 
(replacing in part the judgement of the doctors) in such decisions.29 In spite of all 
similarities, the two cases have to be separated conceptually, because among other things 
the doctor's obligation of providing assistance is very special both in legal and moral 
respects. The situation of a non-terminally ill, but incurable patient can be settled by 
practical steps according to other principles and guarantees. It would be unacceptable 
either in principle, or in practice, if helping to a non-terminally ill patient into death, or 
27 The living will in itself does not exempt from the consideration of all the circumstances of the case. 
Occasionally, it is necessary to employ the "executor" of the living will, i.e. the curator expressing the assumed 
standpoint of a person incapable of stating his own will, or a permanent proxy. The "living will" should not 
be mistaken for die assumption of the risk of an operation. 
28 In the Dutch system, which gives reason for numerous misunderstandings, euthanasia is not legalized 
either, but in each case the act of the doctor performed upon request and under control is taken out of the scope 
of euthanasia during an investigation carried out subsequently. The fact that all this has been included among 
the rules of autopsy and burial has legal-technical reasons, notably, because the Dutch did not want to create 
a law on tiie permission of euthanasia. 
29 It is unavoidable for the jurist and for the legislator to face the question, when parents undertake the risk 
of imprisonment to free their child from suffering—not necessarily in a terminal condition. Naturally, the jurist 
is suspicious in all such cases, that possibly the parent's, or caring person's self-interests play a role in the 
deed. It is another question, however, to what extent this should be solved in the scope of medical ethics. 
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"mercy killing" committed by a relative (or a person in care) were also included in the 
scope of euthanasia.30 
Parallel to the growing chance of abuse, the irreversible nature of medical 
intervention, and the lower level of certainty of the patient's intention permission of 
euthanasia requires more sophisticated guarantees. If the guarantees and the enforcement 
together with the confidence in these institutions are missing, then the necessary 
foundation of such a law has not been established yet.31 
30 The constitutional chances of euthanasia in the narrow sense of the word (related to a terminally ill 
patient) are also worsened by the joint handling of the two cases, since in the case of a non-terminally ill 
patient, the argument related to the legal reinterpretation of life due to death that would occur at all events 
is dropped. 
31 It is a significant difference in the constitutional respect that the right of life is restricted due to the patient's 
current right of self-determination, or in the patient's interest (which is assuntable, or even corresponding with 
the facts of the case normatively specified by the law). 
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Tamás LÁBADY Constitutional Protection of Privacy 
(Protection of Marriage and the Family, 
Right to Privacy) 
Freedom of Marriage 
1. Art. 15 of the Constitution, the basic law of the Republic of Hungary, regulates the 
constitutionally protected objects of marriage and the family in Chapter I on General 
Provisions not in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights and Duties. Accordingly, "the 
Republic of Hungary shall protect the institutions of marriage and the family". 
Very early, in the first month of its functioning, the Constitutional Court has 
interpreted the place and substance of this provision in the basic law.' In its relevant 
decision the Court has stated that the rules on marriage and the family refer to 
fundamental rights and duties within the meaning of Art. S para. 2 of the Constitution. 
In the motivation to the decision it points out that Chapter XII of the Constitution 
contains separate provisions on fundamental rights and duties, but f rom the Constitution 
as a whole it may be concluded that such rights and duties are also contained in Chapter 
I on General Provisions. The highest forum for the protection of the Constitution has 
aff i rmed that "marriage and the family represent the most fundamental and most natural 
community" of citizens constituting the society. The rules governing relations of marriage 
and the family were already included by Art. 5 (e) of Act XI of 1987 among the 
1 Decision No. 4/1990. (III. 4.) of the Constitutional Court, Alkotmánybírósági Határozatok (Decisions of 
the Constitutional Court ) (hereinafter: ABH) 1990, 28-31. 
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fundamental rights and duties of citizens, but such treaunent also evidently follows from 
the provisions of Arts 15 and 67 of the Constitution. 
The insufficient regulation by the Constitution follows rather clearly from the 
message of the Constitutional Court, and not only for formal reasons, notably from the 
fact that the two objects of protection covered by a single article are regulated by the 
Constitution in a chapter other than that on fundamental rights and duties, but also on 
material grounds, since this provision of the Constitution fails to express the value-
content attached by the society to the two institutions and therefor making it 
indispensable for them to be regulated in the domain offundamental rights. Such is the 
case even if to Art. 15 as quoted we add para. 3 of Art. 67 in the chapter on fundamental 
rights, helds that the state responsibilities regarding the protection of the family must be 
laid down in separate provisions of law. 
2. The protection of marriage and family life as a sphere subject to constitutional 
coverage is enunciated at several places in the international instruments that are binding 
on Hungary in consequence of its accession thereto. The Preamble to Law-Decree No. 
7 of 19762 promulgating the international Convention done at New York on 10 
December 1962 recalls the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which spells out the 
following: 
"Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or 
religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal 
rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. Marriage shall be entered 
into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses", 
also laying down detailed rules on the freedom of marriage, the conditions for, the mode 
of and the procedure for contracting a marriage which may be determined by States. 
Art. 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, promulgated by 
Law-Decree No. 8 of 1976,3 provides the following: 
"1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State. 
2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family 
shall be recognized. 
3. No marriage shall be entered into without die free and full consent of the intending 
spouses. 
4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure 
equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses...during marriage and at its 
dissolution." ... 
Art. 10 of Law-Decree No. 9 of 1976 promulgating the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights4 states that 
2 Convention on Mutual Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage anil Registration of Marriages. 
3 The Covenant was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its 19th Session on 16 December 
1966. 
4 See note 3. 
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"1. The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, 
which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particulary for its 
establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent 
children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending 
spouses." 
Art. 16 of Law-Decree No. 10 of 1982 promulgating the Convention adopted at New 
York on 18 December 19795 provides the following: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and shall ensure, on 
a basic of equality of men and women: 
(a) the same right to enter into marriage; 
(b) the same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their 
free and full consent; 
(c) the same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution; ... 
(g) the same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a 
family name, a profession and an occupation; 
(h) the same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, 
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property... 
Finally, the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as 
Convention), promulgated by Act XXXI of 1993, spells out, in Art. 8, that everyone 
respect for his family life and, in Art. 12, ihat men and women of marriageable age have 
the right to marry and to found a family, in accordance with national laws governing the 
exercise of this right, whereas Art. 5 of the Seventh Additional Protocol states that the 
spouses must enjoy equal rights in civil-law matters and equal responsibility in relations 
inter se and with their children in respect of marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution. 
3. In view of the international instruments described above and considering the 
insufficient or incomplete regulation by the Constitution, one may conceptualize two 
extreme regulatory techniques in constitution-making. One, to which attention is called 
by, among others, István Kukorelli,6 would be a "plagiarism", in the strict sense of the 
word, of the international human rights conventions referred to above, notably the 
incorporation in the Constitution of the essential normative content of those conventions. 
The other is most strikingly embodied in the draft constitution "produced from the 
pocket" of Béla Pokol, who, like Frederick, the Prussian technocrat, would, as he had 
also postulated in (Prussian) Allgemeine Landrecht, want to dispense with both jurists and 
judges and therefore even to prohibit explanation of laws with respect to the further 
development of the Constitution's chapter on fundamental rights and would have the 
Constitutional Court inhibited from interpretation of law with a view to developing it, 
while failing to mention, with a light high-profile touch, the fundamental right to marry, 
5 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
6 Jogállam, 19994. No. 2. Körkérdés-válasz (Answers to an All-Round Inquiry), 32. 
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the freedom of marriage and constitutional protection for the family in his draft chapter 
on fundamental rights.7 
Between the two extreme approaches we, for our part, agree with András Bragyova8 
who maintains that the international treaties binding also on Hungary and the very 
international obligations of Hungary do not require either a "copying " by the Constitution 
of these international instruments or even direct observance thereof, but that it is 
inevitable for the constitution-maker to take those instruments into account. A prominent 
place among them is occupied by the European Convention on Human Rights, which to 
keep in view is also inescapably required by (lie future status of Hungary. 
For the present consideration, this dictates the need for the new Constitution to state 
its position, in an autonomous way, but having regard for the international conventions 
binding on Hungary, concerning the values of this sphere which, in addition to the 
protection accorded by the current Constitution to tnarriage and the family, it intends to 
emphasize, prefer and regulate as fundamental rights, with the corresponding 
responsibilities of the State. As regards the restrictive provisions thereon they should be 
raised to the constitutional level. This is especially difficult to do for the added reason 
that what is involved in respect of fundamental rights in general and in the sphere of 
marriage and the family in particular are moral values, ethical principles binding on the 
State, and conventional precepts. 
The first thesis of importance to be stated is consequently not only the impossibility 
for the Constitution to remain silent on the protection of marriage and the family as 
institution, but also the need for its chapter on fundamental rights to include provisions 
more essential than the current regulation. The minimum content of regulation, however, 
will have to be studied further. 
4. Since the Constitution refers to the institution of marriage merely as a subject-
matter of constitutional protection, the Constitutional Court had to spell out not only that 
to marry is a fundamental constitutional right, but also that the freedom of marriage is 
a subjective right guaranteed by the Constitution.9 In the absence of its formulation by 
the Constitution as a subjective right, this right had to be deduced by the Court from the 
general personal right and from freedom of self-determination, and the Court pointed out 
that the right to marry is also part of the right to self-determination. 
Such interpretation by the Constitutional Court of the Constitution in the way of 
developing the law is in keeping with the provisions of Art. 12 of the Convention as well 
as with the relevant rules of the other international legal instruments binding on Hungary. 
At the same time, it is stated in the Court decision that the freedom of marriage is not 
7 POKOL, В.: Egy ú j alkotmány felé, alkotmányjogi konferencia (Towards a New Constitution. Conference 
on Constitutional Law), 23 January 1994. cf. Jogállam... 
8 BRAGYOVA, A.: Az új alkotmány egy koncepciója (A Concept of lite New Constitution), KJK-MTA ÁJI, 
1995, 65-66. 
9 Decision No. 22/1992. (IV. 10.) of (lie Constitutional Court, ABH 1992, 122-125. See SÓLYOM, L.: Az 
emberi jogok az Alkotmánybíróság ú jabb gyakorlatában (Human Rights in the Latest Practice of the 
Constitutional Court), Világosság, 1993. No. 1. 
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of absolute character, namely it does not belong to the catalogue of absolute rights on 
which no restriction is admissible, but that this freedom falls under Art . 8 para. 2 of the 
Constitution, according to which only the essential content of a fundamental right is 
subject to no restriction. Consequently, the requirement of a permit of marriage as a 
procedural condition and the regulation of non-possession of such a permit as an 
impediment marriage affect the essential content of this fundamental right, amount to a 
disproportional restriction, yet are not inevitable. However, this does not rule out the 
possibility for the Constitution to regulate certain conditions for or impediments to 
marriage as a requirement for employment. Yet, in this case, any restriction of this 
constitutional right may only be subject to the exercise of a profession or the pursuit of 
a trade, and the constitutional right to the freedom of marriage m a y not be derogated 
from except in this context. This means that in the case of certain professions the right 
to marry, the freedom of marriage, and free choice of the person of the spouse may not 
be restricted except as a cause of incompatibility related to the particular professions. 
Similar restrictions may be justified by, e.g., special situations and circumstances 
attendant upon military life (or forms of life in other armed bodies). Thus, for instance, 
the requirement for persons in professional service with armed bodies to meet special 
conditions for marriage may be warranted by the extraordinary interest involved in the 
protection of state service secrets, as is known both from comparat ive law f rom 
traditions, or by higher moral standards, etc. Suchlike restrictions as a condition for the 
exercise of a particular profession may be endorsed by the Constitution. 
This set of conditions for restricting the fundamental constitutional right in question 
is thus in keeping with the generally worded requirement of the Convention, under which 
no restrictions on fundamental rights may be regarded as lawful other than those which 
"are necessary in a democratic society", notably so in the interests of national security 
or public safety, the economic welfare of the country, the prevention of disorder or crime, 
the protection or public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. 
The Constitutional Court has taken a similar position in annull ing the relevant 
sections of the Annex to Decree No. 1/1990. of the Minister of the Interior on the Service 
Regulation of the Police of the Republic of Hungary,10 stating that the section in 
question inadmissibly restricts the fundamental right to the f reedom of marriage by 
making marriage (and even partnership in life) between the persons covered subject to 
prior permit or consent. Since the restriction affects the essential content of the 
fundamental right, it is inadmissible under the Constitution. 
It is in this sense that the new Constitution will have to formulate a substantive norm 
for the limitability of the fundamental freedom of marriage. 
5. To formulate in the Constitution the freedom of marriage as a fundamental right, 
as a subjective right to be constitutionally enforceable, and to set out the conditions for 
the imposition of restrictions thereon are inevitable for die added reason that in compiling 
10 Decision No. 23/1993. (IV. 15.) of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1993, 4 3 8 - 4 4 0 . 
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the catalogue of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights it should be kept in mind 
that the State, by incorporating fundamental rights in the Constitution, determines a 
preferred order of moral values, i.e. codifies values as expressed by fundamental rights, 
that take precedence over other values. At the time when significant social movements 
are at work to erode marriage as an institution and as a living tradition, the most 
fundamental and the most natural community of man and woman, the constitution-maker 
must take a stand to the effect that preservation of this value is of paramount importance 
for all society, for the entire constitution-minded collectivity of Hungary. Therefore, in 
conformity with the wording of the major international human rights conventions, the 
Constitution must express that marriage between man and woman, or the freedom of 
marriage is to be defined as a fundamental right of men and women." 
This choice of value implies no discrimination against new (exceptional) forms of 
cohabitation emerging in our kulturkreis in recent decades. 
At the same time, the value of marriage as an institution is also independent of the 
significant changes that in recent years have taken place with respect to the durability of 
marriages. The great number of divorce and the strains in families and broken families 
cannot serve as a basic for eroding the institution of marriage, as has been pointed out 
by the Constitutional Court in its decision12 rejecting proposals which attacked several 
provisions of the Family Act. 
Thus it may be stated in summary that marriage is a natural institution, an intimate, 
mutually complementary relationship of man and wotnan, a framework for mutual support 
and care of spouses, a typical environnant of transmitting life and bringing children in 
a family. The .State must provide constitutional protection for Hie institution of marriage 
also in order for the latter to facilitate for the spouses the establishment of a family with 
common children as well,13 
Every person is free to choose a married or an unmarried state. Every man and 
every woman of marriageable age have the right to contact a marriage and to found a 
family without any discrimination. This must therefore be enunciated in the Constitution. 
6. At the same time, man and woman are united in body and soul not only 
according to St. Paul, but also under Art. 24 of our Family Act providing that husband 
and wife owe fidelity to each other and are under duty to assist and care for each other. 
Consequently, in a natural complementarity between them, they enjoy the same dignity 
and full equality of rights in married life. Although it is stated in Art. 66 para. 1 of the 
current Constitution that "the Republic of Hungary shall guarantee the equality of men 
and women in respect of all civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural 
rights", such equality should be given special emphasis with regard to the rights and 
duties of spouses. 
11 This interpretation has been reaffirmed by the European Court of Human Rights. Rees Judgement of 17 
October 1986, Series A. (1987) 19. 
12 Decision No. 1995/B/1990 of the Constitutional Court. ABH 1993, 515 and 520. 
13 Decision No. 14/1995. (III. 13.) of the Constitutional Court. ABH of March 1995, 99-101. 
Constitutional Protection of Privacy 29 
Several decisions of the Constitutional Court have addressed the constitutional issue 
of equal rights of the spouses. In the absence of appropriate constitutional provisions the 
Court has deduced equality, not from the essence of marriage, but from Art. 66 para. 1 
of the Constitution as quoted, although the special rule on non-discrimination with respect 
to widow's pension,14 conjugal community of property15 and other legal relationships 
of the spouses concerning social insurance16 follows or can be deduced from the essence 
of marriage rather than from other provisions prohibiting discrimination. Seen in this 
context, the equality rule must also be codified, in conformity with international 
instruments, in connection with the fundamental freedom of marriage. 
7. Given the Constitution's choice of value, there is no need to accord special 
constitutional protection to life-partnership and to cohabitation of homosexuals. While 
upholding and supporting the traditional institution of marriage, the Constitution does 
not rule out such new legal forms as are necessary for die recognition and protection 
of newphenimens. In evolving these legal institutions the persons concerned have a 
right, not to make use of the same institution (of marriage), but to be treated, in 
accordance with the relevant constitutional requirement, as persons enjoying equal rights 
and endowed with equal dignity, namely to have their respective standpoints considered 
with equal foresight, attention, impartiality and fairness.17 And a regulation on the 
general prohibition of discrimination is sufficient to have this guaranteed by the 
Constitution. 
The Right to Found a Family and Protection of the Family 
1. The spouses have the inalienable right to found a family and to determine the spacing 
and number of child-births. Marriage being a relationship typically destined for giving 
birth to common children and bringing them up in a family, the State should provide 
constitutional protection for the institution of marriage also with to assisting spouses in 
founding a family. Consequently the family is based primarily but not exclusively on 
marriage, is a primary and natural community which generally enjoys priority over the 
State and any other community. As regards its substance, the constitutional right to a 
family is a guarantee for an institution,18 namely it is not one of the classical freedoms, 
but the relevant provision of the Constitution is intended to assure the maintenance of 
and preferential treatment for the family as an institution. For this very reason and 
having regard for the international instruments analyzed above, the constitution-maker 
will have to ensure inclusion of this institution in the chapter on fundamental rights and 
its special protection by the Constitution also in fiiture. 
14 Decision No. 10/1990. (IV. 27.) of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1990, 50-53. 
15 Decision No. 589/B/199I of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1991, 5 4 8 - 5 4 9 . 
16 Decision No. 1621/E/1992 of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1993, 765-766 . 
17 Decision No. 14/1995. (III. 13.) of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1995, 100. 
18 B R A G Y O V A : op. cil. note 69. 
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The family is not merely a legal, social and economic unit, but largely a community 
of solidarity which is more apt than anything else to teach and transmit cultural, ethical, 
social, intellectual and ideological values indispensable for the welfare and development 
of society. It is with these values kept in view that the Constitution must provide a guide 
to the legislature in seeking and helping to strengthen the unity and stability of the family. 
Families have a right to count on an appropriate family policy of the State, without discri-
mination of any kind, in legal, economic, social and financial fields. In particular, it is the 
so-called large families that have a right to a legal regulation responsive to their needs. 
The constitutional rules on the protection of the family must therefore be formulated 
as a right, irrespective of the fact that what we have here are not rights of the individual, 
but so-called collective rights. Also, as it follows from what has gone before, the relevant 
regulation by the Constitution indisputably belongs to the chapter on fundamental rights, 
because it affects the group of constitutional rights which determine the social standing 
of individuals. 
2. The catalogue of the rights of the child and of parents is of concern to constitutional 
regulation regarding the family. With respect to the former, the New York Convention on 
the Rights of the Child makes it mandatory for legislation to ensure that "the best interests 
of the child shall be the paramount consideration".19 Since the related provisions of our 
Constitution in force are insufficient, they need supplementing in this sense. 
Under Art. 16 of the Constitution, 
"the Republic of Hungary shall devote a particular measure of care to youth's 
security of existence, education and training and shall protect their interests", whereas 
Art. 67 (1) provides that 
"all children in the Republic of Hungary shall be entitled to such protection by the 
family, the State and society as is required for their appropriate bodily, intellectual 
and moral development". 
Finally, under Art. 67 (3), 
"the state responsibilities regarding the situation and protection of the family and 
youth shall be laid down in separate provisions of law". 
3. The rights of the child have been the concern of several Constitutional Court 
decision in connection with the protection of the family under the Constitution in force. 
It should be emphasized that it was in this context that as early as spring of 1990 the 
Constitutional Court devised the formula of positive discrimination,20 which, otherwise 
attacked in literature,2' was to become a general technique used by the Court for the 
constitutional protection of the family. In its relevant decision the Court has stated that 
19 Act LXIV of 1991 promulgating the Convention on the Rights of the Child, done at New York on 20 
November 1989. 
20 Decision No. 9/1990. (IV. 25.) of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1990, 46, and 48-49. 
21 ROMÁN, L .: A nyugdíjjogosulttá válás mint a munkáltatói felmondás jogcíme jogállami szempontból 
(Becoming Eligible for Pension as a Ground for Termination of Employment by the Employer in the Context 
of a Constitutional Stale), Magyar Jog 1993, 150. 
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unless a social goal not contrary to the Constitution or a constitutional right can be 
achived parallel to implementation of constitutional equality as narrowly conceived, 
positive discrimination cannot be deemed to be unconstitutional. It is non-discrimination 
in the broader sense, namely as to equal dignity, and the positive fundamental rights as 
embodied in the Constitution that are to be seen as placing limits on positive 
discrimination. Although social equality as a goal and as a social interest may have 
priority over individual interests, it may never take precedence over the constitutional 
rights of the individual. 
In that decision the Constitutional Court has established the constitutionality of lax 
relief for disadvantaged families, pointing out that non-discrimination as stated in Art. 
70/A para. 1 of the Constitution does not mean prohibition also of all kinds of 
discrimination, thus allowing discrimination ultimately aimed at a greater measure of 
social equality. The Court has expounded these same principles in connection with the 
care allowance due to fosterparents,22 referring to the constitutionally guaranteed 
protection of the child by the family and the State, to children's constitutional right to 
appropriate care and to the right to social security. It is with this same line of reasoning 
that the Court has rejected a proposal objecting to the provisions on entitlement to a 
family allowance under the rule of inadmissible discrimination,23 arguing that the 
contested provisions are precisely intended, in consideration of the constitutional precepts 
of family protection, to create equality of opportunity for children and larger families. 
In several other decisions the Constitutional Court has given effect to the 
constitutional provisions on family protection in respect of children brought up in or 
outside a family. The protection as expressed in those decisions is mainly related to the 
social security of families, but the entitlements involved are formulated by the decisions 
as deriving from a positive, subjective right. The Court has also pointed out that the 
concrete forms of care for children and families, the intensity of family protection, or its 
degree to be determined by specific measures cannot be deduced from the basic law.24 
Therefore it would be practicable for the new Constitution to lay down the general rule 
that the State may not lower the attained level of family protection and care for the child. 
In connection with the constitutional provisions establishing state objectives and state 
responsibilities with respect to the protection of the environment and nature, the 
Constitutional Court has spelled out that the State may not lower the level of protection 
guaranteed by law for nature except when such measure is inevitable for the 
implementation of other fundamental rights or constitutional values. Even in that case, 
however, the extent of reduction in the level of protection may not be disproportional to 
the objective pursued.25 Obviously enough, application of this same technique with 
respect to the protection of youth, children and the family is still more justified and 
22 Decision No. 657/B/1990 of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1990, 333-336. 
23 Decision No. 1292/B/1990 of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1991, 566-568. 
24 Decision No. 422/В/ 1991 of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1992, 471-473. 
25 Decision No. 28/1994. (V. 20.) of the Constitutional Court, A B H 1994, 134-135. 
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necessary. While the basic law cannot determine the social, financial and other 
requirements of concrete state care for families, youth and children, it can, and the new 
Constitution must, provide that the level of protection secured by law may not be 
constitutionally lowered except in accordance with the constitutional conditions for 
constitutional restrictions on fundamental rights. 
This also applies to other entitlements based on one ' s subjective right which 
legislation has granted as benefits for children living in a family and, in view of the 
number of children, for purposes of improving the living conditions of large families. 
Thus, recognition of the period of service allowed for the upbringing of children for 
purposes of social insurance benefits,26 the state guarantee for housing support on 
account of children,27 and all statutory provisions under which the rights of the child 
must be taken into account in connection with the use of dwelling the spouses,28 their 
obligation of maintenance29 and other obligations must be regarded as providing 
guidance in this respect. 
4. The Family Act was amended in 199530 in observance of the basic provisions of 
the New York Convention on the Rights of the Child. The amendment was guided by the 
principle that the interests of the child must be the paramount consideration vis-à-vis the 
parental rights of either parent. The most important basic principle of this international 
instrument, which is binding on Hungary as well, must also be incorporated in the 
Constitution. 
For that matter, this approach has already been expressed in some decisions handed 
down by the Constitutional Court on the basis of the current Constitution. Noteworthy 
among the related judgements are the recognition by the Court of the child's 
constitutional right to ascertainment of its lineage" which the Court has deduced from 
the general personal right, the right to the free development of personality, viz. the right 
to the freedom of self-determination. Accordingly, the right to one's identity and the rig lu 
to self-determination include everyone's most personal right to ascertain, dispute or 
establish his parentelic status and to ensure that such status is not challenged by anyone 
other than those directly concerned in his blood relationship. Also, in other aspects, the 
Constitutional Court has emphasized the primacy of the child's interests as a matter of 
principle in connection with the custody of the child,32 the execution of related court 
orders," the application of artificial inseminationetc. 
26 Decision No. 1009/B/1991 of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1992, 479-480. 
27 Constitutional Court Decision No. 254/D/1991 (ABH 1991, 802-804) and No. 581/B/1990 (ABH 1992, 
645-647). 
28 Decision No. 2299/B/1991 of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1992, 570-573. 
29 Decision No. 20/1994. (IV. 16.) of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1994, 106-113. 
30 Act XXI of 1995 amending Act IV of 1952 on Marriage, Family and Guardianship. 
31 Decision No. 57/1991. (XI. 8.) of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1991, 272-287. 
32 Decision No. 995/B/1990 of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1993, 520 and 524-526. 
33 Decision No. 16/1992. (III. 30.) of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1992, 101-103. 
34 Decision No. 750/B/1990 of the Constitutional Court ABH 1901 728-779 
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In view of the foregoing it is necessary, in the course of drafting the new 
Constitution, to have the interests of the child formulated as the paramount consideration, 
possibly as a right, in family relations among the rules governing family protection. 
5. Similarly, determination of the fundamental parental rights belongs to the category 
of family protection under the Constitution. In this respect the current Constitution 
contains provisions only in Ar t 66 p a r a 2 on support for and protection of mothers and 
in Art. 67 para. 2 on parent's rights concerning the education of their children. 
Indeed, education is in the focus of parental rights to be formulated as a subjective 
right, as parents have an original, primary and inalienable right to the education of their 
children. For this reason the State must recognize parents as the primary educators of 
their children. Parents are entided to educate their children in accordance with their 
moral and ideological convictions, inclusive of the cultural traditions of the family and 
of the social environment which brings influence to bear on the life of the whole family. 
Parents are free to choose the type of school to provide instruction or training for their 
children or other institution deemed fit to educate their children in accordance with their 
conviction. In doing so they naturally must observe the statutory requirements of the State 
regarding compulsory education. 
It is important to emphasize that in principle parents enjoy parental rights with 
respect to children born in or out of wedlock as well as in case of separation and 
divorce. These rights may not be subject to restrictions other than those required by the 
primary interests of the child. 
6. In establishing the constitutional rights of the family, this natural, basic and 
universal community, one should not ignore the fact that the Human Rights Court of 
Strasbourg gives an autonomous interpretation of the category of family under the 
Convention. Accordingly, protection is afforded not only for de jure family life, but also 
for de facto family life in a sociological sense.35 However, this applies only to families 
as traditionally understood, namely to the cohabilitation of man and woman as well as 
children (and eventually to the living together of multigenerational families), and not to 
non-traditional forms of cohabitation (e.g. of homosexuals).3'' Therefore, as has been 
indicated earlier, these special forms of cohabitation need not be covered by special 
constitutional provisions in addition to those on non-discrimination. 
Protection of Privacy (Some Constitutional Rights Relative to the Private 
Sphere) 
1. In discussing the constitutional regulation of fundamental rights relating to the 
protection of privacy it should be noted at the outset that the constitution-maker would 
be mistaken to seek a full-scale and an exclusive regulation of rights concerning the 
35 See Marckx v. Belgium, Series A, No. 31. 
36 See 9369/1981. X. and Y. v. UK. Decisions and Reports, No. 32, 220. 
34 Tamás Lábady 
protection of the private sphere. The proposals for a closed catalogue of fundamental 
rights37 disregard continuous changes in rights relating to the protection of privacy or 
in personal rights and the emergence of new personal rights and freedoms with the 
development of societies and science (technology) which should be taken into con-
sideration by a constitutional State. Therefore, on this score too, we agree with 
Bragyova's view38 that what is to be regarded as a constitutional value is precisely the 
open-ended nature of fundamental rights. 
Nor can we support proposals under which such newly emergent personal rights, 
particularly the "curio" rights are to be covered by the chapter on fundamental rights. 
Thus we are definitely against Gábor Kardos's suggestion that the right to the dignity of 
death, or euthanasia and the right of all women incapable of natural conception to 
artificial insemination should be included in the Constitution.3 ' 
Again, one cannot refuse to consider on this score that the forums of Strasbourg give 
a wider interpretation of the protection of privacy than of other concepts prevailing in the 
Anglo-Saxon and continental legal systems and that this practice applies only partially 
to traditional concept like "privacy" and "protection from publicity".40 This same 
statement holds for the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. Therefore the 
constitution-maker should necessarily bear in mind that the right to the inviolability of 
privacy and the different personal rights will be involved by the legal practice of the 
Constitutional Court. 
2. This question is only covered by Art. 59 para. 1 of the Constitution, under which 
"everyone in the Republic of Hungary shall have the right to good reputation, the 
inviolability of the privacy of his home and correspondence, and the protection of 
personal data", 
hereas Art. 8 (1) of the Convention provides that everyone must have the right to 
respect for his privacy, home and correspondence. Since a separate study of 
questions concerning the protection of secrets and data is in the process of 
preparation41, the related problems will not be treated here. 
The Constitutional Court has deduced the right to privacy from the absolute right to 
human dignity,42 stressing that it considers this right as a variant of the so-called general 
personality right, the different aspects of which include the right to the free development 
of personality, the right to the freedom of self-determination, the. general freedom of 
action and the right to privacy. Nevertheless, the right to privacy is naturally not an 
absolute right free from restrictions, but falls under Art. 8 para. 2 of the Constitution, 
37 See Béla Pokol's draft constitution. 
38 BRAGYOVA: op. cil. 66. 
39 Jogállam, 1994, No. 2, 12. 
40 von DIJK, P.—van HCX)F, G. J. H: Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Klawer, 1990, 368-378. 
41 MAJTÉNYI, L.: Az adatvédelem és az információ szalxtdsága az Alkotmányban (kézirat). [Data Protection 
and the Freedom of Information in the Constitution (Manuscript)). 
42 Decision No. 8/1990. (IV. 23.) of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1990, 44-45. 
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meaning that a fundamental right is free from restrictions only in respect of its essential 
content. The constitutional substance of this fundamental right has been defined by the 
Constitutional Court as lying in the rights to privacy, to self-realization, to the protection 
of autonomy, or the private sphere.43 The Court has determined its liinitability in the 
context of protection of public morale and the holding of public office,44 and, in a 
different phrasing, it has stated that the protection of privacy is of limited scope in the 
case of persons exercising public authority, who as participants in public life cannot 
invoke protection of privacy with respect to the performance of such functions. This 
applies to other personal rights (good reputation, honour, etc.) as well.45 
We maintain that the new Constitution now in the making must perforce express this 
minimum of protection for the private sphere, but it probably cannot do much more than 
that. Consequently the right to the private sphere mist be specified by the Constitution as 
a fundamental subjective right, because the right to the freedom of privacy is a fundamental 
right to protection of the individual's autonomy, one that emanates from the inherent dignity 
of man. In addition to this definition of substance, the Constitution should formulate the 
rules on liinitability in the context of public morale and participation in public life. 
3. The right to the privacy of correspondence, specifically mentioned in the 
Convention, but not in the current Constitution of Hungary, has been interpreted and 
given protection by the Constitutional Court as an organic part of the fundamental right 
to private secrets.46 In other aspect the Court has referred to the rights of convicts to 
correspondence and to the privacy of correspondence,47 but has stated that those rights 
have been modified by changes in the relevant provisions of law, which made them 
subject to requirements essentially expressed in the practice of the forums of Stasbourg 
applying the Convention. 
The right to the privacy of correspondence is a classical fundamental right, and, 
although it undoubtedly forms part of die right to private secrets, its inclusions in the 
Constitution as a separate right and of its exceptional liinitability by law would be 
warranted, if for no other reason than that of bringing it into line with Art. 8 para. 1 of 
the Convention. 
4. It remains justified for the right to good reputation and the right to the privacy of 
the home as specified in the current Constitution to be covered by the new Constitution 
as well, but these rights should be widened to include the right to honour, or integrity 
and respectability in society's judgement among the classical fundamental rights. One 
may also suggest a wording that will cover the general personal right and the general 
right to the free development of personality, and their constitutional limitability could be 
governed by that of the right to privacy. 
43 Decision No. 56/1994. (XI. 10.) of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1994, 314. 
44 Decision No. 20/1990. (X. 4.) of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1990, 67 and 71. 
45 Decision No. 36/1994. (VI. 24.) of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1994, 219-220. 
46 Decision No. 634/B/1991 of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1993, 558-560 . 
47 Decision No. 710/B/1990 of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1993, 801-802 . 
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Attila RÁCZ The Binding Force of Legal Rules — their 
Validity, Effectiveness and Applicability 
Legal rules are general rules of conduct governing social relations. Within the sphere of 
state jurisdiction they are binding on all and their observance can be enforced even by 
public power. 
The directly binding force on all is a fundamental attribute of legal rules. That is why 
under Hungarian law "legal rules" only include legally relevant norms with such binding 
force. Nevertheless, their binding force may differ by phases of the "l ife" of legal rules. 
And this issue is one that deserves special attention, both as a whole and mainly in some 
of its aspects, from the angle of constitutional law as well. 
/ 
A course of conduct conforming to the legal rules can only be expected to be pursued 
if the persons affected are familiar with those rules. On die other hand, it is true that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse from legal prejudice (ignorantia iuris neminem 
excusat), which is a fundamental principle of all legal systems', but this principle can 
only be accepted, along with recognizing the requirement of legal security, if the subjects 
at law are in a position to become familiar with the law in advance. It is these factors 
that account for solutions which regard publications of legal rules as an organic part of 
legislation. Without it, a legal rule does not even come into existence and cannot be 
1 See KELSEN, H.: General Theory of Law and Stale, Harvard University Press, Cambridge — 
Massachusetts, 1946, 44. 
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called one. Legislation is completed, a legal rule becomes valid, at least, formally, only 
upon promulgation. Under the current Hungarian law, too, legal rules become valid when 
those national in scope are promulgated in Magyar Közlöny (Hungarian Gazette) and the 
decrees of local self-governments in their official gazettes or in the locally customary 
manner as determined by the organizational and operational statutes of the self-
governments concerned.2 
Legal rules come into existence as valid ones by their promulgation. The coming into 
existence of legal rules or their provisions as valid ones are presumed until such time as 
the competent organ has withdrawn or annulled them retroactively to the day of promul-
gation. The power to withdraw legislative provisions is conferred by Hungarian law on 
the law-making organ, while it is the Constitutional Court which is competent to annul 
them because of some defect in the essentials of validity, chiefly because of 
unconstitutionality. Among others, when the law-making organ had no constitutional 
power to make law or exceeded its power by, e.g. adopting a legal rule violating the 
Constitution or a legal rule of a higher hierarchical order. The Constitutional Court is 
empowered to annul a legal rule or a provision thereof even in case of an apparently 
"simple violation of law", too, because the hierarchical order of legal rules is determined, 
practically without exception, by the Constitution itself, i.e. the Constitution contains a 
prohibition on issuance of legal rules contrary to those of a higher level. But on the other 
hand, violation of the rules of law-making р а к е du re does not necessarily provide a basis 
for annulment by the Constitutional Court, except in case of violation of a rule of law-
making procedure as laid down in the Constitution. In a legal sense, however, the 
Constitutional Court has a wider scope of action when, for instance, it is also empowered 
to supervise the legality of a self-government decree at the initiative of the head of the 
county (metropolitan) deconcentrated office of state administration. 
A legal rule becomes valid upon promulgation, nevertheless, this means no more than 
some sort of a "prae-state"5 of actual validity, since mere promulgation gives it no 
generally binding force. A legal rule becoming valid by promulgation carries with it 
nothing more than certain preliminary obligations or desiderata, primarily the obligation 
of the competent organ to issue the enforcement decree, where necessary, prior to its 
entry into force, for, under Art. 12 para. 4 of Act XI of 1087 on Law-making legal rules 
and their enforcement decrees must be put into force at the same time. And as regards 
2 Ii will be merely noted that under the current Hungarian law "promulgation" of laws and regulations is 
understood to mean publication in any of the forms mentioned. Historically and in international comparison, 
however, promulgation of legislative provisions, especially laws, was often far from meaning, or did not mean 
simply, publication in one form or another. For historical development in Hungary, see KOVÁCS, I.: Magyar 
Államjog. It. kötet. Egyetemi jegyzet. (Hungarian Stale Law. Volume II) Szeged, 1978, 183 et seq. 
3 For more detail and for different conceptions about the validity of laws and regulations, see PESCHKA, 
V.: A jogszaMlyok elmélete (A Theory of Legal Rules), Akadémiai Kiadó. Budapest, 1979, 214, 177 et seq. Also 
see: VARGA, CS.: A jag és érvényessege (Law and Its Validity), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1986, No. 1; TAMÁS, 
A.: Validity of Law and the Time Factor, ARS? Rechtsgeltung, 1986, No. 27; POKOL, В.: A jog érvényessége 
(Validity of Law), Magyar Jog, 1994, No. 2. 
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the "desiderata" outside the ambit of positive law, it is hardly questionable that during 
the period between promulgation and entry into force, no other legal rule of the same or, 
still less, a lower level contrary to the one in question must be issued without the latter 's 
formal amendment True, during the period between promulgation and entry into force 
(vacatio legis), concrete legal relationships may be created, altered and terminated on the 
basis of a previous legislative provision still in force in order to ensure legal security, but 
application of a similar principle in respect of legislation might amount to defiance of the 
legislator's will and to "abuse of right" as well. 
II 
During the time of its effectiveness, from the day of entry into force to the day of losing 
effect, a legal rule is generally binding in principle. During that period there may be 
created, altered and terminated concrete legal relationships on the basis of the legal rule 
in question. 
1. In Hungary, under Art. 12 para. 1 of the Act on Law-making, any legal rule must 
specify the day on which it enters into force. (Thus, as against historical examples and 
the solutions of some other countries, there is no possibility in Hungary for legal rules 
to go into effect, by virtue of a general provision of law, on the day of promulgation or 
at another date as from that day.) Certain provisions of legal rules may take effect at 
different dates, too. What is essential is obviously the need to avoid uncertainty as to the 
day from which the different provisions come generally binding. The practical 
arrangements under which the date of entry into force is determined somewhat differently 
from the provisions of the Act on Law-making should also be seen in this context. For 
instance, the arrangement under which a legal rule leaves it to another legal rule to 
determine the date for its entry into force or that of some of its provisions which is used 
with relative frequency. No serious objection may be made to this procedure if the power 
to specify the date of entry into force is vested in the same law-making organ. By 
contrast, authorization of another organ is apt to leave room for defiance of the 
legislator's real intention and for "suspension" of the enforcement of the particular legal 
regulation, too. 
As is provided for in the Act on Law-making, the date of entry into force must be 
determined in such a way as to allow sufficient time for preparations for application. In 
Decision No. 28/1992. (IV. 30.) the Constitutional Court, too, considered this to be a 
fundamental requirement of a law-governed state, one ensuing from ArL 2 para. 1 of the 
Constitution, and added that in determining the period of preparations it is necessary to 
take into account the time realistically needed both by the law enforcement authorities 
and by natural and juristic persons affected by the given legal regulation to study its 
provisions and to prepare for voluntary compliance (e.g. purchase of technical equipment, 
adoption of organizational measures). Evidently enough, the fiction that the law is 
familiar to all cannot operate otherwise, for the possibility of acquaintance with the law 
has thus been created. Thereupon may follow the precept that ignorance of the law is no 
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excuse from legal prejudice, which may serve as a basis for legal responsibility as well. 
For these reasons and in accordance with Art. 8 of Decree No. 12/1987. (XII. 29.) of the 
Minister of Justice on Drafting of legal rules, one cannot but exceptionally declare that 
legal rules enter into force on the day of promulgation. In conformity with the Cons-
titutional Court decision cited above, it is impossible to maintain the practice,4 otherwise 
followed on a mass scale until that decision, that the law-making organs put into force 
legal rules on the day of promulgation, without being compelled by any important social 
interest that cannot be affirmed in any other way. To do so is possible only in cases 
where the intention of the State to achieve a constitutional goal could be realized either 
because of the nature of the regulated set of social relations or those of historical 
circumstances or any other reason, exclusively in a way of putting into force the legal 
rule on the day of promulgation, because, for instance, previous acquaintance with the 
substance of regulation might generate social motions likely to frustrate the goal pursued 
by the given regulation. Of course, antedating Magyar Közlöny (Hungarian Gazette) or 
other official journal is ruled out in this case as well. According to Constitutional Court 
decision No. 25/1992. (IV. 30.), it is the Government's responsibility to ensure that the 
official journal is delivered both to the subscribers and to the news distributors for the 
public by or on the day, at the latest, as indicated on Hungarian Gazette. 
2. The effectiveness of legal rules may terminate in various ways: a legal rule is either 
abrogated or loses effect on the basis of legal regulation or its effect is terminated by the 
emergence of other situations of law. 
a) In accordance with the Act on Law-making a legal rule or a provision thereof 
loses effect in Hungary: 
— If it is abrogated by another legal rule (issued by the competent law-making organ), 
naturally with effect from a specified date. Given die requirement of legal security, the 
abrogating legal rule must name concretely die legal rule which is abrogated. For 
instance, inclusion of a general clause to die effect that all earlier legal rules, whether of 
the same or a lower hierarchical order, contrary to the given legal rule must become 
ineffective is insufficient. It is equally evident that the earlier legal rule does not become 
effective again upon the subsequent abrogation of the abrogating legal rule. 
— Furthermore, under the Act on Law-making, a legal rule loses effect upon the 
expiration of the period specified by it. 
— In accordance with Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court, a legal rule 
becomes ineffective if the Constitutional Court annuls it widi effect from a specified date. 
The date of annulation is generally, but depending on the particular case, die day on 
which die relevant Constitutional Court decision is published (annulation ex nunc), but 
4 According to some studies, more than half the laws and regulations had been put into force on the day of 
promulgation before this decision of the Constitutional Court was handed down. From May 1992 the number 
of such laws and regulations fell to one half and one-third of the previous figure, but started to increase again 
from 1993. (See BARTFAI, ZS.: A jogszabályok kihirdetése es hatálybalépése (Promulgation and Entry into 
Force of Legal Rules), Magyar Közigazgatái, 1995. No. 2, 112. 
Tlie Binding Force of Legal Rules their Validity, Effectiveness and Applicability 4 1 
it may also be an earlier day, e.g. the day of entry into force (ex tunc) or a later date (pro 
futuro). 
b) When a legal rule is expressly abrogated on the basis of a legal provision or it 
loses effect, there is no doubt about the termination of its effect in relation to t ime. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of such a legal provision, there is more or less justification 
for raising the question of whether or not the emergence of other situations of law results 
in the termination of effectiveness of legal rules, too. In such situations, however, a 
position can only be taken in view of the requirements of constitutionality and legality 
as well as that of the law-govemed state [primarily as enunciated in decision N o . 
11/1991. (III. 29.) and later decisions of the Constitutional Court). Let us take a look at 
the situations of law which, in the legal setting currently prevailing in Hungary, deserve 
special attention in this context.5 
— The question may arise, for instance, of whether legal rules lose effect upon the 
abolition of the organ which adopted them. .Since there is no strong argument, ei ther 
theoretical or practical, to support the need for reorganizations of or changes in the state 
organization to automatically affect the effectiveness of ;my group of laws and regulations 
forming part of the unified legal system, one might say that, under the arrangement 
generally prevailing throughout the world, the legal rules of the abolished law-making 
organ remain in force in the absence of a separate abrogating provision of law. (In 
Hungary the abolition of the Presidential Council in 1989, for instance, did not in itself 
entail discontinuation in force of the law-decrees adopted by the organ.) The only 
exception may be a change in the system of local self-governments resulting from, e.g. 
establishment of a new commune or unification of communes. In such a case it is 
obvious that the earlier local self-government decrees affecting another area of 
jurisdiction lose effect in the new self-government unit, or that it is necessary to take a 
decision in the new unit on the question whether to keep diem in force or not. 
— Practically there is no evidence anywhere, nor is it disputed today, that 
constitutional changes did not and do not by diemselves affect the effectiveness of l aws 
and regulations issued on the enforcement of earlier constitutional provisions. In the 
absence of constitutional provisions expressly referring to direct abolition of certain legal 
institutions, such laws and regulations generally remain in force until diey lose effect by 
virtue of a separate provision of law and, more recently, perhaps precisely on the basis 
of decisions of constitutional courus establishing unconstitutionality.6 A different solution 
would result in a great measure of legal uncertainty, which, in the case of a new 
5 For a discussion of additional situations, too, see SZAMEL, l..: A jogforrások (Tlie Sources of Law), 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1958, 138 et seq.; SÁRI, J.: A jogalkotás és jogforrási rendszer 
az alkotmánybírósági határozatokban: az Alkotmány "láthatóvá tétele" (Law-Making and the System of Sources 
of Law in Constitutional Court Decisions: Making the Constitution "Visible"), Magyar Közigazgatás, 1994, No. 
8, 461 et seq. 
6 It should be noted that a somewhat different theoretical view is held by, e.g., TAKÁCS, A. in his s tudy 
entitled Gondolatkörök a normatív alkotmányról (Spheres of Thought on a Normative Constitution), Társadalmi 
Szemle, 1991, Nos 8 - 9 , 52 et seq. 
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constitution, would ultimately have a paralysing effect in all everyday situations calling 
for legal regulation. This danger is much smaller, however, when not the Constitution or 
its provisions, but a lower-level legal rule or a provision thereof is abrogated (even by 
a mere modification of its wording) and the question arises whether or not this is coupled 
with discontinuation in force of the related enforcement regulations. This and the 
consideration that an enforcement regulation without the basic regulation is but an 
incomplete one may duly substantiate the approach under which the relevant enforcement 
regulation loses effect with the abrogation of the basic regulation or a provision thereof 
or with modifications in its original wording. Having regard even to the fact that such 
enforcement regulations have been specifically annulled by the Constitutional Court so 
far [see, e.g. Constitutional Court decision No. 25/1993. (IV. 23.)]. 
— In like manner, a differentiated approach may be required to the effect produced 
by changing social conditions on the effectiveness of legal rules, with allowance made 
for the principle of cessante ratione legis cessât lex ipsa (a legislative provision loses 
effect with the extinction of ifs raison d'être), which has long and often been regarded 
as an evident fact, but also as one accompanied by serious reservations. Reservations are 
indeed justified in connection with application of this principle. What still appears to be 
the most defensible approach is that a law or a regulation (or a provision thereof) loses 
effect if the facts or situations governed by it cannot occur after the lapse of a certain 
period of time. However, extinction of the underlying causes of legislation may not by 
itself result in a legislative provision ceasing to have effect,7 as a contrary approach 
might lead to legal uncertainty, arbitrary law enforcement, a total erosion of legality. 
— The applicability appears to be obvious of the old principle (which in Hungary was 
already mentioned in, e.g. István Werbőczy's Tri par titum,8 a compilation of mainly 
customary law) that laws and regulations of the same or a higher hierarchical order may 
not only abrogate earlier ones, but earlier laws and regulations contrary to later ones of 
the same or a higher hierarchical order lose effect even in the absence of a separate 
provision of law (lex posterior derogat legi priori), regardless of whether this principle 
is laid down in a maxim of "written" law, for it is logically impossible to concurrently 
abide by two legislative provisions of contending content. Hence only one of them, 
notably the latter, can be operative. In a large number of cases, however, it is far from 
obvious whether there is a real contradiction between an earlier and a later legislative 
provision, nor is it easy to judge whether or not a later legislative provision of the same 
or perhaps of higher hierarchiád order makes a mere exception to an earlier general rule 
of law (lex posterior specialis derogat priori generali) or how far a later general rule of 
7 See SZÁSZY-SCHWARZ, G.: Parcrga, Atlieneuni Irodalmi és Nyomdai Részvényt ársulat, Budapest, 1912, 
49. 
8 Art. 10 in Title 2 of Part Two. See the special volume of Magyar Törvénytár edited in commemoration 
of the Millenium. The Triparti tum (first edition in 1517 of the original) was translated with introduction and 
references by Dr. KOLOZSVÁRI, S. and Dr. ÓVÁRI, К. Explanatory notes added by Dr. MÁRKUS, D. 
Franklin Társulat Magyar Irodalmi Intézet és Könyvnyomda, Budapest, 1897. 
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law affects the effectiveness of an earlier special rule. A different approach may then lead 
to discordant practice, to a high degree of legal uncertainty. Recently the Constitutional 
Court has also stated on the first occasion that apparent contradictions or conflicts 
between laws and regulations of the same level must be resolved by interpretation of law 
on the part of agencies applying the law or by legislation. In the absence of substantive 
unconstitutionality, the Constitutional Court generally has no power to resolve such 
conflicts of laws and regulations [Constitutional Court Decision No . 35/1991. (VI. 20.)]. 
Subsequently, however, invoking the postulate of a law-governed state as embodied in 
the Constitution, the Court held that despite the correct thesis of legal theory expressed 
in the principle of lex posterior derogat legi priori the law-maker's practice of failing to 
expressly provide for abrogating or amending rules of law contrary to a new one does 
not meet the requirement of legal security as contained in Art. 2 of Lite Constitution, since 
legal security requires both the agencies applying the law and die citizens to be familiar 
with the laws and regulations in force at all times. A situation in which the current 
wording of a legislative provision cannot be established except by an all-round 
comparison of the entire legal material in operation is unacceptable [Decision No. 
11/1994. (III. 2.)]. It is therefore necessary for a later provision of law expressly abrogate 
an earlier one contrary to it. Should it fail to do so, only the Constitutional Court can 
have the power to expressly terminate die effect of a legal rule on account of damage to 
legal security as an attribute of a law-governed state embodied in Art. 2 para. 1 of the 
Constitution. 
— A situadon similar to that resulting from acceptance of the principle of lex 
posterior derogat legi priori might arise in case of customary law derogating from 
legislative provisions. Notably, a legislative provision would lose effect with the 
emergence of customary law contrary to it. Formerly this possibility was also known in 
Hungary, as it was in the legal systems of several countries. According to Werbőczy's 
Tripardtum, for instance, actual and continuous practice contrary to statute of ten 
derogates from statute (Art. 9 in Tide 2 of Part Two). While the theoretical approach was 
not uniform, this was also widely recognized even in this century, namely by relying on 
the lex posterior principle and proceeding from the assumption that statutory and 
customary law are equal sources of positive law.9 But after the adoption in 1949 of the 
Constitution expressly stating the primacy of "written law" there could be no ground for 
upholding that view. Art. 71 para. 2 of the Constitution declared that "the Constitution 
as well as the constitutional provisions of law shall be binding both on all organs of state 
power and on all citizens of the State". This is also stated in die current text (Art. 77 
para. 2) of the Constitution in these terms: "The Constitution and the constitutional 
provisions of law shall be binding on all organizations of society as well as on all state 
organs and citizens". For a long time after 1949 even die very possibility for the 
existence of customary law was generally denied by emphasizing the advantages of 
9 See, e.g., Magyar Jogi Lexikon. VI. kötet (Hungarian Lexicon of Law. Vol. VI), ed. Dr. M Á R K U S , D. 
Pallas Irodalmi és Nyomdai Részvénytársaság, Budapest, 1907, 636 el seq. 
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"written law" over customary law and legal uncertainty resulting f rom the latter. Today, 
however, there can be no longer doubt that in many cases the permissive rules of 
concrete legislative provisions secure a place for customary law also in the Hungarian 
system of sources of law. The operation of customary law derogating from laws and 
regulations and likely to affect the substantive validity thereof is not ruled out in actual 
fact. In effect, in the absence of a relevant legislative provision, the lex posterior 
principle may also prevail as a rule of customary law in so far as earlier laws and 
regulations contrary to later ones of tire same or a higher level are not applied.10 
Obviously, however, an earlier legislative provision cannot formally lose effect with the 
emergence of customary law derogating from written law. A contrary solution would 
simply be unconstitutional, amounting to nothing but disregard of the constitutional 
provisions that spell out the primacy of legal rules. 
— Finally die question arises of whether a law or a regulation or a provision thereof 
becomes ineffective if there emerges no new "customary law derogating from laws and 
regulations", but there has occurred a desuetude (desuetudo), a situation in which a law 
or a regulation is not complied with in general and for a prolonged period in practice." 
For example, a large part of the pre-1848 enactments in Hungary lost effect in such a 
way.12 Even today, a similar situation may unquestionably affect the substantive validity 
of a legislative provision as it is actually inoperative. However, in a stable system of law 
based on the requirement of legal security, it is no longer possible to recognize that non-
compliance with a legal rule would terminate die effectiveness thereof. What is involved 
is merely the fact that a law or a regulation is not observed or enforced in violation of 
legality. Thus, in this context, one should accept under serious reserve any solution — 
which compilations of current laws and regulations adopt practically inevitably, albeit 
often without foundation — that a law or a regulation or a provision thereof is not 
published because it "contains outdated rules", as it were, or it "has lost its relevance". 
Ill 
The possibility of applying a legislative provision may differ from its effectiveness. While 
it is true that, as a general rule, a legislative provision must be applied in concrete cases 
from its entry into force to the date of its losing effect, diere are several exceptions to 
diis rule. 
1. In some cases a legislative provision in force is inapplicable. To give but a few 
examples, a legislative provision is inapplicable without an enforcement decree if the 
latter is made absolutely necessary, mainly as a consequence of a mandatory authorization 
to issue it, for the former's enforcement. (If the law-making organ authorized to issue an 
10 See PESCHKA, V.: A derogáló jogszabály (Tlie Derogatory Provision of Law), Állam- és Jogtudomány, 
1992, Nos 1-4, 14 et set], 
11 Ibid. 17. 
12 See Magyar Jogi Lexikon (Hungarian Lexicon of Law), vol. II, op. cit. 882. 
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enforcement decree fails to do so, thereby creating a situation contrary to the 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court, acting ex officio or on anyone's motion, will invite 
that organ to comply with its obligation within a specified timelimit.) Obviously, the 
given legislative provision cannot be applied until the legally defined preconditions for 
enforcement have been created. (For example, Act LIX of 1993 on the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman for Civic Rights entered into force on 22 June 1993, but it was generally 
impossible to apply until the Ombudsman's election by Parliament on 30 June 1995.) 
Also, a legislative provision cannot be applied if it is annulled only pro futuro by a 
Constitutional Court decision, but at the same time tlie Court declares its inapplicability 
in a concrete pending case [see, e.g. Constitutional Court Decision No. 32/1990. (XII. 
22.)]. Moreover, in judging facts or situations of law previous to the entry into force of 
the relevant provisions of law, the law applying agencies may, in particular cases, apply 
mostly the provisions of law that are in force at the time, not of law application, but only 
of the facts or situations of law in question. And this brings us to the discussion of the 
other main group of exceptions. 
2. There are cases in which a legislative provision is not in force at the time of law 
application, hut it is applicable none the less. The most palpable case is Art. 2 of the 
Criminal Code, under which a criminal offence must be judged according to the law in 
force at tlie time of perpetration (the only exception being that if at tlie time of judgement 
a new criminal law is in force according to which tlie act is not a criminal offence any 
more, or it is to be punished less severely, the new law must be applied). But a similar 
general requirement is that in the course of law application the lawfulness or unlaw-
fulness of a course of conduct must be judged according to the law in force at the time 
the particular conduct was pursued. The effect of a fact of law generating, modifying or 
terminating legal relationships is judged according to the law in force at the time, not of 
law application, but of the emergence of the fact of tlie law. (An obvious example is that 
acquisition or termination of citizenship must always be judged under the law which was 
in force at the time of relevant facts of law affecting citizenship, like birth, marriage, 
lapse of time, etc.) In addition, in continuous legal relationships, situations of law 
previous to the entry into force of a new regulation, involving in particular obligations 
of the subjects at law in those legal relationships, are generally governed, not by the new 
regulation, but by the one which was in force previously. 
3. Finally, there may be cases in which a legislative provision must be applied in 
judging facLs of law occurring, or situations of law terminating, before its entry into 
force, or in past or future aspects of continuous legal relationships which were established 
previously. It is generally in such cases that one speaks of law application (legislation) 
with retroactive effect. 
a) The possibility of law application with retroactive effect is obviously detrimental 
to legal security as, mainly in case of applicability with respect to a period of time 
previous to promulgation of a particular legislative provision, no one is able to consider 
the consequences of his conduct, but it is also in contradiction with the institution of legal 
responsibility, which is based on die presumption that die legislative provision is familiar 
to all at the point of t ime in question. It is therefore not surprising that in the course of 
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bourgeois transformation'3 legislation with retroactive effect was already prohibited by 
the first constitutions with a view to preventing misuse of power. For example, Art. I. 
paras 9 and 10, of the 1787 Constitution of the United States prohibited ex post facto 
legislation (even though the system of precedents might inherently have retained certain 
"retroactive" elements14). On the European continent, retroactive legislation was 
prohibited in France by the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (Art. 8) 
in criminal cases and later by the Declaration forming part of the Constitution of 1795 
(Art. 14) in criminal and civil cases, too. It should be added, however, that shortly 
afterwards it was a point at issue, in the United States (before the Supreme Court) from 
1798 for example,15 whether the prohibition could be general or confined to criminal 
cases. Then the prohibition on retroactive legislation appeared more or less systematically 
in subsequent constitutional development, in the codes of the fundamental branches of 
law, in acts on law-making and chiefly in the international human rights instruments. By 
and large, it became clear that there could be no serious bar to retroactive legislation 
containing "authorization" or "rights" only. Nevertheless, there emerged no uniform 
approach to the question of whether the prohibition on retroactive legislation containing 
obligations or withdrawing rights extended, and in what degree, to other than criminal 
cases as well and whether that prohibition was to be considered applicable only to 
accomplished facts of law and closed situations of law or also to still continuous legal 
relationships which were established previously. 
b) No doubt that retroactive legislation may be viewed differently according in 
particular to whether it is "retroactive", "quasi retroactive" or "retrospective" in 
nature.16 
Legislation with retroactive effect is tolerated the least with respect to judging facts 
or situations of law terminated prior to the entry into force of laws and regulations 
governing them. The different legal systems prohibit chiefly the possibility for an act to 
be regarded as a criminal offence or to be punished more severely under a law becoming 
effective subsequently. This is well illustrated by the general acceptance of the principles 
of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege essentially containing this prohibition. Even 
though constitutional prohibition is not universal (as in, e.g. Art. 97 of the Norwegian 
Constitution of 1814 still in force), the inadmissibility of retroactive legislation is often 
given special emphasis in administrative penal law, with respect to application of 
administrative and financial sanctions, and in cases as well where it would result in 
violation of fundamental rights. 
13 For a general pattern in Hungary in earlier times, see, e. g. WERBOCZY'S Triparlitum (Part Two, Title 2). 
14 It will be merely noted that similar elements may also be found in norms of interpretation laid down in 
later times. 
15 See TRIBE, LAURENCE H.: American Constitutional Law, Second Edition, The Foundation Press, Inc., 
Mineola, New York, 1988, 632 et seq. 
16 For this distinction, see MODERNE, F.: Rapport de synthèse. (Table ronde. Le principe de non rétroactivité 
des lois), Annuaire International de Justice Constitutionnelle, 1990, 437. 
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We unquestionably have a case of retroactive (quasi retroactive) legislation also when 
a legislative provision is applied to a situation of law, in a formerly established but still 
continuing legal relationship, which existed prior to its entry into force. In this respect 
there is generally a somewhat weaker opposition to legislation with retroactive effect . 
Furthermore, taking into account the peculiarities of certain legal relationships, one may 
also formulate theoretical views that it is justified to apply the new legislative provision 
with respect to the past as well, because a longer coexistence of the two, former and later 
"systems of law" is undesirable in such legal relationships.17 
It is then a separate question whether in continuous legal relationships which came 
into being earlier a new legislative provision may be applied pro futuro as from its entry 
into force or whether there are limits to its applicability. It can be stated that in this sense 
the prohibition on retroactive legislation is not recognized in general or, where the consti-
tutional prohibition seems to be absolute, the courts interpret it in a narrower sense. In 
Norway, for example, setting out from the consideration that absolute prohibition would 
rule out any regulatory intervention by the State in existing legal relationships, any 
adjustment to changing social conditions.18 But it is also recognized that there may be 
various limits to such interventions. 
c. The Hungarian solution starts from Art. 12 para. 2 of the Act on Law-making, 
which provides that legal rules may not establish obligations and may not declare any 
conduct to be unlawful for a period preceding promulgation. In Decision No. 34/1991. 
(VI. 15.) the Constitutional Court regarded this rule as being of a "constitutional nature" 
and its observance as being indispensable for giving effect to the principle of legal 
security, which is organically bound up with a law-govenied state as embodied in Art. 
2 para. 1 of the Constitution. This rule generally requires that settled relationships, 
primarily those subject to regulation by criminal law, be left untouched [Constitutional 
Court Decision No. 11/1992. (III. 5.)] and, under the practice of the Constitutional Court, 
that a legislative provision be not applied with respect to the past (to the tune prior to its 
entry into force) in legal relationships established before its entry into force but still 
continuing. 
With respect to the future, however, intervention by laws and regulations in 
continuous legal relationships is not ruled out. The power to decide in a given case 
whether the constitutional conditions for intervention exist and with what limitations is 
vested in the Constitutional Court [Constitutional Court Decision No. 32/1991. (VI. 6.)]. 
In arriving at a decision the Court must also have regard for observance of "acquired 
righLs" as an attribute of a law-governed state [Constitutional Court Decision N o . 
62/1993. (XI. 29.)]. Indeed, various limits to intervention are beginning to take shape in 
some Constitutional Court decisions. For example, intervention is not ruled out even in 
17 See on the subject FORSTHOFF, E.: Traité de droit administratif allemand. Traduit par M. FROMONT. 
Établissements Émile Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1969, 247. 
18 See ANDENAES, M. T.—WILBERG, t.: The Constitution of Norway. A Commentary. Universitetsforlaget 
As, Oslo— Bergen—Stavanger—Tromso, 1987, 117 et seq. 
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civil-law contract relations, but is pennissible only in exceptional cases, primarily because 
the external circumstances beyond the control of the parties have, in a manner impossible 
to foresee, changed to such an extent that maintenance of given legal relationships with 
unchanged substance would become intolerable, e.g. for the State (state budget) [Consti-
tutional Court Decision No. 32/1991. (VI. 6.)]. The limit to intervention in tax-law 
relations consists in that amendments to the relevant regulations may not generally 
extend, without a longer period of preparation, to those natural and juristic persons 
who/which undertook a favoured activity before the entry into force of the pertinent 
amendment because they had counted upon the state guarantee afforded (tax allowance 
granted) [Constitutional Court Decision No. 9/1994. (II. 25.)]. And later, in examining 
the constitutionality of Act XLVII1 of 1995 on legislative amendments to promote 
economic stability, the Constitutional Court held that services and related benefits of the 
system of social provisions may not be essentially modified without constitutionally 
sufficient cause or overnight, without an appropriate period of preparation. There must 
be a special reason for change without transition. Benefits are afforded the greater 
protection the closer they are to enjoyment, namely to die entitlement to services due to 
beneficiaries by subjective rights. Services already acquired or enjoyed must be given still 
greater protection [Constitutional Court Decision No. 43/1995. (III. 30.)]. 
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Vilmos SÓS The Constitutional Paradigm 
Since the appearance of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions more 
than thirty years ago, the term "paradigm" has been used to express the specific patterns, 
scopes and conceptual ranges of the history and theory of science, that, in a given period, 
have a dominant, or even exclusive control over a given science. What paradigm 
expresses is that the community of scholars build on such prior scholarly results that have 
promising future prospects, thus laying the foundations for further scientific research. 
Paradigm-based theoretic work implies that justifiable and relevant problems of scientific 
research, as well as the accepted heuristic and verificatory methods of the solutions 
thereof, are established within tlie scope of that paradigm. In order that a theory may 
function as a paradigm, two conditions have to be met: (i) it has to be novel and 
successful enough to attract more scholars who remain committed to this specific theory 
than any rival theories, and (ii) it has to be open enough so that, within the scope of the 
theory, it presents significant number of problems and tasks for generations of scholars 
to come. 
Such an understanding of the notion of paradigm in the philosophy of science is 
applicable primarily for natural sciences. In humanities, and economics, a "hard core" 
social science is no exception either, however, no theory did gain such dominant control 
as in the case of natural sciences. With respect to the philosophy of law or jurisprudence, 
we have seen co-existing theories and notions in competition and constant debate with 
one another. Nevertheless, these theories have certain paradigmatic features. T h e term 
paradigm denotes a social attitude, conviction and commitment, namely that a circle of 
experts of the given issue, a community of scholars is in the possession of methods and 
means for solving problems within their competence. 
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Such an attitude holds true for those involved with the theory or philosophy of law. 
There is, however, one peculiarity that limits and, at the same time, also widens the 
validity of the legal philosophical paradigm. It is limited inasmuch as that commitment 
to a specific paradigm will not become a generally accepted norm in society, or not even 
in the philosophical or legal community. However rational or widespread a certain legal 
concept might be there is nothing to indicate that at a given time and place one can 
become successful only on that basis. This limitation is derived from another, 
complementary, attribute of the legal paradigm. A natural science paradigm tells us how 
to achieve what we want, it can tell us nothing about what to want and achieve. The 
desired goals and values, whether moral or efficiency values, are divergent, and, quite 
often, conflicting. Within the political community, however, a tradition has taken shape 
that regards constitutionalism as a basic norm, capable to harmonize desired values and 
goals with the efficient realization thereof. The paradigm of constitutionalism is the very 
conviction of a political community that modem democracies require a constitutional 
system: constitutionalism and democracy are interrelated; constitutionalism serves best 
the needs of the operation of a democratic society. The constitution is the strongest 
source for legitimation of a modem democratic society. 
Legitimacy is the acknowledgement of the validity of a social order. According to 
Max Weber, any activity in a social order is adjusted to pre-definable maxims; die 
existing order is regarded as valid in case these maxims are perceived by the people as 
obligatory in some way, or as a model to be followed. People's motives to follow suit 
may be quite diverse, still, the very circumstance that, beside personal motives, actors 
comply with the existing order increases the chances that actions, in general, will also 
adjust to the existing order. Such legitimation might have internal, as well as external, 
guarantees. External guarantees are social conventions and the law. Social conventions 
enforce the order in such a manner that any divergence therefrom is generally and 
practically received with disapproval. As far as the law is concerned, a distinct group of 
people will apply physical and psychological force to coerce compliance with the law, 
or to sanction any violation thereof. 
To date, the general form of legitimation is legal legitimation; people consider 
existing order as lawful, and comply with formally correct, customary or written rules. 
Even, in case of the law, it is a compulsive order, people's conception of legitimacy 
provides the grounds for compliance; i.e. in their understanding, power, based on such 
external coercion, is legitimate. 
Gustav Radbruch, a famous German lawyer writes: "Democracy must be a cherished 
value; Rechtstaat, however, is one's everyday bread, die water one drinks, air one inhales, 
and the greatest merit of democracy is such that it is the exclusive means for maintaining 
tire Rechtstaat" This is why every government these days is so eager to be acknowledged 
as one governed by the rule of law. 
The author of that article is not as cynical as some, otherwise highly reputable legal 
experts, who claim that the law is but a mere means—appropriate, and applicable, for any 
purpose—and he, as technician of the law, is able to formulate any legal arguments 
supporting whatever purpose. But neither do I consider myself as a doctrinaire 
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theoretician who believes that, by merely asserting abstract legal principles, he will find 
solutions for the acceptance of vital legal principles by the citizens, and for putting into 
actual legal practice of the same. There is no such abstract legal theoretical view which 
would not be connected to a specific problem within the existing legal system. Basic 
theoretical issues of the law are in fact legal responses to essential moral, and in a large 
part, political issues. 
During the last 6 - 8 years of the Kádár regime (from the beginning of the '80s till 
1989), in Hungary, legal practice was more liberal than tlie legal system, and increasingly 
more liberal than the written law. This is highly unusual phenomenon, as it is legal 
practice that is generally behind written laws. During the enforcement of the law, there 
are several obstacles to overcome that do not seem to be obstacle in the written law. 
A legitimate legal system is more than a formal system of rules. A legitimate legal 
system builds on legal security, justice and efficiency. A legal positivist regards 
efficiency as the critérium for validity, and derives the other two principles from 
efficiency. According to a natural lawyer, justice is the critérium for validity as well, 
based on what Augustinus said: "What else should become of the state in want of justice, 
than a gigantic gang of crooks?" The foregoing three legal principales often conflict with 
one another, and in order to re-establish tlie equilibrium, one or the other moves to the 
fo re f ron t Should, however, any of them suffer a permanent violation, legal order 
disintegrates, and the legitimatory role of tlie law becomes questionable. 
The reason why law can play a legitimatory role is that, among its many functions, 
the protective role of the law in safeguarding citizens' rights vis-à-vis the state is of 
primary import. Without such protection, order would merely be an external coercive 
order. In the past two centuries, and, increasingly in tlie last few decades, such protection 
of individual rights vis-à-vis the power has found expression in human rights. Human 
rights are elements of an international legal institution. In general, however, they become 
genuine rights provided that they are formulated as citizens' rights in the legal system of 
a state. There is no doubt as to the merits of natural law in advertising and legalizing 
human rights. Natural law, influenced by the French Revolution, claims that by virtue of 
birth, people are entrusted with certain rights. Namely, that people are created free and 
equal. According to a famous american Federalist against the newly formed idea of 
human rights you must defend the rights of Englishmen protected by historical tradition 
and convention, in other words, you shall enjoy the enacted positive rights of any 
country. And however great import was attributed to human rights on die basis of the 
natural law ideology, their enforceability has always been problematic particularly 
because their realization has always been more difficult than enacting them, as citizens' 
rights, in the constitution of a given country. One usually reverted to human rights as the 
ultimate ideological or moral argument in favour of citizens having already been deprived 
of their rights. Not even to achieve equality before tlie law, may legal order presume that, 
in every respect, people were bom equal. Similarly, it may not attempt to make them 
equal in every respect. In the formulation of constitutional rights, and in the constitutional 
protection of freedom, a minimal consensus should exist, namely that tlie differences 
between the individuals may not serve as the basis for different treatment by tlie law, as 
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such differences are irrelevant with respect to constitutional rights. The contrary is true, 
as well—although it is a very strong statement—namely, that the constitution is not 
competent to set forth rights providing for relevant differences between the individuals. 
The constitution alone is appropriate to guarantee the basic rights of the citizens; rights 
that must not be violated by anyone, including the majority. In a constitutional 
democracy, no legitimate power shall have authority with respect to such rights. 
In our modern world, the constitution is the foundation for a democratic system and 
society. In general, constitutions are the products of revolutions or wars. Hannah Arendt 
is perfectly right in saying that the purpose of revolutions is the attainment of freedom, 
an act not equal with liberation or being liberated. If liberation is not followed by the 
enactment of freedom into the constitution, i.e. the creation of legal guarantees for 
freedom, revolution will prove seedless. A constitution may be the product of a 
revolution, still, it will fail to be novel or revolutionary in merit. A constitution can only 
guarantee that the government is limited by laws, and, in defense of the citizens' rights 
vis-à-vis the government and the state, provides constitutional guarantees, however not 
in the form of uncontrollable promises, but as procedural safeguards. This is not a 
revolutionary act. Albeit, it is a revolutionary achievement. 
Constitutionalism in Hungary 
The fact that during the political transition Hungarian society opted for constitutional 
democracy was fundamentally the result not of rational considerations, but rather, and 
quite naturally, the consequence of a political decision. The importance of extremist 
and/or populist movements opposing constitutionalism was minimal. The political elite, 
together with the majority of the Hungarian society, deemed constitutionalism a worthy 
example to be followed as the only tool to maintain democratic law and order, and to 
prevent the recurrence of dictatorship. Therefore it is similarly understandable that, from 
among the ranks of the political elite, those who had a background in law came to the 
fore. Members of the legal profession had a theoretical, rather than practical, knowledge 
of the procedures and tools required for the creation of a democratic state based on the 
principles of constitutionalism. Thus, constitutionalism has become the strongest 
legitimizing force of political transition. 
As one of the most important features of the constitutional paradigm, political 
decisions have to get a legally interprétable form in the constitution; a form that is not 
a manifesto, but something that offers procedural guarantees for the enforcement of the 
rights contained in the constitution. This, however, does not and should not imply that 
the law or even lawyers should decide between the often conflicting moral and political 
values, and neither does it suggest that any political or moral consideration can be put 
in a legal form. 
It is no coincidence, either, that politicians of the leading parties, by making 
references to constitutional legitimacy, always attempted to give a constitutional backing 
to their decisions, which invariably, required, or would have required, the amendment of 
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the constitution. Legal experts, on the other hand, often used legal reasoning in order to 
obstruct political decisions they found objectionable. This tension was not expressly 
counterproductive for a constitutional viewpoint. Often, as the result of the debates, 
compromises were made that created stronger constitutional fundament than any debate 
within the boundaries of the law or politics could have ever created. The fact that none 
of the significant political forces reverted, too often, to employ unconstitutional methods, 
and the legal experts were also keen on not to understand law as the mere application of 
abstract principles, and the realization that law should, at least partially, be adjusted to 
the actual and real political and social conditions, is, without doubt, the greatest 
achievement of the Hungarian development. 
In a society in transition, the development and perfection of constitutionalism takes 
a gradual course, laden with compromise and strong political and moral battles. However, 
the historic moment when a paradigm of legal theory, having political and moral 
undertones, plays a dominant role in society is quite rare. 
The Hungarian political community has, after die collapse of the communist regime, 
been committed to constitutional democracy. For different reasons however, this 
commitment was loaded with conflicts. In the followings I will attempt to analyze the 
general background of the conflicts and some hard cases in which the difficulties of 
realizing the constitutional principles are especially evident. 
The Hungarian constitutional history is an extremely short and simple story. Till 
1946, Hungary had no constitution in the modem sense i.e. as a basic law. However, in 
1222, only 7 years after the Magna Charta, a sort of feudal constitution called Golden 
Bull was bom in Hungary. This early development has been, unfortunately, not followed 
by a continuous constitutional history. Up to the forties of this century no real 
constitution has been amended, while the Golden Bull has always been referred to as the 
centuries old Hungarian constitution (with special emphasis on the continuity principle). 
The first change took place in 1946 when the Parliament adopted an Act on the Republic 
which in some respect was a provisional constitution. Three years later, in 1949 the new, 
already socialist parliament adopted die new socialist constitution that was nothing else 
but a copy of the Stalinist Soviet constitution (here the radical discontinuity principle was 
especially emphasized). This 1949 Constitution was radically modified in 1989, and the 
modified version is the legal constitution in Hungary in our days. New amendments have 
been, of course, introduced even since that time. That is however, rather political then 
constitutional problem. 
The political background of Hungarian constitutionalism is a longer and much more 
complicated problem. 
Hungarian legislation faced an unusual and exceptional situation, namely a transition 
of the social system. Before the new general elections of 1990 under die communist 
regime—Hungary, in comparison widi other communist countries, was a reladvely liberal 
state. Nevertheless, it was a very special kind of liberalism. The Hungarian legal practice 
was more liberal than the law itself. In die last decade, die communist party and its 
government did very rarely enforce the that time valid antidemocratic and repressive 
laws. The so-called Constitution and all valid laws (including die Criminal and die Civil 
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Codes, respectively) were, in many respects, tyrannical. During the last year of the old 
Parliament, legislation (both the Constitution and the Codes) was changed and amended 
positively in many respects. However, the task of the new Parliament was to change basic 
legal principles in order to lay the foundations of a new, democratic system. 
Hungary does not have a new Constitution. The old one is not completely old because 
it was last amended in 1989 under political pressure by the reform wing of the communist 
leadership and oppositional forces, as well. This Constitution already contained guarantees 
for basic human and civil rights. In 1990, one-third of the text was modified and some 
articles were changed twice or even more frequently within one month. It is not a Stalinist 
Constitution any more but it has many controversial articles and is not respected by public 
opinion. It is a widely held opinion that the Constitution is easily changeable if practical 
political goals demand, however, it needs a two-third majority of the votes. There is no 
doubt, that this Constitution is not a solid and widely respected basis for legislation. In the 
press and at different party meetings the extreme right politicians attacked at the 
Constitution as a Stalinist construction. The minister of justice in 1992 declared that it is 
impossible to adopt a new constitution and no need of it. 
Let me mention two examples. Before the first session of the new Parliament, the two 
biggest parties (Hungarian Democratic Forum and Alliance of Free Democrats) made an 
agreement (the so-called Pact) but two important points of the agreement have caused till 
now basic conflicts. First, the factual competencies and obligations of the President, who 
was member of the AFD (the that time biggest oppositional party), were not clearly 
defined. The Free Democrats failed to agree on the most important economic issue, 
privatization, and consequently, the majority faction can make decisions alone about it 
(since it does not require a two-third vote). Art. 9 of the Constitution states: "The 
economy of Hungary is a market economy where public and private ownership shall be 
equally respected and enjoy equal protection." It would be a standard article in any 
country where private property is dominant. In Hungary, where privatization is badly 
needed, this provision makes it possible for the government to exert its dominant 
influence on the economy which seems to increasingly taking place. 
The role of the Constitutional Court proved to be decisive in strengthening the 
democratic development in Hungary. The Court was founded by an Act of 1989, but only 
half of the judges were elected by the old Parliament. I ls foundation and existence proved 
to be the most dominant element in the development of a state of law in Hungary. The 
Court works under extraordinarily strong political pressure, nevertheless, its judgements 
have mainly served the protection of constitutional and civil rights. It should not come 
as a surprise that the Court was sometimes strongly attacked by government forces 
following certain judgements. 
Beyond the scope of legislation several other factors also influenced constitutional 
problems: 
1. The mass media and the press. The coalition parties and the government have had 
a pretty inimical attitude towards the press. Following the general elections of 1990, this 
bad relationship even worsened. Consequently, the press tried to exploit any information 
or unchecked gossips (a great many of which proved to be true later) attacking the 
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legislative and executive power. As a result, in many instances die reaction of the public 
to certain bills preceded the actual enactment, thus exerting influence on the final text of 
the act. The influence of the press had a weak point. Most importantly all some leading 
personalities of the press are not respected by the public due to their role during the 
previous regime. 
2. The indifference or apathy of the public to politics following the general elections 
and first sessions of legislation. 
3. This apathy is connected to the present economic recession or even crisis situation 
in Hungary. It is well known that a capitalistic system and private ownership themselves 
do not guarantee a democratic political system. It is also true that in countries without 
private ownership there is nowhere democracy at all. On the other hand, democracy exists 
only in countries where there is private properly and capitalistic economy. It is fairly 
problematic whether it is possible to build up a democratic political and social system in 
a country where the economy is in crisis. (In some Asian countries, the first steps 
towards democracy were taken after a strong economic growth.) As a matter of fact, in 
Hungary the new democratic political structure was boni but with respect to 
constitutionalism this is not the case. The short-comings of constitutionalism are partly 
connected to poverty and the crisis situation in Hungary. 
The four-year tenn of the first democratically elected Hungarian Parliament is over. 
However, the tendency zeroing on the elimination of the heritage of the past regime, 
either in the fonn of retribution or restitution, has further continued. As a result, the 
establishment of a legal framework for a new economic structure and ownership relations 
has been put on hold. Because the foregoing tendency gained dominance, legislation has 
dealt with issues relating to basic civil rights and a democratic establishment. In short: 
contrary to the regular legislation practice of established democracies, in most cases 
constitutional issues are here debated. 
Since I do not share the view that constitutional issues have legal nature only, I 
perceive the situation as follows: Serious political issues are transformed to merely legal 
ones, since the only means available for the opposition against challenged government 
policies—due to the parliamentary dominance of the government coalition—is to route such 
issues to the standards of constitutionality. These are indeed borderline issues from the 
aspects of constitutionality, they may be understood as clearly legal ones, but by doing 
so, the public will have no understanding of the political and often moral implications 
lying behind these legal issues, and it is rather counterproductive for political democracy. 
Such issues involve the freedom of the mass media, the press and opinion, retribution 
affecting civil rights and the general mood of the public, the relationship of the president 
of the republic and the government, minority issues. 
Due to the foregoing, the Constitutional Court continues to be a key player in 
Hungary, and consequently, decisions on political issues—even if in rather abstract 
fonn—is often relegated to the Court. Whether one appreciates or not this is the only 
establishment body which continues to act without delay, and because the others fail to 
perfonn in this manner, its role at times proves to be politically over-dominating. Due 
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to this, the Constitutional Court is attacked from each side, but mostly by the government 
and the pro-government factions of the Parliament. 
Some hard cases 
Case 1: The 15/1991. (IV. 13.) decision of the Constitutional Court. The collection and 
processing of personal data without strictly defined aim and for undefined future use 
is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional to use a general and uniform personal 
identification symbol (personal identity number) that can be applied without limitation 
by any authorities. Effective as of December 31, 1991, all old regulations concerning 
the use of the personal identity number are deleted. This decision of the Constitutional 
Court was widely challenged not only by the government but also by the public in 
general, what is more, even by many oppositional members of the Parliament. The 
opponents of this decision argued with the enormous budget costs that the re-
construction of the new record keeping system will cause and with quoting public 
interest and the difficulties of keeping track of criminals, etc. Some opponents of the 
decision stated that it would have been more correct and fair if the Constitutional Court 
had left the decision in the competence of die Parliament or at least had conducted an 
opinion poll or public debate prior to the judgement, as is the case with the same issue 
in many European countries. The critics forgot only one thing: in West European 
countries opinion poll was conducted prior to the introduction of the personal identity 
number. In Hungary, however, the personal identity number was in use for a long 
period and the state, in principle, could collect data and information about every 
citizen. This resistance shows that the principles of constitutionalism are not deeply 
rooted in the awareness of the population and the government and even the Parliament 
deem pragmatism more important than constitutionalism. This decision was one among 
the issues where its legal validity was recognized but the competence of the 
Constitutional Court was contested. 
Case 2: The opponents of the activity of die Court idendfy parliamentarism with the 
unlimited power of the Parliament. They consider die majority will as a supreme value. 
But the Parliament has also constitutional limits. The rule of the law is die main 
safeguard of individual freedom, at least since die end of the XVII century. The 
realization of this freedom is easier in countries where for centuries the consistent 
consdtutional requirements have existed. In Hungary where diis is not die case the 
Constitutional Court is sometimes forced to judge on die basis by such relatively open 
legal principles as human dignity or equality of citizens. This does not make these 
judgments political ones. For example, capital punishment is a constitutional issue and 
to decide about it does not need any abolitionist movement or consent of the parties and 
public opinion. The issue of the use of the personal identity number is of similar nature. 
The Constitutional Court is limited only by die Constitution. Only German positivism 
of the last century considers the laws and die constitution as a value in itself which 
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lacks any substantive element. Sometimes tlie Court itself limited its authority, e.g. 
when did not apply the preliminary (before a law has been enacted by the Parliament) 
constitutional norm control, however the Constitution makes it possible. 
The Parliament can exert influence at tlie Court in two ways: (i) to change or 
modi fy the Act on the Constitutional Court. But if the modifications were too much 
significant it would cause malaise in foreign countries, (ii) to change or modify the 
Constitution itself. It would be regrettable and unfortunate because it should mean that 
the Constitution is not more solid than any other law requiring two-third majority of the 
votes which may be adjusted to everyday politics. 
Case 3: The amended Constitution of 1989 declared that "the Republic of Hungary 
is an independent, democratic constitutional state". In a constitutional sense, this 
signified political changes in Hungary. Constitutional statehood is a fact in part only, 
and in part it is a task to be accomplished. The whole legal structure has to be gradually 
harmonized with the Constitution: not only regulations and the operations of state 
institutions have to be introduced to the society, but also the conceptual values of the 
Constitution. Political changes in Hungary were carried out on the grounds of legality 
which also means that reflexive norms of the legal structure must assert themselves. The 
amended Constitution grew out of a formally impeccable compliance with the old 
norms, and as a product of the same. Every norm in force today has to be in full 
compliance with this Constitution, regardless of the date when any given norm was 
passed. 
Two problems arise. What shall be done with tlie legal relationships arising out of 
the old—and by now unconstitutional—norms? And: can we consider the historical 
circumstances of the political changes when we pass judgements about whether the 
new norms applying to unconstitutional provisions of the past regime are constitu-
tional. 
If we try to answer these questions on die grounds of constitutional statehood, the 
requirement of legal security is of greatest importance. Legal security is especially 
important if unconstitutional norms are repealed, but it is even more important when the 
repeal affects legal relationships arising from such regulation. Or else, every regulation 
change of the norm would imply a revision of several legal relationships. Closed legal 
relationships may not be changed either by norms or by the repeal of norms in a 
constitutional manner. The only exception is when another constitutional principle 
competing with the principle of legal security makes it unavoidable but only in case it 
does not cause unproportionately huge harm compared to die set aim. Such an exception 
may be the revision of a final judgement of a criminal case for the benefit of the 
convicted person, if the proceeding was conducted on a later so defined unconstitudonal 
norm. A reverse situation does not constitute an exception, i.e. it is no argument in itself 
against legal security that the result of the legal relationships is unjust. 
The answer to the second problem is that basic guarantees of a constitutional state 
may not be set aside by quoting historical necessities and justice dictated by a con-
stitutional state. No constitutional aims may be realized against a constitutional state. 
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According to the Constitutional Court, legal security relying on the material and formal 
principles of legal security shall have priority against partial and subjective justice. 
In consideration of the foregoing reasoning, an act reviving the limitation period of 
prosecutability violates the limits of the state's penal powers, because it affects such 
guaranteed rights the restriction of which is not allowed by the Constitution even if 
other basic rights may be suspended or restricted. The basic institutions of criminal law 
must not be made relative because the guarantees of criminal law are the results of a 
prior constitutional deliberation, namely, that the risk of unsuccessful prosecution shall 
be borne by the state. When the limitation period expires caused by the state's inability, 
die so acquired unprosecutability is absolute, and it may not be subsequently reduced 
or revived. Historical circumstances or justice may not be quoted in this context. Should 
this not be the case, it would involve an obvious omission of the guarantees of criminal 
law which is absolutely antithetic to the principles of constitutional statehood. The law 
and order in a constitutional state may not deprive anyone from the guarantees of a 
constitutional state, because, as basic rights, they are available to everyone. Justice and 
morality might justify punishment, however, the legal foundation for such punishment 
is conceivable on the grounds of constitutionalism only. 
According to the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, legal security requires 
from the state and legislation that the entire law, in all of its divisions and ramifications 
shall be clear, obvious, predictable and foreseeable with respect to their effect. In 
criminal law, a ban on retroactive effect, the forbiddance especially of ex post facto 
provisions, and a ban on the application of analogy are directly deducible from 
predictability and foreseeability. The principle of legal security requires procedural 
guarantees, as well. The statute of limitation in criminal law restrict in time the state's 
ability to exercise its criminal powers. A failure of the same shall fall on the state. In 
a constitutional state, the state has not and cannot have unlimited powers. The executive 
power itself is not unlimited, either. The executive power may interfere in the 
individual's rights and freedom pursuant to constitutional mandate and justification. 
The criminal law system of a democratic state handles the principles of nullum 
crimen and nulla poena sine lege as a constitutional obligation of the state which means 
that the state has to codify, in advance, in law the conditions for its exercise of the 
criminal powers. It is not only that the state forbids crimes and threatens with 
punishment by law, but, further, that the individual is entitled to be sentenced in a 
lawful manner, and his penalty shall be meted out lawfully, as well. In a constitutional 
state, criminal law is not only a means, but also a protection of values, and is itself 
entrusted with values. Namely: constitutional criminal law principles and guarantees. 
Criminal law protects interest, nevertheless, it cannot serve as a means for moral 
purification respecting the protection of moral values. This is why the Constitutional 
Court declares that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be sentenced and 
punished on the grounds of the laws in force at the time when the crime was committed. 
(Except, however, if the new law permits a lighter penalty.) 
All this is applicable to the expiration of prosecutability. Expiry is a fact, but the 
facts detenninine it are leeal facts. It shall be the court onlv that shall validly determine. 
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whether the prosecutability of a crime has expired or not. Legislators have one single 
constitutional means only for having a say in the matter of expiry. Namely that it passes 
more favourable laws for the benefit of the accused. 
The revival by law the possibility of criminal-prosecution in case an already 
"expired" crime is unconstitutional. With irreversibly ceases because the causes stopping 
to the process set a limit for the state's criminal powers. These causes may not change 
the qualification of an act, since a crime remains a crime. After the time limitation it is 
the personal right of the perpetrator not to be punished. The principle of confidence in 
law requires that once a cause for stopping die possibility of criminal-prosecution has 
materialized the process of a criminal case shall not be revived by law. Time limitation 
stops the process of a criminal case regardless of why die perpetrator has not been 
prosecuted. The failure of the state does not fall on him. 
The extension of the time limitation by law is also unconstitutional. During the 
limitation period, expiry is meant primarily for law enforcement authorities, and 
according to the act, the audiority may, by nullifying, revive the serving of full term 
without notification of the convict. The time limitation will also be extended if the 
authority suspends the proceedings, by indicating the duration of suspension. It is 
called die suspention of the time limitation. It means that however die institution of 
expiradon provides insufficient guarantees for the anticipated stopping of prosecutability, 
it assures that die rules on the limitation period before its experadon shall not change 
for the harm of the perpetrator. At the time of deliberadon, die state's criminal powers 
are subject to the same restrictions as at die time of perpetration. 
Should the limitation period be extended by a retroachve act, its unconstitudonal 
nature may not be legitimized with the explanation that time limitation was suspended. 
If time limitation was indeed suspended at the time of the perpetration pursuant to then 
effective laws then 110 new act is required to announce it. If however at the dine of the 
perpetration time limitation was not suspended, then die adjudication of expiration is the 
responsibility of law enforcement authorities only, and eventually that of die courts. 
Subsequendy, legislators have 110 say in diis matter. 
It is completely unconstitutional, that, pursuant to die law, time limitation shall be 
revived if the state has failed to exercise its "criminal code" due to political 
considerations. This however may mean many different tilings: proceeding did not 
commence, proceeding was stopped without legal reasons, case was finished with 
unlawfully light measures, etc. It is even more difficult to clearly define what qualifies 
for political reasons, since the time frame of the act is so long that it has failed to 
consider the multiple political changes. The criminal policy of an era may subsequendy 
be tenned as unconstitutional, but it is not possible to subsequendy deem non-existent the 
entire activities of criminal powers that functioned in contradiction widi die principles of 
constitutional statehood, and conclude from the foregoing that time limitation with respect 
to the indicated matters could not have commenced. 
Both the act and die decision of the Constitutional Court touch upon die basics of the 
establishment of constitutional statehood. The question at stake here was not whether the 
real felons of the communist regime will be punished or not, but radier, whether the rule 
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of law—which affects the future of a democratic state—shall be subordinated to the 
emotional needs of a segment of the population. Let me add, that due to certain political 
considerations, the needs of the constitutional state coincide with those of a reasonable 
decision. The political situation is rather simple. The political system in Hungary changed 
without revolution. The change, in part, is the result of compromise: they did not fire 
shots, we do not take revenge. The communist system was indeed inert, but one must 
admit: they could have fired guns. 
Case 4: The freedom of the press and the electronic mass media became a constitutional 
problem in Hungary. A real fight or war has developed about die question how the media 
can be independent from the state power. Both the government and the opposition wished 
to have control over the media. Its ultimate logic is not only the focused role of the 
media and free speech in a democratic regime but also because these problems manifest 
the most transparently the vulnerable parts of the present Constitution. 
The fairly complicated issue may be summarized die following way: 
According to the government a significant piece of die media, especially die radio 
and the television is biased and one-sidedly anti-govemmentalist (obviously, die 
oppositional parties claim the same too, widi a counter-aspect diough). Therefore 
die government needs to carry out a more direct and greater influence upon the 
media, first of all with personal appointment policy which is actually allowed by 
a governmental decree. The government has the political responsibility for public 
media, thus the nomination right of the President of Republic is just a formal 
action. 
The Consdtutional Court ruled the followings in its two subsequenlial resolutions. As 
for me, I believe that both of diem has indulged the Court into die polidcs. It was so 
even if the decisions were interpreted in favour of and for bodi pardes. It was no 
wonder that instead of a deeper analysis the competence of the Consdtutional Court 
became into die spodight being criucized by bodi parties (and also by the court). That 
is for sure though, that the Court has expressed its opinion—with abstract consti-
tudonal interpretation—on obviously political dilemmas which due to lack of relevant 
provisions may not be solved by the present Consdtution. Besides, if provisions were 
existed the clarificadon of its blurred wordings would have required constitudonal 
amendment. 
The Decision of Consdtutional Court of 36/1992 argues that die answers to the 
quesdons of the President of the Republic relates merely to those problems which 
have been setded by abstract interpretation irrelevant to die specific case. 
Three judges (Géza Kilényi, Péter Schmidt and Imre Vörös) submitted separate 
opinions. Justice Géza Kilényi argues that bodi die president and die prime minister are 
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to account politically as well, but their types are different. The latter one is direct, 
whereas the president's one is more broad, i.e. it is not about superior or inferior 
responsibilities. Justice Schmidt concludes the competence and sphere of the president 
from the characteristics of the separation of powers. Therefore it holds the Court's scope 
incompetent in resolving problems which were to be elaborated by constitutional 
amendment . Justice Imre Vörös claims that the Court extends its earlier interpretation 
on the competence of the president, it orientates on political issues and deals with 
questions on which the Constitution is tacit. 
It is obvious that the Court has been standing under a strong governmental pressure 
for a long time. Many of its earlier decisions have already challenged (lie loathing of the 
governing parties. Nevertheless its legally often untenable decisions are full with political 
consequential elements which do weaken the reputation of this highly esteemed 
democratic institution. However, it is more than sure that further political oppression is 
going to be performed upon them. There was such a case, in which the prime minister 
demanded that rather than doing abstract constitutional interpretations the Constitutional 
Court should judge wether constitutional or not that the President of the Republic did not 
appoint the leaders of TV and Broadcasting companies. (According to the Constitution 
the president can refuse the recommendation of the prime minister only in the case if it 
is dangerous for the whole democratic system or formally illegal. Substantively the 
president does not have the right to judge the appointment.) Nonetheless if the Court had 
been willing—under the pretext of interpretation—to read into the Constitution things on 
which the Constitution were tacit, may not be surprised upon such expanding legal 
interpretative exactions. It is also the consequences of that assertion uttered by Chief 
Justice László Sólyom, stating that throughout the cases the Court writes the so far 
invisible future constitution of the country too. 
Closing Remarks 
Either before the 1990 general elections, or thereafter, no Hungarian political force was 
in favour of making a new constitution. According to one possible scenario, the drafting 
of a new constitution could have commenced, provided, however, that such agreement, 
by and among the parties, had been reached prior to the elections. In other words, a 
constitutional convention should have been held. According to another possible scenario, 
parties should have come to a consensual agreement regarding every constitutional issue, 
followed by a gradual amending process of the constitution, thus making way for the 
adoption of a new constitution. This should have required compromises on both ends. 
Even prior to the general elections, the relationship between the different parties had 
deteriorated to such an extent that no mutual accord was feasible with respect even to 
commonly shared principle issues. This is why die two major parties of die time opted 
for a third possibility: a pact between the Democratic Forum and the Free Democrats. 
This act, however, postponed die drafting of a new constitution for many years to come. 
Such basic issues, as e.g. the constitution, might necessitate compromises, however, not 
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for tactical, but rather political considerations. Giving preference to tactics may result in 
unexpected consequences when, due to their unpredictability, anticipated benefits might 
just as well get reversed. Instead of symmetrical benefits, one sees (lie birth of 
asymmetrical drawbacks. 
The current amendment-practice of the Constitution may eliminate insignificant 
inconsistencies, however, it will always depend on short-term political bargaining, and 
would not boost respect for the Constitution. The initially frequent amendments brought 
about practically new constitutions, and were, therefore, under constant attack. 
Constitution-making is not identical to legislation, including the two-third legislation, as 
well, as legislators would, in line with the actual political set-up, draft the constitution 
for their own purposes, even when compromises are reached. If the Constitutional Court 
drafted their own "Invisible Constitution", that would neither be desirable, as this body, 
however respectable, is not the embodiment of national sovereignty. 
The coalition program of the new government of 1994 calls for the drafting and 
adoption of a new constitution. The coalition, having a two-third majority, would alone 
have enough power for it. A new constitution, however, is not a matter of who has 
greater strength. A national consensus is required, otherwise, in four years' time, a new 
and differently composed govenunent might again re-draft the constitution. To date, there 
has been no consensus regarding either the substantive or procedural issues of the 
constitution-making. Nevertheless, some progress between the government and the 
opposition has been made; it has been agreed that there will be no unconsensual 
constitution-making. The constitution, however, should immediately be amended in two 
respects. It should be stipulated that any amendment of the constitution shall be subject 
to the adoption of the new constitution. And similarly, that the change contained therein, 
shall enter into force subject to approval by the successive parliament. Effective 
immediately, it should also be stipulated that the election law may be amended during 
die first two years of the term of die government in order to prevent any tactical abuse 
of the same. 
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Francis A. GABOR Quest for Global Harmonization of 
Private International Law from the 
American Perspective 
I. Introduction 
Approaching to the end of the second milenium, the global harmonization of private 
international law has become a vital cohesive force for the regionally segmented world 
community. As the European Union emerges to the model of a federal system from the 
perspective of private international law, tlie creative American experience in this field 
requires a comparative assessment. 
Today, private international law stimulates a historical convergence between the 
common law and the continental civil law tradition which has been clearly manifested 
in the emerging new lex mercatoria. 
On December 11. 1986, the United States deposited at the United Nations 
Headquarters in New York its instrument of ratification of the 1980 U.N. Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (hereinafter: "CISG", "Vienna Convention" 
or "Convention"). With the ratification of the United States, Italy, and the People's 
Republic of China, the Convention became effective on January 1, 1988.' This 
culmination of a century-long effort by legal experts and merchants of the world 
1 WINSHIP: Tlie Scope of the Vienna Convenlion on International Sales Contracts, in: International Sales: 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts For The International Sate of Goods 1 -1 (N. Galston & H. Smit 
eds. 1984) [hereinafter: International Sales]. 
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community revitalizes the ancient lex mercatoria it also presents the challenge of its 
implementation in transnational legal practice. 
It is anticipated that the ratification by the United States will accelerate the 
acceptance of the Convention by other nations. The large number of signatures and the 
drafting history, which reflect sophisticated compromises between diverse jurisprudential 
and socio-economical views, are also encouraging signs for world-wide ratification. 
Despite an optimistic prognosis of future ratifications of the Convention, however, it is 
quite likely that a substantial number of countries will not join in the next decade. Private 
international law, therefore, will be needed as a guiding compass in the decentralized 
transnational legal environment and will continue to be a relevant vehicle to achieve 
universal unification and legal security. 
Article I (1)(B) of the Vienna Convention relies on the rules of private international 
law of the potential forum in an attempt to extend the scope of application of this 
Convention. The United States, along with several other ratifying countries, ratified the 
Convention subject to a reservation to Article I (1)(B). The United States adopted the 
position that the Convention applies only if both of the contracting parties have their 
places of business in countries that ratified the Convention; rules of private international 
law of the forum cannot lead to the application of the Convention. For practical purposes, 
therefore, either the Uniform Commercial Code or the relevant foreign commercial law 
apply unless both of the individual contracting parties are from a Convention state. The 
unsettled and unpredictable status of private international law prompted the United States' 
limited adoption of the Convention. 
Thus, it remained even after ratification a critical goal for world trading nations to 
unify the choice of law rules applicable to the international sale of goods. This objective 
was realized in the course of a unique joint conference with the participation of United 
Nation Commission on Unification of International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") and the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law. This conference prepared he Hague Draft 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
("Hague Draft Convention" or "Hague Convention") which takes great steps toward reso-
lution of legal and socio-economic differences in the world community of trading nations.2 
This Article assesses briefly the potential implementation of the Hague Draft 
Convention from the standpoint of the American interest in the world-wide unification 
of international trade law. 
II. Lock of Separate Private International Law in the United States 
Private international law developed on the continent of Europe as a result of the gradual 
disintegration of the ius commune which was founded on the Roman law heritage.3 As 
private laws gradually became "nationalized" by the emerging sovereign nation states in 
2 m. 
3 See generally RABEL, E.: The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study, I960, 1-48. 
Private International Law front Ute Anterican Perspective 65 
the final framework of national codification, private international law became a unique 
guiding and harmonizing legal force. The principle of national sovereignty set the 
foundation for the creation of rules of private international law, and a unique body of 
domestic laws developed which provided solutions for international jurisdiction and 
choice of law problems. 
It is not surprising that the founder of the American conflict of laws, Justice Story, 
relied on the well-developed European traditions of private international law, in 
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, which transplanted the European tradition into 
American soil.4 As the United States' complex federal system developed in the 19th 
and early 20th century, conflict of laws primarily served the interests of the American 
interstate system; the truly international cases and problems suffered relative neglect. 
In the present era, the lack of a unique well-developed body of private international 
laws engenders substantial uncertainty and legal insecurity for both Americans and 
foreigners contemplating the establishment of legal relationships across national 
boundaries.5 
The United States' want of a separate body of private international law presents 
major problems in the course of attempts at international unification of laws applicable 
to the international sale of goods. Since the United States joined the Vienna Convention 
subject to reservation, its implementation will begin with a restrictive approach; the 
United States will disregard rules of private international law as a potential source leading 
to the application of the uniform laws. At this time, it is critical for the United States' 
interests to reassess the significance of a unique separate body of private international law 
applicable to international sale of goods. It is well recognized that in the United States, 
the international conflict of laws basically covers questions such as judicial jurisdiction 
over foreign defendants, choice of law, international judicial assistance and cooperation, 
and questions of recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments . Lack of a 
uniform and separate body of laws governing international conflict of law problems has 
inhibited the United States' ability to participate effectively in the international unification 
process thus far. The ratification of the Vienna Convention likely presents a fresh 
opportunity for progress in internal unification of American rules of private international 
law.6 
One of the most burning problems for the United States in our decade lies in its 
sliding performance on the world markets. The staggering trade deficit calls for effective 
legislative action by the United States Congress to secure greater protection and 
performance of the American industries within the legal framework of the GATT 
4 S T O R Y , J.: Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (8th ed. 1883). 
5 S e e SCOLES, E . - H A Y , P.: Conflict of Laws, 1982, 8-34. 
6 G A B O R , F. A.: Emerging Unification of Conflict of Laws Roles Applicable to the International Sale of 
Goods : Uncitral and the New Hague Convention on Private International Law, 7 Northwestern Journal of 
International Law A Business, 1986, 696, 6 9 9 - 7 0 0 . 
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System.7 While this work is progressing on the level of public laws and public 
international law, the private transactional aspects of international trade should not be 
neglected. The unsettled status of international trade on the level of the private transaction 
can be considered a unique "non-tariff trade barrier". Thus, it is critical that the United 
States make significant progress toward the harmonization and eventual unification of 
private laws and in particular, private international law governing international sale of 
goods. The United States' ratification of the Vienna Convention signifies progress in this 
direction. 
III. Recognition of Party Autonomy 
As long as the United States does not have a separate codified or even harmonized body 
of laws dealing with private international law, the most effective legal safeguard for 
American transnational contracts lies in the nearly universally recognized principle of 
party autonomy. Thus, the contracting parties' freedom to control their transactions shall 
be examined 011 the levels of both legislative and judicial jurisdiction. For all practical 
purposes, the two levels of party autonomy are very closely related to each other. 
Experienced legal counsel, in drawing up contracts, generally designates the forum whose 
law will be applicable to the contract in the fonn of a stipulation of an effective choice 
of law clause. In other words, the private international law rules of the selected forum 
will detennine the perimeters of the parties' choice of law options. 
1. Freedom of Choice of Law 
In a transnational contract, a properly drafted choice of law provision effectively reduces 
risk in the transnational legal environment. A survey of national codifications and the 
prevailing common law approaches in the United States, United Kingdom and other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, as well as the most recent international codification of 
conflict of law rules, leads to the conclusion that the principle of choice of law freedom 
of the parties is almost universally recognized at the present time.8 The essential 
differences lie in determining the criteria limitations, and general perimeters for the 
parties' exercise of choice of law freedom. 
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) adopts a modem and liberal approach for 
party autonomy in § 1-105, providing: 
7 For an excellent and comprehensive discussion by leading authorities, see Symposium, U. S. Trade Policy: 
Problems and Options, New York University Journal of International Law, 1986, 1075. 
8 GABOR, supra note 6. at 706-708 (for Hie United States). See P ELI С H ET, M.: Report on the Law 
Applicable to International Sales of Goods (Prel. Doc. No. 1, SeiK. 1982), 95-119. See also JOHNSTON: Party 
Autonomy in Contracts Specifying Foreign Law, Wilhem <t Mary Law Review, 1966, 37. 
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When a transaction bears a reasonable relation to (his state and also to another state 
or nation, the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state 
or nation shall govern their rights and duties. ' 
Thus, § 1 -105 codifies a two-tier test. First, the parties must agree on tlie governing law. 
Second, the transaction must bear a reasonable relation to the state of the chosen law. 
The official comment to § 1-105 does not define the term "reasonable relation". 
Subsequent case law has identified a number of relevant factors to be considered in 
determining whether a relation is reasonable. The factors include the location of the 
signing of the contract, the parties' principal places of business, the place where the 
greater part of performance occurred or was to have occurred, and the location of any 
property subject to the contract.10 
In American conflict of laws, therefore, § 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
offers a flexible framework for die parties choice of law freedom, which has been further 
refined by leading judicial decisions." Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws did not 
provide choice of law freedom for tlie contracting parties, based on theoretical grounds 
that denied the parties' rights to become legislators in their private contract.12 Judicial 
practice, even in states holding this traditional approach to conflict of laws, gradually 
recognized party autonomy in choice of law.13 
9 Uniform Commercial Code, § 1 -105 . See also LEFLAR: Conflict of Laws Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, Arkansas Law Review, 1981, 91-100. 
10 LEFLAR: ibid. 9, at 91-100. 
11 One annotation of the Uniform Commercial Code, illustrates this point: 
Where a loan agreement between Venezuelan corporate borrower and Swiss corporate lender contained 
choice of law clause naming New York law as governing, and there were considerable contacts with New York, 
New York law governed. 
Where a Venezuelan corporation borrowed money f rom Swiss corporation with principal place of business 
in New York, notes were delivered to lender in New York. New York was the place where lender paid to 
guarantor's commission on guarantees, and prior loan agreement between parties provided New York law would 
govern, New York law governed second loan agreement, wlticli contained no choice-of-law provision. 
Corporation Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F. 2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 449 
U. S. 1080., 1 University of Los Angeles, 15 (1986). 
12 See Note, Effectiveness of Choice of Law O n u s e s in Contract Confl icts of Law: Party Autonomy or 
Objective Determination, Columbia Law Review, 1982, 1661. 
13 See Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124 (1882) ("presumed intention"); Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 
Ltd., 221 F. 2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955). A more recent case, Goodwin Brothers Leasing, Inc. v. H & В, Inc., 597 
S. W. 2 d 303 (Tenn. 1980), retained the traditional approach of the Restatement of Conflicts of Law § 332 
(1934) [hereinafter: Restatement]. In (his case, the corporate parties st ipulated the law of a state which 
permitted the extraction of a higher rate of interest on loans than did the law of the other interested state. Tlie 
Tennessee Supreme Court relied on Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co. , 274 U. S. 403 (1927), in 
recognizing the validation principle in contracts. As long as the contract has a substantial natural relationship 
with the law of the validating state, and the difference between the two interest rates is not substantial , the 
parties ' expectation shall be given effect. Tlie Tennessee Supreme Cour t further referred to Uniform 
Commercial Code, § 1-105 as the uniform foundation for the parties' au tonomy. It is interesting that leading 
provisions of Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law (1971) [hereinafter Restatement (Second)], Chapter 
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Today most of the states follow the modem approach of Restatement Second of 
Conflict of Laws. Article 187 provides a more refined premise for the parties' choice of 
law decisions.14 Here the "reasonable relations" requirement is replaced by the 
requirement of "substantial relationship" to the parties or to the transaction, or as an 
alternative, a "reasonable basis" requirement for the recognition of parties' choice of law. 
The parties' choice of law freedom can control any particular issue. Thus, Articles 1 and 
7 recognizes the notion of "depacage" by initially isolating the legal issues and applying 
a separate choice of law analysis to each of them. If the substantial relationship test is 
not satisfied, the alternative reasonable basis requirement can be satisfied by a properly 
drafted choice of forum clause.15 
An additional major limitation on the parties' choice of law freedom is based on "the 
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state 
and which would be the state of the applicable law in die absence of choice of law by 
the parties".16 In practical terms, an effective choice of law provision should be 
stipulated with reference to the conflict of laws system of the potential forum which will 
determine the applicable law in the absence of choice by the parlies, or in the case when 
this choice is disregarded. On this basis, die fundamental policy of the otherwise 
applicable law and the forum must be analyzed and assessed, and then the factual 
contacts should be closely scrutinized between the jurisdiction and the selected law to 
determine which state has a materially greater interest in applying its own policies. 
In comparison to the relatively restrictive American approach to party autonomy, that 
of civil law countries, generally provides more freedom for die parues' choice of law.17 
6, and Chapter 8 §§ 186, 203, were also analyzed and relied on in making the proper evaluation of the parties' 
autonomy. See also JAMES: Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on Conflict of Laws Concial Contracts, 
Georgian Law Journal, 1958, 260; WEINBERGER: Parly Autonomy and Choice-of-Law: The Restatement 
(Second), Interest Analysis, and the Search for a Methodological Synthesis. Hofstra Review, 1957, 553; Note, 
Commercial Security and Uniformity Through Express Stipulations in Contracts as to Governing Law, 
Harvard Law Review, 1949, 647. 
14 See Note, supra note 12 (an interesting analytical approach opposing party autonomy). 
15 For a comprehensive overview, see GILBERT: Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate 
Contracts, Kentucky Law Journal, 1976, 1. 
16 Barnes Group, Inc. v. С & С Products, Inc., 716 F. 2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1983) (a restrictive covenant is found 
to violate fundamental state policy). See also Southern International Sales Co. v. Potter & Brumfield Div. of 
AMF, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1339 (S. [). N. Y. 1976) (invalidating a clause permitting termination at will of a 
dealer 's contract and choosing Indiana law as controlling, because the clause was enforceable and the 
defendant's operations were based in Indiana. Plaintiff, a Puerto Rican corporation, successfully relied on a 
Commonwealth statute protecting against unilateral termination clauses to override the choice of law). 
17 A Swiss Draft was published in 10 Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über das internationale Privalrecht BB1 
82.072 (1982). The Federal Republic of Germany Draft was published in 5 Praxis des Internationalen Privat-
und Verfahrensrecht (1983). The Austrian Federal Statute on Private International Law is found in 15 
Bundesgesetz (June 1987), Bundesgesetzblatt No. 304, translated in American Journal of Comparative Law, 
1980, 197. 
For the People's Republic of Hungary approach to conflicts, see A Magyar Népköztársaság Elnöki 
Tanácsának 1979. évi 13. számú törvényerejű rendelete a nemzetközi magánjogról (Law-decree No. 13 of the 
Presidential Council of the Hungarian People 's Republic on Private International Law), Magyar Közlöny, 
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Generally, civil law countries do not require a "reasonable" or "substantial" nexus 
between the chosen law and the essential elements of the transaction or the contracting 
parties. The parties may choose any law. The Vienna Convention recognizes the parties' 
autonomy in flexible language stated in Article 6: "The parlies may exclude the 
application of this Convention, ... derogate from it or vary the effect of any of its 
provisions. '"8 
Article VII (1) of the Hague Draft Convention supplemented this relatively general 
and vague provision by providing more specifically that: 
A contract of sale is governed by the law chosen by the parties. The parties' 
agreement on this choice must be expressed or be clearly demonstrated by the terms 
of the contract and the conduct of the parties, viewed in their entirety. Such a choice 
may be limited to a part of the contract ." 
This threshold provision allows the parties complete freedom margin to choose the law 
applicable to their contract. There are two alternative requirements in drafting the criteria 
for the proper choice of law provisions according to the Hague Draft Convention. First, 
the choice of law should preferably be made expressly in the contract. Second, as an 
alternative, an implied choice of law by the parties is acceptable under the Hague Draft 
Convention.20 It is obvious that no further requirement for the parties' choice of law, 
in particular, no nexus between the law and the parties or the transaction be met. On the 
other hand, if the other sections of the Hague Draft Convention are considered, Article 
1979, 495, t ranslated in GABOR, F. A.: A Socialist Approach to Codification of Private International Law 
in Hungary: Comments and Translation, Tu lane Law Review, 1980, 63, 80. 
For the USSR approach, see Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislat ion of the USSR and for the 
Union Republ ics , Law of Dec. 8, 1961, 18 Ved. Verkh . Sov. SSSR no. 525 ; Fundamental Pr inciples of 
Legislation of the USSR and of the Union Republics on Marriage and the Family, Law of June 27, 1968, 
8 Ved. Verkli. Sov. SSSR. See also GABOR, F. A.—MAVI, V.: Harmonization of Private International Law 
in the Soviet Union and Lastern Europe: Comparative Law Survey, Review of Socialist Law, 1984, 97. For 
Czechos lovakia ' s approach to private international law, see Code of International Trade, discussed in Glos, 
The Czechos lovak Law of Sale, Review of Socialist Law, 1978, 107. For the Polish approach, s ee Law of 
Nov. 12, 1965, Concerning Private International Law, 46 Dziennik Ustaw Polskiej Rzecrypospol i te j 
Lodowej i tem 290, discussed in LASOK: The Polish System of Private International Law, American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 1967, 330. For the German Democratic Republ ic ' s private internat ional law, 
see Law of Dec. 5, 1975, [1975) Gesetzblatt Der DDR I 748, discussed in JUENGER: The Conf l ic ts 
Statute of the German Democrat ic Republic: An Introduction and Translat ion, American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 1977, 332. See generally MADL, F.: Foreign Trade Monopoly-Private International 
Law, 1967, 53; ROMAN: Socialist Conflict of Laws Rules and Practice in East-West Trade Contrac ts , Law 
and Policy in Internatioiuil Business, 1975, 1 113. 
18 Sales Convention, art. 6. 
19 GABOR: supra note 6, at 706-708. See also D O R E : Choice of Law Under the International Sales 
Convention: A U. S. Perspective, American Journal of International Law, 1983, 521, 529-536. 
20 See Travaux Préparatoires, in Hague Convention Minutes No. 6 of Commission I: Intervention Nos. 45-65, 
(1985). 
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17 and Article 18 refer to both the traditional negative and the more recent positive form 
of public policy of the forum state as controlling the parties' choice of law freedom.21 
In sum, the parties' choice of law provisions of the Hague Draft Convention and the 
Uniform Commercial Code can be reconciled in future judicial practice. Both Article 7 
of the Hague Convention and § 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code reflect the need 
for flexibility in international commerce. The essential difference lies in the requirement 
of the UCC of a "reasonable relationship" as additional criteria. In judicial practice, 
however, the public policy of the potential forum and the other closely interested and 
related states can also maintain effective control over lite parties' autonomy, and die 
reasonable relationship test may become superfluous. 
2. Forum Selection Clauses 
The revitalized lex mercatoria of the Vienna Convention and the Hague Draft Convention 
will be applied by national courts and arbitration tribunals. It is an unavoidable reality that 
the legal and cultural background of each decision-maker will influence his implementation 
of the interpretation of the uniform laws. For this reason, both Article 8 of the Vienna 
Convention and Article 16 of the Hague Draft Convention address the threshold problem 
of effective interpretation. These provisions can be considered a key to the future success 
of the Conventions. Accordingly, the interpretation of the Convention should be based on 
its international character and on the need to promote uniformity in its application.22 An 
ideal solution to more effective interpretation of the new lex mercatoria is the designation 
of an internationally recognized judicial or arbitration authority for consistent and binding 
interpretation of the relevant Conventions.21 
For the immediate future, however, the pragmatic implementation of the uniform 
commercial laws can be based on die contracting parties' autonomy in controlling the 
perimeters of the dispute settlement. It is an encouraging development that forum 
selection or prorogation clauses and arbitration clauses are almost universally recognized 
by the world trading nations.24 While forum selection clauses are universally recognized, 
21 Id. 
22 GABOR: supra note 6, at 723. Article 16 of the Hague Draft Convention addresses one of the more 
significant threshold questions of effective interpretation, a key to the future success of the Convention. Article 
16 provides that "[iln the interpretation of the [Hague Draft) Convention, regard is to be had to its international 
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application". In a decentralized transnational legal 
environment, the decision-makers in disputes must rely on this provision in order to escape their respective 
national heritages and biases in interpreting transnational contracts. Titus, the emphasis is on recognizing the 
importance of the international character of transactions and the objective of uniformity in the construction of 
the Hague Draft Convention. This guideline for interpretation coincides with the basic guidelines provided in 
Article 8 of the Sales Convention. 
23 Id. at 726. 
24 See FARQUHARSON: Choice of Forum Clauses: Brief Survey of Anglo-American Law International Law, 
1974, 83, 91-93; SHUZ: Controlling Forum Shopping, International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 1986, 
374, 377. 
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the actual criteria and requirements for their recognition show significant differences. 
International unification of forum selection clauses would serve a very useful purpose. 
Unfortunately, the Hague Convention on the Unification of Choice of Forum Clauses did 
not receive wide support and has not received a sufficient number of ratifications to 
become effective at the present time.25 
Traditionally, American courts expressed hostility toward forum selection clauses. 
The courts believed that this type of clause could deprive the court of its legitimate 
jurisdictional power; therefore, in many cases they rejected it as violating the public 
policy of the otherwise available forum court.26 In 1972, tire United States Supreme 
Court, in the landmark decision of Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Company,27 adopted 
a new approach to forum selection clauses in transnational contracts. In this case, 
Zapata, a Houston-based American corporation, contracted with a German corporation, 
Unterweser, to tow the parties' drilling rig from Louisiana to Italy. The contract 
between them provided that "any dispute arising must be treated before the London 
Court of Justice".28 In addition, the contract contained two clauses exculpating 
Unterweser from liability for damage done to the barge being towed. As the result of 
damages suffered to the drilling rig, law suits were filed in the United States and 
English courus.29 
The English Court of Appeals refused to stay the English action, stating that Zapata 
had failed to show the strong reasons necessary to overcome the prima facie presumption 
that forum selection clauses are valid.30 Zapata had argued that some of the witnesses 
25 DAVID: The International Unification of Private Law, in 2 International Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law, 1976, 145-148. 
26 Tliis traditional judicial hostility has taeen changing, as reflected in Restatement (Second), supra note 13, 
§ 80. Today, choice-of-forum agreements have been enforced except when it is "unfair or unreasonable" to do 
so. See Model Choice of Forum Act (a uniform law adopted lay four states and withdrawn in 1975), reprinted 
in Handbook of The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Stale Laws, 1976, 351. 
27 407 U. S. 1 (1972). 
28 The Chaparral/Bremen Litigation: Two Commentaries, International tmd Comparative Law Quarterly, 
1973, 329. See also JUENGER: Supreme Court Validation of Forum-Selection Clauses, Wayne law Review, 
1972, 49; NADELMANN: Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United Stales: The Road to Zapata, American Journal 
of Comparative Law, 1973, 124; REESE: The Supreme Court Supports Enforcement of Choice-Forum Clauses, 
International Law. 1973, 530. 
29 Bremen, 407 II. S. at 2. 
30 Today an English court would apply the European Economic Communi ty Convention on Jurisdiction and 
the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 15 J. O. Comm. Eur. (No. 
299) 32 (1972) (entered into force for original member states Feb. 1, 1973), translated in 3 Common Mkt. Rep. 
(CCH) 6003 (1977) [hereinafter Brussels Convention). One of the parties to the agreement, Unterweser, was 
domiciled in the Federal Republic of Germany, a country which ratified the Brüssel Convention; the forum 
selected, England, was also a party to tliis Convention. Tims, Article 17 of the Brussels Convention would apply 
and the English courts would be required to enforce this forum selection clause. Tliis result was achieved by 
the English Court of Appeals wliich considered this case. Unterweser Reederei G. M. L. H. v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Co., 2 L loyd ' s Rep. 158 (С. А. 1968). See also G1ARDINA: The European Court and the Brussels Convention 
on Jurisdiction and Judgments. International and Cnmnarntive Jaw Ouarterlv 1078 763—767 
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to this action were Americans and that evidence relating to issues of fact was in the 
United States. However, Justice Willmer observed that a number of tlie witnesses were 
German, and the tug was German and manned by German crew. The fact that the 
majority of the witnesses were in America was insufficient to stay the English action. As 
the contract between the parties provided for the application of tlie English law, the court 
did not have to consider the effect of applying a foreign law." 
Meanwhile, in the United States, suit had been brought in the United States District 
Court in Tampa, Florida. Unterweser's attempt to dismiss this action eventually reached 
the United States Supreme Court.'2 The Supreme Court adopted the English view and 
announced the prima facie presumption in favor of tlie validity and enforceability of 
choice of forum clauses. This presumption, die court believed, was merely the other side 
of die proposition recognized in National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Szukhentwhich 
indicates tiiat parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to die jurisdiction of 
a given court. As a result of diis presumption, the party bringing the suit in a court other 
tiian the contracted choice of forum bears a "heavy burden" of proof. The parties 
resisting the choice of forum provision have die burden of clearly showing either that the 
clause is invalid because of fraud or overreaching, or that enforcement of the clause will 
be unreasonable or unjust under the particular circumstances of the case.34 In diese 
circumstances the court found no evidence of fraud or overreaching, and England was 
held not to be an unreasonable forum, due to neutrality and expertise of the London 
Court in admiralty cases. In addition, litigating in England would not place an 
unreasonable burden on Zapata.35 
The Supreme Court indicated diat a contracted choice of forum may not be 
enforceable if enforcement would contravene "a strong public policy" of die forum in 
which the action is brought.36 Zapata had argued diat exculpation clauses contravene 
public policy, and since these were enforceable in England, diat the forum selection 
clause should not be enforced. The United States Supreme Court found, however, that 
the exculpation clauses in international towage contracts did not violate public policy.37 
On the other hand, if a contracted choice of forum provision would result in the violation 
of a binding federal regulation, public policy would be violated and the provision would 
not be enforced. 
Although Bremen was an admiralty case involving a foreign forum, its holding is 
not limited to admiralty cases but applies to all federal court cases involving forum 
selection clauses, even if a domestic forum is chosen and die action is between parties 
31 Zapata 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 160-161. 
32 Bremen, 407 U. S. 1 (1972). 
33 375 U. S. 311 (1964). 
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of different states.38 Moreover, a number of states have also adopted the Bremen 
decision.39 
The Bremen rationale was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in S her к v. 
Alberto Culver Co.40 to enforce a contract clause providing for settlement of disputes 
by arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France. Despite 
this clause, the American party to the agreement brought suit in the Third District Court 
in Illinois. The Supreme Court held that an agreement to arbitrate before a specified 
tribunal is in effect a specialized kind of forum selection clause that designates not only 
the site of the suit, but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.41 
Party autonomy to control the method of dispute settlement in a transnational contract 
is almost universally recognized. One of the most important regional developments in this 
area is the ratification by most of the members of the European Economic Community 
("Brussels Convention")42 of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgment. 
Article 17 of the Brussels Convention allows the contracting parties to confer jurisdiction 
on the courts of the member 's state by agreement. Agreement to confer jurisdiction 
overrides all other bases of jurisdiction, except in those matters in which a court has 
exclusive jurisdiction.43 The requirements for drafting a valid prorogation clause under 
the Brussels Convention are strictly construed by leading cases submitted for inter-
pretation to the European Court of Justice.44 The forum selection clause must be in 
writing and must designate precisely the jurisdiction of the court and reflect a valid 
agreement by both parties. Thus, the essential criteria for evaluation of the parties' choice 
of forum clause is comparable to the American approach outlined in the Bremen decision, 
the court will examine the agreement for overreaching, unequal bargaining positions or 
any other illegalities in the consent which invalidate the contractual choice of forum. As 
long as the parties manifest a valid consent in writing, however, the European courts will 
not go further to scrutinize the potential hardship on one of the parties or the possibility 
of violation of public policy of the otherwise available forum. 
Arbitration provides a more internationally accepted form of dispute set t lement in 
transnational contract disputes. In 1970 the United States became a party to the 1958 
United Nation Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration 
38 See J U E N G E R : supra note 28, at 59. The Bremen rationale was adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court in Sherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U. S. 506 (1973). To enforce a contract clause providing for 
settlement of disputes by arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France. Despite 
this clause, the United States party to the agreement brought suit in the Third District Court in Illinois. The 
Supreme Court held that an agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized forum 
selection clause that designates not only the site of the suit, but the procedure to be used in resolving the 
dispute as well. Id. at 519. 
39 Mannrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 439, 439 n. 3 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1986). 
40 Sherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U. S. 506. Lawyers edition. Second. 270 (1974). 
41 Id. 
42 Brussels Convention, supra note 30. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
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Awards ("Arbitration Convention").45 In light of this globally adopted Arbitration 
Convention, arbitration offers a more uniform method of dispute settlement in a 
transnational contract at the present time. The major advantage of arbitration from the 
American perspective is the internationally assured recognition of arbitration awards 
under the Arbitration Convention and the United States' well-established bilateral 
treaty network in this area.46 At the same time, the United States has no international 
treaty relationship on recognition and enforcement of its judicial judgments abroad or 
vice versa. This presents one of the most unsettled and disturbing areas of the 
American private international law. Therefore, the effective exercise of party autonomy 
should also extend to the planning of die recognition and enforcement of the final 
judgements. 
In sum, the most effective implementation of die Vienna Convention from the 
American perspective lies in the full recognition and refined application of the contracting 
parties' autonomy. The relatively unsetded state of private international law governing 
transnational contracts places a greater responsibility on international legal counsel in 
drafting an enforceable, valid choice of law and forum selection provision in every major 
transnational contract. The exercise of party autonomy should be based on the following 
step-by-step analysis: 
1. a solid understanding of the newly revitalized lex mercatoria of the Vienna 
Convention and other related conventions; 
2. a comparative law assessment of die commercial law heritage of both countries 
in the transnational contract; 
3. selection of the proper forum for dispute settlement which is recognized by both 
the country of the seller and die buyer, as well as other interested countries; and 
4. assessment of the private international law rules of die selected forum and the 
other connected states (at least the private international law system of the state of the 
seller and the buyer) as a condition for drafting an effective and enforceable choice of 
law provision. 
Even experienced international legal counsel faces considerable difficulty in following 
diis step-by-step analysis in drafting an effective choice of forum clause. Publication of 
a comprehensive digest covering the relevant municipal and transnational legislative and 
judicial sources with authoritative scholarly interpretation on die effective exercise of the 
contractual party autonomy would provide a useful guide. Such a publication might also 
aid in achieving early uniformity in such provisions.47 
45 Convention on tlie Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Approved Sept. 1, 1970, 21 
U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997, 330 U. N. T. S. 3. 
46 See International Chamber of Commerce, International Arbitration, 1984. 
47 There are several multi-volume publications covering transnational commercial laws, such as Digest of 
Commercial Laws of The World (G. Kohlik ed. 1985). Ulis proposal would focus on the private international 
law aspects of the transnational contracts. 
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IV. Applicable Law in the Absence of an Exercised Choice 
It is certainly the preferred solution for the contracting parties to exercise their autonomy 
and to stipulate an effective forum selection and choice of law clauses in their cont rac t 
Both national and international codifications of private international law strongly prefer 
and rely on the exercise of the parties' contractual autonomy. In the absence of choice 
of law by the parties, national laws provide more or less comparable directions for the 
applicable law. The analysis of this article now turns to a comparison of the prevailing 
American approaches set out in the Uniform Commercial Code and Restatement Second 
on Conflict of Laws with the most recent conflict of law rules applicable to international 
sale of goods set out in the Hague Draft Convention.48 
The 1972 official text of the Uniform Commercial Code provides only a very brief 
choice of law rules to govern in the absence of the contractual choice of the parties. 
Section 1 - 1 0 5 of the UCC provides: 
Except as provided hereafter in this section, [and] failing such agreement this Act 
applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state. 
The major objective of this section is to extend the scope of application of the Uniform 
Commercial Code as far as possible. The permanent editorial board of the U C C and 
leading legal scholars believe that the application of the UCC should be extended. They 
justify this extension with a number of factors, including its comprehensiveness, the 
uniformity that it provides, and its reformulation and restatement of the law merchant, 
its role in furthering the understanding of the business community of transnational 
dq 
contracts. 
The Uniform Commercial Code truly became the uniform substantive law within the 
United States by the middle of the 1970s, and as a result interstate conflict of law 
problems diminished. At the same time, llie very simple and misleadingly straightforward 
language of § 1-105 did not seem to be sufficient to cover the complexities of 
transnational contracts. The "appropriate relation" test refers to the choice of law system 
of the particular forum. Thus, it is an unsettled and unhannonized choice of law system 
of each of the fifty American jurisdictions which will determine when the U C C or the 
particular foreign commercial law will control the transaction. 
Jurisdictions following Restatement First on Conflict of Laws still retain the relatively 
simple, jurisdiction-selecting connecting factors.5" Accordingly, all relevant questions 
48 Restatement (Second), supra note 13, §§ 188-221. 
49 See, e.g. LEFLAR: supra note 9, at 100-103. 
50 Restatement, supra note 13, $ 332: 
LAW GOVERNING VALIDITY O F C O N T R A C T 
The law of the place of contracting determines the validity and effect of a promise with respect to 
(a) capacity to make the contract; 
(b) the necessary form, if any, in which the promise must be made; 
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relating to the substantive validity of the contract will be determined by the law of the 
place of acceptance, while the subsequent legal questions concerning the performance of 
the contract should be referred to the designated place of performance.51 In addition to 
these two prevailing rules, most of the courts following the First Restatement also give 
some recognition to the parties' implied or tacit choice of law in the form of the principle 
of validation.52 
Today we are facing the definite trend that Restatement Second of Conflicts of Laws, 
which was published in 1971 (just a year before the publication of the most recent 
official version of the Uniform Commercial Code) is gradually becoming the controlling 
source of authority in most of the American jurisdictions.53 Restatement Second analysis 
(c) the mutual assent or consideration, if any, required to make a promise binding; 
(d) any other requirements for making a promise binding; 
(e) fraud, illegality, or any other circumstance which make a promise void or voidable; 
(f) except as stated in 358, the nature and extent of the duty for the performance of which a party 
becomes bound; 
(g) the time when and the place where the promise is by its terms to be performed; 
(It) the absolute or conditional character of the promise. 
Section 358 provides: 
LAW GOVERNING PERFORMANCE 
The duty of the performance of which a parly to a contract is bound will be discharged by compliance 
witli the law of the place of performance of the promise with respect to 
(a) the manner of performance; 
(b) the time and locality of performance; 
(c) the person or persons whom or to whom performance shall be made or rendered; 
(d) the sufficiency of performance; 
(e) excuse for non-performance. 
51 See supra note 50. Exclusive reliance on rigid connecting factors, such as lex loci contractus (law of the 
place of the contract), has been strongly criticized by most authorities in both common and civil law countries. 
Section 188 of Restatement (Second), supra note 13, § 188. Cf. Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations (European Economic Communities), Official Journal European Communities (No. L. 
266) 1 (Oct. 1980) (abandonment of mechanical choice of law rules in regional codification) [hereinafter Rome 
Contractual Obligations Treaty], 
52 E.g., Pritcltard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124 (1882) ("presumed intention" as a basis for validation of interstate 
commercial contracts). See generally 3 EHRENZWEIG. A.: Private International Law: A Comparative Treatise 
on American International Conflict of law, 1977, 15-33. 
53 Cases relying heavily on the Restatement (Second) include: Bankers Trust Co. v. Crawford, 781 F. 2d 39 
(3rd Cir. 1986) (holder in due course rights governed by law of place of transfer of cashier's check); Partrederiet 
Treasure Saga Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 804 F. 2d 308 (5th Cir. 1986) (forum non-conveniens case, § 145.2); 
Syndicate 420 at Lloyd's London v. Early Am. Ins., 796 F. 2d 821 (5th Cir. 1986) (forum non-conveniens case, 
§ 188); Kashfi v. Phibro-Salamon, Inc., No. 83-4358 (S. I). N. Y. 1986) (forum non-conveniens case, § 202); 
Johnson v. Ronamy Consumer Credit Corp., 515 A. 2d 682 (Del. 1986) (§ 194); Webb v. Dessert Seed Co. Inc., 
718 P. 2d 1057 (Colo. 1986) (§ 191); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Ferrin. 487 N. E. 2d 568 (Ohio 1986) (§ 188). 
Restatement (Second) § 191 was also used to inject meaning into the "appropriate relationship" test contained 
in Uniform Commercial Code, § 1-105(2). Alpen A Wolfman v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406 (Vt. 1986). More-
over, Restatement (Second) is becoming the standard of reference in most cases using the "modern" approach, 
not just those wliich explicitly adqil it, and there is an increasing tendency to use its presumptions as localizing 
factors. See KOZYRIS: Choice of Law Cases in 1986. A. R. A. Sec. Conflict of Laws Newsletter (Dec. 1987). 
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relies on the modem policy-oriented approach. The innovative starting point is the 
identification of the relevant legal issue, the isolation of the issue, and application of a 
complex analysis to this particular issue. This new starting point is called "dcpacage" and 
is an innovative American method of resolving choice of law problems. Unfortunately, 
the same analysis shall govern, without regard to the nature of the problem, whether it 
is interstate or international in its essential character. The starting point for determining 
the relevant legal issues related to the validity of a contract for the sale of interest in 
movable property (chattels), should be the presumptive rule of Article 191 of Restatement 
Second. It provides: 
The validity of a contract for the sale of an interest in a chattel and the rights created 
thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, 
by the local law of the state where under the terms of the contract the seller is to 
deliver the chattel unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a 
more significant relationship under the principles stated in Article 6 to the transaction 
and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will apply. 
In the context of "the appropriate relation" clause test of the UCC, the core of Article 
191 refers to the place of delivery by the seller. The place of delivery is the place where, 
in the words of § 2-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the seller "completes his 
performance with reference to die physical delivery" of the chattel.54 In the case of 
F.O.B, or C.I.F. contracts for instance, the place of delivery generally will be in die place 
where the seller surrenders die physical possession and control of the goods and delivers 
diem to the carrier or other intermediary party for final shipment to the buyer.55 The 
relatively simple solution of Article 191 is a presumptive choice of law rule, which 
always can be replaced if the particular issue has a more significant relationship to 
another state under the general principles of Articles 6 and 188. The comments of the 
Restatement Second following Article 191 however, recognize dial in die majority of the 
cases, the place of delivery will be the state where the seller has his domicile or principal 
place of business. Therefore, Article 191 frequendy leads to the application of the sellers' 
law. On die other hand, the law of the buyer's domicile or place of business will usually 
be applied, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, if the delivery of 
the contract takes place in that state.56 
The most important question for analysis is whether die prevailing American 
approach to choice of law in the international sale of gcxids manifested in Article 191 and 
Article 188 of the Restatement Second can be effectively reconciled with the emerging 
new unification of private international law set out in Article 8 of the Hague Draft 
5 4 Uniform Commercial Code, § 2 -401 . See also Restatement (Second) supra note 16, § 191 comment d. 
55 Restatement (Second), supra note 13, § 191 comment d. 
5 6 Id. comment f and illustrations. 
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Convention. This Convention worked out a sophisticated compromise in Article 8, which 
forms its core. Article 8 ( 1 ) provides that: 
To the extent that the law applicable to a contract of sale has not been chosen by the 
parties in accordance with Article 7, the contract is governed by the law of the state 
where the seller has his place of business at the time of completion of the contract5 7 
Accordingly, in the absence of choice of law by the parties, the law of the seller's 
principal place of business shall govern. The rationale for this choice of law rule lies in 
the legal and socio-economic foundation of the international sales contract. In a typical 
case, the seller bears the more complex and demanding performance in the transaction. 
The seller 's range of obligations are in relative terms, less precisely defined. Moreover, 
the seller faces more uncertainty in die transnational environment in the course of 
fulfilling contractual obligations. Therefore, the seller's reliance on die seller's own legal 
system to govern all aspects of the transnational contract contributes a great deal towards 
certainty, uniformity, and a sense of legal security.58 
The prevailing American approach under Restatement Second does not distinguish 
between domesdc and transnational contracts. The majority of American cases 
nonetheless reach a result comparable to that of Article 8(1) of die Hague Draft 
Convention, pointing to the law of die seller. On the odier hand, die exceptions to the 
basic premise fonn the core of die Hague Draft Convention. The major shift from the law 
of the seller's state to the application of die law of die buyer's state is found in Article 
8(2). This provision states dial: 
The contract is governed by die law of the State where the buyer has his place of 
business at the time of conclusion of the contract, if 
(a) the negotiations were conducted, and the contract concluded by and in the 
presence of the parties, in that state; or 
(b) the contract provides expressly that die seller must perfonn his obligation to 
deliver the goods in that state; or 
(c) the contract was concluded on terms determined mainly by the buyer and in 
response to an invitation directed by die buyer to persons invited to bid. (a call for 
tenders).59 
The diree major exceptions in Article 8(2) reflect (he legal and socio-economic interests 
of buyers in international sales transactions. Most of die developing countries supported 
57 Hague Draft Convention, art. 8(1). 
58 PELICHET, M.: supra note 8, at 85-91. See also JAFFEY: l i te English Proper Law Doctrine and the EEC 
Convention, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1984, 531; LIPSTEIN, K.: Characteristic 
Performance-Л New Concept in the Conflict of Laws in Matters of Contracts for the EEC, Northwestern 
Journal of International Law <4 Business, 1981, 402, and 406-407. 
59 Hague Draft Convention, art. 8(2). 
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these exceptions for purposes of restoring the balance in favor of the potentially 
economically weaker buyer.60 The first exception has a narrow scope of application. It 
disregards to some extent the realities of modem international trade in that both 
negotiation and signing of the contract do not typically take place in the buyer 's state. 
The second exception presents more of a controversy. The practical impact of this 
exception is much more substantial, because it refers to the determination of the place 
of delivery of the seller. This requires a characterization of the essential elements of the 
contract by the potential forum. As long as there are no uniform laws in effect on this 
point, the injection of this exception creates inherent uncertainties in the application of 
the Hague Draf t Convention. 
The most controversial provision of the Hague Draft Convention lies in Article 8(3) 
which establishes the general escape clause from the application of Articles 8(1) and 8(2). 
This section reads: 
By way of exception, where in light of the circumstances as a whole, for instance, any 
business relations between the parties, the contract is manifestly more closely connected 
with the law which is not tlie law which would otherwise be applicable to the contract 
under paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Article, die contract is governed by that odier law.61 
The adoption of this general escape clause generated heated debate among the delegates to 
the Hague Draft Convention. Many of die civil law countries, including the one-time 
socialist countries, strongly opposed tiiis clause, emphasizing that it would create an 
inherent, dangerous uncertainty in the effective application of die Hague Convention. Tlie 
delegates of the civil law countries, relying on their legal heritage, emphasized the need for 
clearly defined a priori choice of law rules as die basic foundation for creating international 
legal security in this area. 
At the same time, most of the common law countries, including the United States, 
placed more weight on the need for practical flexibility in determining the private 
international law governing the international sale of goods. Tlie delegates from common law 
countries insisted that a general escape clause such as Article 8(3) forms a necessary part 
of the overall compromise to work out effective and uniformly recognized choice of law 
rules dealing with the international sale of goods.62 
The general escape clause of Article 8(3) of die Hague Draft Convention clearly 
expresses the American interest manifested under Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws 
and other modem approaches to conflict of laws.61 It is well recognized in die United 
60 Hague Convention Minutes, supra note 20, Intervention Nos. 5-10 . 
61 Hague Draft Convention, art. 8(3). 
62 See G A B O R : supra note 6, at 718-719 . 
63 See generally CORRIE: Tlie Verdict of quiescent Years, University of Chicago Law Review, 1961, 258; 
CURRIE: Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, Duke Law Journal. 1963, 1 ; 3 EHRENSWEIG, A. and 
JAYME, E.: Private International Law (spec. pt. 1977); KEGEL: Paternal Home and Dream Home: traditional 
Conflict of Laws and the American Reformers. American Journal of Comparative Law, 1979, 615; 
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States that Article 191 of Restatement Second expresses only a presumptive choice of law 
rule which can be replaced by referring to a policy-oriented analysis under the general 
principles of Article 188. The most significant relationship test of Restatement Second can 
be viewed as a discretional escape clause for the American judges. Thus, the general escape 
clause of the Hague Convention is quite consistent with the modern American choice of law 
methodology; its adoption by the United States will be very easy. The crucial question, still 
left open, is whether the American choice of law system effectively governs interstate legal 
relationships in a constitutionally coordinated federal system where the semi-sovereign states 
share common harmonized legal traditions. The federal system permits and necessitates 
legal flexibility. On the other hand, in the decentralized transnational legal environment, 
where there exists 185 sovereign municipal legal systems relying on their own unique 
national legal tradition, the question remains whether the same level of flexibility and 
uncertainty can be easily adopted. 
V. Proposal for Implementation of International Uniform Laws 
]. Vienna Convention 
Revitalization of the ancient lex mercatoria is one of the major achievements of our 
century. The creation of a uniform substantive law applicable to the international sale of 
goods eliminates a major "non-tariff trade barrier" to the free flow of goods and services 
across national boundaries. The United States has a vital interest in becoming an active 
participant of this process, as evidenced by its ratification of the Vienna Convention. 
The next phase of the unification of international trade law leads to the challenge of 
implementing the new rules on international and national levels. On the international level, 
the most important interest of the United States lies in the stimulation of global participation 
in the unification process. The signs are quite encouraging, as the drafting history and the 
large number of signatory states point to a potential world-wide ratification of the Vienna 
Convention.64 A major stumbling block for effective implementation lies in the unsettled 
status of private international law as excluded by the United States' and other countries' 
reservations.65 
The effective implemention of uniform laws should be based on the consistent and 
harmonious interpretation of their essential provisions. The most encouraging measure to 
achieve this goal lies in the creation of a central authority for authoritative interpretation of 
the provisions of the new uniform laws. One successful example of this method, provided 
NADELMANN: Impressionism and Unification of Law: The EEC Draft Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Contractual and Non-Contractual Obligations, American Journal of Comparative Law, 1976, 1. But see 
ZWEIGERT: Some Reflections on the Sociological Dimensions of Private International Law or What is Justice 
in the Conflict of Laws?, University of Colorado Law Review. 1973, 283 [This article was published in German 
as Zur Armut des internationalen Privatrechts an sozialen Werten, Rabeiszeitschrift, 1973, 435]. 
64 See WINSHIP: supra note 1, at 8-10. 
65 Sales Convention. U. S. reservation to art. 1(1) (6). 
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in the protocol which was adopted to the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Judgments,66 gave jurisdictional power to the European Court of Justice for binding 
interpretation of the Brussels Convention. A similar protocol is also attached to the new 
Rome Contractual Obligation Convention establishing uniform choice of law rules to 
contracts for the member states of the European Economic Community the ratification of 
which is expected in the near future.67 The same central authority obviously cannot be as 
easily established in the more diversified transnational community. An attempt should be 
made however, to designate a court or an arbitration tribunal for potential binding, or at 
least advisory, authority for interpretation of the Vienna Convention. 
As a more feasible alternative, a Digest should be established for the regular publication 
of leading national court and arbitration decisions relating to the Vienna Convention. Such 
a publication would promote consistent national implementation and interpretation of the 
Convention. A status table of the relevant ratifications with reservations and the significant 
scholarly and expert assessments of the leading provisions and cases could also be included 
in this comprehensive Digest.68 
On a national level of implementation of the new lex mercatoria, the United States 
should focus on its complex federal system. The Vienna Convention was ratified by the 
United States as an international treaty; therefore, under Article VI of the United States 
Constitution it is the binding law of the land. It is a self-executing treaty which does not 
require further legislative enactment.69 Accordingly, it is to be hoped that American courts 
and arbitration tribunals will give a consistent interpretation of this convention and that the 
leading cases will be published in an appropriate form. 
2. Hague Draft Convention 
At the same time, American private international law applicable to the international sale of 
goods requires prompt action on federal and stale levels. The long-term American interest 
would most likely be best served by federal legislation in this area. Congress has the 
constitutional power to enact such legislation under the enabling legislation section of 
66 Brussels Convention, supra note 30. 
67 The Rome Contractual Obligations Treaty, supra note 50, incorporates a joint declaration providing: 
l i t e Governments of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, on signing the Convention 
is applied as effectively as possible; Anxious to prevent differences of interpretation of the Convention f rom 
impairing its unifying effect; 
Declared themselves ready: 
1) to examine the possibility of conferring jurisdiction in certain matters on the Court of Justice of tlie 
European Communit ies and, if necessary, to negotiate an agreement to this effect; 
2) to arrange meetings at regular intervals between their representatives. 
68 GABOR: supra note 6, at 726. 
69 See generally McDOUGAL, M . - L A S S W E L L , H.—MILLER, J.: The Interpretation of Argeemenls arui 
World Public Order, 1972. 
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Article 4 paragraph 1 of the Full-Faith-and Credit clause. It is true that Congress never 
utilized this constitutional power in this area, and the overwhelming majority of conflict of 
law problems have been left for the individual states in our federal system. At this stage of 
international unification of commercial law, however, it is critical that the United States 
speak "in one language" with the rest of the world. Reliance on the conflict of law systems 
of fifty states creates a sense of uncertainty and confusion in transnational commercial 
relationships. The modem policy-oriented approaches to judicial and legislative jurisdiction 
of the Restatement Second can function effectively within our federal system where the 
Constitution and the common legal heritage present a strong cohesive force among the 
member states. The same rules tuid approaches, however, can be self-defeating and 
confusing if applied in a truly transnational context. Thus, the creation of order in the form 
of a federal unification is an essential step forward in the effective implementation of the 
new lex mercatoria in the United States. 
If a federal level of unification of international conflict of laws cannot be accomplished 
in the immediate future, another alternative for harmonization at the state level could be 
explored. The National Conference on Uniform State Laws can be used as an effective 
vehicle to implement international unification of private international law. The 
commissioners of uniform state laws can draft model legislation on subjects where state 
legislation might help implement international treaties of the United States, or where world 
unification would be desirable.7" 
The Hague Draft Convention could serve as an acceptable basis for drafting model 
legislation to extend the application of § 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Article 
26 of the Hague Draft Convention particularly takes into consideration the interest of federal 
systems.71 Uniform legislation is the preferred fonn of implementation of the Hague 
Convention for the United States. It could lake several years of experimentation on the state 
level before the legislation could be universally adopted. The United States is free under 
Articles 26 and 29 of the Hague Draft Convention to make selective reservations and 
suggest a revisions of the Hague Convention based on its experience in its federal system. 
The Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code should carefully consider 
and analyze this new Hague Draft Convention for future adoption as model legislation. 
Realistic national unification by litis vehicle can contribute to die elimination of a major 
"non-tariff trade barrier" for our free competition on the world market.72 
VI. Conclusion 
In sum, the United States' interest would be well served by ils "legal adoption" of the 
Hague Draft Convention, which represents thus far a neglected stepchild of the new lex 
70 See Handbook of The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of 
The Annual Conference Meeting in Its Ninety-Second Year 220—47 (1983). 
71 Hague Draft Convention, art. 26. 
72 LANDO, O.: Contracts, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 1976, 3-8. 
Private International Law front Ute Anterican Perspective 83 
mercatoria. The core choice of law provisions of the Hague Convention can be reconciled 
with the prevailing American judicial and arbitration practices under the Uniform 
Commercial Code and Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws. The scope of Section 
1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code can be extended by any of a number of alternative 
implementations of this uniform private international law regime of the new lex mercatoria. 
It is premature to assess the future international reception of the Hague Draf t 
Convention. The widespread ratification and implementation of the Vienna Convention 
certainly will significantly influence this process. In the meantime national choice of law 
solutions will be applied which according to Professor Reese's insight quite frequently will 
lead to comparable substantive results. Thus, the common underlying principles of different 
national approaches may lead die world trading nations to die acceptance of unavailable 
compromises manifested in the Hague Draft Convention. 
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Roman A. TOKARCZYK Biojurisprudence: 
A New Current in Jurisprudence 
The outline of the problems 
The moment of conception is the undeniable beginning of all deliberations on human life, 
as the supreme good that conditions the utilization of oiher goods. Human life, no matter 
how explained and justified, is unanimously regarded as the value of values. Human birth 
is the natural entry into the social and natural environment just as inevitable human death 
is also a natural way out. Man's biological nature alone determines, by conception, birth 
and death, the objective boundaries of deliberation on his life. 
The uniqueness of human life consists in the entwining of man 's biological nature and 
rational nature, and of the two with social nature. One-sided descriptions of human nature 
led to the formulation of one-sided paradigms that did not show all its sides: biologism, 
naturalism, evolutionism, rationalism, culturalism, sociologism, psychologisin, legalism etc. 
The interconnections of all sides of human nature are manifested more fully when its 
descriptions are subjected to evaluation and regulation in particular normative systems. 
The experience of all history of humankind demonstrates that different sides of human 
nature can be permeated both by good and evil. Good, unlike evil, does not require any 
normative regulation. Evil, which hurts the body with pain, can arouse evil in human 
rationality, which in tum provokes evil in man's social interactions. Other directions of evil 
penetration are also possible. Conceived in the rational or social layer of human nature, 
evil can affect its bodily side. Normative systems aim at preventing evils resulting f rom 
different sides of human nature, or at least at minimizing their effects . 
Descriptions, evaluations and norms concerning different aspects of human nature are 
the object of cognition consolidated through scientific knowledge of man forces narrow 
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specialization wherein fragments of tlie particular sides of the rich and interesting human 
nature can be known. Scientific specialization hampers a comprehensive and coherent 
description of human nature. There is therefore considerable truth in the words of Edgar 
Morin, a well-known French philosopher, that the last continent not yet explored by man 
is man himself. The comprehensive and coherent cognition of human nature is hindered 
by the rapid development of technology, which interferes in the life of man situated in 
the life of the natural environment. Scientific knowledge and resultant technology raise 
both great expectations and jus t as great fears. This is particularly evident in the 
development of human nature and the natural environment. 
The aiming at an overall and coherent understanding of human life leads to the 
formation of new currents of diought and the resultant new branches of knowledge. These 
holistic trends of thought belong to anthropology in the broadest sense. They produce 
new branches of knowledge that integrate the knowledge of different sides of human 
nature, segmented by narrow specialization. The most interesting branches of scientific 
knowledge concerned with that goal are at present diose which, basing on the descriptions 
of human life discovered by tlie biological sciences, formulate new value judgments 
derived from the ethical sciences, for tlie possible application of the medical and 
technological sciences regulated by the legal sciences. We can dius discern the contours 
of bioanthropology, anthropoethics, anthropopolitics, bioethics, biopolotics, biomedicine 
and other branches of science. 
Investigating the problems that combine die achievements of biological sciences in 
describing human life and the environment with their evaluation by the ethical sciences, 
for their frequently risk-laden (since experimental) application in medicine and 
technology, I find sufficient grounds to present the outline of a new current in juris-
prudence called biojurisprudence that accounts for tlie comprehensive and coherent 
treatment of some new problems. 
Characteristics of biojurisprudence 
I derive the name of biojurisprudence from the Greek word bios or life and the Latin 
word jurisprudentia — legal knowledge and wisdom. 
Biojurisprudence as the name of a new current in jurisprudence directly points to the 
connection between its subject matter and biology and jurisprudence. However, it does 
not directly indicate the existing links with medicine and ecology. These are manifested 
primarily in the application of technological achievements, sometimes hazardous for 
human life and harmful for tlie life of the environment. Biojurisprudence does not cover 
the whole subject matter of the aforesaid branches of science. It embraces only those 
parts that relate to human life and the life of the environment, often threatened by the 
risk-laden (since experimental) application of technology and thereby requiring legal 
protection. 
The subject matter of biojurisprudence covers all threats to human life from the 
moment of conception until death, requiring legal protection on account of frequent risk-
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laden experimentation. It also covers the protection of the life of the natural environment 
as the obvious condition of human life. In view of the natural rhythm of human life: birth 
preceded by conception, life and death, three segments of biojurisprudence can be 
distinguished: biojusgenesis, biojustherapy and biojusthanatology. 
Biojusgenesis deals with threats to human life that require legal protection f rom the 
moment of conception until death. The origins of the legal protection of this s tage of 
human life (nasciturus) go back to early Roman law, which, using legal fiction, treated 
the nasciturus as the bom child whenever his or her good was involved (nasciturus pro 
iam natu habetur quotiens de commodis eius agitur). The development of the legal 
protection of the nasciturus in Roman law and the related systems was characterized by 
the scattering of regulations in various branches of law. It is currently included in 
international law as part of human rights. It is confinned by national constitutional law. 
It is further specified by civil law within the scope of being a carrier of rights, legal 
capacity, and in property and non-property relations. It is consolidated by family law. It 
is broadened by contract laws, to especially include the law on offenses arisen during 
fetal life. It is recognized by succession law, which treats the nasciturus as a potential 
heir. It is protected by criminal law against unjustified annihilation. The catalog of 
situations that demand the intervention of the law during the period from the moment of 
conception to man's birth is widened by the dilemmas accompanying the conceptions of 
the right to life, genetic engineering, eugenics, assisted fertilization techniques, and 
techniques preventing conception and birth. All those manifestations of the nasciturus, 
rather uniform but artificially scattered in legal systems, arc comprehensively and 
coherently embraced by biojusgenesis as a segment of biojurisprudence. 
Biojustherapy can be extended to cover both human life and life of the natural 
environment. With regard to the protection of human life, biojustherapy deals primarily 
with the highly controversial problems ottfansplantalion of some cells, tissues and organs 
in order to improve the quality of and save human life. No less controversial is the 
complex of doubts about the advisability and scope of the legal regulation of euthanasia. 
The problem of suicide belongs to the subject matter of biojustherapy insofar as it stems 
from factors outside human nature that can be regulated by law. A highly specific 
character is displayed by the normative and legal aspects of population policy. The scope 
of biojustherapy also includes the issues of the protection of the life of the environment 
Since these have been comprehensively regulated in environmental law, they need not be 
dwelt upon. It mus t however, be stressed that environmental law can be treated as a 
special model for an overall and coherent solution as described by ecology and evaluated 
by ecological ethics. A similar comprehensive and coherent treatment would be desirable 
in the case of the scattered legal norms that protect human life. The conceptions of the 
right to life provide the conceptual ground for an overall treaunent of the legal protection 
of human life and the life of the environment. 
Biojusthanatology is especially concerned with the regulation by law of the end of 
human life: man 's death. Descriptions of death symptoms are provided by the advances 
in the biological, medical or even sociological sciences. The biological sciences treat of 
biological death, medical sciences of clinical and brain death, and finally the sociological 
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sciences deal with man's social death. Each of those kinds of human death can arouse 
a number of doubts that require, nevertheless, unequivocal solution by law. The doubts 
are mainly as to who, on what condition and for what ends decides about another man's 
death. Unequivocal legal solutions, with definite legal consequences caused by human 
death, belonging to biojusthanatology, could be developed on a broader plane of thought: 
that of biojusgenesis and biojustherapy as segments of biojurisprudence. The legal norms 
protecting human life from its conception until death could make up a branch of law 
called the human life protection law. 
The characteristics of jurisprudence is further deepened and enlarged by showing its 
links with the biological, medical, ethical and legal sciences. 
Biology and jurisprudence 
The juxtaposition of biology and biojurisprudence cannot miss die question about what 
unites and divides the two realms of scientific knowledge. For one thing, they are united 
by the first and divided by the second constituents of their names. 
The common subject matter of biology and biojurisprudence is manifested in the 
interest in human life as a continuous process in the natural environment, yielding to 
adaptation, accommodation and assimilation factors. However, while biology mainly 
describes human life and the life of the environment, jurisprudence, on these grounds and 
following selected axiological criteria, postulates the protection of life. The more precise 
the biological description of life and the more lucid the criteria of axiological evaluation 
of life, the easier it is for biojurisprudence to formulate postulates of regulating it. 
An extreme form of biologism or even panbiologism as a preferred way of explaining 
the world, both natural and social, from the biological viewpoint. Certainly, biologism, 
even less so panbiologism, does not leave much room for traditional jurisprudence, or 
even modem biojurisprudence in explaining the dilemmas of the protection of human life 
and the environment. Biologism, reinforced by spectacular achievements in genetics, 
embryology, genetic engineering, physiology, and bionics, developed peculiar worship of 
the biological sciences. Biological strands penetrated some currents in jurisprudence, 
notably in the form of evolutionism, racism, psychoanalysis, and behaviorism. However, 
biologism is most markedly felt in those doctrines of natural law that recognize the 
biological side of human nature as the proper source of moral and legal duties. Those 
doctrines, often without good reason, have in a way included the sphere of ethos in the 
sphere of bios. Biojurisprudence, while emphasizing the importance of advances in the 
biological sciences for the protection of life, does not reduce them to the extremes of 
biologism. 
An extreme form of biojurisprudence would be total legalism consisting in the 
attempts to regulate by law the whole of human life and the whole of the natural 
environment. Although the history of mankind has known such ideas, they should be 
decidedly rejected in view of the objectives of jurisprudence. For jurisprudence postulates 
regulation only of that scope of human life and the life of tire environment that is 
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threatened by the often risk-laden (since experimental) application of scientific 
discoveries through technology. Total legalism, as confirmed by the tragic experience of 
mankind, admitted arbitrarily of criminal exceptions, despite declarations of the total 
protection of human life and the life of the environment. Following political criteria, total 
legalism deprived of such protection the lives of whole groups of people exterminated 
for racial, national, religious or other reasons. Biojurisprudence firmly dissociates itself 
from the extremes of total legalism. 
l in l ike biologism influencing jurisprudence, the impact of jurisprudence on biology 
has never been very great. This impact can be felt, probably not very distinctly, through 
the connections of the philosophy of law with the philosophy of biology. For the two 
philosophies meet on the common ground of die philosophy of life also encountered 
under different names: practical philosophy, philosophy for everyone, wisdom of life, the 
art of life, the forming of life. 
Medicine and biojurisprudence 
The word medicine, derived from Latin mederi, has had many meanings in its long 
history. Two of them, however, are die most important: 1. the science of health and 
disease, 2. the art of healing as a practical skill of preventing disease and treating the 
sick. It was largely the second meaning that contributed to tlie formation of the subject 
matter of biojurisprudence. Medicine alone as a science does not have a direct influence 
on human life. This influence is only evident in the practice of treating disease, the more 
so if it utilizes techniques that are often risk-laden as they are experimental. Therefore, 
biojurisprudence attaches less importance to die art of healing in accord with medical 
canons or lege artis, as lawyers call it. For biojurisprudence far more important is the 
opposite of the art of healing called medical malpractice. However, biojurisprudence is 
primarily concerned with defining the legal grounds for risk-laden experimentation in the 
art of healing. 
Risk-laden experimentation in medicine became possible due to the advances in 
biological and technological sciences. The advances in the former define for medicine the 
range of risk-laden experimentation while the advances in the latter provide the means: 
medical techniques. Risk-laden experimentation in medicine certainly raises great 
expectations and equally great fears; it challenges the existing norms of the protection of 
human life and calls urgently for the making on new norms. The main task of 
biojurisprudence is thus to comprehensively and coherently present tlie conditions of the 
scope of regulation by law that provides the legal grounds for risk-laden experimentation 
in medicine. This is the task of the state authorities, which regulate and control medicine 
with the help of the law. Here, too, the extremes are possible: from full liberalism based 
on complete trust in tlie professional and moral competence of physicians to total 
legalism, which we reject, that tends to regulate by law everything that can be regulated. 
The two extremes are a theoretical model rather than a solution that could be 
consistently applied in medical practice. Medical practice, manifested through the art of 
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healing, will probably remain, as always, in the sphere of various compromises trying to 
balance divergent interests. 
Biojurisprudence, in its comprehensive and coherent treatment of that problem, can 
assist medicine in balancing divergent interests. This is possible provided that 
biojurisprudence itself attains such normative equilibrium that will be situated on the 
changing points between the protection of human life as the supreme value and the value 
of risk-laden experimentation in the art of healing. In determining these points, we can 
apply the taxonomy of the ways of legal regulation and medical techniques. The 
taxonomy of the ways of legal regulation can concentrate on the values protected (human 
life), medical techniques, motives for the protection of values and application of 
techniques, organizational structures of the protection of human life, admitting the use 
of these techniques. The taxonomy of medical techniques alone can be reduced to 
evaluations of technology that remain die object of intensive scientific investigation. The 
right combination, in the area of biojurisprudence, of the results of the two kinds of 
taxonomy can become an alternative both for groundlessly fatalistic and uncritically 
optimistic views. 
Morality and biojurisprudence 
The sense of the term 'morality', close to the Latin term moralilas, denotes the whole of 
judgments, norms, models and rules of conduct that protect the values of good, Tightness 
and justice binding through social acceptance. Theoretical views on morality are called 
ethics, but it is not only in scientific discourse that the tenu morality embraces both 
morality and ethics. Morality together with ethics is of paramount importance for 
biojurisprudence because not only does it judge and evaluate the objects of legal 
regulation but also provides models of such regulation in die form of moral norms. The 
crucial importance of morality for biojurisprudence can be expressed by means of two 
questions: 1. what is the connection of the legal status of norms with the moral status of 
norms?, 2. what is the scope, if any, of the necessity and admissibility of enforcing moral 
norms by means of legal ones? 
Question one prompts a search for the answers in ethical thought, which is home to 
extremely divergent views but in respect of the protection of human life it remains 
exceptionally unanimous. The connection of the legal status of norms with the moral 
status of norms is a reflection of the vast problems of the relation between morality and 
law. The existence or non-existence of this connection is justified by the thought essential 
both for ethics and jurisprudence. It is clearly substantiated by the thought of natural law 
and die accompanying thought of natural rights, whereas its existence is strongly denied 
by the thought of legal positivism. In die thought of the social contract (contractualism) 
Ulis connection is manifested indirectly while in highly influential utilitarian thought it 
is immaterial. All those currents of thought, however, are important for biojurisprudence, 
which seeks justification for the scope of regulation by law of the protection of human 
life and life of the environment against (lie threat of risk-laden experimentation. 
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Morality, also on account of its multiplicity of currents of thought, comprises the 
broadest scope of the protection of life. This is expressed by morality in general and by 
particular ethics built upon it, for example the ethics of the protection of life, ecological 
ethics, medical ethics etc. The scope of the protection of life by law is narrower because 
the scope of regulation by law is narrower. The task of biojurisprudence lies in 
comparing the ranges of regulation of the protection of life and indicating the scope that 
deserves to be regulated by law. There are thus instances of the scope of the protection 
of life regulated both by morality and by law, exclusively by morali ty or by law, and 
possibly neither by morality nor by law. The agreement between legal regulation and 
moral regulation is favourable to both of them with respect to their social acceptance. 
Disagreement of that kind weakens first of all the effectiveness of the law because the 
ineffectiveness of morality is less measurable and thereby less conspicuous. 
The other question leads to the answer that biojurisprudence has grown from a 
conviction of the necessity to enforce some moral norms that protect life by means of 
legal norms. This answer is too general: it should be developed on die vast scale of moral 
judgements ranging from moral scepticism (which expresses doubts in the possibility of 
knowing and rationally justifying moral judgements) to different varieties of moral 
relativism (referring judgements to relativized facts rather than to the criteria of universal 
rationality) to moral absolutism (which maintains that only one moral structure is 
acceptable: the divine command) and moral egoism (which seeks praxeologically 
effective means to realize the ends of subjective interests, not necessarily contradictory 
to moral altruism). The choice of particular moral judgements as the grounds for 
justifying a legal regulation belongs to the realm of politics, which formulates its law — 
making decisions in the broad systemic spectrum from democracy to dictatorship. 
Biojurisprudence is probably unable to overcome the antinomy, especially evident in 
newer moral systems, between the conceptions of die sanctity of life and those of the 
quality of life. The conceptions of die sanctity of life are included in religious moral 
systems, notably in Catholicism, demanding the extension of legal protection over the 
whole of human life from the moment of conception to natural death. They uphold, like 
all moral systems, the prohibition to kill a human being and the duty to protect sustain 
and save human life without any exception. However, the secular conceptions of the 
quality of life, while diey likewise uphold die prohibition to kill, yet they admit of 
numerous exceptions in respect of the protection of human life ( ' jusdfied ' war, the state 
of necessity, self-defense, death penalty, euthanasia, experimentadon risk, inevitable 
traffic accidents). Biojurisprudence cannot and will not compete widi die religious 
conceptions, therefore it relates to the secular conceptions. 
Jurisprudence and biojurisprudence 
Biojurisprudence is one of die currents in jurisprudence that reflects some effects of 
advances in the modem biological and technological sciences and in medicine, demanding 
regulation by law. The subject matter of biojurisprudence is die whole of legal thought, 
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legal norms in force and postulated, and legal practice concerning the protection of 
human life and of the natural environment. Like all other currents in jurisprudence it is 
incapable of promoting good directly. It can indirectly consolidate good by endeavours 
to prevent evil or, when this proves to be unsuccessful, to minimize its effects. 
Jurisprudence embraces the whole of legal thought, legal norms and practice, derived 
from the term ius used by Roman lawyers as unmatched masters in the art. Bio-
jurisprudence primarily relates to that sense of the term ius, which Celsus, an eminent 
Roman lawyer, formulated in a maxim: law is die art of applying that which is good and 
right (ius est ars boni et aequi). Jurisprudence has always been influenced by other 
branches of knowledge in its scope of the catalogues of protected values and their 
justification, less so with respect to the legal constructions and procedures themselves. 
These influences come from die older trends in jurisprudence, mainly natural law and 
legal positivism, and from its newer currents, for example jurisprudence of concepts and 
interests, and analytical jurisprudence. 
It would be difficult to overesdmate the vital importance of die conception of natural 
law for the whole of jurisprudence and also biojurisprudence. Based chiefly on philo-
sophical and ethical assumptions, the conceptions of natural law construct universal 
norms of die protection of man under rationalized freedom. It would hardly be possible 
to say same thing about die conceptions of legal positivism. Relating primarily to 
philosophical and politological voluntarist thought, die conceptions of legal positivism 
resolve conflicts between the protection of man and die protection of die state's interests 
in favour of the latter. Although the conceptions of natural law are decidedly closer to 
die assumptions of biojurisprudcnce (one can even say that it exhibits some features of 
natural law), yet the latter cannot ignore die conceptions of legal positivism characterized 
by greater realism. 
Biojurisprudence should also be generally situated among die newer currents in 
jurisprudence. Jurisprudence of concepts (Regrij fs jurisprudenz) , developed in the circle 
of German thought, points to the crucial or even law-making sense of legal concepts. 
This indication remains important also for biojurisprudence because precision of concepts 
is an immanent value of the whole of jurisprudence aiming at die univocality of concepts, 
strict formulations ;md clarity of constructions. A similar relationship obtains between 
biojurisprudence and Anglo-Saxon analytical jurisprudence, recognized as a variety of 
legal positivism based on the experience of die practice of common law. If jurisprudence 
of interests, having European origins, treats law as a means of resolving conflicts of 
interests in society, then biojurisprudence is entirely jurisprudence of interests but 
concentrated on the 'interest of interests'—the protection of human life and the life of the 
environment. Finally, sociological jurisprudence, developed on Nordi-American soil, and 
other possible currents in jurisprudence: economic, politological, psychological, 
anthropological, and integrative, reflect primarily those contexts of law that are signalled 
by their names. All diose contexts are found together in biojurisprudence since the 
protection of human life and die life of die natural environment are entangled in the 
whole complex of social relations. 
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Filiations between sciences 
Biojurisprudence, like every current in science, cannot claim a monopoly of the subject 
matter with which it deals. It has numerous and more or less complicated filiations with 
other branches of knowledges. Besides the problems that belong exclusively is its subject 
matter, it includes topics that partly overlap, intersect with or border the subject matter 
of other branches of science. As most branches of knowledge are interested in human life 
and many of them in the life of the natural environment, these filiations are extremely 
well developed. In order to mark the contours of the subject matter of biojurisprudence 
more clearly it is enough to mention its direct filiations with, on the one hand, two 
branches of knowledge with an ethical character and on the other hand, also with two 
branches with a jurisprudential character. In the former we touch upon some filiations of 
biojurisprudence with bioethics and medical ethics, and in the latter some filiations with 
medical law and forensic medicine. 
Bioethics derives its name from the combination of die Greek word bios or life and 
ethos or custom in the sense of morality. It is a new branch of knowledge, developed 
only since the 1960s. Like biojurisprudence it deals with die normative knowledge of 
the protection of human life and die life of die environment against die direats ac-
companying risk-laden experiments in utilizing the achievements of the biological 
sciences. In that sense, together with jurisprudence, it is included in the 'science of 
survival' of man and the environment. However, while bioethics strives for diat survival 
by means of sanctions arising out of moral norms, biojurisprudence tries to do so with 
legal sanctions. And it is at diat point that main differences between the two should be 
discerned. 
Medical ethics is a set of principles and moral norms that should bind physicians in 
the pracdce of dieir profession. As die ediics of one profession it is a specific 
concretization of the principles and norms of general ediics. Biojurisprudence relates both 
to parucular medical ethics and general ediics. Numerous codes of medical ediics, worked 
out for millennia, contain universal contents accepted by biojurisprudence. In most 
general terms, they focus 011 the patient's good, taking into account the interests of 
society. There are, however, fundamental differences of principles and norms between 
different kinds of medical ethics about whedier it is advisable to endow them with legal 
sanctions. According to the conceptions of die autonomy of medical ethics the regulation 
by law of the professionalism of physicians brings more harm than good because it 
restricts their freedom of decision. According to patemalisdc conceptions, however, the 
law should determine the limits of die physician's freedom of decision-making because 
this follows from the state's function towards medicine. Biojurisprudence favours the 
paternalistic conceptions but at the same time it emphasizes die necessity to limit to the 
necessary minimum the legal regulation of die professional practice of physicians. 
Medical law has marked its separate character mainly in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
As a separate branch of law it does not reflect diose divisions of legal systems into 
branches of law that are preserved in traditional jurisprudence. Therefore medical law 
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contains legal norms that are, on the one hand, so much homogeneous as to be interest 
for medicine, and, on the other hand, so much heterogeneous as to belong to various 
branches of law: from civil law to contract law and tort law to criminal law. It must be 
pointed out that this solution is very close to the assumptions of biojurisprudence. For its 
aim is to break the existing ties of legal norms protecting human life with various 
branches of law and to collect them, following the model of the law on the protection of 
natural environment, into a uniform and coherent whole. In its most general terms, 
medical law regulates the relations between physicians and patients and the organization 
of medical institutions. It includes the legal criteria of distinguishing between good 
medical practice (lege artis) and medical malpractice. Important rules of medical law 
concern the patients consent as to the form and range of therapy, the confidential 
character of information on his condition, the treating of the dying persons and the 
pronouncing of death. Medical law treats of diese norms from die medical point of view 
while biojurisprudence mainly from the standpoint of law. Moreover, the treatment by 
biojurisprudence of the problems of die protection of human life is more universal than 
their treatment by medical law. 
Forensic medicine is a branch of medical science whose objecdve is to apply it 
practically for the needs of the administration of justice. While biojurisprudence, 
bioethics, medical ethics and medical law have a normative character, forensic medicine 
is more of a descriptive nature. Forensic medicine is even indispensable in some civil 
cases (for example to establish paternity) and most often in criminal cases (to establish 
the cause of deadi). It thus plays an important role in lawsuits and criminal proceedings 
in discovering the objective truth, which is the basis of just adjudicadon. While the 
normative branches of knowledge create the norms of die protection of human life, 
forensic medicine serves to help in their practical application. 
Summary 
Biojurisprudence, whose concepts I present, is a new current in jurisprudence 
concentrated around die problems of the legal protccdon of human life and the life of the 
natural environment. This current seeks to integrate both the law-making thought 
scattered by narrow specialization and die law-making practice concerning die protection 
of human life and the life of die environment. Riojurisprudence provides a scientifically 
well-grounded foundation for new branches of law bring to die fore, emphasize and 
protect human life and the life of the environment. 
The subject matter of biojurisprudence embraces all direats to human life and the life 
of the natural environment. Taking into account the natural rhythm of human life from 
the moment of conception to birth, and life until death, 1 distinguish three segments of 
biojurisprudence: biojusgenesis, biojustherapy and biojusthanatology. This tripartite 
division, with appropriate modifications to avoid anthropomorphism, can also apply to 
the protection of die life of die environment. 
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I show the connections of the subject matter of biojurisprudence with the subject 
matter of many branches of knowledge, primarily with biology, medicine, ethics and 
jurisprudence. Biological knowledge provides biojurisprudence with descriptions of life. 
Medical knowledge has aroused the interest of biojurisprudence in the ways of utilizing 
the biological knowledge about human life and the life of the environment, sometimes 
requiring regulation by law. Ethical knowledge, with its judgements of life and the ways 
of saving it, provides the ground for legal regulations. The knowledge of jurisprudence 
is to some extent the source and broader background for biojurisprudence. 
I also indicate the interesting filiations of biojurisprudence with some other sciences, 
whose goal is also the protection of human life and the life of the environment: bioethics, 
medical law and forensic medicine. I see the urgent need to develop a new branch of law, 
after die model of environmental law, which could be called human life protection law. 
This law would collect into one uniform and coherent whole all legal norms concerning 
the protection of human life that are now scattered in many branches of law. 
I find it a peculiar paradox that law created by man for man has pushed man himself 
into the background in its systems. In the traditional systems of law prominence is given 
to property and non-property law, substantive and non-substantive law, proprietary and 
non-proprietary right, private and public law etc. but there is no law on the protection of 
man. There is an urgent need to change the situation by for exajnple instituting the code 
of the protection of life (of man and of the environment), which would assert the primacy 
of life in the hierarchy of values protected by law. Biojurisprudence gives the impetus 
to the indispensable changes, for example in the legal systems, by the all-round treaunent 
of the whole of problems concerning the legal protection of life. 
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KALEIDOSCOPE 
Diversion and Mediation in Austria* 
Since 1985 the Austrian administration of criminal justice applies the settlement of 
conflicts as a possibility of a governmental reaction to criminal acts within the criminal 
law, relating to the young offenders. What has begun first as a test within some few 
judicial districts is determined by law since 1989, when the Act on Juvenile Courts 1988 
became effective. The government 's declaration to the beginning of a new legislation 
period dated December 18, 1990 intends expressly within the legal sector to utilize the 
good experiences with a modem Act on Juvenile Courts also for the penal law 
concerning adults. By that the course to a settlement of conflicts for adults has been 
traced out. Recently the model-test of a settlement between the delinquent and the victim 
within the penal law for adults is going on in several Austrian judicial districts. 
I. With regard to the 1988 Act on Juvenile Courts 
A juveni le is a person upon completion of the 14th year of life and before completion 
of the 19th year of life. Minors under the age of 14 are not punishable. 
A juveni le committing a penal offence is not punishable if he or she is not mature 
enough for certain reasons to understand the wrong of the offence and to act according 
to this understanding, or if he or she commits a misdemeanour under the age of 16 
without severe guilt and the application of the Act on juvenile Courts is not required for 
special reasons in order to prevent the juvenile from criminal offenses. 
The public prosecutor shall desist from criminal prosecution of a juvenile offence that 
is punished only a fine, by a prison sentence of not more than 5 years or such a prison 
* Thanks to the Chief State Prosecutor, Dr. Christoph MAYERHOFER (Department Head of tlie Ministry 
of Justice, Vienna), for providing information concerning the existing system of mediation in Austria. 
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sentence together with a fine, if it must be assumed that the court will provisionally 
suspend the proceedings pursuant to Art. 9 of the Act on Juvenile Court or it will not 
impose a penalty according to Art. 12 of the Act on Juvenile Courts and further measures 
are not deem as necessary to prevent the suspect from criminal offenses. In any case 
there is no desistance from criminal prosecution if the offence caused the death of person. 
If it seems necessary to warn the suspect about the wrong of offenses as charged 
against him or she and the possible consequences, the Guardian Court or the Tutelar 
Court shall perform that warning upon request of the public prosecutor. 
According to Art. 7 of the Act on Juvenile Courts the public prosecutor may declare 
a desistance from criminal prosecution in conformity with Ar t 6 of the Act on Juvenile 
Courts conditional on the shown readiness of the suspect to accept the responsibility for 
the offence and to settle the eventual consequences of the offence in an appropriate way 
according to the circumstances, particularly compensating for the damage to the best of 
his or her ability (settlement of the offence out of court). 
The public prosecutor may request persons and authorities having practice in social 
work, especially within the association for the assistance of persons placed on probation, 
to instruct the suspect about the possibility of a settlement of the offence out of court and 
to give a lead and assistance about such a settlement if he consents to it. The victim shall 
be included in these efforts in so far as he is willing to do so. 
The settlement of the offence is based on two elements in one respect on the 
pedagogical influence on the offender, who shall be made aware of the social relevance 
of his offence. Therefore the underfounding of the values is in the foreground. In another 
respect it should come to settlement with the victim in order to establish the social peace. 
The first mentioned element is in the foreground, because the law does not speak about 
a settlement between the delinquent and the victim resp. about a settlement of conflicts. 
The compensation for damage is not the decisive point of view. For this reason public 
prosecutor may aim at a settlement of the offence even if the damage should have been 
paid. In such a case the elaboration concerning the relation between the delinquent and 
the victim, the illumination of the personal conditions as well as the supervising of the 
agreed compromise and its reliability are just the goal. 
Regarding the definition of the conditions for the settlement of the offence out of 
court the legislator prefers the formulation that the suspect "shows the readiness to accept 
the responsibility for the offence and to settle the eventual consequences of the offence..." 
By that it is expressed that the person concerned must show his or her readiness to deal 
with charged offence and its wrong and to take the responsibility. 
The aim of the settlement of the offence is a complete admission of guilt. In some 
special cases one may accept a mitigation of the admission (confession of negligence 
instead of criminal intent, reliance on legal excuses or reasons for the lack of guilt). But 
the denial of causality as such excludes the application of any settlement of the offence. 
As one of the minimum standards for a settlement it is necessary that the delinquent 
has taken action in some way. It is not sufficient that the parents or the insurance have 
paid for damages without his or her action, that means without his or her efforts. Just as 
insufficient is the mere renunciation of the victim without any discussion about the 
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damage and without any reflections on its amount. The delinquent must take an action 
towards the victim, and that requires at least the credible working off concerning the 
wrong of the offence by the delinquent. 
But the existing readiness of the victim to assist a settlement of the o f fence out of 
court is not considered as a condition for its carrying out. In principle a missing readiness 
of the victim (who must be quite at liberty to do so) shall not exclude the execution of 
a settlement of the offence out of court 
Normally the delinquent shall come to a meeting upon request of the victim, but 
cases are thinkable, in which such a meeting is unreasonable for the juvenile, particularly 
if the victim follows other interests than reconciliation. Local distances can be an obstacle 
to a meeting, too. 
As a rule the recovery of damages shall be the principal item of the settlement of the 
offence out of court, but ways of an indirect and symbolic reparation, compensation or 
satisfaction (for instance also the voluntary service within public welfare institutions) 
upon to the apology offered to the victim are conceivable. 
A work for the welfare of the public must always be related to the injured person. 
Works for the welfare of the public to be done for third persons are provided under 
conditions according to Art. 19 of the Act on Juvenile Courts . But should it be a case 
of Art. 7 of the Act on Juvenile Courts, the said work must be performed within the 
sphere of the victim and without any consideration to the consent of third persons. 
Delinquent and victim may not agree that the offender should render a service in a 
hospital fo r 3 days, except the offence is directed against the institution of the 
hospital. 
A settlement of the of fence may also be carried out with legal entities, particularly 
if they can be personified by accepted representatives (the managing director of a 
department store or the mayor of a municipality). 
A settlement of the offence with persons remained unknown is possible and may also 
be used in view of offenses where the victims cannot be personified (e.g. of fenses against 
the Military Penal Code). 
Concerning the compensation by paying a sum of money it is not necessary that the 
whole damage is paid, as the victim demands it, because the settlement of the offence 
shall be a playground for revenge and "neurotic claims". Therefore claims of compen-
sation under civil law may continue to ex i s t 
The damage shall be compensated "to the best of the ability", and for this reason the 
indemnity may be less than the amount of compensation payable according to a civil law 
claim. Where the offender receives only an apprentice-remuneration, the settlement of the 
offence will be also considered as carried out, if he compensate, for a partial amount by 
installments corresponding to the best of his ability. The property of a juvenile is subject 
to payments, the provisions of Art. 151, and 154 of the Civil Code (consent by the 
authority of guardianship) shall be observed. 
Agreements between delinquent and victim shall be accepted as far as possible, if 
they are not unrealistic, immoral or even unlawful. 
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Just in view of the experiences made by the model test "settlement of conflicts" and 
with regard to the need of proceedings, which shall be as far as possible undivided for 
the whole federal territory, now only probation officers can be taken into consideration 
for this task (officers and state employers within the association for the assistance of 
persons placed on probation, established as a permanent institution of the Ministry of 
Justice, who satisfy the requirements of Art. 2 of the Act on Probation). But the service 
of other persons and authorities, having practice in social work, to a later time shall not 
excluded as such by the tenet of the law. 
Concerning the choice of the cases an unanimous opinion of lawyer and probation 
officer about the qualification would be desirable. 
The law does not provide any time limit for the carrying out of the settlement of the 
offence. The period of limitation goes on during the time, in which the settlement is tried. 
The facts communicated by the public prosecutor are the bases for the negotiations 
of the probation officer. The probation officer is not an authority for investigations like 
security organs. In case new facts appear when trying the settlement, if particularly the 
number of facts or the extent of guilt of the offender are changed or outlooks for the 
future must be judged in a seriously different way in view of the personal circumstances 
of the deliquenf s person, then the probation officer has to inform the public prosecutor 
about it. A frustrated settlement of the offence causes more damage than it might be 
useful. 
Above all it appears advisable that the probation officer informs the public prosecutor 
that the assignment of a probation officer is necessary in order to deal with the personal 
problems, which cannot be solved by the settlement of the offence (special-preventive 
impediment to a settlement of the offence). 
The settlement of the offence does not include a social care for the victim. 
If delinquent and victim had settled the damage autonomously in the meantime 
without knowledge by the public prosecutor about it, then it shall be communicated to 
the public prosecutor, who may decide to desist immediately from criminal prosecution 
without a settlement of the offence. (Art. 47) 
Before the opening of the trial the court shall examine the possibility of a settlement 
of the offence out of court officially or on request of the accused or the injured party, if 
the public prosecutor did not yet apply for it. (Art. 48) 
The court shall provisionally suspend the proceeding for juvenile offence, if the facts 
appear sufficiently clarified, the fault cannot be considered as severe guilt and the 
imposition of penalty is not necessary in order to prevent the accused from criminal 
offenses. The provisional dismissal is only possible (Art. 49) 
1. for a probation time from 1 year to 2 years; 
2. under the order of one or more conditions (Art. 19 of the Act on Juvenile 
Court), to which the accused declares himself prepared to accomplish them. 
The dismissal for a probation time may be made conditional on the declared readiness 
of the accused to comply with certain orders or to accept the care by a probation officer. 
A reasonable time limit shall be determined for the accomplishment of a condition. This 
period and the probation time are not counted in the terms of limitation. 
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A provisional dismissal of the proceedings according to Art. 9 of the Act on Juvenile 
Courts should not be chosen just as a "way out" in cases with doubtful evidence. On the 
contrary the precondition is that the facts have been sufficiently clarified, and in this 
connection the taken evidence must speak for a penal guilt of the person being prosecuted 
for a juveni le offence in the sense of a "prima-facie-evidence" according to the subjective 
conviction of the judge. As a rule there will be a confession of the accused — just as a 
result of the provided requirement of consent; but also a confession shall not be a 
prerequisite for the application of this legal institute. Regarding the application of § 9 of 
the Act on Juvenile Courts one has to observe in any case the presumption of innocence 
under Art. 6 para. 2 of the European Convention for Protection of Human Rights 
continues to be valid for the accused. 
At any time the accused may apply for the continuation of the criminal proceedings, 
for instance to invalidate a suspicion against him. 
If the determination of a probation time as the only measure is not sufficient, a 
probation officer may be appointed or conditions may be issued. A connection of the two 
orders is admissible. 
An extension of the period for good reasons is not excluded. 
In case of a provisional dismissal of the criminal proceedings the court may order one 
or more of the following conditions for the accused under Art. 19 of the Act on Juvenile 
Courts: 
1. to pay a sum of money at once or in partial amounts in favour of a public welfare 
institution; 
2. to render gratuitously certain services during the leisure time in the public interest, 
for example the assistance in institutions for the care of juveniles, physically 
handicapped and elderly people, medical welfare or environment protection; 
3. to compensate for the damage produced by the offence to the best of the ability 
or to contribute to the settlement of the consequences of the offence; 
4. to participate in courses for instructions or continue such instruction or another 
appropriate event. 
Conditions are unlawful, which would effect an infringement of personal rights or an 
interference with the way of living. 
The legislator proceeds from the assumption that the specification of the conditions, 
which may be ordered for an accused in connection with a provisional dismissal of the 
criminal proceedings under Art. 9 para. 1 n. 2 of the Act on Juvenile Courts, should in 
fact remain as an exclusive one, but the definition of the four mentioned types of 
conditions are formulated in such a wide manner that as good as all of the possible 
measures are covered by it. 
In the view of the legislator "another contribution to the settlement of the con-
sequences of the offence" under n. 3 does not require a civil reconciliation with the 
injured party, who possibly is not prepared to do so. On principle every appropriate 
material or immaterial contribution to the reparation, which is agreed by the accused and 
reasonable for him, can be made to the subject of a condition. In its general sense under 
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application of Ar t 7 para. 2 of the Act of Juvenile Courts the corresponding possibilities 
may be found out by charging a social worker. 
Above all by such services in favour of the public the understanding can be 
strengthened that the damaging of objects, which are owned by a territorial authority or 
a public institution and belong therefore in a wider sense to the public, like benches in 
park-grounds, telephone boxes, facilities of transport services, does not carry less weight 
than the damaging of private property. In view of a correct understanding of the inner 
meaning of the conditions one will observe that the juvenile can relate the conditions to 
the offence, although in an indirect way (active assistance in the restoration of damaged 
objects, assistance in the care of old people, if the offence has been committed against 
old people, assistance in the care of sick persons or participation in courses of first aid 
or traffic psychology, if the offence has caused a bodily injure, etc.). But the conditions 
must be also related to the offender and that means, that the physical and mental abilities 
of the juvenile have to be taken into consideration. 
Furthermore conditions are only useful, if the juvenile does not understand them just 
as a pressure or an authoritarian order, but if they are based on his readiness to do a 
service. Therefore the law demands the consent of the juvenile to a condition. This 
consent shall not be made only under the pressure of the impending criminal proceedings, 
but it shall signify a substantial agreement For that purpose it will be necessary that the 
judge discusses the nature and the meaning of the condition with the juvenile and, if it 
is possible, also with the person vested with the right of his education. 
II. Settlement of conflicts concerning adults 
At the moment a settlement of conflicts within the criminal law for adults is only 
possible under Art. 42 of the Penal Code, which provides a desistance from criminal 
prosecution according to reasons of impunity inter alia if the consequences of the offence 
are essentially eliminated, compensated or settled in another way. By means of an 
initiative of the administration of justice aiming at a settlement between the delinquent 
and the victim also for adult suspects by the settlement of conflicts a considerable 
number of charges could be deal with in a more prompt and effective way than within 
the other formal proceedings with a trial, with a verdict of guilty and with the connected 
consequences of a condemnation. 
The thinkable scope of application for the settlement of conflicts concerning adult 
persons shows certainly a more comprehensive spread than this one under the penal law 
for juveniles. 
First of all naturally those cases suggest themselves, in which juveniles and adults arc 
involved in an offence. In this connection a procedural equal treatment is simply obvious. 
In fact there has been already repeated occasions in practice to combine a settlement of 
the offence out of court pursuant to Art. 7 of the Act of Juvenile Courts concerning a 
juvenile with a settlement of conflicts under Art 42 of the Penal Code concerning an 
adult (although only slightly older) accomplice. The common settlement of damages and 
the reconciliation with the victim leads to a desistance from prosecution under Art. 6 of 
the Act on Juvenile Courts with regard to the juvenile and on the other hand the distance 
from prosecution by reason of Art. 42 of the Penal Code regarding the adult. 
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Within the range of violent crimes there are many scopes of application for a 
settlement of the offence. Acts of violence causing injuries, dangerous menaces among 
hostile neighbours or intimidations within the family organization, which result f rom 
conflict bearing case histories, could be composed to the greater part more lasting and 
to the total effects more favourable already on the level of the preliminary proceedings 
with the attempt of reconciliation. The underlying emotional tensions of the persons 
concerned can be solved within informal proceedings through the intermediary of a 
neutral person, who is charged with the settlement of conflicts, in an essential prompter 
and—as the experience in the field of the criminal law relating to young offenders 
shows—more effective way than it could be achieved by the judge during the trial. The 
lacking stress of an impending condemnation, the closer distance to the victim, who does 
not appear against the accused only as a complainant for indemnity and formal opposing 
party, and the directly responsible acting of the conflict parties promote this settlement 
among the persons involved in the aggression. 
Within the group of the offenses against property the settlement of conflicts is the 
obvious choice as instrument for sanctions. By their structure they are directed to a 
compensation for damage. Already during the experimental phase of the settlement of 
conflicts within proceedings for juvenile offenses the advantage of a settlement between 
the delinquent and the victim has been shown particularly in the field of property 
delinquency. The prompt satisfaction of the social framework, which had been disturbed 
by the offence, especially the direct and complete integration of the victim, but also the 
effective feeling of the consequences of the offence for the suspect, have been considered 
as a positive experience by all of the persons involved. With regard to the offenses 
against property one can distinguish between delinquents and victims in many cases 
without difficulties. Furthermore the size of the caused damage can be established in a 
relatively exact way. By that the settlement between the delinquent and the victim can 
be started on without problems for the most part. 
The charges for violation of the liability to provide maintenance under Art. 198 of 
the Penal Code are based many times on conflict situations of the involved family 
members. Pending divorce proceedings, the dispute about the rights of care and custody 
or "only" the controversies about the extent of the visitation right produce frequently 
the starting point for a refusal of payment made by the person obliged to provide 
maintenance. To create a settlement in this connection appears certainly more useful 
than to increase the gravity of the situation by criminal proceeding and a condemnation 
breaking off by these means definitely the contact among the family members. 
The goal of the experimental phase should be to create the basis for legal 
embodiment of the idea of diversion in the general criminal law and to open up the 
possibility also for the adult offender to legalize the unworthy of his delinquency by 
his or her own action. In addition to this the significance of the victim of the o f fence 
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First of all the title of this writing demands 
an explanation: what a nonsense it is, even 
to imagine that one of the most prominent 
f igures of contemporary philosophy of law, 
Arthur Kaufmann , addresses dilettantes in 
h i s book constituting an exponent of the 
fundamental problems of the philosophy of 
law. Nevertheless, it is the author himself 
w h o claims that his book with the subtitle 
"Introduction to the thinking of philosophy 
of l aw" is intended for those who are 
dilettantes in the sense of the word adopted 
by Jacob Burckhardt . For those who are 
specialists within a particular field of juris-
prudence, but as regards to the totality 
exceeding their field of proficiency, they are 
dilettantes lacking a general overview, who 
still foster a sympathet ic attitude towards 
the subject and w h o have a vocation and 
ability to immerse themselves in the totality 
of jurisprudence. T h e point is that lawyers 
consider fundamenta l theoretical grounds 
such as those laid down by the history, 
phi losophy and sociology of law as luxury, 
therefore it is no wonder if nowadays an 
educated lawyer is more of a rarity. These 
lawyers who like the subject and possess the 
necessary skills for the immersed under-
standing of connections of law, are primarily 
designated to read his book [Ibid, at 1]. The 
modesty, maybe false modesty of the author 
is refuted by the content and thoughtfullness 
of his work. It is a summar iz ing work 
embracing a whole treasury of thoughts, 
where the issues and particular quest ions of 
the philosophy of law are not s imply raised 
and presented in an object ive manner but 
always f rom the aspect of the author ' s 
standpoint concerning the quest ions of 
philosophy of law. It is not a book 
exclusively for dilettantes, in fact, it is not 
for dilettantes in the first p lace. If it is 
admissible to refer to the fundamental 
category of henneneutic phi losophy that 
Kaufmann obviously praises positively, this 
book modesdy intended for dilettantes can 
hardly be understood without the relevant 
"preliminary" knowledge in philosophy and 
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philosophy of law. However, in possession 
of this "preliminary knowledge", it is a 
highly inspirational piece of writing that 
enjoyably stimulates many thoughts. 
One more general remark about the 
work: about the way the author addresses 
and analyses the questions and problems of 
philosophy of law, about the spirit the whole 
book is pervaded by. Kaufmann cannot 
stand dogmas, he is firmly devoted to 
understanding, dialogue and tolerance. It is 
his ambition to teach the thinking of the 
philosophy of law by his book; his realist 
philosophy of law rests on experience, and 
does not, in any way, vindicate itself the 
right to make "firmly established" state-
ments but it solely contains questionable 
judgments, and never statements containing 
irrefutable conclusions [Ibid, at 2]. 
Before having a closer look at the 
discussion of principles of philosophy of 
law, it is indispensable to briefly outline the 
extremely rich content of his work. The 
book discusses almost exclusively "substan-
tial questions", it attempts to expound a 
"material philosophy of law" dealing with 
the problems of our age [Ibid, at 2-3] . 
Within this framework it discusses the 
following subject matters: The substance and 
task of philosophy of law, delimiting the 
borders of philosophy of law, theory of law, 
and legal dogmatics. An overview of the 
history of problems of philosophy of law, 
concentrating first of all on the relationship 
between natural law and legal positivism, 
searching for a third solution beside natural 
law and legal positivism (Radbruch, legal 
hermeneutics, argumentation theory, the 
general principles of law and Critical Legal 
Studies). Subsequently it introduces to legal 
methodology, to the process of knowledge 
of law, to the theory of jurisprudence; in the 
center of these contemplations the attempt 
to create a harmonious legal methodology 
can be found that searches for the balance 
of law-making and finding of law, primarily 
with the method of hermeneutic understand-
ing. Then the exposition of the author is 
directed at the explanation of the general 
concepts of law (general legal theory). 
Within this section he analyses the basic 
elements of the concept of law, the notion 
of legal norm, sources of law, statement of 
facts and the subjects of law. The relation 
of law and language constitutes a separate 
issue. Thus we have arrived to the intimate-
ly substantia] problems of the philosophy 
of law: concept of law, law and statute, the 
relation of "to be" and "ought to be" (Sein 
and Sollen), validity of law, the right of 
resistance and civil disobedience. All that 
is exceeded by the question of legal idea, 
and the relations of its constituting elements: 
justice and equality, justice and expediency, 
justice and rule of law, law and morals 
(morals, custom, tradition). The final chap-
ters of the book presents the modern streams 
of the philosophy of law and the tasks of 
contemporary philosophy of law. 
In order to make perceptible, with what 
a care and circumspect the author studies 
the problems of legal philosophy and how 
he attempts to solve them, I must confine 
myself to the brief outline of two inter-
related and substantial expositions of the 
work. 
The first is the attempt to create a 
harmonious legal methodology [Ibid, at 71-
81]. The starting point is part of the history 
of legal theory, the traditional legal method-
ology elaborated by Savigny. The central 
issue is the relation of law-making and 
finding of law. The way leading to the 
solution is the gradual structure of law 
(Thomas of Aquino, Hans Kelsen). Kauf-
mann distinguishes three stages within the 
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process of implementation of law: a) 
abstract-general principles of law that are 
beyond positiveness and beyond history; b) 
concrete-general, positive law in the formal 
sense that is valid for a more or less long 
period of time; c) concrete historic law that 
is positive in the material sense. The scheme 
is briefly as it follows: principle of law 
(legal idea)—legal norm—legal decision. 
Further comprehension demands two basic 
prerequisites: a) none of the above-men-
tioned stages can be missing from the 
process of implementation of law; b) none 
of the stages can simply be deducted from 
the one that is above it according to a 
certain logic. With the help of the first 
statement Kaufmann distinguishes himself 
from the views claiming that it is possible 
to make law without according any values 
to it (theory of power, theory of will, theory 
of interest, empirical sociology of law, the 
theory of the "nature of things" or of 
"factual normativity"). The second statement 
is really a refusal of all kinds of one-sided 
normativist theories. The author arrives at 
the conclusion that finding of the law 
always happens in an analogous way, in a 
deductive-inductive manner [Ibid, at 72-73]. 
The solution recommended by the author 
is to understand the legal method in a way 
offered by hermeneutic philosophy. 
In relation to discovering the process 
of implementation of the law, hermeneutic 
philosophy does not mean the hermeneutic 
aspect as a transcendental-philosophy but 
as a method. It is the major argument 
against hermeneutics as a method that it 
is irrational, subjectivist and unscholarly. 
This objection could be raised, however, 
against the legal method in general, since 
legal method is not purely rational, exact 
and unambiguous. And it is exactly this 
legal method the author wants to under-
stand in a hermeneutic, and if possible, 
rational way. 
What does it mean to understand the 
legal method in a hermeneutic way? It 
means nothing else but the hermeneutic 
circle of the process of legal understanding. 
It is the essential point in this hermeneutic 
circle that transformating a norm into a 
statement of facts prescribed by law (inter-
pretation) happens based on the case, and 
transformation of the case into statement 
of facts (construction) always happens 
based on the legal norm. This transform-
ation, construction is always a creative, 
constructive action that precedes Sub-
sumtion. Case and legal norm are the raw 
material for the methodological process, 
they have to be formed and elaborated in 
an inter-related manner so that they 
become suitable for "matching" each other 
(analogy), that means in an actively 
creative action they have to bee made 
"equal". This is no determination, neither 
Subsumtion, nor interpretation, but it is a 
decision (decisio) [Ibid, at 76-77] . 
Traditional positivist methodology 
considers "application of law" to be the 
normal case, and the case of "f inding of 
law" it only treats as an exception differing 
significantly from the application of law. 
In contrast with the positivist view, "the 
imperfect (incomplete) nature of law" is 
not a defect but it is a priori and necessary. 
A statute cannot be formulated unambigu-
ously, because it was created for an 
countless variety of cases. The notions 
used by the law are not unequivocal, they 
do not fall into the category of abstract-
general notions, but in fact they are notions 
of "types" or "classes" concerning which 
instead of either-or the applicable express-
ion is more or less. [Ibid, at p. 79. See my 
reservations concerning this statement in 
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Peschka, Type and analogy in law, Law 
and Philosophy of Law, Budapest, 1980. 
pp. 355-369. Kaufmann ' comments on 
that: Analogie und "Natur der Sache", 
Heidelberg, 1982, 75-76.] Consequently 
the way of thinking pervading the process 
of application and finding of law is not a 
simple Subsumtion, it is a type-making and 
analogy-based way of thinking. In the 
course of application the law, objective 
interpretation of the law always constitutes 
a complex, "deductive-inductive, analogy-
making process, the division of attention 
among the statement of facts incorporated 
in the provisions of law and the actually 
existing facts". "It is only due to this 
analogy of the normative statement of facts 
and the facts of life, due to this polarity 
that law can exist and develop, that it is 
entitled to a share of the historic structure 
of existence." [KAUFMANN, Grund-
probleme der Rechtsphilosophie, 112]. 
The second problem of philosophy of 
law that the reader's attention is being 
directed to constitutes the core of Kauf-
mann's legal philosophy: the concept of 
law, with special regard to the relation 
between law and right The question 
deserves attention also for the reason that 
Hungarian constitution declares Hungary to 
be a rule-of-law state. Similarly, Kaufmann 
analyzes the concept of law from the 
perspective of the rule-of-law state, laying 
emphasis on the fact that the famous saying 
of Kant according to which "lawyers still 
keep on searching for the definition of law" 
is still valid, at least in the sense that neither 
today is an equivocal and final definition 
of law possible. Then, after having analyzed 
the definitions available in the doctrine, he 
finally concludes accepting the formulation 
by E. Bodenheimer saying that "law is 
bridge between is and ought" [Ibid, at 123]. 
The core of the problem is the relation 
between law (lex) and right (ius). The 
starting point for theoretical expositions is 
the statement made by Thomas of Aquino, 
stating that law is embodied in the authority 
of the drafters of the law, whereas right is 
per se a rightful action, and thus right 
decision in concrete situations. [Ibid, at 
127.] Having studied the development of the 
modem concept of law and expounding on 
the concept of law the author arrives at the 
conclusion by the end that just as the legal 
norm cannot be deducted purely from the 
idea of law, similarly, legal decision cannot 
be simply deducted from the legal norm. 
Both legal idea and legal norm only provide 
law with possibilities, and the question is 
whether they will serve as basis for the 
emerging of law in its full reality? The 
answer is no, since the basis for that will 
be concrete facts of life. As a concrete 
statute can only be enacted from the abstract 
legal idea in consideration of the possible 
life conditions to be regulated, concrete law 
can only emerge from the statute with 
reference to virtual life conditions. It is just 
as impossible to create normative law from 
the state of being as it is impossible to do 
so merely from the category of ought to be. 
"Real law evolves only where norm and 
facts, be and shall be correspond to each 
other: law is the meting of is and ought." 
[Ibid, at 135-136.] Law is not of a substan-
tial but of a relational nature, law is more 
than complex of paragraphs, it is a unit 
composed of relations instead of norms. The 
historic realization of law embraces a pro-
cess of concretization and positivization 
from legislation to the legal decision. Since 
this concept of law combines formal and 
materia] principles of law, it exceeds the 
scope of conflict between natural law and 
positivism. 
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That was only a small part of the 
thoughts K a u f m a n n ' s book is full of . Its 
m a j o r characteristics are erudition, sensi-
tivity towards problems, moderation, toler-
a n c e and the e legance of its style. Every 
educated lawyer should necessarily read this 
book, and also those wishing to attain legal 
education. 
Vilmos PESCHKA 
Is tván DIÓSZEGI: A hatalmi politika másfél évszázada, 1789-1939, [One and a half 
centur ies of power politics], M T A Történettudományi Intézete, Budapest , 1994, pp. 477 
" L a w is the servant of politics. Reading 
D i ó s z e g i ' s new book reminds the reader 
of this saying. T h e one and a half centuries 
of dominat ion poli t ics studied by the 
au tho r (1789 -1939) clearly p roves the 
Tightness of this s tatement , s ince all inter-
na t ional treaties, al l iances, international 
o rganiza t ions which had been fo rmed dur-
ing that period turned out to be pure 
formal i t ies , o rnamenta l or s imple f rame-
w o r k for the real political aspirat ions in 
the background. 
By placing fore ign relations into the 
fo re f ron t , Professsor Diószegi creates a 
co lou r fu l f resco about the events of the 
h u n d r e d and f i f ty years concerned. The 
express ion "co lour fu l f resco" was used 
h e r e on purpose: the book is writ ten in an 
exci t ing , highly readable style which is 
ea sy to understand for the wider public, as 
we l l . At the s ame t ime the book l ives up 
wi th the requi rements of scientif ic stan-
da rds . Each chapter is divided into short 
subchapte rs which only extend to t w o or 
th ree pages, but wi thin this s tructure the 
au tho r has managed to analyze the events 
f r o m more than one viewpoint, f rom the 
a spec t of the fore ign policies of several 
s ta tes . The work is intended to contain a 
g lobal view, for it does not merely concen-
t ra te on Europe but in the center of the 
s tudy there are the ambitions for power and 
domina t ion ruling the whole wor ld . 
T h e presentation of the t ime period is 
started at the French Revolut ion, which 
opened a new era in history through 
winding up the feudal sys tem and through 
the rising of new social powers . This is the 
starting point of the first par t of the work, 
the title of which is "Decades of transform-
ation". István Diószegi descr ibes the 
historic events in details and in the course 
of that demonst ra tes how the opposing 
powers, namely the ones support ing dinas-
tical legit imacy and the o thers f ighting for 
the creation of a civil—national state first 
coll ided. This period lasted f rom the 
destroyment of Bastil le through Napo leo ' s 
ruling until the restauration carried out by 
the Holy All iance and even af ter that, till 
the first gaps became visible and the 
preparat ions for national revolut ions be-
ginned. 
The next period starts f r o m the date 
when Europe has been "set on f i re" . This 
section describes the intricate way through 
which German and Italian nat ional unities 
could be reached, ending with the estab-
l ishment of the new South Slavic national 
states. The third period is concerned with 
the evolution of the allies sys tems in the 
f ramework of colonial izing aspirations 
which had preceded the First World War. 
Finally, the last section of the book deals 
with the period following the "first burning 
down of the wor ld" , which w a s extremely 
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complicated from the viewpoint of history 
of diplomacy. 
The author of this review does not 
intend more than to sketch a rough, per-
haps even superficial, outline of the 
historical topics discussed in the book. 
There are, from the legal point of view, 
two groups of thought of special interest 
to be found in the work, concerning the 
direction of foreign affairs and the system 
of movements in international politics. W e 
wish to concentrate on outlining and 
expounding these thoughts in our review. 
I. The study of the inner, cohesive and 
coherent structure of the foreign policy of 
a state should arouse the interest of all the 
readers connected with the legal sphere. 
The author examines important insti-
tutions in his work, though concentrating 
exclusively on the period of dynastic 
legitimacy (to use his own expression) and 
the birth of the first modern, national-
ethnic states before World War I. Perhaps 
some attention should have been given to 
drawing a picture yet again of the contem-
porary legal institutions, administrative 
mechanisms and tools of government, when 
discussing the colourful events following 
the War. Professor Diószegi opts instead 
for giving a more detailed account of the 
structure of international diplomacy and, 
concentrating on a few states, and on the 
supreme control of foreign policy in his 
study of the structure of foreign policy. 
Throughout the centuries it was the 
supreme ruler who controlled the foreign 
policy of a country. Beside the right of the 
Crown to declare war, conclude peace 
treaties, send and receive diplomatic 
envoys and sign international treaties, the 
state was always represented by the sover-
eign. The first significant blow at the 
exclusive role played by the monarch in 
directing foreign policy was struck by the 
French Revolution. In May 1790 the 
National Assembly decreed that the right 
to declare war or conclude peace passed 
to the nation. The importance and effect 
of this decleration surpasses by far the 
constitutional changes effected in England 
during the preceding decades. It also 
contributed to the violent reaction of the 
contemporary absolutist dynasties, mani-
fested in the war against France. 
It would be worthwhile to examine the 
way Professor János Sári analyses the 
weakening of the exclusive power of the 
sovereign (SÁRI, János: The historical 
dimensions of the division of power and its 
significance in our days or the inner logic 
of constitutional systems. Doctoral Disserta-
tion. Manuscript. Budapest, 1996). He states 
that the realization of the ideology concerning 
the the division of power parallelled the 
gradual loss of the exclusive power of the 
monarch. As the representatives of the feudal 
society are pushed more and more into the 
background, he loses his political support, has 
to act in an "empty space". This historical 
process is completed by the French Revol-
ution, or namely by the emergence of the 
idea of the sovereignty of the people. The 
effects of this were far reaching, as Diószegi 
also pointed out. 
If we continue to study the historical fate 
of the power vested on the sovereign, we will 
encounter two possible directions of deve-
lopment. One is the case of the United States, 
where the president possesses the means to 
interfere with the legislative processes (except 
the right to disperse the Congress). His 
political privileges as the head of the state 
reminds us in many ways of those of a 
monarch. In the parlamentary systems, on the 
other hand, it is the parliament and the 
government that executes the duties of 
Book review 111 
governing, and the head of the state is usually 
considered to be "outside the system" for he 
has no political liabality. In these countries 
"the first man of the state" loses his real 
influence on the executive power, could even 
be said to run a course of his own. Naturally 
this also means a diminuation of his role 
played in foreign politics. 
But let us return to the train of thoughts 
followed by Professor Diószegi. The Holy 
Alliance coming into existence after the 
Napoleonic Wars, rooted in the idea of 
dynastic legitimacy, conserved and rein-
stated the old conditions on the continent. 
These condition prevailed, at least partially, 
even after the revolutions of 1848 that 
demanded constitutional state. The author 
considers 1871 the end of this phase. In 
1871, with the birth of the German Empire, 
the establishment of the new Republic of 
France, the appearence of an independent 
Italy and the dualistic Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy that took place a few years 
earlier, the constitutional forms of govern-
ment finally emerged victorious. 
István Diószegi uses the inner structure 
of the French Republic of the 1870s as his 
model. The president of the republic, func-
tioning as the head of the state, plays a 
merely formal and representative role in 
foreign policy, limited to the duties of 
protocol. The real decisions in foreign 
politics were made by the government 
(ultimately responsible to the parliament). 
Beside the head of the government foreing 
policy was determined to great extent by 
the minister of foreign affairs, after all the 
actual realization and execution were 
among his duties. The minister of foreign 
affairs also had to bear the burdens of the 
institution of ministerial responsibility, a 
phenomenon that became established during 
this period. He was held responsible for the 
work of the whole office, including the 
activities of the foreign legations. In his 
decisions he could rely on the advice of the 
ministerial council of foreign affairs con-
sisting of heads of political departments and 
deputy chieves. The structure and oper-
ational mechanism of the ministry is best 
reflected in the course and fate of an 
official report by a deputy. (As regards 
diplomatic envoys and deputies, it should 
be noted, that the document regulating the 
status of the heads of diplomatic service 
proved to be one of the regulations of the 
1815 Congress of Vienna, that continued 
valid with time.) 
A diplomatic agent sent his report to the 
ministry of foreign affairs through couriers 
enjoying special privileges. Even though the 
report was invariably addressed to the 
minister of foreign affairs, it had to pass 
through the bureaucratic administration. 
According to the nature of the different 
tasks and problems the ministry was divided 
into departments, where the report was 
forwarded to the heads of the groups res-
ponsible for the different countries. The 
head of such a group gave a short account 
of the report to the head of the political 
department (the most important organ of the 
ministry). Only the reports considered really 
significant ever reached the minister himself, 
while the rest were dealt with in the lower 
regions of the ministry. Only in exceptional 
cases (situations threatening with war or 
diplomatic crisis) could the agent com-
municate with the minister personally. 
It might not be beside the point to add 
some extra information to the description 
of the author. The minister, usually the chief 
adviser of the head of the government in 
foreign affairs, did not personally supervise 
the activity of the office. The actual work 
of supervising and directing was done by 
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his permanent deputy chief. In England it 
became a constitutional costume for the 
organization directed by the deputy chief of 
the minister to withdraw from the daily 
political battles. The responsibility of 
making desicions about foreign affair rested 
on the politicians, and not on the members 
of diplomatic service. 
Returning to the work of the author 
Professor Diószegi contends that the parlia-
ment used interpellation as the means of 
controlling the activity of the government 
If the parliament refused to accept the 
answer it could eventually lead to a crisis 
between the parliament and the government. 
The budget extended to foreign affairs was 
also voted by the parliament. The govern-
ment declaring war needed the consent of 
the "House" for the military expenses. Thus 
foreign policy depended on the legislative 
body at the last count (although the declar-
ation of war was never voted against by the 
parliament, after all there is no historical 
example of such an event.) 
The author finds that the English and 
the American parliamentary practices, as 
regards their basic elements, are similar to 
the French, albeit with some notable differ-
ences. The English sovereign has retained 
certain rights to interfere with foreign 
policy, and the constitution of the United 
States combines the role of head of the state 
and the head of the government in the 
institution of the president. 
We would like to add some further 
considerations to the English and American 
system of directing foreign affairs, for the 
sake of a more detailed picture. 
As a result of the developements effected 
in the period discussed by professor Diószegi 
foreign affairs were and are under the joined 
supervision of the Crown, the Parliament and 
the Cabinet. The rights pertaining to the 
Crown can be divided into two groups: royal 
prerogatives, exercised by the monarch and 
those that were relegated to the Cabinet 
These are the following: deciding the courses 
taken in foreign policy, concluding treaties 
with other states, declaring war, recognition 
of a state or a government and joining 
international organizations. There is no strict 
boundary between these two groups of 
prerogatives, for the monarch continues to 
exercise some traditional rights that might 
actually influence the foreign policy of the 
United Kingdoms. Such rights are: constant 
contact with the ministers, "encouraging" 
(meaning that in certain cases the monarch 
might express personal opinions), approving 
the documents of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, personal correspondance and confer-
ences with foreign heads of state, contact 
with the leaders of diplomatic missions. 
These and the "remembrance of the past and 
the traditions of religion"—to use the ex-
pression of Benjamin Constant—secure the 
influence of the sovereign in England till our 
days. 
According to the English law the most 
important part in foreign policy is played by 
the Prime Minister, who might transform his 
secretariat into a "private ministry of foreign 
affairs" in order to gain more information 
for the successful performance of his duties. 
The Prime Minister might also choose to 
retain the portfolio of foreign affairs—as did 
McDonald between the two World Wars. 
The position of the Prime Minister is rein-
forced by the fact that he is in charge of 
drawing up the suggestions and compromises 
concerning foriegn affairs and he is the one 
to decide whether and when they should be 
discussed by the Parliament. The Cabinet has 
an ascendacy over the Parliament in the 
supervision of foreign affairs. The Parliament 
has only limited rights in this matter (for 
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example the majority of the international 
treaties concluded by the Government does 
not need the consent of the Parliament). 
There is no constitutional rule demanding, 
that an international treaty concluded by the 
government could not be signed by the 
monarch without the assent of the Parlia-
ment. 
The United States is a federation of 
member-states, that may not become parties 
to international treaties or foreign alliances 
according to the Constitution. Their rights 
to interfere in foreign affairs are limited and 
they need the consent of the Congress to 
exercise them. The process of making de-
cisions concerning foreign affairs is best 
described by John Spanier and Eric M. 
Uslaner. (J. SPANIER—E. M. USLANER: 
Foreign Policy and the Democratic 
Dilemmas. (3rd ed.) New York 1982. 81. 
p . -quoted by G. KARDOS: "The Foreign 
Polic of the United States" in: The Special 
Characteristics of the Foreign Policy of 
Some Capitalist Countries. Budapest 1987. 
53-54.) They visualisé this process, taking 
both historical development and present 
conditions into consideration, by depicting 
four concentric circles. The innermost circle 
is that of the president and his advisers, this 
is followed by the level of the government, 
the armed forces and the scientists, then 
comes the Congress, the political parties and 
syndicates, and the final circle represents the 
media and the public opinion. The influence 
of the heads of the important institutions 
depends on the extent they are capable of 
gainig the president's confidence by their 
formal positions, for in the US the only 
function of the central government offices 
is to help the president. 
In the direction of foreign affairs the 
president could be said to possess unlimited 
power. He is the commander-in-chief of the 
aimed forces, he might conclude interna-
tional treaties, might appoint ambassadors 
and consuls, and is authorized by the Consti-
tution to take extraordinary measures. 
According to the Constitution the ministers 
are directly and solely responsible to the 
president. Although the consent of the Senate 
is necessary for their appointment, the 
president is entitled to appoint one of his 
followers as the minister of foreign affairs. 
On this level the absolute power of the 
president is limited by the Committee of 
Foreign Affairs of the American Senate, 
where the most important audiences take 
place, and the motions for a possible 
amendment, the conditions of ratification 
are discussed in detail. As the the interna-
tional treaties concluded by the president 
gain the status of law in the country accord-
ing to the Constitution (Art. 6), the Senate 
might voice its opinion through giving 
advice, furthermore the required consent of 
the Senate (at least two-third of the votes) 
counterbalances the dominance of the 
president in foreign affairs. 
The author in his examination of the 
period in question arrives at the conclusion, 
that Germany and the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy was characterised by an amalgam 
of constitutional and absolutist forms. The 
illusory nature of the German parliamen-
tarism is well documented by the fact, that 
the Imperial Council, although born on the 
principle of universal suffrage, did not rise 
above the level of a consultative body, 
because the majority party could not form 
a government nor was the leading minister 
liable to the Council. Nor could refusing to 
accept the answers given to the inter-
pellations made in the Reichstag lead to a 
crisis, for this had no constitutional legal 
consequences of any kind. The Empire had 
no central government in any case, since 
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only the dignities of the Emperor and the 
Chancellor were considered Pangerman 
functions, the empire was otherwise gov-
erned by the Prussian ministry. Foreign 
policy was formally and practically alike 
considered the "entailed property" of the 
Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor. 
In the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the 
governments of the Austrian and of the 
Hungarian territories were formed by the 
majority party. Joint ministries were set up 
to deal with the common affairs including 
foreign affairs. At the top of the bureaucracy 
stood the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet (Coun-
cil of Ministers) supervising all common 
affairs. The national Parliaments had no say 
in the supervision of common affairs this 
being the task of the delegations meeting 
once a year. The author views the appoint-
ment of the common ministers, in which the 
Parliaments had no authority, as a relic of 
royal absolutism. He regards the figure of 
the sovereign chairing the common Cabinet 
(or Council of Ministers) in a similar way. 
Like in Germany the foreign policy came 
under the jurisdiction of the "King and 
Emperor" and the common Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. The changes described by 
Professor Diószegi determined the formal 
ground, the possible movements and the 
structure of the foreign policy of the decades 
to come. The First World War put an end 
to this period, many fledgling states were 
born as a result of the "cartographical 
changes" and in the next few decades new 
forms of state organization came to exist-
ence (meaning primarily the socialist 
Sovietunion, the fascist Italy, the national-
socialist Germany and Japan of the Far 
East). The author of this review would not 
have minded reading something on the 
special characteristics of the structure of the 
foreign politics employed by these new 
formations. After all the foreign activities 
of these countries played a decisive role in 
forming the events of history. In the case 
of the Sovietunion, for example, the special 
forms of its state organization grew to 
"worldwide proportions" after the Second 
World War. 
II. In his epilogue the author presents 
the essential connections, the key motives 
in historical processes he arrived at after a 
thorough examination of foreign politics. He 
seems to share his own musings on the 
nature of foreign politics (he actually gives 
this subtitle to the chapter). 
The primary importance of the interests 
of the state, as the main motive, might be 
divided according to different views when 
its concrete massage in foreign policy is 
considered. In the analysis of István Dió-
szegi sovereignity and security stand at the 
first place. Both are connected with the 
international position of the state, thus the 
author calls them positional relations. 
There is no such thing as absolute and 
unconlaminated sovereignity, with the 
posssible exception of England in its period 
of "glorious isolation". Those states that do 
not opt for an arbitrary isolation, enter a 
system of mutual dependence through their 
contacts and alliances, so we had perhaps 
better speak of a limited sovereignity in 
their case. The category of limited so-
vereignity includes a wide scale of possibil-
ities, that might extend from the system of 
agreements, pacts and contracts entailing 
international rights and duties to the (albeit 
reluctant) acquiescence in the temporal or 
permanent occupation of a country or 
countries. This occupation might be founded 
on the terms of a peace treaty dictated by 
the victor after a war. The states take into 
account, in fact have to do so, in their 
relation to each other the possible limita-
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tions, but their final aim in foreign policy 
is to obtain and retain as complete a sove-
reignity as possible. 
The other motive of positional relations 
in foreign politics is security. The author 
does not mean millitary security, nor the 
state's ability for self-defense, nor security 
guaranteed by treaties (with the enemy, or 
in alliance with other powers against the 
enemy), but political security. According the 
definition of Professor Diószegi this means 
that a country limits, liquidates or subordi-
nates a country or countries that threaten its 
own existence. 
The sovereign power that is exclusive 
and autocratic by nature cannot suffer a 
division of power, and should this become 
permanent its unhealthy nature becomes 
more and more pronounced eventually lead-
ing to a permanent state of civil w a r l i k e in 
the case of the recent events in the Balcans. 
Opposed to the logic of internal politics the 
plurality of international life is evidently 
unavoidable, in spite of this the ideal (for 
the country) is a state of complete and ab-
solute security, that is an arbitrary elimin-
ation of international plurality. The struggle 
to achieve this ideal state is and has always 
been present in international power politics, 
but it has never attained in its perfect form. 
What substitutes it is a pursuit for 
relative security—says Diószegi. On the first 
level of this manylayered concept of secu-
rity we find the idea of local security. 
According to the definition of the author 
this is but the conservation of the condi-
tions prevailing on the borders, with the 
aim of eliminating any actual or possible 
threat, and preventing the neighbours from 
gaining excessive strength. 
This could be achieved by treaties and 
pacts, by subordination of the other country 
and, at the last resort, by annexing it. The 
"positive" reason for this last move is to 
abolish the source of danger, the "negative" 
is to prevent occupation by other powers. 
A good example of this last case is Poland, 
that was divided on three occasions. 
On the second level is the question of 
regional security, that is the state 's efforts 
to quench any threatening tendency in the 
sorrounding territories. This is achieved by 
the same measures than local security, 
asserts the author, that is the country tries 
to conserve the other small countries in a 
state of division (as did France throughout 
the centuries trying to prevent the realization 
of a German unity), or might subordinate, 
make them dependent, or at the last step 
annex the states to its territory—history has 
produced many examples of these two last 
cases. 
The last and highest level of relative 
security is the continental security, that 
consists of a series of measures taken on the 
behalf of security politics regarding a whole 
continent. The existence of this tendency can 
be pointed out in the Russian, the German 
and the French foreign policy, but apart from 
achieving some minor results it was never 
given a definite shape, though it kept 
haunting the foreign policy of the aforesaid 
countries. Professor Diószegi mentions only 
the United States as a historical example, 
that using all the means available managed 
with the obstinacy of a bulldog to draw the 
whole North-American continent under its 
political supervision and legalised these 
proceedings on an international level by 
having the Monroe-principle accepted. 
The author considers desirable the intro-
duction of a new category of security as a 
consequence of the changes following the 
Second World War: the category of interna-
tional security. He argues that the latest 
manifestations of world politics can be 
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expressed only by the help of this new 
"terminus technicus". 
The reader could ask with some justifi-
cation: was it not the task of the Security 
Council of the United Nations to help 
maintain exactly this kind of security. 
Considering that the suggestion of the author 
regarding the category of international 
security makes it evident that his observa-
tions on the nature of foreign politics are 
not strictly based on the one and a half 
centuries examined by him, he should have 
made his statement more unambigous. 
In his study of foreign politics the other 
great group Professor Diószegi examines 
is that of territorial connexion. The question 
of obtaining, preserving and regaining 
territory has alway been at the forefront 
of foreign politics. The countries accept the 
concept of international plurality in their 
relations with oneanother, but this does not 
automatically mean respecting the terri-
torial integrity of the others. The historical 
changes did not spare the territorial bor-
ders, and the different states have often 
changed their position on the same geo-
graphical territory, alternating between the 
role of trying to preserve and the role of 
tring to regain the same teritory. The author 
first expounds the category of obtaining 
territory, that might mean an addition of 
new territories, or even the restoration of 
independence lost previously. In the age of 
dynastic legitimacy the extinction of the 
direct line to inherit was considered a legal 
ground for obtaining new territorities. Such 
examples are the Spanish or the Austrian 
wars of successions. 
Géza Herczegh [Magyarország külpoliti-
kája, 896-1919. (The Foreign Policy of 
Hungary 896-1918) Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 
Budapest, 1987. 385 p.] writes, that in 
medieval Europe the Christian countries 
considered the territories of the others 
inviolable, and wars to gain territories could 
only be fought on the ground of some "real 
and justifiable" cause. The most frequent 
cause was provided by the extinction of a 
royal house. Consanguinal ties with such a 
royal family—the result of the intricate 
system of royal intermarriages—entided the 
relatives to claim the right of inheritence, 
the right to obtain the territory considered 
an unviolabe unity. The wars were always 
aimed at enforcing the claim of inheritence 
in an absolute sense, that is at obtaining the 
whole territory of a country. The first 
deviation from this pracüce establishing a 
precedent was the repeated division of 
Poland, but this happened during the last 
act—to use the term utilized by Professor 
Diószegi—of dynastic legitimacy. 
Returning to the train of thoughts 
followed by István Diószegi: In the age of 
national governments and ethnic states the 
question of obtaining territory gains in 
importance and becomes a central problem 
on the stage of international relations. The 
final aim of a state organised on national 
basis has always been to contain its whole 
ethnic stock within its own borders—an aim 
achievable only by a radical readjustment 
of the existing borders. In this new state of 
affairs legal principles untill then considered 
inviolable soon lost their validity. To give 
an example: during the process leading to 
the realization of German unity dynastic 
legitimacy was no longer considered a 
dogma (which led to the disappearance of 
the smaller states). During the realization 
of the other classical unity, the Italian unity, 
another political formaüon that so far 
seemed to be eternal, the secular power of 
the Pope, was overthrown—emphasizes 
Professor Diószegi. Although these changes 
were effected under the flag bearing the 
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legend "ethnic states", the executi ves of this 
ideology quite often overstepped the mark: 
the ethnic boundaries fairly often did not 
correspond with the borders of the state. 
New borders did not include the whole 
ethnic stock (German unity did not include 
German speaking Austrians, therefore the 
dream of Great-Germany was not fullfilled) 
or they contained ethnically alien national-
ities as well (in the case of Germany Prussia 
preserved its Polish speaking territories), or 
again they might have struck a deep wedge 
into the body of other nations (Poland after 
the First World War). 
Out of security considerations ethnically 
neutral states also had their say about the 
development of local problems brought 
about by obtaining territories under the 
pretext of establishing ethnic states. Pro-
fessor Diószegi brings up as examples the 
oppression of the Hungarian revolution and 
war of independence by the Russian inter-
vention in 1849, the attemps of France to 
prevent the unification of Germany in 1870 
and the dissection of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy by the Allied Powers following 
the First World War. In each case the 
explanation offered to the public was 
different, but behind it lurked the constella-
tion of a more complicated national interest 
of political security. 
The book next considers the problem of 
preserving territory. The question of preserv-
ing territorial integrity becomes of primary 
importance for a country when alien powers 
challenge the valid state of affairs. In this 
event the preservation of the status quo 
becomes vital. In the age of dynastic legit-
imacy the heirs of the collateral line of 
descent supported their claims to the territory 
by claiming primacy, continuity or legality. 
As the dubious quality of these claims often 
led to wars, Maria Teresia for example 
preserved her throne at a great cost in human 
life, beside the existence of dynasties legit-
imate forms concerning state territories 
evolved during the course of centuries. 
Beginning with the Middle Ages the idea of 
territorial integrity became connected with 
certain symbols, usually crowns. Thus state 
territories were also called the countries of 
certain crowns, for example the Hungarian 
Crown, or the Crown of the Holy Roman 
Empire. The most eloquent testimony of the 
legitimate power attributed to the concept 
of integrity intertwined with sacral symbols 
is given by the example of the Hungarian 
Crown. When the ethnic states first appeared, 
the legal pretext previously used to obtain 
a territory was again utilised to retain it, and 
all types of arguements were thrown in to 
support "legal claims". To quote István 
Diószegi: "The unviolable nature of state 
borders drawn up on the grounds of security 
considerations, and of both justified and 
unjustified territorial claims, was often 
declared of universal interest by the very 
men who drew these borders. The members 
of the Holy Alliance called the Treaty of 
Vienna of 1815 a manifestation of divine 
justice, and after 1945 there was a great deal 
of talk about the state borders drawn up after 
the war serving the peace and security of 
Europe. Now, after the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall, the victors of the Second World War 
will have to do a plenty of thinking about 
the new legitimacy." 
The third and last category discussed by 
the author, the category of regaining terri-
tory, is the one that presents us with the 
most problems. Professor Diószegi thinks 
that the title of heir and the idea of dynastic 
legitimacy gradually lost ground during the 
centuries as legal claim for the regaining of 
some territory. It was ousted and substituted 
by the legal pretence of a nation's right to 
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regain territories. It is especially in our 
region that this legal ground still holds valid 
and the demographical maps of ethnically 
mixed countries provide a good excuse for 
militant, aggressive groups. 
The author calls these claims justifiable 
and legally founded—as opposed to conquests 
that might not be justified by the reasons 
listed above. Researching the beginnings of 
expansion, Professor Diószegi alludes to 
those constituents of human nature, human 
instincts that are represented by the 
behavioural forms of collecting, augmenting, 
and the purposeless activity of accumulating 
possession for its own sake. The volume of 
the book probably prevented him from 
expounding this territorial motive of foreign 
policy more thoroughly, though it doubtlessly 
sounds convinincing, when the author asserts, 
that "After all it stands to reason, that one 
can get rich more easily and quickly by 
taking away what belongs to some other man 
than by struggling to produce new assets." 
The former, economically motivated aspir-
ations had to be supported by apparently 
legitim arguements and this always led to 
the elaboration of the necessary ideology that 
tried to justify these claims. Beside the usual 
economic considerations there might be other 
reasons behind the conquest István Diószegi 
starts with presenting the military-security 
considerations reinforcing the defensive 
position of the state, by describing the 
constant political stuggle of France to make 
natural boundaries its official borders. The 
object of the foreign policy of Russia 
documents the other motive, the effort to 
obtain access to the sea or ocean. There can 
be found may illustrations of conquest made 
to gain prestige from Napoleon through 
Mussolini to the "tyrants" of our days. 
Expansional politics on the other hand might 
threaten the security of another powerfull 
country, thus inducing other conquests 
motivated by considerations of security, and 
leading to a chain reaction of expansions 
culminating in catastrophe. 
The author deals with the concept of 
"protection" as the third idependent feature 
of foreign policy. The role of the protector 
means, that the protecting state "raises its 
voice" in order to ensure that the other 
country treat its protégés in the same 
manner than the rest of the population, or 
even give them special privileges. This is 
discussed as an independent feature by the 
author, for these efforts are not related with 
safety or territorial considerations. Of the 
motivations behind the role of protector 
religion is the most ancient—we must re-
member the diplomatic memoranda "worry-
ing" about the situation of Christians living 
in Turkey. Professor Diószegi asserts that 
the demand to have the category of minority 
rights recognized and guaranteed, a hot issue 
these days in our own region, or even the 
demand for autonomies of different types 
are all the fruits of the institution of protec-
tion, a legacy of the period of ethnic states, 
where the manifestations of the role of the 
protector were not exercised by the mother 
country alone, as the function performed by 
the ethnically neutral powers is reflected in 
the articles on the protection of minorities 
in the Peace Treaties of Paris and in the 
creation of a court of appeal in Leauge of 
Nations. 
The politically motivated protection is 
a category of its own. According to the 
definition of the au tho r "The state that is 
in the position of the protector makes its own 
social-political organization and ideology the 
role model, and excepts the other country not 
to discriminate against those citizens who 
choose to follow this model. Any kind of 
discrimination is retaliated by the state in the 
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position of the protector." The war declared 
by France in the name of revolutional soli-
darity in 1792, or the proletarian solidarity 
of the Sovietunion actively helping the cause 
of world revolution in the 20s could be 
viewed as such a retaliation. The author 
suggests the new term "democratic soli-
darity" for designating the manifestations of 
political protection of our days, when a 
group of citizens protests against the viol-
ation of the democratic and human rights 
of a group of their co-citizens by the 
supreme power (Charta' 77, Solidarity' 81), 
and than these groups are extended the 
protection of the model state or states—in 
our examples the Western states. 
It might be mentioned, that giving the 
adjective "democratic" to the concept of so-
lidarity may raise the problem of relativity. 
It might be more fortunate to operate with 
ideologically less coloured and partial 
expressions, that do not evoke conditional 
reflexes. Beside the "classical" antithesis of 
socialist-capitalist, the relative nature of the 
concept of democracy is also demonstrated 
by the radically different interpretation—and 
practice-of democracy in the economically 
developed countries, for example in the 
United States or Taivan or Singapur. The 
legality of active protection based on "de-
mocratic solidarity" is a complicated ques-
tion in any case. The Sovietunion spoke of 
democracy in 1979 in Afganistan, and so 
did the US in connection with Haiti quite 
recently. In both cases the sovereignity of 
the protected states was violated in the 
course of a legally rather dubious protection 
of democracy. The question is made even 
more complicated—or perhaps legitimate in 
this case alone—by the democracy-protecting 
actions effectuated within the framework of 
the United Nations, for example in the case 
of the Kuwaiti crisis culminating in the Golf 
War (although constallation of security-
policy were also raised in the case of 
Kuwait). Without becoming even more 
entangled in the analysis of these latter 
problems, w e point out, that we merely 
wished to draw attention to the danger of 
choosing adjectives categorically. 
The author, summing up his own 
thoughts, concludes that the role of protec-
tor is only an additional motive of foreign 
policy. It comes to the fore, when the 
manifestation of protection is compatible 
with the main considerations of the foreign 
policy of the country extending the pro-
tection, but when it ceases to be so, the 
question of protection is quickly forgotten. 
Effectiveness is not among the virtues of 
political protection, after all interventions 
of this type always violate sovereignity, 
which no state can tolerate, therefore its 
realization becomes possible only by exercis-
ing constraint, or in extreme cases by utiliz-
ing armed forces, but this might happen 
only if such a drastic measure is vindicated 
by other, safety or territorial considerations 
of the foreign policy. 
After making an account of the most 
important motivations in foreign politics, 
István Diószegi arrives at the conclusion that 
there is no absolute fixed order of values 
between positional and territorial consider-
ations, and such a choice is necessary only 
in case of conf l ic t However the author is 
of the opinion that in these cases the 
territorial motivation gains ascendancy, at 
least in the majority of the examples, over 
sovereignity and security. 
Of course this is not an exhaustive list 
of the components of foreign policy, there 
is the extensive collection of scientific, 
cultural, legal-economical relations, the 
testimonies of the ideological solidarity, that 
might even gain priority in certain cases, or 
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might rise to the most privileged position, 
but ususally remain far bellow the safety and 
territorial consideration of foreign policy. 
The book of István Diószegi is a sig-
nificant work, for the influence of the events 
and new ideologies of the one and a half 
century analysed extends to our days. Study-
ing this thorough, detailed and readable work 
might contribute to the formation of a new 
perceptive, a new ground for academic inves-
tigation, a "pair of glasses" constituted of 
conscious pieces, through which connections 
hitherto unpercieved might become visible 
and the behaviour of countries in interna-
tional life might be understood. Among the 
books recently published on power politics 
the work of Professor Diószegi is certainly 
a worthwhile reading material, due to his 
unique perception of the history of diplo-
macy and his interesting observations. 
Károly KISTELEKI 
Imre VÖRÖS: A tu la jdonhoz való j og és az önkormányzatok [The property and the 
economic activities of local governments], Települési Önkormányzatok Országos Szövetsége, 
Budapest, 1994, pp. 119 
The monograph written by Imre Vörös is 
from many aspects an exciting reading. 
The subject of the work in itself already 
combines multiple aspects. I do not believe 
that there is any expert dealing with the 
activities of municipalities in practice, the 
attention of whom would not be caught by 
the up-to-dateness of this book. I doubt if 
there was anybody regarding himself as 
"homo politicus" who would not be inter-
ested in this study of the separation of public 
and private spheres in the light of the right 
to property. And I am also convinced that 
every colleague of Imre Vörös at the Consti-
tutional Court will read these more than a 
hundred pages with professional excitement. 
The main reason for the attention paid 
to the book will most probably be that, 
although the judges of the Constitutional 
Court may attach separate opinions to the 
judgment, or, eventually, concurring opin-
ions, the judges still lack a forum to criticize 
the judgment or—let us put it correctly—to 
criticize the views of their fellow judges. I 
think that this will give birth to a completely 
new literary form in Hungary. This new 
literary form is the analysis of the differing 
views of the members of the Constitutional 
Court Such an analysis can be regarded as 
an interior study—from the aspect of the 
author's employment status, however since 
it addresses the public, it can also be 
regarded as an external study. 
In my opinion, Justice Vörös has played 
a very prominent role in laying down the 
basis for this tradition. His work was 
inspired by passionate professional adher-
ence to a legal institution, to a fundamental 
right; one can sense his responsibility among 
the lines. His readiness to take responsibility 
could be characterized with the words of the 
famous Hungarian poet, Miklós Radnóti, as 
"confession and commitment". Therefore the 
book tells us about more than the properties 
of the local governments, it deals with more 
than constitutional adjudication on the issue; 
the book is primarily about the modem 
concept of the "inviolability of property". 
This book is thus exciting because of 
the collision of pro and contra opinions. The 
book is in fact a romance about the right 
to property. Its subtitle could be, maybe 
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with an air of exaggeration: "Fight against 
the lack of concepts—with a concept". 
The backbone of the study is formed 
by criticism in connection with the prop-
erties of the local governments, and sugges-
tions inspired by the former. This theoreti-
cal link between de lege lata and de lege 
ferenda is based in the first place on a 
critique of the valid legal norms. (Part "A": 
The properties of the local government and 
its economic activities de lege lata). After 
the analysis of the controversies and defi-
ciencies in the legal regulation, the author 
begins to scrutinize the relevant practice of 
the Constitutional Court. [Part"B": Art. 12 
para. 2; Art. 13. para. 1; Art. 44. para. 1 
b, of the Constitution in the light of the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court], This 
part is divided into three section with an 
additional summary at the end. Firstly, 
following the threefold structure, Justice 
Vörös separately examines the right to 
property as a fundamental right, then he 
studies whether and to what extent the local 
government can be a subject of fundamental 
rights and finally he elaborates on the 
particular right of local governments to 
property in details. In the next part of the 
book dealing with lege ferenda (Part "C": 
Proposals concerning the constitutional 
regulation of the properties of local govern-
ments and their involvment in economic 
activities) the reader learns about the 
author 's concept and proposals, which 
have been worked out and summed up on 
the basis of a valuation of foreign experi-
ence. 
In Part "A" the author emphasizes the 
fact that whereas property may exist with-
out economic activity, no economic activity 
exists without property—therefore he treats 
the question of economic activities as being 
inferior to property. 
After having examined the provisions 
of both the Constitution and the Act on 
Local Governments, the author considers 
the most serious problem to be that the 
strive for regulating the fundamental 
collective right of self-government (Art. 42 
of the Constitution) is not absolute in any 
of the legal norms, but rather conditional. 
It is not clear, what are the principal, 
conceptual grounds for the independence 
of local governments. As a logical conse-
quence of this, restrictions to be imposed 
upon this independence are not clearly set 
forth, either, i.e. the "limits, the methods 
and the legitimacy of restrictions" are not 
clearly determined. The author criticizes the 
provisions of the Act on Local Govern-
ments (which came into force in 1974—ed.) 
in an especially harsh manner. In his eyes 
the structure of the Act is most similar to 
a rick of straw which was scattered pell-
mell all over the ground, and it is complete-
ly wrong from the viewpoint of codification 
technique. Imre Vörös leaves no doubt in 
the reader's mind when he shows that the 
drafters of that particular Act had absolutely 
no affinity to civil law. Although his 
argumentation is strongly biased for civil 
law, because of his own subject, his style 
is nevertheless full of wit. The following 
expressions are good examples of criticism: 
a civil law balderdash, linguistic and legal 
nonsense, meaningless verbosity, etc. 
In the first chapter of Part "B" Justice 
Vörös sets forth that for a certain period 
of time he used to consider the practice of 
the Constitutional Court as correct and 
consistent Later on his professional convic-
tions urged him to "take Cassandra 's role", 
i.e. to stand up for an idea everybody else 
refuses to believe in as long as they recog-
nize it is true. The relevant decisions were 
the following: the decision concerning 
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indemnification, the decision concerning 
former church properties, and the one 
concerning the question of housing. 
With regard to the problems of indem-
nification Imre Vörös believes that the so-
lutions are in some way related to actual 
political aims. He even points out that the 
Constitutional Court has revised one of its 
former decisions as a result of a compro-
mise between the parties to the coalition. 
Concentrating strictly on questions of the 
law, he is convinced that insertion of the 
category of a "statutory option" in fact 
creates a possibility for taking away of 
property, thus eliminating the autonomy of 
the owner. Imre Vörös has already in his 
separate opinion expressed his fears regard-
ing that such a decision might effect a loss 
of legitimacy of the constitutional guaran-
tees of the right to property. In his opinion, 
Act No. LXXVIII of 1993 serves as evi-
dence for proving that his fears had been 
well-established, in so far that this Act 
incorporates an obligation imposed upon 
local governments to alienate their property 
under the name of option. 
In connection with the decision con-
cerning the legal status of former church 
property [4/1993. (XII. 22.)], the author 
thinks that no distinction has been made 
between imposing burden on the property 
and the taking away of the proprietary 
rights. 
According to the decision of the Consti-
tutional Court concerning housing [64/1993. 
(XII. 12.)] a burden imposed by the force 
of administrational law can result in that 
the particular right concerned, which is, in 
the present case the right to property, will 
be deprived of the protection provided by 
the guarantee to its substance and this 
protection will be reduced to a guarantee 
to the value of the property instead. The 
author claims that this per se violates the 
Constitution, and it completely contradicts 
the rule of law principle, since the owner 
will be unable to foresee, whether in the 
given case the Constitutional Court will 
rather protect the substance of the property 
or only its value. Hence the protection of 
proprietary rights under civil law becomes 
the subject of the discretionary decision of 
the Constitutional Court, the right to 
property gets meaningless. "The so-called 
guarantee to the value of property is 
nothing more than a fig-leaf that is sup-
posed to cover the too obvious political 
agreement in the background of the deci-
sion concerned, i.e. an attempt to legalize 
the taking away of proprietary rights." 
The decision, since it has adopted a one-
sided, emotional interpretation protecting 
exclusively the interests of the tenant, does 
not take into consideration that an apartment 
shall not solely function as a "shelter" but 
it also serves other purposes, such as ensur-
ing the basic life conditions, and not only 
for the tenant, but also for the owner. The 
above described constitutional possibility for 
acquisition of proprietary rights possesses 
the danger that it can be extended with 
regard to both the subjects and the objects 
of these rights. According to the author the 
most harmful consequence of the decision 
is that the actual object of the right to 
property comes out of the scope of constitu-
tional protection of the right to property (Art. 
13 para. 2 of the Constitution) without that, 
at the same time, it would fall under the 
protection provided by the constitutional 
provision on expropriation (Art. 13 para. 2). 
Thus it is "no longer a proprietary right" 
because of its undetermined object and 
confused interpretation. Imre Vörös agrees 
with professor Depenhauer, member of the 
German Constitutional Court on the subject 
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matter. The basis of legitimacy for the 
German Federal Constitutional Court is 
exclusively the positive constitutional law. 
For the Hungarian Court, on the other hand, 
the concept of invisible constitution provides 
with an opportunity to get involved in 
politics, absent an express authorization for 
that. 
In the authors view reference by the 
Constitutional Court to the practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights, and 
especially to the James-case is false and 
misleading. Firstly, because the Court should 
have reasonably referred to this decision in 
case of the annulment of the statutory option 
provided by the Housing Act, and secondly 
because he is convinced that a provision of 
a legal norm has been declared void despite 
of that the reasoning of the judgment proves 
just the opposite, i.e. that the norm con-
cerned complied with the Constitution. 
Based on the foregoing, Imre Vörös 
claims to be sufficiently demonstrated that 
although the Constitutional Court had 
recognized the right to property as a funda-
mental constitutional right before, neverthe-
less it reversed its consistent decisions later 
on, so that the constitutional guarantees to 
the substance of the property have been 
turned into guarantees merely protecting its 
value. The author of the monograph dis-
agrees with Ulis. He is convinced that the 
fundamental right to property can only be 
effectively protected in the totality of its 
three composing elements: "protection of 
the ability to acquire property, and protec-
tion against both the taking away and the 
restriction of proprietary rights", for in the 
absence of these, at the present stage of 
development, "neither democracy, nor social 
market economy exists". The protection of 
the first two elements out of the three shall 
be absolute, whereas restrictions shall be 
tested against the requirements of propor-
tionality and necessity, The socially bound 
nature of property, as well as the wider 
authorization of the legal persons of public 
law to impose restrictions, and determination 
of the limits of restriction by law may serve 
as possible basis for imposing restrictions 
on proprietary rights. 
In the second chapter of Part "B" Imre 
Vörös takes the position, arguing against the 
relevant decisions of the Constitutional 
Court, that it is ineligible from the view-
point of a jurist to transform questions of 
fundamental rights of the local governments 
(Art. 44/A of the Constitution) into ques-
tions of authorization [4/1993. (II. 12.)]. In 
the concrete cases the local governments are 
subjects of the civil life just like any other 
subject of private law. 
The author declares decision 4/1993. (II. 
12.) of the Constitutional Court to be 
inconsistent because it narrows the right to 
property of local governments so that only 
the legal position of the owner will be 
protected and it excludes from the protection 
the several proprietary rights. 
Decision 64/1993. (XII. 22.) even forgets 
about the protection of the legal position of 
the owner, since this cannot be included into 
category of guarantee to the value of prop-
erty. Besides, the statement concerning 
value-connected guarantee cannot be based 
on any provisions of the constitution. 
In the summary of Part "B" Justice 
Vörös repeatedly states that though the 
practice of the Constitutional Court has been 
influenced by the actual problems of poli-
tics, it still protects—but with a particular 
uncertainty—the legal status of local govern-
ments, however the content of this is also 
rather uncertain. Hopefully when it comes 
to the taking away of the property of local 
governments, their proprietary rights will 
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lonly in a limited number of cases stand 
under the protection of the guarantees to 
ther value of the property. In these particular 
cases Vörös concerns it to be regrettful that 
the Constitutional Court has not taken into 
consideration Art. 8 para. 2 of the Constitu-
tion, since it declares that the substantial 
meaning of fundamental rights shall not be 
restricted. 
In conclusion the author sums up the 
consequences to be drawn from foreign 
experiences and he formulates his current 
message, his concept regarding the ongoing 
process of constitution-making. His propo-
sals concerning the regulation of the legal 
status of local governments refer to certain 
changes in terminology, and the text he 
proposes outlines a flexible, but at the same 
time accurately elaborated model. In this 
model local governments possess the 
complexity of rights but their rights can be 
subjected to restrictions provided that the 
necessary guarantees are available. 
To date, it has more or less turned out, 
what are the portions one is entitled to (if 
at all) of the "dish of the political transform-
ation. On the back cover of the book the 
author" presents "the song of the changes, 
which in his opinion only those will sing 
who get a share of the spoil. But the 
question of the near future is whether who 
can intone the "hymn of constitution-mak-
ing". This is the reason why I considered 
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PREFACE 
FINNISH-HUNGARIAN SEMINARS 
ON CRIMINAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW* 
Within the framework of the co-operation agreements between the Finnish and 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, a series of bilateral seminars began at the end of the 
seventies. Every two or three years since then there have been meetings for criminal and 
public lawyers of both countries. These seminars brought together Finnish and 
Hungarian scholars to discuss the most timely issues of penal law, constitutional law, 
administrative law and international law. All those conferences were attended by 
scholars, government legal officials and practitioners, the attenders presented papers, 
made comments and participated in discussion. 
In 1996 Hungary hosted two seminars with Finnish colleagues, the fifth seminar of 
administrative law held in March and the seventh seminar on criminal law in September. 
That conferences will undoubtedly remain in our memory as one of the most fruitful and 
warm academic events. The publishers extends its thanks to the participants for their 
contributions. 
The papers made at those seminars together with the opening remarks are edited for 
publication in this volume. 
Finally, again the publishers wish to express their deepest appreciation to Adjunct 
Professor Balázs József Gellér, who edited the conference material, as well as to 
Caroline MacMahon-Gellér , M A (Cantab.), who was the linguistic editor of these 
articles and turned as much of them as we would allow her into English. 
* This publication has received support from Hungarian National Science Foundation (OTKA) grant No. 
T 14829. 
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At the opening session of the 7th Finnish-Hungarian Seminar on Criminal Law 
Professor Tibor Horváth welcomed the participants to the conference with the following 
words. 
"Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Guests, Dear Colleagues! It is my pleasure to greet 
our guests from Finland here at the University of Miskolc, and to welcome all the 
participants in this Finnish-Hungarian Criminal Law Seminar. My pleasure is not only 
at the presumably high standards of this academic conference, but also at the fact that 
Finnish-Hungarian academic co-operation has continued in this specific area with 
uninterrupted energy. 
It is well known to all of you how much the social and political changes and the 
changing international political situation have influenced—indeed, more often impeded 
rather than assisted—the developing cultural relationship between our two countries. The 
Second World War and its political, or rather geopolitical, consequences meant an 
essential break in this process. Only in the 1970's were there important changes, when 
a kind of cultural co-operation was forged with the signing of the Helsinki Accords. 
It is my satisfaction to point out that representatives of Finnish and Hungarian 
jurisprudence played an active part in this process, and themselves contributed to the 
pulling down of cultural borders. This mutual effort has now been acknowledged. 
There are several cultural agreements between our two countries, of which one is the 
academic agreement regulating co-operation in the area of jurisprudence. 
However, it is also true that co-operation in the field of jurisprudence has developed 
slowly, irregularly, and accidentally. We, the lawyers and criminologists, were lucky 
when our interest turned towards Finland at the beginning of the 1970's. We desired to 
acquaint ourselves thoroughly with Scandinavian criminal law; we were, additionally, 
aware of the relationship between our nations, and we watched with undeniable curiosity 
the developments in this economically and culturally kindred nation. 
I myself visited Finland at the beginning of the 1970's, and I was to learn more 
about Finnish jurisprudence in Helsinki and Turku, where I met outstanding scholars 
and experts such as Professor Lahti, who at that time was working at the University 
of Turku. As far as the development of our academic relationship is concerned, it was 
undoubtedly important that I met Professor Antilla, the then directress of the Legal-
Political Institute in Helsinki, who was a criminologist well-known in the western 
world. My second visit took place in 1975, and by that time Professor Antilla and 
myself were already exploring the possibilities of future Finnish-Hungarian co-
operation. It was after this that Professor Antilla proposed the establishment of an 
official academic co-operation, and also the idea of a Finnish-Hungarian criminal law 
seminar such as we have today. The Institute of Political and Legal Sciences at the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences accepted the offer of official co-operation with 
pleasure, and the first Finnish-Hungarian criminology meeting was organised in this 
spirit in 1979 in Budapest. I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge 
Professor András Szabó, Constitutional Court Judge, and Professor Imre Wiener, who 
also participated, along with myself, in the organisation of the very first Finnish-Hun-
garian Seminar. 
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This first meeting was followed by a second one in Helsinki, organised by Professor 
Antilla and Professor Lahti. Intellectually and emotionally these first two meetings were, 
for myself, the most memorable. In addition to the academic content of the seminars, 
all of us were impressed by the kind attention and friendly attitude with which we were 
treated by our Finnish colleagues in Helsinki and Turku; to give jus t one example, the 
Lehtimaja family greeted us in their own home with Hungarian words and music. The 
first and second meetings were followed by two more in Budapest and in Helsinki, and 
now we are together again, this time in Miskolc, where the University of Miskolc 
Institute of Criminal Sciences is hosting the 7th Finnish-Hungarian Seminar. 
This setting was not accidentally chosen. As a professor of the legal faculty, 
founded in 1981, I have always consciously worked to develop co-operation with 
Finnish jurisprudence, primarily with the universities and research institutes, through the 
Miskolc Legal Faculty and the Institute. My work has not been without success. We 
have invited speakers from Finland, such as P. Koskinent and T. Utriaincnt, to lecture 
to our students; we then established a relationship with the University of Rovaniemi. E. 
Riepula, the rector of the University of Lapland and the present Dean of the Legal 
Faculty there, was also our guest. 
Our connections with Finnish jurisprudence are not, of course, one-sided. I am very 
proud of the fact that the majority of the members of the Institute are participating in 
some way in the information exchange built up between the institutions. For example, 
as HEUNI scholarship holders, some of them have spent time at the Institute of 
Helsinki, and some of us have given lectures in Rovaniemi. I myself was greatly 
honoured when the University of Lapland conferred on me the degree of honoris causa 
for my academic work and my participation in the development of Finnish-Hungarian 
academic co-operation. 
Dear Colleagues, I believe that the academic topics which are on the agenda of the 
Finnish-Hungarian seminars have a special theoretical and practical importance for both 
countries. Therefore it was not by accident that the first meeting discussed sensitive 
questions of the sanction system and the imposition of punishments. The social and 
political changes in Hungary are compelling Hungarian jurisprudence to search for ways 
in which to harmonise our laws more fully with those of the rest of Europe. This 
conference could give enormous help to this ambition, particularly when we note that 
in the field of criminal law and criminal just ice both Finland and Hungary have similar 
legislative and juridical problems. 
When we are in the process of solving these problems we should not be indifferent 
to the fact that although Finnish and Hungarian legal thinking were formed in different 
historical backgrounds, we are linked together by our common European culture. There 
are more factors which link us together than there are those which draw us apart. Let 
me refer briefly to the fact the both the Finnish and Hungarian criminal codes from the 
end of the last century were based on classical criminological principles, and that the 
later development of both countries' legislation was influenced by reforming tendencies. 
Last, but not least, the further development today of both countries is influenced by the 
principle of a democratic constitutional state, and dependent upon the guarantee taken 
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from the principle of nullum crimen and nulla poena, and the requirement of a penal 
system based on rationality and humanity. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my intention to open the 7th Finnish-Hungarian Criminal 
Law Seminar with these thoughts, and I hope that the issues which are to be discussed 
will help to develop the trend towards European legal harmony in our countries, will 
foster better mutual understanding between our two countries, and will further co-
operation and friendship between Finnish and Hungarian experts." 
At the opening session of the 7th Finnish-Hungarian Seminar on Criminal L a w 
Professor Imre A. Wiener after welcoming the participants all paid tribute to Dr. Márta 
Bittó, who died in Budapest on the 16. October, 1995. 
"Márta Bittó was always an active organiser and participant at the Finnish-
Hungarian Seminars. Dr. Bittó had worked for the Institute for Legal and Administrative 
Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences since 1972. For twenty years it was 
my pleasure and my privilege to work with her and to witness her achievements in the 
field of criminal law. In the seventies her research activities focused on foreign juridical 
systems; in the eighties on the protection of the environment and questions of 
administrative offences within the framework of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. For some years professional negligence was her main research subject, and this 
was explored in her dissertation entitled Labour Protection and Criminal Law, for which 
she received her doctoral (PhD) degree. From the late eighties onwards she taught at the 
School of Public Administration. 
Her international scholarly activity was concerned firstly with the Association 
Internationale de Droit Pénal (AIDP). During her relationship with the AIDP, she 
participated in many conferences and made many friends in the international scholarly 
and professional world. She was a national reporter at the XIV and XV International 
Congresses of Penal Law. She organised several scholarly international conferences in 
Hungary and also prepared reports on those held abroad. Her participation at numerous 
international conferences increased the knowledge of her work and personal qualities 
among many jurists throughout the world. 
The Finnish-Hungarian Seminars on Criminal Law, held every three years, o f fe r 
excellent opportunities for the research workers of our Institute and the professors of 
the Faculty of Law of the University of Helsinki to discuss contemporary questions of 
criminal science. Márta Bittó was a prominent participant in these Hungarian-Finnish 
seminars. She will be remembered for her affability and kindness. I believe that she is 
also missed by our Finnish colleagues who, like us, remember her fondly. 
Imre A. WIENER 
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STUDIES 
Risto EEROLA C o m p a r a t i v e Aspects 
of the Criminal Responsibility 
of Government Members 
in Western Europe 
1. Introduction 
The reasons for choosing this topic for an article can be seen at two levels. Firstly, there 
have been some recent cases in the Nordic countries where the question of the criminal 
responsibility of government members has become an issue. 
In Denmark a case was brought against a former Minister of Justice in 1993. Two 
years later he was convicted of intentionally breaching his official duties. The sources 
for these duties are to be found in the Fundamental Law, other laws, or the nature of 
his position as a minister.1 
During the same year there was a case in Finland against a former Minister of 
Trade and Industry who was accused of demanding payment as a condition for certain 
state financial transactions relating to banking and industry. The Finnish High Court 
of Impeachment convicted him of accepting a bribe and of violating his official 
duties.2 
These cases may be described as the factual background for considering this topic 
to be of current interest. I also considered this topic to be suitable for discussion under 
1 The judgement of the High Court of Impeachment was given on 22nd June 1995 and can be found (in 
Danish) in Ugeskrifi for Retsvasen (1995) 672 R. This judgement has given rise to much debate in Denmark. 
In particular, the question has been raised as to whether the Danish High Court of Impeachment in its present 
form is a suitable forum for dealing with these matters. See, e.g., VILTOFT, H.: "Rigsretinstitutionen", Juristen, 
1996, 255, and KIERKEGAARD, A.: "Rigsretinstitutionen", Juristen, 1996, 260. 
2 The judgement was given on 29th October 1993. 
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the title of the seminar: The Rule of Law and Criminal Law. The criminal responsibility 
of government members is—at least in my opinion—an appropriate topic for demonstrating 
the functioning of the principle of the rule of law (or the idea of Rechtsstaat) at the 
highest level of the state hierarchy. At this level the fields of criminal law and 
constitutional law can be seen as being intertwined. 
Secondly, there are other reasons for my selection of this topic which are connected 
with some legislative reforms that have been made in this area, especially in Finland. 
At the beginning of this year a committee was appointed with the task of planning a 
total reform of Finnish constitutional laws.3 Relevant parts of these laws concerning the 
criminal responsibility of government members will also be reformed. 
I shall not attempt to give a detailed presentation of this theme here; rather, I shall 
simply sketch out some outlines. Firstly, I shall deal with the question of whether 
special legislation concerning the criminal responsibility of government members is 
necessary^-and, if the answer is in the affirmative, what is the reason for that conclusion. 
Consideration of these questions will lead us to draw some conclusions about the 
different starting points or differing background assumptions regarding the systems of 
Western European countries. Following this, I shall make some brief remarks on the 
role of special legislation on the criminal responsibility of government members. 
2. Is There a Need for Special Legislation Concerning the Criminal 
Responsibility of Government Members? 
If we look at the constitutions of Western European countries, we can make an 
important observation: in nearly all of these countries there are regulations concerning 
the criminal responsibility of government members. Furthermore, it can be seen that 
parliament features prominently in the process because in almost every country it is 
parliament (or at least one of its chambers or committees) which decides whether to 
bring a case against a member of the government. 
Exceptions to this procedure can be found in Germany (about which, more will be 
said below) and France. In France the constitutional sections on the criminal responsibil-
ity of government members were reformed in 1993.4 Before this reform, parliament's 
role in the process was also significant in France. In order to bring a case against a 
government member, a decision made both in the National Assembly and in the Senate 
was required. Now, after the reform, every citizen who claims to have suffered harm 
as a result of a minister's action has the right to complain to a special Commission of 
Investigation (commission des requêtes), which is composed of judges. This commission 
3 The committee will have to publish its report by the end of March 1997. Its main task is to consolidate 
the four constitutional laws of Finland into a single constitutional document. The name of the committee is very 
illustrative: "Constitution 2000", that is, a reformed constitution for a new millennium. 
4 The constitutional basis of this criminal liability is to be found in Article 68-1 of the French Consti-
tution. 
Comparative Aspects of the Criminal Liability of Government Members in Western Europe 131 
has the power to decide whether the process will continue. In connection with this 
reform, a new court was also established to deal with such cases.3 
The other remarkable exception is Germany, where there is no separate regulation 
concerning the criminal responsibility of members of the federal government. The 
German Constitution only regulates the process for bringing a case against the President 
of the Federal Republic. ' This represents a clear departure from the Weimar Constitu-
tion of 1919, according to which Parliament could bring a criminal case against a 
member of the government.7 
This difference between the Weimar Constitution and the new Constitution of 1949 
was not created by chance, but was the result of a deliberate decision. The reason for 
this was that Parliament 's right to bring a criminal case against government members 
was considered to be part of a different political system, that is, that of a constitutional 
monarchy.8 In this system the idea was that the monarch himself or herself was not 
legally responsible for any of his or her actions. ' The legal responsibility for actions 
and decisions, therefore, lay elsewhere, which meant the monarch's advisers, that is, the 
members of his or her cabinet. 
Now we should ask whether the specially regulated criminal responsibility of 
government members is really an old-fashioned phenomenon belonging to another 
political era. Almost always when this question is raised it is said that parliament 's right 
to bring a criminal case against a member of the government was necessary because it 
5 The new court is called La Cour de justice de la République. It consists of 15 judges of whom 12 are 
elected by the French Parliament. Three of the judges are members of the Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation). 
For the situation before the reform see DUVERGER, M.: Le système politique français. Droit constitutionnel 
et systèmes politiques. 1986, 436, and HAURJOU, A.—GICQUEL, J.: Droit constitutionnel et institutions 
politiques. Paris, 1980, 1136. 
6 See Article 61 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) . This solution has been criticised; see, e.g., 
MAUNZ, T . - D Ü R I G , G.—HERZOG, R.: Grundgesetz. Kommentar. Band lit. Art. 38-91, München, 1991, 
comments on Article 61, margin no. 7. It is interesüng to note that Parliament's right to bring a criminal case 
against a minister can be found in the constitutions of the German states (Landesver fassungen) . There are, 
however, some exceptions to this rule: the constitutions of Berlin, Hamburg, Rheinland-Pfalz, Schleswig-
Holstein and the constitutions of "die fünf neuen Länder". See BENDA, E—MAIHOFER, W . - V O G E L , H-J.: 
Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts des Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 2., völlig neubearbeitete und erweiterte 
Atflage. Studienausgabe. Teil 1, Berlin, 1995, 559 margin no. 54. 
7 See ACHTERBERG, N.: Parlamentsrecht. Tübingen, 1984, 487, and von M Ü N C H , I.: Grund-
gesetz-Kommentar. Band 2 (Artikel 21 bis Artikel 69), Wemding, 1976, 695. 
8 See von BEYME, K.: Die parlamentarische Regierungssysteme in Europa. 2.. durchgesehene und ergänzte 
Aiflage. München, 1973, 357: "Man sah eine solche Bestimmung mit Recht als überlebtes Relikt aus der 
konstitutionellen Zeit an." 
9 It must be noted, however, that there are also different versions of constitutional monarchy. For example, 
the criminal liability of ministers was included in the French Fundamental Act (Charte) of 1814. The Act 
itself was, however, promulgated (octroyé) by the monarch as is shown in the preamble. This preamble was 
revoked during the July Revolution of 1830. The process has been described in detail in JYRÄNKI, A.: 
Lakién laki. Perustuslaki ja sen sitovuus eurooppalaiscssa ja pohjoisamerikkaiaisessa oikeusajaltelussa 
suurten vallankumousten kaudelta toiseen maailmansotaan. Mikkeli, 1989, 179, 189. 
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had no power to control government politically.10 After gaining that power, the insti-
tution of impeachment (and corresponding institutions) has been said to have played its 
role in controlling government." 
To my mind there are, however, strong arguments for a negative answer to the 
question raised above. The different solutions to the problem of the criminal responsibil-
ity of government members may be seen as representing different views of the 
relationship between politics and law in general. The main question is how to control 
the use of power and how to prevent its misuse. Answering this question also means the 
need to define the role of criminal law as part of broader means of control. 
There are basically two different models of the relations between government and 
parliament: the German model in which Parliament plays no role in deciding to bring 
a case against a member of the federal government, and another model in which the 
power to start criminal proceedings against a minister is vested in Parliament. 
When we consider the relationship between government and parliament, the 
German model may be seen to reflect a different kind of emphasis from, for example, 
the model used in the Nordic countries. In Germany, Parliament can control govern-
ment only politically; legal control lies elsewhere. Therefore, we can say that the focus 
of the German control mechanism lies in political control. Parliament has very effective 
means of carrying out this control; in particular, through its investigation committees 
as mentioned in Article 44 of the German Constitution.12 These committees are a very 
important means by which the opposition can monitor the government's actions. 
Whenever a quarter of the members of Parliament demands an investigation, 
Parliament has an obligation to set up an investigation committee.13 This right is often 
used.14 
The other model treats the controlling powers of parliament as a whole. This, again, 
opens the door to the possibility of translating political questions into legal ones in 
parliament. This kind of procedure may be a tempting alternative for those parliamentary 
groups that do not have enough parliamentary power to raise questions for political 
debate by any other means. For example, in Finland a complaint concerning the unlaw-
fulness of an official act of a member of the Council of State may be filed in Parliament 
10 See, e.g., concerning the corresponding Danish institution VILTOFT, op. cit., 249. 
11 Concerning Great Britain, see DICEY, A. V.: Introduction to the Study of Law of the Constitution, London, 
1924. 439: "The process ... is, and has long been, obsolete ... it is laid aside among the antiquities of the 
constitution, nor will it ever, we may anticipate, be drawn again from its scabbard." See also YARDLEY, D. 
C. M.: Introduction to the British Constitutional Law, 6th edition, Chatham, 1984. 27, and PHILLIPS, O. 
H.—JACKSON, P.: Constitutional and Administrative Law, 6th edition, Norwich, 1978. 125 who seem to hold 
a similar opinion. 
12 The corresponding article in the Weimar Constitution was Article 34. 
13 Parliament can, of course, decide to set up an investigation committee by a majority. The work of this kind 
of committee is known as Mehrheits-Enquête. See MAUNZ—DÜRIG—HERZOG, op. cit., margin no. 31. 
14 These committees may be said to carry out investigations on behalf of the minority in Parliament 
(Minderheits-Enquêle). MAUNZ—DÜRIG—HERZOG, op. cit., margin no. 31, margin no 35 and von MÜNCH, 
op. cit., 486. A list of the committees (up to 1975) can be found in ibid., 498. 
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by five deputies.15 It goes without saying that such complaints are widely publicised in 
the m e d i a It is interesting to compare this institution with that of interpellation. Deputies 
may address an interpellation to a member of the Council of State for consideration in 
Parliament. The Speaker can, however, only forward this interpellation to the competent 
member of the Council of State if at least twenty members, including the interpellators, 
have supported the interpellation in writing.16 These interpellations and the responses 
to them may be considered as major political debates in Parliament. 
In this second model, we can also see an interesting feature: there is either no possi-
bility of setting up a special investigation committee, or this possibility is seldom used. 
For example, it is not possible to set up a special investigation committee of parliament 
in either Finland or Sweden.17 In both countries the Constitutional Commit tee of 
Parliament, however, plays a very important role in controlling government. 
In each of these countries the Constitutional Committee of Parliament also has 
powers relating to the legal control of government. In Sweden, the Committee has the 
power to decide to initiate impeachment proceedings,18 whilst in Finland, its counter-
part first investigates the alleged illegal acts and then gives its report to a plenary 
session of Parliament which has the power to decide whether there are sufficient 
grounds to start criminal proceedings against a minister." 
In Denmark, it is possible for Parliament to set up special commissions consisting 
of Members of Parliament.20 This possibility is, however, very seldom used: the last 
t ime this kind of special commission was set up was in 1945 in order to investigate the 
responsibility of government members and certain other persons for the German 
occupation.21 The rare use of this kind of special commission may be explained 
historically. The setting up of such a commission is understood to be a preparation for 
criminal proceedings in the High Court of Impeachment.22 There has been some debate 
as to the need to constitute a parliamentary investigation committee that would be a 
standing committee.23 
15 Section 2 of the Ministerial Responsibility Act. This Act is one of the fundamental laws of Finland. 
16 For details see Section 37 of the Parliament Act. 
17 In 1990 the Finnish Parliament Act was, however, amended so that the competent Ministry shall present 
with a committee of the parliament an account of any matter within the competence of the committee requested 
thereby. If necessary, the committee may after that provide the Ministry with a statement. See Section 53 of 
the Parliament Act. 
18 See section 3 in Chapter 12 of the Swedish Constitution Act and for comment, H O L M B E R G , 
E.—STJERNQUIST, N.: Vár fórfattning. Tionde upplagen. Göteborg, 1995, 199. 
19 For details see Sections 4 and 6 of the Ministerial Responsibility Act. 
20 The legal basis for this is to be found in Section 51 of the Fundamental Law of Denmark. 
21 See CHRISTENSEN, J. P.: "Ministeransvaret — i lyset av tamilsagen", Nordisk administrativ! Tidsskrift. 
1993, 13; BUSCK, L : "Offentl ige h winger i Folketinget", Juristen. 1989, 97; and ESPERSEN, O . - R O S S , A.: 
Dansk Satsforfatningsret I. Viborg, 1980, 461. 
22 See B U S C K : op. cit., 97 and E S P E R S E N - R O S S : op. cit., 253. 
23 In 1989 the Danish Parliament Act was amended so that nowadays the parliamentary commit tees may 
organise hearings (hpring) to which, e.g., ministers may be invited. These hearings may be held in publ ic . 
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The first conclusion that can drawn on the basis of the previous consideration is that 
the role of parliament is seen somewhat differently in these two models. The German 
model reflects the idea of parliament as a controlling body-but one which exercises only 
political control. In this model, the exercise of legal control over government lies 
outside parliament. The reason for this again may lie in German history: legal control 
may have deliberately been taken out of the hands of politicians. The other model 
recognises that the parliament also has the possibility of starting criminal proceedings 
against a member of government. 
The second conclusion might be that in the German model the work of the govern-
ment is not seen as being very different from the work of the administration because 
basically the same regulations apply both to members of federal government and to civil 
servants. The other model would then be built on the idea of government work as 
qualitatively different from that of the administration. In this model the work of 
government would not be seen as administrative, but rather as the formulation of policies. 
This in turn would lead to the situation in which the essential elements of the criminal 
responsibility of ministers must be different from those of civil servants. 
This conclusion seems, however, to be a hasty one. Noting that the same legislation 
applies both to government members and to civil servants does not necessarily mean 
that the legal position of a minister and a civil servant would actually be the same. If 
this is true, it would mean that the special position of a minister is not taken into 
account according to the letter of the law, but according to actual practice. This 
assumption leads us to reformulate the second conclusion. In both of the models the 
difference between the work of government and the work of administration is seen and 
recognised. In one model (for example, in Finland, Sweden and Denmark), the 
difference has been recognised by the enactment of special legislation concerning the 
criminal responsibility of ministers. In the German model, in turn, it is possible that the 
difference is recognised through the general doctrines of the criminal law. 
I would dare to say that both of these models may basically lead to (almost) the 
same result. If we consider the model in which there is special legislation on the 
criminal responsibility of government members, we can see that it is a very difficult task 
to formulate the essential elements of the criminal responsibility of government 
members. The reasons for this difficulty are obvious. Firstly, these essential elements 
should cover a wide range of actions carried out within different institutional 
frameworks: for example, work in government plenary sessions, work in committees set 
up within the government, the work of an individual minister in his or her ministry, and 
so on. Secondly, the essential elements should cover the acts of a minister in different 
international organisations and bodies, such as the European Community. Thirdly, if the 
idea of the qualitative difference between the work of government and the work of 
administration is taken seriously, every wrongful act or omission cannot carry the threat 
of punishment. Government has to deal with very many matters, often within a very 
tight schedule. An overly legalistic attitude would quickly and effectively act as a 
hindrance to the work of government. Fourthly, it must not be forgotten that the 
ministers also have other roles: they may be party leaders (or at least have a prominent 
Comparat ive Aspects of the Criminal Liability of Government Members in Western Europe 135 
position in their party), they may be important figures in a trade union or in private 
business, or they may participate in the administration of a municipality. This problem 
of multiple roles is of ten present when we consider a statement that a member of the 
government has given to the media; it is not always easy to know in which capacity the 
minister has acted. 
All this means that the essential elements of the criminal responsibility of government 
members must be rather open. This again raises some doubts from the point of view of 
the principle of legality. The legislator must therefore try to find a balance between these 
two requirements: the problem is therefore how to formulate the essential elements of 
criminal responsibility of government members so as to make them open enough to cover 
the various tasks of government without being too imprecise in describing the punishable 
acts and omissions'? 
These problems may be very well illustrated by quoting the relevant Finnish 
legislation on the criminal responsibility of government members which is now (or 
should I say, still) in force (Section 7 of the Ministerial Responsibility Act, which has 
the force of a constitutional law):24 
"The following shall be considered unlawful acts for which charges under this act 
may be brought against a member of the Council of State or the Chancellor of Justice: 
If, in an official act, he has aided or abetted manifest unlawfulness; 
If he has intentionally abused his official position to manifestly harm the country, 
and the abuse is to be deemed an offence in office; or 
If he has otherwise in some official act proceeded in a manifestly unlawful manner." 
In the corresponding Swedish legislation, the essential elements are formulated in 
a somewhat similar way (Swedish Constitution Act chapter 12 section 3):25 
"A present or former member of the Council of State may be held liable under 
criminal law for an act or omission in office only if he has manifestly breached the 
duties of his office. The Constitutional Committee of the Parliament shall decide 
whether to bring charges and the case shall be dealt with in the Supreme Cour t ." 
The important words in both of these sections are those that define the character of 
a punishable unlawful act in office. The act or omission must be manifestly unlawful , 
the minister must have assisted or abetted manifest unlawfulness, and so on. This means 
that the legislator has given a government member more freedom of action than civil 
servants have in general. In order to be punishable, the acts and omissions of 
government members must clearly be against the law or in other words, it must be 
obvious that a certain act or omission is prohibited by law. If this is translated into the 
modern language of criminal law, it may be said that the area of tolerated risk 
(erlaubtes Risiko) is much wider in the work of government than in the work of civil 
servants. The threshold of forbidden risk taking is higher. 
24 The translation is f rom a booklet (Constitutional laws of Finland—Procedure of Parliament) published by 
the Parliament of Finland, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice in 1996. 
25 M y translation [R. E.]. 
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Generally speaking, there are two reasons for this solution. Firstly, as has been 
noted above, government has to deal with so many matters that an individual minister 
cannot reasonably be expected to be deeply involved in all the affairs of government. 
All he or she can do is to rely on the other members of government, especially on that 
minister who is responsible for the specific matter in question. Secondly, the duties of 
a cabinet minister are not at all clear. They are seldom written down anywhere in detail, 
which means that it is often established practice that provides the minister with any 
guidelines. And at different times and in different situations the minister must 
implement this practice in a way he or she considers is relevant and appropriate. 
The kind of regulation concerning the criminal responsibility of government 
members that we can find in the constitutional laws of Finland and Sweden can easily 
be criticised for being too open from the point of view of the principle of legality. The 
argument that can be put in favour of that kind of regulation is that the ultimate purpose 
of this legislation is to limit the criminal responsibility of government members in 
comparison to civil servants. 
So the end result seems to be rather similar to that in a system where the special 
status and tasks of a minister are recognised only by implementing the general doctrines 
of criminal law. For example, in a criminal case against a German federal minister, it 
may be assumed that the concrete situation would be considered from rather similar 
starting points to those that have been the background ideas in Finnish and Swedish 
legislation. The assessment of the act or omission would be made from the point of 
view of the doctrine of forbidden risk taking. If this is correct, it is possible to put the 
question of whether it would after all be better to try to write out this kind of limitation 
of criminal responsibility in the legislation, rather than to try to reach the same end 
through the general doctrines of the criminal law. 
3. The Role of the Special Regulation on the Criminal Responsibility of 
Government Members 
Finally, it is possible to make some brief remarks on the overall role of the special 
regulation of the criminal responsibility of government members. When we think about 
the political system as a whole, we can say that if questions concerning the criminal res-
ponsibility of government members were to be part of everyday life in a political system, 
then that system would not have a sound foundation. This must not, however, lead us to 
think that the regulation of the criminal responsibility of government members would 
only be applied during special proceedings in parliament or during proceedings of the 
High Court of Impeachment. If the political system is a healthy one, then the possibility 
of criminal responsibility proceedings is really seen as the legal system's ultimate threat 
in controlling the use of political power. And that threat may have a strong preventive 
impact: for example, it may make ministers seek legal advice before a decision is taken 
by the government. In Finland, the Chancellor of Justice has become more of a legal 
adviser to the Council of State than an official exercising legal control over that body. 
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In a constitutional system there can be several measures which prevent situations 
that might result in criminal charges being brought in the High Court of Impeachment. 
It may, for example, be laid down in the constitution that members of the government 
are prohibited f rom engaging in work or taking up a position that would endanger their 
ability to carry out their duties or endanger their impartiality. The Finnish Constitution 
Act was amended by this kind of provision in 1995 (Section 36 c): 
"During his term of office as a minister, a member of the Council of State shall 
neither attend to the duties of a public administrative position nor perform any other 
task which could hamper the performance of his ministerial duties or undermine publ ic 
confidence in his activities as a member of the Council of State." 
In addition to this, the Government must inform Parliament about the details of the 
commitments of its members without delay. This communication to Parliament mus t 
contain, for example, the details of private enterprise activities of government members 
as well as information about their property ownership and debts. A debate, if necessary, 
will be held during a plenary sitting of Parliament. 
In this way the institution of the criminal responsibility of government members can 
be seen as a part of the control system focusing on the use of political power. Though 
criminal charges are actually seldom brought against a minister, the institution of the 
criminal responsibility of ministers must not be considered as being obsolete. On the 
contrary, it may be seen as the ultimate recourse in the control of the use of power and, 
in this capacity, as an essential part of the system. A totally different question is 
whether there is a need for a special court for these cases, and which would be the mos t 
suitable procedure when deciding to bring a charge against a minister. 

1 2 1 6 - 2 5 7 4 / 96 / $ 5.00 
© 1996 Ab dé mi ai Kiadó , Budapest 
Ákos FARKAS- T h e Constitutional L imi t s 
Erika RÓTH of the Efficiency of Criminal Justice 
I. Efficiency in Criminal Justice 
Efficiency is the indicator of the traditional criminal justice system that provides 
information on the ratio of the performance of traditional criminal procedure to the 
amount of costs and expenditures invested. 
The efficiency rate of the criminal justice system is traditionally given in index 
figures that indicate the quantitative and time co-efficients of criminal investigation and 
punishment. The general principle employed, with which we do not agree, is that actual 
efficiency is not included in this approach. By efficiency is meant the extent to which 
the re-occurrence of criminal acts is affected. The overall performance of jurisdictional 
systems is defined by different types of expenditures: for example, financial, personnel 
and educational. 
These index-numbers make up the indicator of eff ic iency which also implies the 
general limits of the system. We would contend that it is not necessary to prove that 
the evaluation of efficiency is justified if it concerns the whole system, when it is 
taken into consideration how the re-occurrence of crime is affected. This does not 
exclude the examination of different sub-systems; on the contrary, it strongly supports 
our view that such an examination is necessary. In order to make sense, this exami-
nation must be extended to the whole system. The scope of recent efficiency research, 
if these examinations can be labelled in such a fashion, has been restricted to the 
examination of the efficiency of the organisational conditions of a given jurisdictional 
sub-system: that is, whether these conditions are met by other sub-systems or differ 
from them, which is frequently the case. Therefore, the aim of these examinations is 
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to respond to the efficiency indices set up and followed by different organisational 
sub-systems: 
— those of the police (regardless of whether or not there is close co-operation with 
the Prosecution, whether the police are independent or play an auxiliary role): the 
improvement and development of "clear-up rates", that is, the investigation of more 
persons and the termination of fewer investigations and follow-up investigations. The 
rate of success may vary depending on the different authorities participating in the 
criminal process having differing tasks. These tasks may vary as a result of the different 
criminal procedure regulations of different countries; 
— those of the Prosecution: higher efficiency rate of prosecuting; 
— those of the courts: more cases terminated and fewer successful appeals; 
— those of prison agencies: period of imprisonment passes without any problems.1 
2. The Connections Between Criminal Policy and Prosecution 
A criminal justice system does not only aim to fulfil the efficiency indices set up by its 
own organisations, but also to meet the expectations of a given society and government 
in the fight against crime. These expectations and the general demands for criminal 
justice are set out in criminal policy. This expression first appeared in German legal 
literature in the 1820's and 30's, and was, like many other Hungarian legal terms, 
borrowed from the German. It has gone through several changes in meaning since then, 
and it is interpreted in a much broader sense now. Its contemporary meaning covers the 
following areas: from the various acts of prosecution of crime to the legal and non-legal 
actions of the state or social organisations. In the definition of criminal policy, the broad 
interpretation which refers to criminology and prosecution has become commonly 
accepted. Jeschek,2 for example, uses the term as an expression to show how criminal 
justice can be most successfully modified so as to be able to fulfil the task of the 
protection of society. Kaiser3 interprets it as the term applied to those social strategies 
and techniques, including sanctions, that aim to control crimes. The means applied to 
achieve this control are humanity and repression. 
With the following statement that is based on the past one hundred years' experience, 
we can claim that the more successfully a given legal system is able to fulfil its tasks 
with its legal devices and strengthen the sense of security in society, the more applicable 
a humanitarian and liberal criminal justice system becomes in the long run. 
The rate of criminality in England between the two World Wars shows a very good 
example of this. As Radzinowicz points out, the rate of violent criminal acts was low, 
as was also the number of politically-motivated crimes. There were hardly any organised 
1 FARKAS, Á.: "Az igazságszolgáltatás hatékonyságának alapkérdései" (Fundamental Questions of the 
Efficiency of Criminal Justice), Rendészeti Szemle, 1992, No. 7, 20-26. 
2 JESCHEK, H.-H.: Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil, Berlin, 1978, 16. 
3 KAISER. G.: Kriminologie, Heidelberg, 1976. 57. 
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crimes and the rate of criminal drug dealing was also negligible. Due to the liberal legal 
principles applied at the same time, these factors resulted in a shortening of the time of 
pre-trial detention. The number of short- and long-term imprisonments also considerably 
decreased. The guiding principles of penalty-imposition were also modified and the 
economic conditions of culprits were taken into consideration to a much larger extent 
when imposing a penalty. Probation and measures related to it were commonly applied. 
According to statistics, the efficiency rate of the so-called "borstal system" for juvenile 
delinquents was 75%, and served as an example to the whole world. 
The more tension that can be observed between the expectations from a criminal 
just ice system (that is, the sense of security of society, and the efficiency of a legal 
system) the more probable is the formation of a repressive and/or authoritative criminal 
policy. A good example of this is the current development of criminal policy. 
The overall aim of contemporary criminal policy is to achieve the opt imum result 
in the fight against crime, and to use the different means of criminal policy in the most 
eff icient way by applying legal and non-legal devices that are the most appropriate at 
a given level of civilisation (in its broadest sense). Following this concept, Imre Békés4  
claims that "[c]riminal policy falls out of the scope of the sphere of law and it does not 
deal with criminal justice, it rather focuses on its social content and goals." Let us add 
one thing to this: that is, criminal policy is politics in this sense, and thus it is related 
to social politics and policy. 
This statement, however, needs further clarification because the aims of criminal 
policy must be formulated within the framework of criminal justice. They ought to 
appear in criminal law and criminal procedure law, as well as in the regulations of 
prison law; they should also go through the various stages of legal procedures and be 
applied by law, because criminal policy can gain legitimacy only in this way. Therefore, 
criminal policy is not unified, as it conforms to the characteristic features of a specific 
branch of law and those of a given organisational system. There is no doubt about the 
fact that the expectations set up by criminal policy and doctrine in criminal just ice are 
interpreted in a different way according to the view taken of the basic principles of 
criminal procedure and its doctrinal characteristics. Criminal policy also depends on the 
characteristic features of a given branch of law in which it is applied, and so the 
inherent limitations of these branches may have an influence on it. It is a fact that there 
are different criminal policies existing in parallel within different branches of law, and 
these depend upon the topic of regulation. 
This also reflects those contradictions that appear because different criminal policies 
co-exist, and they are not related to each other in a unified system. An excellent 
example of this is the development of European criminal justice in the last decade, 
which demonstrates that specific types of punishment have definitely become more 
severe, in accordance with the basic principle of criminal policy whose aim is to set up 
4 BÉKÉS, I.: "Dogmatika és büntelópolitika" (Dogmatics and Penal Policy), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1986. 
No. 12, 592. 
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obstacles in the way of the increase of crime, and the rapid change in the forms of 
crime, such as terrorism, drug abuse, and organised crime. One of these obstacles is the 
application of repression, but we can also note the humanisation of the sentencing 
policy, the decreasing number of prison sentences and the increasing number of less 
severe sanctions. Similarly, we can also observe that the demand of criminal policy 
which states that the norms of human rights have to be respected, has been fulfilled. 
There is a tendency to speed up and to simplify criminal procedure, to apply secret 
police devices and, at the same time, to ease the guarantees in the procedure.5 
This tendency and its hidden contradictions call our attention to the fact that there 
are limits to expedience, which also set limits to efficiency. As Jeschek claims, "[n]ot 
everything proves to be lawful that is rational."6 
We must also see that the grounds on which criminal policy has been based are 
insecure, as Schwind points out. The doubt in criminal statistics, the inadequate amount 
of information available about the genuine reasons for the commission of crimes, and 
about the possible ways of preventing them, may make us uneasy about the best 
definition of the aims of criminal policy (but not about the need for it).7 
As Zipf claims, criminal policies are based on value selection, which is axiomatic 
rather than ontological; they determine and establish values. In the history of law the 
scope of the choice of values has been restricted to the binary value of humanity and 
reprcssion.This is the background to any kind of codificatory process: for example, the 
scope_of the accused's rights, the rights of different authorities in criminal justice, or 
the rights of the accused in Criminal Procedure. Criminal justice, as well as criminal 
procedure law, contains elements of repressive characteristic features. The scope of 
repression and the dominance of pure expedience have been gradually restricted by the 
recognition of humanitarian values. This tendency has resulted in human rights 
becoming a standard and has led to the definition of a constitutional state. These factors 
can also not be neglected in the formulation of criminal policy. 
Another important factor in defining criminal policy is organisational interests. The 
criminal justice system, like any other organisation, wishes to fulfil its tasks efficiently 
by achieving good results, because this is the way in which it justifies its existence and 
the need for further development, maintenance, and operation. Criminal justice is the 
creation of a balance between crime and a sense of social security by the investigation 
of crime, the definition of responsibility in terms of criminal justice, the application of 
sanctions (and their being carried out), and it (criminal justice) also has relevance with 
respect to crime prevention. In these ways it performs a duty set by a legal demand. 
However, this demand for legality is not always properly satisfied. That is the reason 
5 ESER, A. -HUBER, B. (eds.): Strafrechtsentwicklung in Europa S Landesbtrichte 1986/1988, Teil 1 und 
2, Freiburg im Berisgau, 1990. On this, see FARKAS, À.: "Fejlődési tendenciák a büntetőjogban Európában" 
(Developmental Trends in Criminal Law in Europe), Magyar Jog, 1994, No. 3, 185-189. 
6 JESCHECK: op. cit., 17. 
7 SCHWIND. H.-D. : "Unsichere Grundlage der Kriminalpolitik", in HIRSCH, H - J . - K A I S E R , 
G—MARQUART, H. (ed.): Gedächtnisschrift für Hilde Kaufmann, Berlin, New York, 1986, 86-99. 
The Constitutional Limits of the Efficiency of Criminal Justice 143 
why, as recent studies have shown, criminal justice is selective and sets up priorities.8 
A considerable part of these features is reflected in recent trends of criminal policy, 
including the following: the alteration of material or procedural law, the definition of the 
rate of intensity in crime investigation, and the formation of a codification process. To 
modify and affect criminal policy may be regarded as a normal component of legal 
activities. The main emphasis in shaping criminal policy is on the reduction of its 
responsibilities, and the gaining of more independence from the restrictive demand for 
legality, including the loosening of its ties.' 
Therefore criminal policy is based on values, which can be encompassed by the 
binary value of repression and humanity. This definition allows the formulation of further 
values. These new values are further supplemented if there is an overlap between 
criminal policy and other types of policy, such as economic, social, juvenile etc. The 
dominant factor that plays an important part in the formulation of criminal policy is 
expediency, concepts of which are further modified by the latest results of criminal 
science: for example, those of criminology, victimology, etc. The other factors which 
support the former statement are that expediency is also affected by the way in which 
criminal justice maintains a balance between social demands and a sense of social 
security (including the rate of social tension and organisational interests). Criminal policy 
is not homogeneous; it always corresponds to the characteristic features of a given branch 
of law. But it further sub-divides into smaller sub-categories of criminal policy. All these 
features reflect the diversity and shortcomings of criminal policy 
Criminal policy functions as the primary filter of those demands, expectations, and 
wishes that the state and government are supposed to meet and fulfil in the fight of legal, 
social, and state organisations against crime. It classifies, ranks, and sets up priorities of 
those issues that become objects of the codification process and are eventually passed 
into law; it also determines those criteria that are to be applied in law (for example, in 
prosecutions). 
3. The Limits of the Efficiency of the Criminal Justice System 
The limits of efficiency are firstly, social; secondly, financial; and thirdly, legal. Changes 
in crime constitute social limits. Financial limits are expressed in economic terms, that 
is, the budget of a given country is never capable of subsidising its legal system 
(financially, educationally, and institutionally) to the extent that it could reduce the rate 
of crime for a longer period of time because of the limits of economic resources. The 
available amount may only cover those expenses that are to stabilise this rate at a certain 
level by improving technical facilities, introducing institutional reorganisations, or 
updating the existing training system. Every organisation works towards this goal of 
8 BÁRD, К.: A büntetőhatalom megosztásának buktatói (Obstacles to the Derision of Penal Power), 
Budapest . 1987, 53-131. 
9 Ibid. 
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stabilisation, and recent changes in crime rates are often depicted as a decreasing 
tendency in order to support this aim, which is questionable. 
The third limit is set by law with all its contradictions (for example, those between 
criminal law and criminal procedure law) and norms that hinder criminal justice in 
becoming expedient, and also restrict its discretion. The doctrinal system of criminal 
justice and the requirements of a constitutional state belong to this category, which we 
wish to analyse in detail. 
If we set the organisations of criminal justice the task of carrying out a quick and 
efficient procedure, we may take it for granted that there will be more abuse of authority 
to achieve the desired goal during criminal procedures, and procedural actions are likely 
to become arbitrary and lack the necessary guarantees. Therefore, if a legislator wishes 
to express his demand for better efficiency and expediency, he must incorporate the 
appropriate guarantees in criminal procedure, with the help of particular rules whose chief 
task is to provide a legal remedy in case they are violated. 
The task of criminal procedure is to examine the facts of the case thoroughly without 
omitting a detail by keeping to legal rules. The basic principles are enlisted among the 
legal guarantees,10 but as we will see later, the proper application of the basic principles 
may temporarily prevent the authorities from accomplishing the tasks set by Hungarian 
Criminal Procedure. 
From the point of view of legal security, the definition of procedural guarantees and 
the way they are kept is an important component of criminal procedure in a constitutional 
state. 
All the guarantee regulations applied in criminal procedure can be traced back to the 
ones found in international human rights conventions, or they can be found—more or 
less—among the provisions of the basic rights in the Constitution. 
The human rights codified by different conventions and state constitutions are taken 
to be inalienable. They can be restricted only by regulation, supplemented with very strict 
guarantees, by any state, and there must be a firm reason for doing so. If a state and its 
institutions do not keep the rules according to this principle, a person deprived of his 
rights may bring an action for damages and submit a petition against the state at the 
European Commission of Human Rights in Strasbourg. If his rights are violated by a 
citizen—either a government office clerk or civil servant—this violation of law will 
probably be regarded as a criminal activity and/or serve as the basis for compensation. 
It is precisely criminal procedure that produces one of those "firm reasons" that may 
restrict human rights. There are two contradictory interests in this debate: one is the 
interest of the state in justifying the demand for an efficient criminal justice system, and 
the other is that of the individual who expects his human rights to be guaranteed. The 
latter is insured by the state in international agreements, and in its constitution; but the 
state has also to be responsible for the former interest, because ever since private revenge 
10 CSÉKA, E —VIDA, M.: A büntető eljárási jog vázlata I (An Outline of Criminal Procedure Law), Szeged, 
1996, 10. 
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was replaced by state repression, the state, and its organisations, has had to satisfy the 
demand for criminal justice. This is not only the right of a given state, but has also for 
a long historical period been its duty. The solution to this contradiction has resulted in 
the collection of those norms which define the conditions and requirements that make it 
possible to restrict the human rights of individuals, or to deprive individuals of their 
human rights altogether. 
It is the international conventions that are the highest level of regulation containing 
these guarantees, even if it is not always the case at the level of the source of law 
because in order to overtake and pass a regulation of an international agreement as an 
internal legal norm, a new regulation has first to be approved by an Act of Parliament. 
International conventions occupy this superior position because the contracting parties 
accept the fact that by joining these conventions they are to introduce the same or similar 
regulations in their domestic norms. 
This tendency can be seen in the constitutional acts of our country. As long as the 
X X Act of 1949 only touched upon human rights in a few words, the regulations of Act 
XL of 1990 introduced essential modifications to bring our Constitution into line with the 
text of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The guarantees of criminal procedure are best described by the basic principles. One 
of the basic principles of classification in Legal Science classifies basic concepts 
according to their sources. One of these groups consists of constitutional basic concepts, 
that is, those which are also incorporated in the Constitution. Ervin Cséka points out that 
the choice of constitutional concepts was previously not consistent. Today the importance 
of the basic concepts is expressed in the Constitution, where they are listed amongst the 
regulations.11 The Constitution also contains a few basic operational principles together 
with organisational ones: for example, the presumption of innocence, the right to a legal 
remedy, the basic concept of defence, and the defence of individual freedom are also 
mentioned. 
In the next section we will focus in detail on three basic constitutional concepts. 
These are the presumption of innocence, the basic principle of defence, and individual 
freedom and other civil rights. They will be examined from the viewpoint of how the 
scope of their application can be restricted, and how efficient criminal procedure appears 
to be. 
According to the principle of the presumption of innocence, nobody can be regarded 
as guilty until his criminal responsibility has been stated by the final judgement of the 
court. The function of this presumption is to create a favourable and objective legal 
situation for the accused during the procedure, and to leave the task of providing 
evidence to the authorities. One of the evidentiary rules says that the accused cannot be 
obliged to prove his innocence, as the authorities have to provide proper evidence of it 
beyond any shadow of doubt. It is only the innocence of the accused that may be 
presumed, although the implicit assumption of guilt can be seen during the criminal 
11 Ibid., 38. 
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procedure.12 This statement is the equivalent, with respect to the authorities, of a red rag 
to a bull, but this practice has been observed and the fact of its existence is supported by 
the analyses of the relevant data. Therefore we may be almost certain that a court will 
find the accused guilty when there is an equal amount of evidence proving either his guilt 
or innocence, even if it is not permissible to find the accused guilty of an offence which 
lacks any incontestable evidence which would prove his guilt. This follows from the 
presumption of innocence. By following the principle of in dubio pro reo, Tibor Király 
suggests a solution: "If a slight doubt remains because the court was unable to investigate 
the whole truth, the accused is acquitted, which is his right according to the presumption 
of innocence".13 To illustrate this implicit assumption of guilt, we can imagine a case 
where the accused has protested his innocence and only at a later stage of the criminal 
procedure makes a confession of his guilt. The question of why events should take this 
turn is not raised, and instead the court regards this confession as superior evidence, and 
believes in its validity. The accused is therefore found guilty, and a verdict is reached in 
good conscience. However, in contrast to this is a case in which the accused later 
changes the confession he made at the beginning of the investigation and denies 
committing the crime; he is then interrogated several times and expected to explain 
thoroughly why he had earlier made an admission of guilt if his latter confession is in 
fact true. If he gives the unwise answer that a member of the investigating authorities had 
put mental, but not physical, pressure on him by saying that he would be released if he 
admitted committing the crime, and if did not, then his pre-trial detention period would 
be served in full, then the response in a better situation is usually a benign smile. In a 
worse situation it can be a reprimand about the consequences of a false confession. The 
principle of the presumption of innocence has recently been at great risk; there is a 
gradually increasing tendency to reverse the burden of proof in a few cases of criminal 
investigations where finding evidence requires great efforts. Although the evidentiary 
rules at the level of basic principles have remained the same, everyday practice is 
different: for example, if a person accused of tax fraud does not try to produce evidence 
of being "innocent", he cannot expect a favourable end to his case. 
The basic principle of defence contains all those rights which the accused may make 
use of and refer to in order to be able to become aware of why he has to go through a 
criminal procedure, to express his opinion about it, to be able to defend himself, make 
remaries and propose a motion, and to apply for defence. The authorities must also 
provide the accused with information on his rights in this case, according to the general 
practice with regard to rights and duties. At this point we may point out again that 
guarantee regulations lose their importance from time to time. 
12 OROSZ, В.: "Büntető jogalkalmazásunk az Európai Közösség normáinak tükrében" (Our Criminal Law 
Practice in the Light of European Community Norms), Rendészeti Szemle, 1993, No. 11, 32-33. 
13 KIRÁLY, T.: "A büntető eljárási jog reformja elé" (Before the Reform of the Law of Criminal Procedure), 
Magyar Jog, 1993, No. 5, 258. 
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In order to ease the job of the investigating authorities, the records of interrogations 
are similar to official printed forms with the text of the warnings printed on in them in 
advance. It is true that this part has to be signed separately by the interrogated person, 
but most of the accused do not read the records and simply sign the paper where the 
interrogator shows them to do so4.If there is no counsel for the defence present at the 
interrogation, it is very difficult later to refer to the warnings if one has never been told 
of them. Warnings are also often used in a threatening manner: for example, the accused 
is informed of his right to remain silent, but in this case he will have to wait to go home 
to his family. It is especially juveniles who can be affected by this method. There has 
already been a case where the accused, who was a policeman, eventually gave in and 
made a confession af ter such a warning. 
The next question, which is not so troublesome as far as the application of law is 
concerned, is at which point in the proceedings the accused may claim for a defence 
counsel. According to the 3rd paragraph of the 6th article of H.C.P. (Hungarian Criminal 
Procedure), the accused can choose a counsel at the beginning of the procedure who can 
be in charge of any stage of the procedure on his behalf. Since most accused persons are 
not aware of the particular rules of H.CP. , they do not even say they are going to make 
an admission in the presence of their counsel af ter having been warned about the 
possibility of authorising one. The participation of a counsel is compulsory only in a few 
types of case, and it is the authority that officially appoints a counsel for the defence if 
the accused does not give authorisation to anyone within three days.14 During these 
three days the investigation authorities may still continue to carry out a very efficient j o b 
by keeping efficiency in mind; they may interrogate the accused several times, w h o 
usually happens to be in pre-trial detention. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the appointed counsels for the 
defence do not try to get in touch with their clients as soon as possible. They usually first 
meet with their imprisoned clients during the interrogation, but even this meeting does 
not necessarily take place because the presence of the counsel is only compulsory during 
the court trial. The investigating authorities do not generally approve of the extension of 
defence rights, and they consider it to be a factor which works against efficiency.15 
Another common shortcoming is the conduct of counsels, which is often detrimental to 
the duration and the efficiency of the procedure. Counsels are often late in submitting 
proposals, sometimes handing them in only at the trial. It is quite probable that had an 
evidence proposal f rom the defence side been submitted in time, a more favourable result 
at an early stage of the procedure may have been forthcoming. Thus the counsels may 
put the accused at a disadvantage as a result of a faulty defence (for example, remand 
detention which could have been avoided). 
14 On these questions see KONKOLY, С.: "Hézagok a büntetőeljárási törvényben" (Gaps in the Criminal 
Procedure Code), Rendészeti Szemle, 1991, No. 2, 62-67. 
15 See BORAI, Á.: "A büntetőeljárási törvény módosításának tapasztalatai" (Lessons of the Modification of 
the Criminal Procedure Code), Rendészeti Szemle, 1991, No. 7, 14. 
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Although we ourselves often work as defenders, we must admit that the practice of 
state appointed counsels does not make possible an efficient defence in most cases. As has 
already been mentioned at several conferences, the solution to the problem might be the 
establishment of a Public Defenders Office. The members of this office—whose work, 
hopefully, would be sufficiently remunerated—would work exclusively for the defence in 
cases by appointment, and the accomplishment of this task would be monitored. The cre-
ation of conditions where legal assistance could be offered freely would be a significant 
step forward in developing this system, because the current practice is for the accused to 
pay the costs of his defence if he is sentenced. The state only pays a "deposit" for him. 
H.C.P. makes it possible for the appointed counsel to ask for an obligatory payment 
order, thus creating an official legal relationship between himself and the accused. 
Although counsels for the defence do not usually make use of this opportunity, we find 
it unjustified that the accused is obliged to pay the standard commission price even if he 
does not appoint anybody as his counsel. It is especially unfair if the counsel performs 
only the usual duties of defence, that is, he participates in the procedure when H.C.P. 
declares this to be compulsory and applies sanctions in cases of a counsel's absence. 
With regard to the defence of individual freedom and other civil rights, we will 
focus on coercive measures, briefly examining the anomalies related to our topic without 
going into detail on the reasons of specific procedure regulations. 
Pre-trial detention raises the most problems amongst coercive actions which restrict 
individual freedom, as this is the action that has the greatest practical impact on human 
rights. Although the rules of H.C.P. do not permit it, often the only purpose of detention 
is to simplify the whole procedure; that is, the accused can be presented and 
interrogated without being summoned, and the trial does not have to be postponed 
because the accused, being at liberty, does not appear on time. The new codificatory 
concepts appear, however, to make the requirement of constitutionality secondary to the 
interests of efficiency, because according to the recent draft of the new H.C.P., it will 
become possible to order the pre-trial detention of the accused in order to s implify the 
procedure, with the presumption that the presence of the accused is best ensured only 
in this fashion. In comparison to this, the basic criminal principle of constitutionality 
is that the pre-trial detention of the accused should only be applied if there is a firm 
reason for doing so. This principle has already been described in the recommendations 
and resolutions of the Council of Europe16 and the conclusions of conferences. 
Amongst the enforcement actions that restrict individual freedom we must mention 
the problem of the prohibition of leaving residence, which has now been resolved. 
H.C.R did not clearly state that the prohibition on leaving one 's home could only be 
ordered in the cases listed as the reasons for pre-trial detention before Act XXVI of 
1989. In fact, H.C.P. referred to this in its Ministerial explanation attached to the Bill 
16 See Resolution (65) 11 (adopted by the Ministers' Deputies on 9th April 1965) and Recommendation No. 
R. (80) 11 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States concerning Custody Pending Trial (adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 27 June 1980 at the 321st meeting of the Ministers' Deputies). 
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without any result, because order No. 40/1987 of the Minister of Interior on the police 
investigations of criminal activities, and that of the Attorney General , No. 7/1987, on 
the investigations of the Prosecution in criminal cases, extended the scope of the 
conditions for the application of coercive measures, and the prohibition on leaving 
residence could be ordered in many cases even if it was not listed amongst the reasons 
for pre-trial detention. It undoubtedly served efficiency, but contradicted the constitu-
tional basic principles which claim that basic civil rights may only be restricted by 
statutes passed by Parliament. 
The existence of reasons for ordering pre-trial detention is often questioned, as is 
often the case when the authorities are simply cautious and assume, for example, that 
the accused may escape, or get in touch and act in collusion with his fellows, or contact 
the witnesses. Our experience has shown that the danger of collusion often does not exist. 
Pure logic helped to justify it: in a case when each accused and witness had been 
interrogated and confronted with one another, the pre-trial detention lasted for several 
months. 
This superfluous caution occurs in those cases when the prosecutor and the court 
giving out the order both refer to all three reasons for pre-trial detention, believing that 
one of them at least will be found justified by the next forum. Authorities often do not 
meet the requirements set for them as they do not terminate pre-trial detention the 
moment it becomes justified. Even more frequently the next forum does not find pre-
trial detention to be justified any longer when the time for prolonging remand has 
expired, although weeks or months are likely to have passed by then. 
Interpreting efficiency as a time factor, we find mistakes in pre-trial detentions. The 
so called "prisoner" cases, when the accused is in remand custody, take priority, but it 
can still happen that it takes a year or two until the sentence is pronounced. In the case 
of minor criminal activities, a tendency to take time spent in pre-trial detention into 
consideration when handing down a sentence can be seen. It is not unimaginable that 
the accused would have been able "to get away" with a few months ' less imprisonment 
if our legal system made possible a quicker procedure. 
Therefore, we generalise in the following fashion: the interests of the accused held 
in detention are to go through the criminal procedure within the shortest period of time, 
although at the same time the prolongation of the proceedings is a favourable factor for 
those who are defended at liberty, because delay in the criminal procedure may have 
a favourable influence on sentencing.17 
Finally, let me briefly draw a few conclusions on the limits of efficiency: 
(1) The number of investigated criminal cases is gradually increasing; their 
structures and methods are changing and improving. 
17 "Delays in the Criminal Justice System. Reports presented to the 9th Criminological Colloquium (1989) 
European Committee on Crime Problems", Criminological Research, Vol. XXVII I . 1992. 
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(2) Criminal justice cannot keep up with these changes and developments either 
financially or technically. It has never been able to do so. The number of un-investigated 
criminal activities (latent crime) is considerable. 
(3) The criminal justice system is also not able to cope with the investigated cases, 
a situation which cannot be significantly helped by the improvement of the staff and 
subsidies in criminal justice. The consequence of this is that criminal justice tries to get 
rid of a considerable number of cases by allowing the principle of opportunism to shape 
changing policy. 
(4) Constitutional and human rights guarantees have strengthened the position of the 
accused and his counsel, which considerably restricts the scope of activity of legal 
authorities. 
(5) The reforms in criminal justice and, in particular, of criminal procedure 
(regardless of which direction they point in) aim to simplify and speed up the procedure, 
in order to solve criminal cases on the basis of consensus, which is often achieved by 
giving up the principles of "material truth" and the adversarial trial. 
(6) These facts show that the criminal justice system has started to shift in the 
direction of bureaucratic self-absorption, thus, unless this view is changed, making itself 
incapable of working efficiently and of preventing the reproduction of crime to any 
extent, in view of the criteria we have analysed above. 
A criminal justice system fulfils its social role by merely existing. It creates an 
opportunity to give an account of responsibilities after criminal activities have occurred, 
and it also reflects and strengthens those values that are preferred by society. In other 
words, it functions as a "cane hanging on the wall". And that is already some kind of 
an achievement. 
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Lenke FEHÉR European Integrat ion: 
The Legal Situation of the Victim 
in Criminal Procedure* 
Over the past decade and a half, and especially from 1990 onwards, "victim policy" has 
consistently been a research priority in Hungary. This research has made an important 
contribution to the development of practical "victim policy" through many publications, 
as well as by direct communication between the various organisations which deal with 
the problem of crime and its victims. 
During this period several non-governmental organisations specialising in victim 
support—such as the White Ring, ESZTER, or ESCAPE—started to function. In the 
experiences recorded by the White Ring, the great majority of victims need support of 
a legal nature (for example, to write requests, to represent them in court, to provide 
support when negotiating with insurance companies), and financial support (monetary 
help, financing of everyday expenditures, repairing broken locks, etc.). Other, more 
specialised victim support services, such as ESZTER, which deals with victims of 
sexual crimes, or ESCAPE, which deals with the victims of forced prostitution and 
trafficking in persons, are more active in giving psychological support and treatment 
according to the individual needs of the victims. 
"Victim policy", dealing with the victims of crimes, has developed in two different 
directions: on the one hand, within the framework of criminal law and criminal pro-
cedure law; and on the other hand, with the activities of social organisations. 
At the present time, criminality has greatly changed in both a qualitative and a 
quantitative sense. It appears that the traditional criminal procedural law is no longer 
* The preparation of this study has been supported by T 018.228 sz. O T K A . 
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able to handle effectively the problems which now arise. The nature of the procedure 
is too formal, and too bureaucratic, and in consequence the victims and witnesses cannot 
regard the procedure as a considerate process relating to them which serves their own 
interests. On the contrary, the requirement to frequently appear before the authorities 
and the court creates a feeling that the procedure is a harassment, instead of an action 
undertaken on their behalf.1 This is especially true in the case of victims of sexual 
crimes, who suffer new traumas due to repeated interviews and hearings in the course 
of investigation and court procedures. "Sex crimes are a special problem, because many 
victims, particularly raped women, are forced into the role of a defendant by police 
officers, prosecutors, defence counsellors, and judges, who use indecent and insulting 
examination methods in their investigation."2 In cases where the victims are minors, it 
is generally necessary to pay special attention to Article 16 of the Declaration of the 
Rights of Children. However, it is also very important to provide the option of a 
judge—possibly in the presence of a psychologist—attending the hearing, and then this 
record can be substituted for repeated cross-examinations at trial.3 
It is not a problem facing only us, but rather a world-wide phenomenon, that courts 
deal with too many cases and files; consequently, it is more and more difficult to 
maintain a balance, to finish the procedure within a reasonable period of time, to focus 
on the rights and interests of the victim, and to attain the goals of criminal policy.4 All 
of this leads us to conclude that in the field of criminalisation, as well as of criminal 
procedure, there is a tendency to decrease the competence of the criminal law. 
Minimising intervention, however, means placing more responsibility, control, and social 
participation in the criminalisation process.5 
With reference to the sanction system, there is a tendency towards humanisation. 
This means the humanisation of the conditions of prison life, as well as the existence 
and use of a number of alternative punishments. From this arises the question of 
retributive or restorative justice. In a broader sense, every criminal justice system has 
retributive and restorative purposes and tendencies, that is, a restoration of the legal 
order which was violated by the crime. The infliction of a punishment, however, always 
means a malum, a negative experience for the offender; in other words, a retribution for 
the crime committed. Restorative efforts have appeared from time to time in the history 
1 ERDEI, Á.: "Hagyomány és korszerűség" (Tradition and Modernity), Börtönügyi Szemle, 1995, No. 1. 8. 
2 SESSAR, К.: "Tertiary Victimization", in GALWAY, B.-HUDSON, J. (eds.): Criminal Justice, Restitution 
and Reconciliation, New York, 1990, 38. 
3 A bűncselekmények áldozataink jogi helyzetére és kártalanítására vonatkozó nézetek és javaslatok 
(Opinions and Suggestions on the Legal Status and Compensation of the Victims of Crime) (Előteijesztő: Fehér 
Gyűrű Közhasznú Egyesület), Budapest, 1995, Kézirat, 9. 
4 LÉVAI, M.: Társadalmi, politikai változások és a bűnözés (Societal and Political Changes and Criminality). 
Válogatás a 11. Nemzetközi Kriminológiai Kongresszus előadásiból, Budapest, 1993, aug. 22-27, 123. 
5 KIRÁLY, T.: "A büntető eljárási jog reformja elé" (Before the Reform of the Law of Criminal Procedure), 
Magyar Jog. 1993, No. 5, 257-261. 
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of criminal law. This restoration sometimes has a symbolic, and sometimes a more 
instrumental, character.6 
The vast majority of crimes are defined as dangerous to society, even if the victim 
is a natural person. The prevailing criminal justice system must, in the name of the 
society, prosecute the criminal offender , bringing charges and instituting proceedings 
against him at trial. This method is more guaranteed and efficient than an individual 
vic t im's action. The state's monopoly on accusation has a special consequence: the 
response to the crime given by the criminal law is more repressive than reparative or 
restitutive. The transformation of an individual harm to a social one however, should 
not neglect the v ic t im's interests, either on a general, or on individual level. I am 
convinced that in present criminal law we require a harmonious blend of the different 
features and interests. New variations of sanctions or responses are directed towards the 
vict ims ' demands for restitution, compensation, and conciliation. However , to convert 
criminal law into civil law or social conflict-management, is not a real alternative. 
Cr ime should be considered as a special kind of conflict, a transgession of public rule, 
an infringement of the abstract juridical—moral order, as well as a harm to the victims, 
a threat to social peace, a violation of public order and safety. Reactions or responses 
to the crime should be in accordance of these competing values. 
There is an increasing belief of many scientific scholars, that "restorative justice" 
could be a serious alternative in responding to crime. This response is based on a socio-
ethical approach which stresses the responsibilities of the parties to find a constructive 
solution to the crime-conflict. The approach therefore offers the potential for more 
peacekeeping in society as a whole. 
"At the heart of the idea of restorative justice—according to Martin Wright—is the 
recognition, that crime is not merely lawbreaking: it causes harm—to individual victims, 
to community, the state or the environment. The first response should, therefore, be to 
try to remedy the harm, as far as possible, or if necessary to make things better than 
before. Secondly, when offenders are known, they should be required to contribute 
towards making things right as much as they are able. This may be paying compensa-
tion, meeting the victim, working for charitable organisation, or co-operating with a 
rehabilitative programme. Thirdly, the community should play its part by offering 
support to the victim, for example through Victim Support, and by enabling offenders 
to make amends, for example by providing employment so that they can earn money 
with which to pay compensation. The fourth leg of the restorative just ice model is a 
specific strategy for cr ime prevention."7 
Restorative justice has come to mean a great variety of things to many different 
people. The roots of the restorative justice paradigm date back to the early 1970s. Social 
6 FEHÉR, L.: Alternative penal sanctions. Acta Juridica, 1994. No. 36., 46. 
7 W R I G H T , M.: Family group conferencing: is it restorative? is it just? Paper presented at a workshop at 
the International Conference: Restorative justice for juveniles—potentialities, risks and problems for research, 
Leuven, 1997. 1. 
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and political forces coalesced with other efforts 1) the search for informal justice and 
dispute resolution processes, 2) increasing scientific scepticism regarding the deterrent 
effect of a punitive system, and 3) the rise of the victim support movement.8 Prior to 
1990 it was seen as an incomplete attempt at a "paradigm shift" away from the existing 
retributive response to crime. Since 1990 however a number of developments have 
dramatically changed the face of the restorative justice movement. The practice of 
restorative justice, which was largely synonymous with victim—offender reconciliation 
programs (VORPs) in 1989 were provided by the important institution of the Family 
Group Conferences (FGCs) as the official response to juvenile offenders in New 
Zealand, based on a western-style adoption of aboriginal Maori practice. In the same 
year (1989) the Australian John Braithwaite published his theory in his book "Crime, 
Shame and Reintegration". The idea—underlying restorative justice—have attracted the 
prison abolition movement, as well as the critical criminology and the feminist 
movement, too.9 
According to Van Ness, "restorative justice teaches us about moral conduct. It helps 
us to focus on the harm that often results when people fail to act morally, and to seek 
for responses that repair the harm and reinforce moral conduct."10 "Crime is not only 
an injury to a victim, but also disobedience to a rule. That is, it is the injury comes 
when the rule is disobeyed. This is an important concept to retain for basic human rights 
reasons (no one should be "punished" for something they did which was legal at the 
time they did it)".11 
In the development of juvenile justice system there are several existing models, like 
the welfare (or rehabilitative), the classical retributive, the non-intervention, the 
corporation or the restorative one.12 However these models hardly even develop in pure 
forms, on the contrary, elements of the various models co-exist and make colourful the 
features of the others. 
The restorative model of justice takes into account the needs of the victim reacting to 
the crime by implementing various techniques of intervention, instead of imposing 
punishment or rehabilitation. These interventions—reparation, reconciliation, mediation, 
compensation, community services etc.—are aiming primarily to restore the damage 
8 MESSMER, H.—OTTO, H.-U. Restorative Justice: steps on the way toward a good idea. In: Restorative 
Justice on Trial: Pitfalls and Potentials of Victim-Offender Mediation-International Research Perspectives. 
Netherlands, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1992. 1-12. 
9 McCOLD, P.: Restorative Justice Variations on a Theme. Appendix: Delphi Responses. Paper presented 
at a workshop at the International Conference: Restorative justice for juveniles—potentialities, risks and 
problems for research. Leuven, 1997. 17. 
10 McCOLD: op. cit. 4. 
11 Op. cit. 3., 18. Paper presented at a workshop at the International Conference: Restorative justice for 
juveniles—potentialities, risks and problems for research. Leuven, 1997. 17. 
12 See GATTI, U.—CERETTI, A.: Italian experiences. Paper presented at a workshop at the International 
Conference: Restorative justice for juveniles—potentialities, risks and problems for research. Leuven, 1997. 
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caused by the crime, to arise the sense of responsibility in the wrongdoer, without 
stigmatising him. 
"A distinguishing feature of restorative justice is that the victim should benefit from 
it at least as much as the offender."13 It is therefore necessery to ask what victims 
want. The victims needs has been summarised by Reynolds as follows: 
— Help with the practical/emotional effects of cr ime 
— To be treated sensitively and with respect 
— To know what 's happening in the case 
— To understand what 's happening in the case 
— To be heard and taken seriously 
— Public acknowlegement that wrong has been done 
— To feel it is worth pursuing the case 
— Quick resolution of the case 
— To know "Why me?" 
— To know that the offence will not be repeated 
— Some want an apology from the offender 
— Some want compensation 
— Some want retribution (most do not) 
— Most want to be free of responsibility for decisions about the offender.14 
Criminal punishment is a special kind of social reaction to the crime, that is by its 
nature responsive. Additionally, the repressive character, the inclination towards 
stabilisation of law and social order, cannot be denied. From the v ic t ims ' viewpoint, 
to punish an offender also serves as a moral judgement. However, in most cases the 
vict im's aim is connected with material compensation. 
Compensation for the harm suffered by and damage to the victim as a consequence 
of crime can be attained partially or wholly by way of restitution or compensation 
given by the offender; state compensation; victim-support services; insurance com-
pensation. From this ca ta logue-according to Hungarian law—state compensation still 
does not exist; victim-support services do not have enough funding; insurance 
compensation is very problematical; and compensation given by the offender can be 
reached within the criminal proceedings through the so-called "adhesive procedure", 
but there is very little hope that it can be successfully enforced. In Hungarian criminal 
procedure (Article 55 of the Criminal Procedure Code), the victim, his successor, or 
the prosecutor can assert a civil claim to receive compensation for the losses incurred 
by the crime committed against him. This happens within the f ramework of the so-
called "adhesive procedure". 
13 Op. cit. t., 3. 
14 REYNOLDS, T.: The victim's perspective. Paper to ISTDIMediation UK conference "Repairing the 
damage: restorative justice in action", Bristol, 1997. 
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In Hungary the present legal system does not allow for mediation procedures. 
Elements of mediation, as elsewhere, can be found in our substantive and procedural 
criminal law, too.]i 
The ideas of restitution given by the offender (Schadengutmachung) and mediation 
are closely connected. Mediation means reconciliation between the offender and the 
victim. It is a possible model of dispute settlement. Reconciliation as a procedure takes 
place outside criminal procedure, as well as in its initial pre-trial phase. 
The persons involved in mediation act in the roles of the offender, the victim, and 
the mediator. An important starting point of mediation is the voluntary consent of the 
parties (offender and victim) to act in the proceedings, coupled with an admission of 
guilt by the offender. 
Communication in the mediation process is directed by the mediator, who con-
centrates on creating conditions and forms of compensation which are acceptable to both 
parties. At the same time, it of course includes a detailed discussion of the crime, thus 
providing a release from emotional tensions, aiding the interpretation of events, and 
negotiating a way out of the conflict. The aim is reconciliation and the attainment of an 
appropriate form of compensation. This means that the victim can more quickly get 
compensation for material losses and damages. The mediator is responsible for keeping 
the negotiations on the right track, and for maintaining concentration on the most 
important questions. 
It is necessary to stress that mediation in the case of adult offenders is not an equal 
alternative to the traditional fine or imprisonment. Emphasis on the formal as well as 
on the substantial difference between mediation and other sanctions, which precondi-
tion its careful application, is unavoidable. I would like to stress, however, that 
mediation is a situationally adequate and flexible tool. There are numerous arguments 
favouring mediation. It forms a new and more humane kind of sanction which can be 
regarded as an alternative to short-term imprisonment; it is a means of substituting for 
the criminal process. Another point of view is that it solves the conflict at the place 
where it originated, and it maintains social peace. It eliminates the disadvantages of 
courtroom communication by an informal atmosphere, by actively involving the parties 
concerned, and it helps the offender to face his crime and to understand the victim's 
viewpoint. At the same time it hopefully develops a higher level of conflict manage-
ment in society. 
Mediation can be a stage of the procedure which can solve the problem, but in the 
case of failure, the machinery of criminal justice can re-start. Consequently, it is 
necessary to form a structure which can be integrated into the present system as 
mediation, and can be re-integrated when mediation is unsuccessful. 
In any case, it is of primary importance that we clarify our expectations concerning 
this form of diversion from the criminal process, its price, and the balance between costs 
and benefits. In this connection, we cannot avoid re-thinking the entire criminal policy 
15 FEHÉR.: op. cit., 50. 
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and the criminal justice system. The criminal justice system has to be able to give a 
prompt and adequate answer to criminality, to react quickly and effectively to its evolving 
tendencies. The changes and development of the system cannot disregard the experiences 
of our legal history and the values of our legal traditions. At the same time, it should be 
modernised and harmonised with European trends, standards, and principles. 
All over the world great attention is being paid to the protection of human rights. 
This also has an effect on criminal procedure as embodied in the rights of the defendant, 
in the principle of fair procedure, and the "equality of arms" between the actors in the 
criminal procedure. The principle of publicity—which is a guarantee against judicial 
arbitrariness—makes witnesses and victims vulnerable; in the case of organised and 
serious crimes, the actions of terrorist groups or criminal gangs especially endanger 
these actors in the criminal process. This has made witness-protection a necessary 
provision. 
The victim's needs and interests are manifest in three different areas. The first is in 
the initial phase of the investigation, where he or she is acknowledged and treated as 
a victim. In this phase it is necessary to provide more information f o r the victim, and 
to extend the right to be present at certain procedural acts. The authorities also have an 
interest in avoiding de-humanising treatment of the victim, because "frustrated victims 
are bad witnesses".16 
The second critical point is the participation of the victim in the criminal procedure. 
In this phase he or she has the right 
— to make proposals; 
— to make remarks; 
— to be informed; 
— to obtain legal assistance. 
The victim cannot put questions directly, but can only propose quest ions to be put . 
The rights of the victim are greatest in the case of private prosecutions, and are more 
limited in public prosecutions. There is a necessity for co-ordinated participation during 
the main trial proceedings, when the victim may be permitted to be a subsidiary 
prosecutor or intervener, and have the right to complain alongside the public prosecutor 
СNebenklage). In this case he has the same rights as the public prosecutor, except fo r 
changing, widening, or dropping the accusation, and for appealing for an increase in the 
punishment. Effor ts are being made to replace the institution of subsidiary private 
prosecution for special cases when the public prosecutor does indict the offender or does 
not represent the case. 
The third area is the decision-making process and the right to appeal. It is necessary 
to widen this last point in the future. I would also strongly support the provision of a 
state-appointed victim advocate in special cases, to parallel the state-appointed defence 
counsel of the de fendan t 
16 SESSAR: op. cit., 38 . 
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Victims of crimes "are not more vindictive than non-victims".17 Moreover, victims 
of property crimes are more interested in receiving compensation and restitution than 
in punishing the offender. Lack of restitution, however, may encourage the retributive 
needs of the victim, which helps to justify punishment for the offender. 
Hungarian criminal procedure should be regarded as relatively modern, and is in 
principle in accordance with European norms, expectations, and obligations. This 
statement, however, does not deny the necessity of its further developing, based on the 
traditions of and according to European tendencies, and in keeping with efforts at 
integration. 
17 GOLDSTEIN, A. S.: "Defining (he Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution", Mississippi Law Journal, 
1982. No. 52. 515-561. 
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Balázs József GELLER Hate Speech in Hungarian 
Criminal Law 
I. Hate Speech in Criminal Law from the First Criminal Code until the 
Code of 1978 
The first Hungarian Penal Code, the Csemegi Code of 1878, was already concerned with 
the strength of words. In its Article 172 (2) it stated that "whoever during s o m e 
assembly publicly incites a certain class, nationality or denomination to hatred against 
another, through words, or through distribution of printing, writing, depiction, commi t s 
a crime. '" 
The second important step in the development of the cr iminal law of sedi t ious 
libel—which had been the form of criminalisation used against hate speech—was the III 
Act of 1921 On the More Effective Protection of State and Social Order, which in its 
Article 7 punished "whoever states or spreads such an untrue fact , which is suitable to 
impair the appreciation or violates the credibility of the Hungarian state or Hungar ian 
nation";2 Article 8 imposed punishment for a misdemeanour on those " w h o use 
reviling expressions or commit such an act against the Hungarian state or Hungar ian 
1 Article 172 (2) of V Act of 1878; The Csemegi Code (named after its draf ter Károly Csemegi) was the 
first Hungarian Penal Code enacted by the Parliament in 1878 (V Act of 1878). See also G Y Ö R G Y I , 
К — K Ó N Y A , Mrs. I ,—MARGITÁN, É.: Az állam elleni bűncselekményekre vonatkozó rendelkezések módo-
sításáról (About the Modification of Regulations on Crimes Against State), Budapest , 1990, 17 and 30 /1992 . 
(V. 26.) AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court) , 197. 
2 Article 7 of III. Act of 1921; GYÖRGYI—KÓNYA—MARGITÁN: op. cit., 20. 
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nation."3 Subsequently expanding the protection, the V Act of 1941 tried to protect 
the national feelings of nationalities living on the territories re-integrated into 
Hungary.4 
Following the Second World War, the VII Act of 1946 On the Penal Law 
Protection of State-Order and Republic replaced the regulation of the Csemegi Code 
with Sedition and Seditious Libel Against the Democratic State-Order, Democratic 
Republic, and the Freedom and Equality of Citizens.s Additionally, the XVIII Act of 
1948 widened the circle of criminal legal protection and punished similar actions against 
the Hungarian nation, nationality, and any denomination.6 In 1952 a compilation of the 
criminal statutes in effect was edited—the Official Compilation of the Substantive 
Criminal Law Rules in Effect—which basically upheld the offences of the VII Act of 
1946 and the XLVIII Act of 1948 under the Chapter of Crimes Against the Internal 
Security of the State.1 
The situation persisted until the Code of 1961 modified the definition of Seditious 
Libel in several respects and created a new crime, Affronting a Community, as an 
offence against public order.8 This new criminal offence was given, however, the same 
wording as Seditious Libel, an Offence Against State with severer punishments. The law 
enforcement was advised to apply the latter crime if mitigating circumstances, such as 
the motive for the crime, the circumstances of its commission, and the personality of 
the offender would allow it.9 To distinguish between the two types of crimes proved 
to be a difficult and uneasy j o b for the authorities; the legislator therefore tried to add 
to the distinctive factors of these offences in the next criminal code.10 
3 1921. évi III. te., 8. Cikk. For studies on the Act see ANGYAL, P.: A magyar büntetőjog kézikönyve. Az 
állam és a társadalmi rend védelméről szóló 1921:111. T.C. (Handbook of Hungarian Criminal Law. 111. Act 
of 1921 On the More Effective Protection of State and Social Order). Budapest; VÁMBÉRY, R.:. "A 
rendjavaslat" (The Draft of the Law on Social Order), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1921, No. 6; DEGRÉ, M.: "Az 
állam és társadalmi rend védelméről szóló új törvény" (The New Act on the Protection of State and Social 
Order), Magyar Jogi Szemle, 1921, No. 2. 
4 V Act of 1941; GYÖRGYI—KÓNYA—MARGITÁN: op. cit., 23. 
5 VII Act of 1946; GYÖRGYI—KÓNYA—MARGITÁN : op. cit., 23-24; 30/1992. (V. 26.) AB határozat 
(Decision of the Constitutional Court), 197. 
6 Article 19 of the XVIII Act of 1948; GYÖRGYI—KÓNYA—MARGITÁN: op. cit., 26; 30/1992. (V. 26.) 
AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court), 197. 
7 GYÖRGYT-KÓNYA—MARGITÁN: op. cit., 26; 30/1992. (V. 26.) AB határozat (Decision of the 
Constitutional Court), 198. 
8 Articles 127 and 217 of the V Act of 1961. 
9 GYÖRGYI—KÓNYA—MARGITÁN: op. cit., 28-29; 30/1992. (V. 26.) AB határozat (Decision of the 
Constitutional Court), 198. 
10 30/1992. (V. 26.) AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court), 198. 
Hate Speech in Hungarian Criminal Law 161 
II. Hate Speech under the Penal Code of 1978 until the XXV Act of 1989 
The structure which regulated hate speech remained almost the same in the third Penal 
Code (PC) of Hungary, the IV Act of 1978"-which is still in effect, although with 
enormous modifications. 
Before 1989,12 the P C contained two separate offences, the aims of which were to 
ensure the peacefulness of the political and social public mood.13 One c r ime was 
defined in Chapter X of the Code of 1978 dealing with Crimes Against State—Seditious 
Libel (Article 148)—'whilst the other offence, called Affronting a Community (Article 
269), was set out as a Crime Against Public Order in Chapter XVI of the Code.1 4 
11 V Act of 1978. 
12 XVI Act of 1989 and X X V Act of 1989; H A L M A I , G.; A véleményszabadság határai (The Limits of 
Freedom of Expression). Budapest, 1994, 237; GYÖRGYI—KÓNYA—MARGITÁN: op. cit. XVI Act of 1989 
abolished the death penalty for Cr imes Against Slate, whilst the XXV Act of 1989 completely redrafted the 
whole Chapter X of the PC containing these offences. 
13 ERDŐS Y, E.—FÖLDVÁRI, J.: A magyar büntetőjog különös része (The Special Part cf Hungarian 
Criminal Law), Pécs, 1994, 285. 
14 In the unmodified Code of 1878: "Seditious Libel 
Article 148. (1) Whoever in the presence of others, with the purpose to arouse hatred against 
a) the Hungarian nation or some nationality, 
b) the constitutional order of the Hungarian People's Republic, 
c) international relations aimed at alliance, friendship or other forms of co-operation of the Hungarian 
People's Republic, 
d) any nation, religion or race, as well as against—because of their socialist conviction—particular groups 
or individuals, commits an act fit for such purpose, is punishable for a felony with deprivation cf liberty from 
one to five years. 
(2) The punishment is two to eight years deprivation of liberty if 
a) seditious libel is committed in wide publicity or as a member of a group, 
b) seditious libel in case of paragraph (1) point c)-d) results in the disturbance of the international 
relations of the Hungarian People's Republic. 
(3) Whoever commits preparation to seditious libel as defined in paragraph (2) is punishable for a 
misdemeanour with up to two years, in the time of war for a felony with one to five years deprivation cf liberty. 
Affronting a Community 
Article 269. (1) Whoever in the presence cf others commits an act fit to excite hatred against 
a) the Hungarian nation or some nationality, 
b) the constitutional order of the Hungarian People's Republic, 
c) international relations aimed at alliance, friendship or other forms of co-operation of the Hungarian 
People's Republic, 
d) any nation, religion or race, as well as against—because of their socialist conviction—particular groups 
or individuals, is punishable for a misdemeanour with deprivation of liberty up to two years. 
(2) Whoever in the presence cf others uses an expression offending or degrading to the Hungarian nation, 
the constitutional order cf the Hungarian People's Republic, furthermore—because of their nationality, religion, 
race or socüilist conviction—groups or individuals, or commits other such acts, is punishable for a 
misdemeanour with up to one year deprivation of liberty, reformative-educative labour, or fine. 
(3) Whoever commits the offence defined in paragraphs (1) and (2) as a member of a group or in wide 
publicity, is punishable for a felony with up to three, and for a misdemeanour with up to two years deprivation 
of liberty." 
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The Crimes Against State (Chapter X, Article 139/A-Article 151 of PC)—and 
especially Seditious Libel (Article 148)—were the ultima ratio of the party-state's fight 
against plurality of opinions,15 even though according to the Ministerial Reasoning of 
Seditious Libel, the Hungarian People 's Republic secured the fundamental rights of the 
citizens, amongst other things freedom of expression; however, it continued that "the 
freedom of thought and criticism does not mean that anybody using such a pretext could 
aspire to undermine the constitutional order, and to disturb the peaceful building work 
of our socialist state."16 
Since Seditious Libel had been defined as a Crime Against State its legal object17  
was the state, social, or economic order of the Hungarian People's Republic. The Code, 
however, contrary to the other crimes against state, enumerated in the definition of this 
offence the direct legal objects as well. These were: the constitutional order of the 
Hungarian People 's Republic; international relations aimed at alliance, friendship or 
other forms of co-operation of the Hungarian People 's Republic; any nation, religion 
or race, or the Hungarian nation or some other nationality; and certain individuals or 
groups, because of their socialist conviction.18 The exact meaning of these obscure 
terms—interestingly enough—did not cause interpretative problems for the judicial 
15 Supra note 10. 
16 1 978. évi V. törvényjavaslat és miniszteri indokás (The Draft and Ministerial Reasoning of the V Act of 
1978), Budapest. 1979, 208 G shall cite this source as 'Reasoning'). 
17 In Hungarian criminal law, according to a widely accepted theory, the offence has a legal object, which 
is also referred to as the object of the crime. Some crimes have an object of perpetration as well. The legal 
object (object of the offence) is the interest or right (individual or social) which is protected by the criminal 
law and violated or endangered by the commission of the certain crime. The object of perpetration, however 
is the person (passive subject) or object towards which the conduct of perpetration is directed. Thus, for 
example, the object of theft are the proprietory rights, whilst the object of perpetration is the thing actually 
stolen (e.g. a bag). See NAGY, F.—TOKAJI, G.: A magyar büntetőjog általános része (The General Part of 
Hungarian Criminal Law), Szeged, 1993, 63-65 . Some writers also distinguish between general legal object, 
special legal object and direct legal object. General legal object is the system of legally recognised interests. 
From another viewpoint, the legal system itself, the special legal object is the system of similar or related 
rights protected by the law, and the direct legal object is the concrete interest endangered or violated by the 
commission of the offence. For example, the Hungarian legal system is the general legal object of homicide, 
human life and bodily integrity is the special legal object (Chapter XII of the PC), and human life is the direct 
legal object, while the object of the crime is in this case a human being, called the passive subject against 
whom the crime is directed. See BÉKÉS, I .-FÔLDVÀRI, J . -GÁSPÁR, Gy.-ТОКАЛ, G.: A magyar büntetőjog 
általános része (The General Part of Hungarian Criminal Law), Budapest, 1980, 106-107. 
18 LÁSZLÓ J. (ed.): A Büntetőtörvénykönyv magyarázata (Commentary to the Hungarian Penal Code), Buda-
pest, 1986, 407. G shall refer 1 0 'his source as 'Commentary'). One of the objects of the crime was the 
constitutional order of the Hungarian People's Republic which comprised—amongst other things—the protection 
of the Hungarian Socialist Worker Party (the Communist Party). See Reasoning, op. cit., 209 and Commentary, 
op. cit., 409. Thus it was held that when the defendant announced that the Hungarian state is not independent 
as a result of her social order and this does not foster the nation's interest, such statements are suitable to arouse 
hatred against the state and social order of Hungary and violate, therefore. Article 148 (1) b) BJD 3897 (BJD 
is an abbreviation of Criminal Law Decision). 
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practice, and I shall examine the possible reasons for this when looking at the new 
legislation.19 
Seditious Libel was an endangering crime; in other words it was not necessary to 
its completion that the act should really trigger hatred, but it had to be suitable to 
arouse such. It could be committed by any act which by its nature was fit for the above 
purpose.2 0 The act had to be suitable in an abstract fashion (abstract endangerment), 
which would mean in practice that the action's suitability to arouse hatred was examined 
objectively, purely on the grounds of the content and meaning of the act, and regardless 
of the impact it had on the environment (audience).21 
Any act suitable to trigger hatred qualified as a Crime Against State, namely as 
Seditious Libel, if it had been committed with the aim of arousing hatred against the 
described groups or individuals. Direct intention (dolus directus)22 was needed to 
commit Seditious Libel, meaning that the offender had to foresee that his act was fit to 
arouse hatred, and had to wish that this end should be realised. Hungarian criminal law 
distinguishes between different forms of intention,23 the motive of the crime, and the aim. 
For an offence to be fully committed all objective elements of its definition (fact-pattern) 
must be met and—in the case of an intentional crime-covered by the perpetrator's intention; 
the aim of a crime is an end, the achievement of which is the purpose of the criminal 
conduct but its realisation is not necessary for the crime to be complete. This latter aim, 
however, must be differentiated from the motive of the crime.24 Article 148 (1) defines 
the basic conduct of perpetration of the crime whilst paragraph (2) states some qualifying 
circumstances (commission in wide publicity, as a member of a group etc.), and 
paragraph (3) declares that the preparation of this offence should be punishable as 
well.25 
19 The offence did not def ine an object of perpetration; nevertheless an attack directed against a corporeal 
object, f o r example, a flag, qualified as this crime. See Commentary op. cit., 409. 
20 Reasoning, op. cit., 209; Commentary, op. cit., 409. 
21 Commentary, op. cit., 409. 
22 Dolus directus and dolus eventualis are defined in Article 13 of the PC; "Article 13. The offence is 
committed intentionally if the perpetrator wishes the consequences of his conduct or acquiesces in these 
consequences." 
23 Ibid. 
24 NAGY—TOKAJI: op. cit., 62-63. 
25 The general definition of preparation as a phase of the offence is set out in Article 18 of the PC: 
TArticlel8. ( 1) Where the law orders it so specifically, whoever with the purpose of committing an offence 
provides the conditions necessary thereto, or facilitating it, invites to. offers himself to. undertakes its. or agrees 
in its common perpetration is punishable for preparation. 
(2) Not punishable for preparation is 
(a) who. due to his voluntary desistance the commencement of the offence fails to come about; 
(b) who in order to avert commission retracts his invitation, offer, undertaking, or endeavours to make 
the other participants desist from the commission of the offence, provided that the commencement of commission 
of the offence, for any reason fails to come about; 
(c) who reports the preparation to the authorities. 
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The PC defined two different offences under the title of Affronting a Community in 
Article 269,26 Article 269 (1)—as already mentioned—corresponds to Seditious Libel as 
defined in Article 148 (1), with the difference of lacking the aim of arousing hatred; 
conduct of perpetration was only an offence against public peace. 
As we have seen, in the terminology of both crimes the objects of the offence27 
were the same, and also the conduct of perpetration.2* The difference lay on the mens 
rea side of the crimes, since Seditious Libel was an aimed crime, but in the case of 
Affronting a Community, the "aim to arouse hatred against a certain community" for the 
purpose of violating the interests of the state, was lacking; otherwise the wording of both 
crimes was the same.2 ' 
In criminal practice this differentiation caused serious problems since both of these 
offences were crimes requiring intention on the mens rea side, and the only difference 
was that in the case of Seditious Libel this above-mentioned particular aim (to arouse 
hatred against a certain community) was also an element of the subjective side, whilst 
such a purpose, defined as hostile to the state, was missing in the case of Affronting a 
Community,30 Judicial practice tried to differentiate between these two crimes, which 
was of major importance due to the great discrepancy between the punishments attached 
to them.3 ' Thus it was held that it is not Sedition but Affronting a Community if there 
are no facts to prove that the offender made his remarks out of hostile political 
purpose.32 Facts referring to such an aim could be the place, time and circumstances 
of commission, but the personal conditions of the perpetrator (for example, his 
ancestry33) were of importance as well.34 
Usually from the intoxicated state of the offender the conclusion was drawn that 
there was not any aim against the state.35 In another case, however, in which the 
perpetrator threw a large quantity of leaflets from a train window, the court concluded 
that this mode of perpetration indicated an aim to arouse hatred and thus he was found 
guilty of Sedition (Article 148).36 
Article 269 (2) defined the second and less severe form of Affronting a Community, 
which was also called in practice reviling. Contrary to paragraph (1), the act of 
(3) Where in case of paragraph (2) the preparation is in itself another offence, the perpetrator is 
punishable for this latter offence." 
26 Commentary, op. cit., 772. 
27 HALMAI: op. cit.. 237; 30/1992. (V. 26.) AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court), 198. 
28 ERDÖSY—FÖLDVÁRI: op. cit., 285. 
29 Ibid, at 285-286. 
30 Ibid.-, HALMAI: op. cit.. 237. 
31 Commentary, op. cit., 441, 772. 
32 BJD 9104.; 278. sz - BH 1982/7. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Commentary, op. cit., 773. 
35 Ibid, at 773. 
36 BJD 9105. 
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perpetration in paragraph (2) was not arousing to hatred but meant any conduct 
impairing the honour of the direct legal objects.37 
III. The Law Following the 1989 Modification of the Criminal Code 
Since, a s previously stated, the ultima ratio for limiting freedom of speech is criminal 
law,3* the first product of the "Roundtable Discussions"—which, although informal, was 
the mos t important institution conducting discussions between the communis t regime 
and the opposition, and which drafted the script for peaceful transition—was the 
development of a draft modification for the Penal Code.3 9 One of these important 
modifications—also created by the "Roundtable"—was the above-mentioned X X V Act of 
1989,40 abolishing the whole Chapter X on Crimes Against State of the PC and 
introducing, amongst other things, the new law of seditious libel: Sedition Against a 
Community.41 
Because of the problems set out above, this modification of the law of sedition was 
inevitable. The draft of Kálmán Györgyi for the modification suggested that some sort 
of sedition should be kep t as a Crime Against State, which would have protected the 
State of Hungary, the national flag and the national anthem. Acts involving hate speech 
were to be incorporated in a new crime against public peace.42 The XXV Act of 1989 
went half-way down the road envisioned by the draft, but abolished, however, both the 
former Seditious Libel (Article 148) and Affronting a Community (Article 269), and 
created only one new offence, placing it amongst the Crimes Against Public Peace 
(Title II of Chapter XVI) . The Explanation to the Modification's Draft reasoned that 
conducts suitable to a f fec t the public mood-ha te speech, for example—are per se 
Offences Against Public Peace." 
The new crime of Sedition Against a Community (Article 269) originally had two 
paragraphs in which two types of the of fence were defined.44 Paragraph (1) defined 
37 Commentary , op. cit., 773. 
38 H A L M A I : op. cit., 237; 30/1992. (V. 26.) AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court) , 201. 
39 Ibid, at 198. 
40 1989. évi XXV. törvény. 
41 H A L M A I : op. cit., 237; 30/1992. (V. 26.) AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court). 198; 
ERDÓSY—FÖLDVÁRI: op. cit., 286. 
42 GYÖRGYI—KÓNYA—MARGITÁN: op. cit., 52 -53 . 
43 ERDÓSY—FÖLDVÁRI: op. cit., 286. 
44 Sedition Against a Community (Article 269) reads as follows: 
"Sedition Against a Community 
Article 269. (1) Whoever in wide publicity incites to hatred against 
a) the Hungarian nation or some nationality, 
b) some nation, religion or race, furthermore certain groups of the population, commits a felony and is 
punishable with deprivation of liberty up to three years. 
[(2) Whoever in wide publicity uses an expression offensive or degrading to the Hungarian nation or some 
nationality, nation, religion or race, or commits other such conducts, is punishable for a misdemeanour with 
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a felony, whilst paragraph (2) set out a misdemeanour form of the offence . However, 
the misdemeanour [Article 269 (2)]—known also as reviling in earlier Hungarian 
criminal law terminology—was abolished by the Constitutional Court on the grounds 
of unconstitutionality.45 The two forms of the crime differed slightly in their protected 
objects—paragraph (2) did not enumerate "certain groups of population"—but more im-
portantly, the conduct of perpetration was also different. Whilst in the felony form of 
the crime the conduct required for perpetration was "inciting to hatred\ which 
according to the Explanation of the Code might be suitable in itself to disturb public 
peace (since it has violence or the threat of violence inherent), the same could not be 
said of reviling expressions (the conduct of perpetration of the second—the misdemean-
our - fo rm of the crime).46 
In this new Article 269 (1) the legal object of the offence was the public peace of 
Hungary, which means general positive mental, emotional and convictional relations 
towards state, social, legal and economic institutions and ideas.47 As in the preceding 
formulations of a similar crime, the legislator lists the direct legal objects (the 
Hungarian nation, any nationality, any nation, religion or race, and certain groups of the 
population). A number of cases raising the issue of the meaning of race, religion, or 
groups of population were expected; however, neither this offence nor its successor48 
has been widely used in criminal practice. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the 
courts will either use the internationally accepted meanings of these terms,49 to which 
they are encouraged by Article 7 (1) of the Hungarian Constitution and the 53/1993. (X. 
6.) AB határozat decision50 of the Constitutional Court, or use the following logical 
and linguistic interpretation.51 
The previous sedition crimes under Article 148 and the old Article 269 (1) were 
endangering offences; thus any act qualified as conduct of perpetration if it had the 
potential to arouse hatred, which—as explained above—was viewed objectively. 
deprivation of liberty up to one year, community service or fine.]" This paragraph was abolished by the decision 
of the Constitutional Court [30/1992. (V. 26.) AB határozat). 
45 30/1992. (V. 26.) AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court) Hatályos Jogszabály Gyűjtemény 
Vol. 19. 
46 HALMAI: op cit., 237; ERDÔSY—FÖLDVÁRI: op. cit., 285, 287. 
47 ERDÓSY—FÖLDVÁRI: op. cit., 283, 286. 
48 See infra Chapters С, Е. 
49 See for example the fundamental concept of ' race ' as defined very broadly in Article 1(1) of the "Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966)", in BROWNLŒ, I. (ed.): 
Basic Documents on Human Rights, 1994, 149-150. Similarly Article 1 (1) of the "Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981)" may give 
some idea of the extent of the freedom (ibid, at 109—110). 
50 Hun. Const. Article 7 (1): "The legal system of the Hungarian Republic accepts the universally recognised 
rules and regulations of international law, and harmonises the interna! laws and statutes of the country with 
the obligations assumed under international law". See 53/1993 (X. 6.) AB határozat (Decision of the 
Constitutional Court). 
51 n a g y — t o k a j i : op. cit., 9. 
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Therefore, the court always established whether it was possible for a certain action to 
have aroused hatred against—for example—a certain race or religion. To fuel hatred 
against a religion is only possible if it is viewed as such by the potential mass 
developing this hostility, but at the same time it is independent of any off icial 
assessment of what is a religion or race etc. In consequence, had the court been able to 
establish that, for example, a speech urging the assault of Krishna believers, was fit to 
create hatred against persons having this faith, even if such a religion was not officially 
recognised as ' religion' , the crime would have been committed. 
The problem with this type of logical analysis as regards Sedition Against a 
Community according to the 1989 modification, was that it was not clear whether the 
conduct of perpetration: inciting to hatred was an endangering type of conduct like the 
conduct of the previous Article 148 (act fit to arouse to hatred). This question will be 
scrutinised below, but it will be shown (and indeed, as regards Seditious Libel, has been 
shown52) that incitement to hatred comprises only the objective fitness to trigger hatred 
in other persons. It is also true concerning the new sedition law, that even if officially 
(for example, biologically) a certain group may not be identified as a race, or having 
a religion etc., if there is an objective possibility of creating hostile feelings against this 
identifiable group of individuals on the grounds of the actual conduct (speech) and the 
public perception of the attacked people, the act qualifies as incitement to hatred, and 
the group as protected.53 This interpretation also follows from the fact that Sedition 
Against a Community is a Crime Against Public Peace, and thus its commission must 
violate or endanger such. This violation or endangerment is independent of the official 
(i.e. legal) perception of these terms; it is dependent instead upon the actual inciting 
conduct and the dispositions of the recipient. Obviously, the meaning given in this 
fashion to these direct legal objects would then become a legal notion through the 
application of criminal law endorsing such interpretation. 
The intention of the legislator to widen as much as possible the range of protected 
direct legal objects can also be seen in the incorporation of the term certain groups of 
the population. The Constitutional Court points out that this term indicates the intention 
to protect persons with differing views (political parties, associations, movements etc.) 
or who are different for any reason.54 This interpretation makes it undoubtedly 
compulsory to charge a perpetrator under this crime if he incites to hatred against—for 
example—HIV-positive persons. 
The conduct of perpetration is incitement to hatred against the direct legal objects." 
In interpreting the exact meaning of this term one must refer to the Constitutional Court 's 
decision examining the constitutionality of this offence;56 in its decision the Court dealt 
52 See Chapter II. 
53 Such a definition was not given by the courts; however, it is the only logically possible interpretation of 
their decisions. 
54 See supra note 45, 202. 
55 ERDŐSY—FÖLDVÁRI: op. cit., 287. 
56 See supra note 45, 202. 
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extensively with the meaning of this vital term. The Court first looked at the common 
language meaning of the word hatred,51 which is according to the Magyar Nyelv Ér-
telmező Szótára (Hungarian Language Dictionary), the most extreme negative, hostile 
temper of the highest degree.58 Whoever incites (considering the meaning of the 
Hungarian equivalent: 'usz(t'), encourages hostile, damaging behaviour against an 
individual, group of people, organisation, or measure. Since already in the Csemegi Code 
the conduct of perpetration was sedition to hatred, which basically is identical in the 
Hungarian language with the term here scrutinised, the judiciary was able to rely on more 
than 100 years of legal practice in interpreting the conduct of perpetration of the offence 
in question.59 
The Curia (the supreme court in Hungary before the Second World War) had already 
defined the meaning and scope of the conduct of perpetration in its decisions at the turn 
of the century.60 The Constitutional Court, quoting the Curia's definition, stated that 
under the term of sedition the statute does not mean any unpleasant and offending 
expression, but exclusively such turbulent outbursts which are liable to inflame the 
passions of a larger mass of people to a high level, and out of which hatred may develop, 
and which thus can lead to the disturbance of society's order and peace.61 The Con-
stitutional Court also cited another decision, saying that criticism, negative expressions 
and even offensive communication is not sedition; we can only speak of sedition if the 
expression does not target the sense but the feelings of the other, and is fit to arouse 
hostile passions. It is completely irrelevant whether the stated facts are true or not, it 
is only important that these 'facts'—if they are facts—should be fit to arouse hatred.62 
The 1989 Act made the term in wide publicity (which was a qualifying circum-
stance in the previous sedition law) an element of Sedition Against a Community. The 
PC only says in Article 137 point 10 that "in wide publicity includes the perpetration 
of a criminal offence by press, by other means of mass media and by multiplication 
too."63 Following the Ministerial Reasoning and a court decision, in wide publicity 
can be established if at the time of the commission of the crime a large number of 
persons were present or there was a chance that a not predetermined large number of 
persons would obtain knowledge of the act.64 The body of persons present is large if 
their number cannot be estimated by looking at the crowd. This vague definition was 
interpreted by further court decisions, which held that a crowd of 20-25 people could 
qualify as 'in wide publicity' even if it is in someone's home.65 Courts also decided 
57 Obviously the Hungarian meaning was scrutinised. 
58 See supra note 54, quoting Magyar Nyelv Értelmező Szótára, Vol. II, 1132. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. citing BJD Vol. 7, 272. 
62 Ibid, citing BJD Vol 1, 124. 
63 PC, § 137, point 10. 
64 BJD 8834.; BH 1981. 223. sz.; BH 1986. 315. sz. 
65 BJD 660. 
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that this element can be established even by the tearing down of posters or other 
materials from walls.66 
In the past few years several procedures were initiated on the basis of the second 
form of Sedition Against a Community (Article 269 (2), reviling).61 In August 1991 
police confiscated the 4/94 issue of the Anarchist Newspaper, the newsletter of the 
Anarchist Group of Budapest, published for the Pope's visit to Hungary, on the grounds 
that they had probable cause ("well- founded suspicion" in the wording of the Hungarian 
Criminal Procedure Code68) to believe that the misdemeanour form of Sedition Against 
a Community had been committed; on the first page of the newsletter the headline was: 
"May your Kingdom not come!". The writer of the piece went on to elaborate his 
opinion that the Church is not based on issues of faith but on power.69 
The most important case, however, arose out of articles published in the "Szent 
Korona" (Holy Crown) newspaper. The Prosecution for the X and XVII District of 
Budapest filed charges against the editor-in-chief, his deputy, and the responsible editor 
in February 1991, alleging that the newspaper in its issues of the second half of 1990 
published 14 statements violating Article 269 of the PC.7 0 The president of the court 
in session decided to suspend the trial in order to bring the question of the constitu-
tionality of Article 269 before the Constitutional Court.71 
The issue which had arisen during this case pending before the Central District 
Court of Pest was that the Article 269 of the PC might contradict Article 61 of the 
Constitution, guaranteeing freedom of expression and the press,72 as well as Article 60, 
ensuring freedom of thought,73 and Article 65, stating the right to asylum. The judge 
66 BJD 4924. 
67 H A L M A I : op. cit., 238. 
68 Ar t i c le l2 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Hungary (CPC) says; " T h e criminal procedure can only 
be initiated on the bases of the conditions set out in this statute, in case of well founded suspicion and only 
against whom the well founded suspicion of a crime is burdening." Such a regulation is in conformity with 
Article 5 1/c of the "European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950)"; See also Eur. 
Court H. R. , Fox, Cam bell. Hartley v. United Kingdom judgment of 30 August 1990, Series A No. 182. 
69 See supra note 67. 
70 Ibid, 242. 
71 Ibid, 243 . 
72 Hun. Const . Article 61: 
"(/) In the Republic of Hungary everyone has the right to the free declaration of his views and opinions, and 
has the right of access to information of public interest, and also the freedom to disseminate such information. 
(2) The Republic of Hungary recognises the freedom of the Press. 
(3) The law on the public data and information and the law on the freedom cf the Press require for ratification 
the support of two thirds of the votes of the MPs present" 
73 Hun. Cons t . Article 60: 
"(I) In the Republic of Hungary everyone has the right to the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
(2) This right includes the free choice or acceptance of religion or any other conviction according to one's 
conscience, and the liberty to express, or refuse to express, to exercise or teach one's religion and conviction 
through the performance of religious acts and rites, either individually or together with others, either publicly 
or in a close circle." 
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of the Central District Court, using the right laid down by Article 38 of the XXXII Act 
of 1989 On the Constitutional Court,1* suspended the trial and referred the question 
to the Constitutional Court, reasoning that the disputed section of the Penal Code is 
contrary to Article 61 (1) and (2) with regard to Article 8 ( 1 H 2 ) and (4)7S of the 
Constitution.76 
At the session of the Court, the President of the Supreme Court and the Chief 
Prosecutor stated their view that the motion is not well-founded, and that the section in 
question is not unconstitutional.77 
The Constitutional Court had firstly to define the actual question of constitutionality. 
In order to do so it started with the historical examination of sedition and related 
offences.78 As a second step it observed that Article 269 does not have any conflicting 
points with freedom of thought (Article 60 of the Constitution) and the right to asylum 
(Article 65 of the Constitution). It stated that "[t]he Article 269 means the actual 
limitation of freedom of expression defined in Article 61 paragraph (1) and the freedom 
of the press indicated in paragraph (2) of the Constitution, and marks out the borders 
with the heaviest tools of the liability system: with criminal law sanctions."79 
Thirdly, the Court—now that it was ascertained that freedom of expression has a 
point of contact with Article 269—had to set out its interpretation of freedom of 
expression. According to the Court, freedom of expression has a distinguished role 
amongst the basic constitutional rights; in fact it is a 'mother right' of other freedoms, 
the so-called 'communication freedoms' . That is, other rights can be derived from this 
fundamental freedom, such as freedom of speech and the press, and the right to 
information. In a wider meaning freedom of expression comprises the freedom to create 
and distribute art, and of scientific activity.80 Freedom of religion is also connected to 
freedom of expression.81 
74 1989. évi XXXII. törvény. Article 38. 
75 Hun. Const. Article 8: 
"(1) The Republic of Hungary recognises the inviolable and inalienable rights of persons. Ensuring respect and 
protection for these rights is a primary obligation of the State. 
(2) In the Republic of Hungary the rules on fundamental rights and obligations are determined by Act of 
Parliament, but must not limit essential contents of the fundamental right. 
(3) (irrelevant) 
(4) In times of emergency, national crises, or extreme danger, the exercise of fundamental rights may be 
suspended or limited—except the fundamental rights specified in Article 54-56., Article 57. paragraphs (2)-(4), 
Article 60., Article 66-69. and Article 70/E." 
76 See supra note 45, 197. 
77 Ibid, at 197. 
78 Ibid, at 197-198. 
79 Ibid, at 198. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Usually freedom of religion and conscience is placed outside communication rights, obviously because this 
right is inherent to the intimate inner sphere of the individual; thus it is generally not paît of the communication 
process. The Hungarian Constitutional Court with one of its decisions of 1993 placed—in certain 
aspects—freedom of religion amongst communication rights. The reasoning of the judgement, in interpreting 
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Only at this stage did the Court define the real constitutional issue: Article 8 (2) of 
the Constitution says that "in the Hungarian Republic the rules on fundamental rights 
and obligations are determined by Act of Parliament, but must not limit essential 
contents of the fundamental right." Therefore, the crucial constitutional question was 
whether the legislator by enacting Article 269 (1) and (2) violated Article 8 (2) of the 
Constitution, by limiting the essential content of freedom of expression and the press as 
ensured in Article 61 (1) and (2).82 
The Constitutional Court referred in several of its decisions to the prohibition on 
violating the essential content of a certain right and set out a test for establishing 
whether, because of its violation of Article 8 (2), a certain limitation imposed on a 
constitutional right is arbitrary.83 In this case the Court rephrased the test: 
"The state can only apply the measure of limiting fundamental rights if the protec-
tion or success of another right and freedom or the protection of another constitutional 
interest cannot be achieved otherwise. For the constitutionality of fundamental right 
limitation it is, therefore, not enough in itself that it is applied for the protection of 
another right or freedom or in the interest of some constitutional end. It is necessary, 
however, that it should meet the requirements of proportionality: the importance of the 
end to be achieved and the extent of the harm to the fundamental right should be in 
proper proportion to each other. The legislator is compelled to use the mildest means 
suitable to achieve the given end while applying the limitation. The limitation of the 
right's content is unconstitutional if it is exercised lacking any compelling reason, 
arbitrarily, or if the extent of the limitation is unproportional compared with the end to 
be achieved."*4 
In other words, a limitation of a fundamental right is not arbitrary if: 
a) a limitation is necessary for the protection of another fundamental right or 
freedom or another constitutional interest; 
b) the employed measure is suitable to achieve this end; 
c) the importance of this end has to be proportionate to the extent of the harm 
caused by the limitation; 
Article 60 of the Constitution, mentions three elements of the freedom of religion: freedom of belief (faith), 
freedom in exercising the religion, freedom to the joint and public exercise of religion. In the view of the 
Constitutional Court the second element, freedom in exercising religion (traditionally cult f reedom) is clearly 
a communication right, and they expressed their view that the text of the Constitution defines freedom of belief 
through f reedom of communication since it defines die subject of f reedom of religion as the right to f reely 
choose or accept religion. See HALMAI: op cit., 113-114; 4/1993. (II. 12) AB határozat (Decision of the 
Constitutional Court). 
82 H A L M A I : op. cit., 244. 
83 This test can be found in its clearest form in the decision 20/1990. (X. 4.) AB határozat (Decision of the 
Constitutional Court), or in the decision abolishing the death penalty, 23/1990. (X. 31.) AB határozat (Decision 
of the Constitutional Court). 
84 See supra note 45, 199. 
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d) the applicable limitation has to be the least intrusive,85 
The question was then asked: what can be said about the existence of these 
conditions as regards Article 269 of the Penal Code? As already elaborated,86 sedition 
had two forms, the conduct of perpetration of which was different: "incitement to 
hatred" [Article 269 (1)] in the first case and "reviling" [Article 269(2)] in the second. 
This difference justified a separate examination of the constitutionality of the two forms 
of this crime.87 
The Court began by examining the first type of sedition. The conduct of perpetra-
tion of this offence was "inciting to hatred". The Court ascertained that it is the duty 
of the state not only to honour but to protect fundamental rights.88 This, as set out in 
the decision on abortion,89 includes the duty of the state, in cases of fundamental 
individual rights, to take measures to ensure their effectiveness. Article 61 of the 
Constitution declares not only the individual subjective right to freedom of expression, 
but also the objective side of this freedom. Therefore, beside the individual freedom of 
expression (subjective right), Article 61 comprises a "state duty to ensure conditions for 
the development and functioning maintenance of democratic public opinion."90 The 
Court concludes that the "objective, institutional side of freedom of expression does not 
only concern the freedom of the press, freedom of education etc., but points to the other 
side of the institutional system, which places freedom of expression in general amongst 
the other protected interests. Therefore the constitutional limits of freedom of expression 
must be defined in such a way that they should consider, beside the basic right of the 
individual making the expression, the indispensable interest for democracy of the 
development of public opinion."91 
As it has been shown above, "incitement to hatred" is an extremely serious act, 
which—according to the Court—prohibits certain communities of people from living in 
85 The Court does not explicitly point out the suitability of the applied limitation as a separate condition; 
however, it is inherent to its analysis. 1 slightly disagree with Halmai, who whilst also listing these elements 
as prongs of the test, places the condition of suitability in third place. In my view the Court always examined 
the suitability of the applied means as second only to the basic question of the necessity of the limitation. See 
HALMAI: op. cit., 244. Halmai also draws a parallel between the Court's assessment and the so called 
theoretical view. He cites J. Kiss' opinion [KISS, J.: Az abortuszról. Érvek és ellen érvek (On Abortion. Reasons 
and Against), Budapest, 1992, 32] who lists the conditions as follows: a) the limitation has to have a reasonable 
cause; b) it must be relevant from the point of view of the reason; c) it must be necessary; d) it must be of 
necessary extent. In my opinion this set of conditions does not follow the logic of the Court 's decisions, and 
is contrary to legal logic. 
86 See Chapter II. 
87 See supra note 45, 199. 
88 Hun. Const. Article 8 (1). 
89 64/1991. (XII. 17.) AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court), Hatályos jogszabályok 
gyűjteménye. Vol. 19, 201. 
90 See supra note 45, 199. This principle was also invoked by the Court in its decision declaring the crime 
Affronting an Authority or Official unconstitutional. [36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB határozat (Decision of the 
Constitutional Court), MK (1994) No. 24, 2512]. 
91 See supra note 45, 199. 
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harmony with other groups. According to Article 2 (1) of the Constitution, Hungary is 
a democratic state under the rule of law. The notion of democracy is extremely 
complex, but it beyond doubt includes the right to be different, the protection of 
minorities, and the giving up of force and the threat of force. Incitement to hatred, being 
the preparation to violence, is a denial of these principles. It would be contrary to 
democratic principles to tolerate these forms of expression. It is necessary therefore to 
limit freedom of expression in this respect. '2 
The Court did not really discuss the question of whether Article 269 (1) is suitable 
for limiting free expression, since it had already declared that criminal law is the ultima 
ratio in the legal system. However, it still had to look at the proportionality of the 
intrusion and whether this type of limitation is the least intrusive. The Court stated that 
since the offence in paragraph (1) basically punishes speech which incites to hatred as 
a preparation to violence, its criminalisation is not disproportionate; and sedition is not 
a Crime Against State anymore, and is therefore not too severe (after the changes in 
1989 its scope has been enlarged but its severity softened). Thus also the requirement 
of the least harmful limitation was satisfied." 
Scrutinising the second paragraph, the Court found the following, as interpreted in 
Halmai 's analysis: 
1. Using expressions offensive or degrading to the Hungarian nation, or some 
nationality, nation, religion etc. Article 269 (2) obviously indirectly also offends the 
individuals belonging to these groups, but this does not mean that such individuals' 
human dignity as protected by Article 54 (1) of the Constitution94 would be directly 
harmed by such conduct. 
2. Similarly, it cannot be contended that the rights of freedom of conscience and 
religion (Article 60 of the Constitution) or the national and ethnic minority rights 
(Article 68 of the Constitution) would be violated by such expressions, since the person 
asserting his opinion is not in a position to limit these rights. 
3. Furthermore, the right against discrimination (Art. 70/A) cannot be brought into 
connection with offensive or degrading expressions either, and it is quite plain that this 
provision does not apply to private individuals in limiting their discriminatory 
behaviour. 
4. It is hard to find international obligations deriving from international instruments 
to which Hungary is a party, and which incorporate rules needing criminal law 
protection as provided by Article 269 (2). 
It seemed conclusive that reviling, as defined in paragraph (2) of Article 269, was 
not sanctioned because a constitutional right was being protected; thus the sufficient 
92 Ibid, at 200. 
93 Ibid, at 202. 
94 Hun. Const. Article 54: 
"(1) In the Republic of Hungary every human being has the innate right to life and human dignity, and no one 
may be arbitrarily deprived of these rights." 
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cause was missing which would have justified the limitation of the fundamental right 
to free expression.95 Therefore, the very first condition of the limitation of fundamental 
rights was not satisfied in the view of the Cour t The penalisation of reviling speech and 
similar conducts by criminal law is thus unconstitutional. 
The Court nevertheless pointed out that: 
a) "The constitution ensures free communication—the individual behaviour and the 
social process-and the fundamental right of free expression does not concern its content. 
There is space for every expression in this process, for good and harmful, pleasant and 
offensive as well—especially because the evaluation of the expression is the product of 
this process."96 
b) Article 269 (2) does not create an external limitation to freedom of speech 
(external means in protection of another constitutional right), but an internal, protecting 
the person from offending and degrading speech. To determine what is offending and 
degrading is not a question for criminal law. The harm to public peace caused by 
reviling speech is a presumption which cannot justify the limitation of such a funda-
mental right as freedom of expression.97 
In conclusion, the second form of Sedition Against a Community defined in 
paragraph (2) of Article 269 was declared unconstitutional, because it limited the right 
to freedom of expression and the press as laid down in Article 61 (1) and (2), violating 
therefore Article 8 (2) of the Constitution, which prohibits the limitation of the essential 
content of a fundamental right but allows—in conjunction with Article 8 (4)—some 
narrowing of certain freedoms under conditions of meeting the four points of the test 
discussed above.98 
TV. Article 156 and Hate Speech Before the Modifications in 1996 
A new aspect was added to the possible penal answers to hate crimes under Hungarian 
criminal law by a highly publicised trial: the 'Skinhead Case' , which resulted in the 
conviction of 46 juveniles (out of 48 indicted) for Serious Bodily Harm Out of a Base 
Reason." 
95 See supra note 93. 
96 See supra note 45, 203. This statement has been quoted in the decision 36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB határozat 
(Decision of the Constitutional Court), MK (1994) No. 68, 2513. 
97 See supra note 45, 203. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Fővárosi Bíróság 5.B.311/1992/86. The PC defines Bodily Harm as follows: 
"Article 170 (1) Whoever violates the bodily integrity or health of another, where the injury or sickness 
heals within eight days, commits light bodily harm, and is punishable with deprivation of liberty up to one year, 
community service, or fine. 
(2) Where the injury or sickness heals in more than eight days, the perpetrator commits the felony of 
serious bodily harm, and is punishable with deprivation of liberty up to three years. 
(3) If bodily harm is committed out of a base reason or purpose, the punishment for a felony is, in case 
of light bodily harm up to three years, in case of serious bodily harm up to five years deprivation of liberty." 
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The legal problem arose around Article 156 of the PC, which defined the Crime 
Against Ethnic, National, Racial or Religious Group as follows: 
"Crime against Ethnic, National, Racial or Religious Group Article 156. Whoever causes 
serious bodily or mental injury to a member of an ethnic, national, racial or religious 
group because he belongs to such a group, commits a felony and is punishable with 
deprivation of liberty from two to eight years." 
This crime has been created according to the requirements of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948),100 which was incorporated 
into the Hungarian legal system by the act-decree, 1955. évi 16. sz. tvr.m Under the 
obligation to undertake necessary legislation in order to give effect to the provisions of 
the Convention, placed on the Contracting Parties by Article V of the Convention,102 
the Penal Code of 1961103 included offences in Articles 137 and 138 which were 
equivalent to the crimes laid out in Article II and III of the Convention.104 The P C of 
1978 took over without any modification Article 138 in its section Article 156, 
criminalising an act similar to the one defined in Article II (b) of the Convention. 
Crime Against Ethnic, National, Racial or Religious Group was placed in Chapter 
XI, Crimes Against Humanity, which contains two titles, Crimes Against Peace and War 
Crimes. Therefore, the legal object of the offence in Article 156 was 'humanity ' and 
'peace ' . The object of the crime, however, was twofold. Firstly, it was the interest of 
the person who has suffered serious bodily or mental harm to his physical and mental 
integrity and health; secondly, it was the right of the same individual to belong to any 
ethnic, national, racial or religious group.105 
100 Basic Documents on Human Rights, op. cit., 31 (the United Kingdom has also ratified the Convention: 
Genocide Act, United Kingdom Statutes, 1969, c. 12, in force 3 0 April 1970). 
101 Commentary, op. cit., 426. 
102 Supra note 100, 32. 
103 V Act of 1961. 
104 "Article II 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intention to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions cf life calculated to bring about the physical destruction 
in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group 
Article III 
The following acts shall be punishable: 
(a) Genocide; 
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
(d) Attempt to commit genocide; 
(e) Complicity in genocide." (Supra note 100, 31-32). 
105 Commentary, op. cit., 427. 
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Article 156 set out a material crime; that is, its definition required a certain result 
for the full commission of the offence. The result in this case was serious bodily or 
mental injury. The offence was defined in an open fact-pattern,106 Thus no specific 
behaviour was required for the commission, it was enough that an intentional act of the 
perpetrator should cause the result (serious physical or mental injury), and this result 
was covered by the offender's intention. This crime must be examined, for even though 
serious physical harm cannot—under any circumstances—be caused by hate speech, 
theoretically speaking serious mental injury can be. Serious bodily harm must be 
understood—in the absence of another definition—to be an injury healing after eight days, 
in compliance with the result of Serious Bodily Harm (Article 170 (2) of the PC). It is 
not impossible to commit the offence under Article 156 by causing light bodily harm 
within the meaning of Article 170 (1) (that is, causing injury which heals earlier than 
eight days), if, besides such, the assault has also caused serious mental harm to the 
victim.107 T h e Commentary defines serious mental injury as a state caused either by 
physical or mental assault on the person, in which the victim's mental integrity and 
stability is overturned—at least for a time—and this experience remains a lasting and 
painful memory.108 Using again the definitions and practice of Bodily Harm [Article 
170 (1), (2)], we may assume that mental injury is a type of sickness (one of the results 
required for Bodily Harm}09)-, it follows, therefore, that serious mental injury is a 
pathological deviation from the normal mental state of the victim, which heals after 
eight days. 
The seriousness of this offence was not only indicated by the terms of punishment 
attached to it (two to eight years' imprisonment), but by the lack of limitation period, 
which in the case of most crimes terminates punishability after a period of time. 
According to Article 33 (2) b) punishability did not lapse in cases of Crimes Against 
Humanity."0 
The debate unleashed by the 'Skinhead Case' focused on the following questions: 
'What is the scope of Article 156's application? Is it a mere declaration in order to 
satisfy an international obligation, thus being an invalid norm, or is it possible to use 
it as a means to fight hate crimes, and so hate speech?' 
The undisputed facts of the case can be summarised very concisely as follows: a 
large group of skinheads and sympathisers marched through the outskirts of Budapest 
breaking up into smaller groups, with the proven intent of assaulting gypsies, blacks, 
and Arabs. They had several encounters with members of these ethnic groups and races, 
106 Open fact-pattem is a mode of defining the crime in the statute. In such a case the statute does not describe 
the actual conduct of perpetration, only the result. Any behaviour leading to this result in a culpable manner 
will qualify as criminal: see BÉKÉS—FÖLDVÁRI—GÁSPÁR—TOKAJI: op. cit., 117. 
107 See supra note 105. 
108 Ibid. 
109 "Sickness means a pathological deviation from the normal physical and mental state of the human being." 
(Commentary, op. cit., 476). 
110 PC Article 33 (2) b). 
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in the course of which the skinheads used abusive speech and caused light bodily harm 
during several incidents, and inflicted serious bodily harm on one victim. As a 
consequence, two of the black victims have terminated their studies in Hungary and left 
the country, and all three of them have suffered serious depression and fear, and have 
virtually isolated themselves from the outside world.111 
The case was brought to the Metropolitan Court112 by the prosecution under 
Article 156. This first instance court changed the charge and in i ts judgement qualified 
the acts as Serious Bodily Harm Out of Base Reason [(Article 170(3)]. However, the 
Chief Prosecutor of Hungary backed the appeal filed by the prosecution, and the case 
came before the Supreme Court.113 The Chief Prosecutor s u m m e d up his opinion in 
the appeal, saying that the legal object of the crimes in Chapter IX (Crimes Against 
Peace) of the PC cannot be narrowed down to peace between states; it also includes the 
protection of peaceful relations between ethnic, national, racial and religious groups 
within the state. The defendants assaulted the victims exclusively because of their skin 
colour, their nationality, or their race. Such a motive rendered these acts as directed not 
only against the specific individuals, but also against the groups they represented. He 
therefore concluded that it endangered the peaceful relation between the ethnic, national, 
racial and religious groups, and thus attacked the legal object of Article 156.114 
The Supreme Court rejected the appeal and upheld the Metropolitan Cour t ' s 
judgement. In its decision the basic question it had to answer was: can Article 156 be 
used in cases in which the offender(s) caused serious bodily harm and mental shock to 
the victim with an intentional physical and verbal attack motivated solely by the ethnic, 
national origin, race or religion of the attacked? 
The Supreme Court negated the question, giving two reasons: 
1. Historically, legal practice used sedition offences (Seditious Libel, Affronting a 
Community) in conjunction with other crimes to deal with similar acts, and the fact that 
those crimes do not exist anymore does not just i fy the unprecedented use of Article 
156.115 
2. The acts in question do not endanger or violate the legal object of Article 156, 
and thus do not attack the interest protected by Article 156. Therefore , it is per se unfit 
to be used against such behaviours."6 
111 BH 1994. 299. sz. 
112 Criminal Procedure Code Article 25 b). 
113 The Supreme Court and the Constitutional court are two different courts. Accord ing to the Consti tution: 
"Article 45 (1) In the Hungarian Republic, the Supreme Court of the Hungarian Republic, the Metropolitan 
Court and the county courts, and local courts administer justice." I Act of 1989 (1989. évi I törvény) prescribes 
the creation of the Constitutional Court, and XXXII Act of 1989 (1989. évi X X X I I . törvény) defines the basic 
functions and operation of the Constitutional Court. The Court is outside the cour t system and does not 
adjudicate individual cases, but only as far as the constitutionality of a certain n o r m is concerned. 
114 See supra note 111, 417. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid, 417-418 . 
178 Balázs József Gellér 
Elaborating on these statements, the Court looked at the historical development of 
the criminal law regulation of such acts. It established that until the PC of 1961 they 
were covered only by the sedition laws (which I have mentioned above). The Supreme 
Court also found that from 1961 until 1989 similar conducts—acts which offended the 
person on racial, ethnic, national or religious bases—were still dealt with under sedition 
(if necessary concurrently with some other offence, for example Serious Bodily Harm), 
even though the PC already contained the Crime Against Ethnic, National, Racial or 
Religious Group defined in Article 138 of the Code of 1961, and Article 156 of the 
Code of 1978.117 Such a qualification of hate crimes focused on the political side of 
the offences, making hate behaviour a Crime Against State (using Seditious Libel), or 
Crime Against Public Order (using Affronting a Community). 
According to the Court, following the modifications of 1989 (elimination of 
Seditious Libel as a Crime Against State) legal appreciation of the fact that such acts 
undoubtedly still endanger the internal peace of the state (in attacking the relations of 
ethnic groups, nationalities, religions and races) seemed to be possible. The situation 
that the offenders ' special motivation (namely, to upset the relations between these 
social groups) cannot be taken into account except as base reason (a general qualifying 
circumstance of Bodily Harm), does not provide sufficient grounds for employing an 
offence which protects a completely different interest, and which additionally has never 
been used in judicial practice; in contrast, Bodily Harm Out of Base Reason [Article 170 
(1), (2), (3)] had been previously applied."8 
The dispute did not fade away after the decision of the Supreme Court. Endre Bócz, 
Chief Prosecutor of the Capital, published a detailed attack on the decision."9 He 
maintained that the reason why previous practice relied on Seditious Libel and Bodily 
Harm is that Seditious Libel was an endangering crime; thus it was not necessary to 
prove a result in order to prove the commission. Additionally, be fore the Code of 1978 
it was not even an aimed crime. Therefore, to prove a charge under sedition was much 
easier than to do the same under Article 156.120 
Bócz is undoubtedly right in alleging such a motivation on behalf of the law 
enforcement. However, I believe that the background reason for not using Article 156 
was irrelevant. It is true that the legal practice has no legally binding force on any 
court,121 but there is nevertheless an unofficial judge-made law. Law courts abide by 
the published decisions of the superior courts for the simple reason that they do not 
wish to be overruled on appeal.122 As a consequence, there is judge-made law in the 
form of interpretations in the Hungarian legal system. 
117 Ibid, 417. 
118 Ibid. 
119 BÓCZ, E.: "A skinhead-ügyek és a Btk. 156" (The 'Skinhead Cases' and Article 156 of the Penal Code), 
Magyar Jog. 1994, No. 6, 347. 
120 Ibid, 351. 
121 Supra note 117. 
122 Ibid. 
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The Constitution forbids that anyone should be pronounced guilty of, or sentenced 
for, any act that was not considered a criminal o f fence under Hungarian law at the t ime 
it was committed;123 the PC also limits the retroactive use of criminal statutes to in 
favorem cases. '2 4 Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court, in elaborating on the 
meaning of the principles nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege, d id not 
deal with the question of retrospectively changing interpretations and revival of inval id 
norms.125 Fuller is, however, quite correct in insisting that " the evil of the re t rospec-
tive law arises because men may have acted upon the previous state of the law and the 
actions thus taken may be frustrated or made unexpectedly burdensome by a backward 
looking alteration in their legal effect."126 However , Kelsen too is quite clear on this 
matter: "A norm is not regarded as valid, which is never obeyed or applied. In fac t , a 
legal norm may lose its validity by never being applied or obeyed by so-called desue-
tude."127 
As the facts are. Article 156—for whatever reason—had not been used against the 
perpetrators of hate crimes, and its application would have been more burdensome on 
the defendants than the then valid practice; what is more, it had to be regarded as an 
invalid norm in these cases. In my opinion, its sudden usage in similar cases had 
contradicted the nullum crimen principle. 
The most important objection to the prosecut ion 's qualification of the of fence was 
grounded in the difference of legal objects. Art icle 10 of the P C says in paragraph (1) 
that "the offence is an act, committed intentionally oo-if the law also punishes reckless 
perpetration—recklessly, which is dangerous to society and for which the law orders 
the infliction of punishment." Under paragraph (2) it continues, that "an act 
endangering society is such activity or omission which harms or endangers the s tate , 
social, or economic order of the Hungarian Republic, the person or rights of the 
citizens." 
This means that a criminal offence has three major elements according to the P C : 
culpability (intention or recklessness), social danger, and a definition as punishable . 
Though a vast number of theories has interpreted these and similar elements throughout 
the history of criminal law,128 it can be said that today it is generally accepted that 
123 Hun. Const. Article 57 (4). 
124 PC Article 2. 
125 11/1992. (III. 5.) AB határozat (Decision of the Consti tutional Court), MK (1992) No. 23, 9 3 7 - 9 3 8 . 
126 FULLER. L. L.: Morality of Law, New Haven. 1964, 80. 
127 KELSEN, H.: Pure Theory of Law, 1978,213. Kelsen asserts that "since the validity of a norm is an ought 
and not an is, it is necessary to distinguish the validity of a no rm from its effectiveness. Effectiveness is an J i s -
fact ' that the norm is actually applied and obeyed.. . . A norm that is not obeyed by anybody anywhere, in o ther 
words a norm that is not effective at least to some degree, is not regarded as a valid norm. A legal no rm is no 
longer considered to be valid, if it remains permanently ineffect ive." (KELSEN: op. cit., 10-11). 
128 Some of the most influential discussions of the topic can be found in: ANGYAL, P.: A magyar büntetőjog 
tankönyve (Textbook of Hungarian Criminal Law), Budapest, 1920, 60.; HELLER, E.: A magyar büntetőjog 
általános tanai (General Principles of Hungarian Criminal Law), Budapest, 1937, 60; SCHULTEISZ, E.: A 
bűncselekmény tana (Principles of the Offence), 1948, 13; B É K É S I . -GYÖRGYI, K . - P A P P , L : A magyar bűn-
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a criminal o f fence is a behaviour, which is unlawful (i.e. has violated a statutory 
provision—social danger is interpreted in this way), and which corresponds to a 
definition of an offence (fact-pattem likeness) and is culpable.129 
Article 10 (2) lists five basic general legal objects: the state order, social order, 
economic order, the person, or rights of the citizens which must be harmed or 
endangered by the act or omission in order to constitute a crime. The Chapters and 
Titles of the PC incorporating the different offences give further indication of the direct 
legal object of the crime. The argument of the prosecution was—as mentioned 
above—that the legal object of the crimes in Chapter IX (Crimes Against Peace) cannot 
be narrowed down solely to peace between states.130 The Supreme Court based its 
analyses of the legal object on arguments proving legislative intention, examined by 
methods of historical and systematic interpretation. 
The Court looked at 
a) the reason for creating the offence, its place in the criminal legal structure; 
b) the seriousness of the crime. 
a/1) The Court established that Crimes Against Peace—Article 156 is one of 
them—were placed in Chapter IX (Crimes Against Humanity) together with War Crimes, 
showing legislative opinion that both groups of crimes attack the relation between states 
and nations;131 
a/2) except for one offence (Article 154), all others were incorporated into the P C 
on the basis of international instruments;132 
a/3) Article 156 was created to incorporate Article II b) of the Genocide Conven-
tion133 as indicated in the Ministerial Reasoning of the DraftlM Furthermore, Article 
155135 of the PC corresponds with all other crimes set out in Article II and III of the 
tetőjog általános része (The General Part of Hungarian Criminal Law), Budapest, 1979, 22-28; TOKAJI , G.: 
A bűncselekmény tan alapjai a magyar büntetőjogban (Foundations of the Principles of the Offence in 
Hungarian Criminal Law), 1984, 23-70, 90-96. 
129 NAGY—TOKAJI: op. cit., 31. 
130 Supra note 111, 416. 
131 Ibid, at 418. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Basic Documents on Human Rights, op. cit., 31. 
134 Commentary, op. cit., 426. 
135 "Article 155. ( I ) Whoever, in order to completely or partially exterminate an ethnical, national, racial or 
religious group, 
a) kills a member of such a group, 
b) forces the group under living conditions that threaten it, or some of its members, with destruction, 
c) takes measures aimed at preventing births within the group, 
d) forcibly transfers children belonging to the group to another group, 
commits a felony and is punishable with deprivation of liberty from ten to fifteen years or for life. 
(2) Whoever makes preparations for genocide is punishable for a felony with deprivation of liberty from 
two to eight years." 
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Convent ion . Art icle 157,136 which is based on the Apartheid Convent ion, 1 3 7 is how-
ever a subsidiary c r ime to Article 155 and Article 156, meaning that it can only be 
appl ied if the Article 155 or Article 156 are not applicable. It fol lows tha t Article 156 
mus t re fer to a more serious cr ime than Article 157 (this is also suppor ted by the 
d i f fe rence in the te rms of pun i shment attached to these crimes). A l l these facts 
show—according to the Court—that Art icle 156 is penalising a fo rm of genocide as 
def ined by international law in the Genocide Convent ion, and so establishing the 
jur isdict ion of an international tribunal.1 3 8 
b) the facts scrutinised above already indicate the seriousness of the cr ime. 
Addit ionally, such an offence is no t subject to a limitation period, and thus the 
punishabi l i ty does not cease; af ter a n y length of t ime the perpetrator c an be charged 
with such an of fence . It also fol lows f rom the origins in international l a w of the Crime 
Against Ethnic, National, Racial or Religious Group (Article 156) tha t the s imple 
mot ivat ion of inflicting injury because of membership of the described groups cannot 
be interpreted narrowly. It must ins tead be understood as requiring an intent according 
to Art ic le II of the Genocide Convent ion : intent to destroy, in whole or part these 
groups.1 3 9 If this o f f e n c e is not in terpreted this way it means that a pe rpe t ra to r ' s action 
which caused serious bodily or mental injury to the victim because of their ethnic, racial 
etc . origin, would establish a cr ime which is a lways prosecutable and the jurisdiction 
of an international tribunal.140 
B ó c z ' s main argument can be summar ised as fo l lows: 
a) the legislator created a separate cr ime of Article II b) of the Convent ion in Article 
156 of the PC, whilst incorporating the other forms of genocide in Ar t i c l e 155; 
b) Article II a) , b) , where individuals are the vic t ims of genocide the Convention 
uses plural form (members of the group), whilst the P C in Article 155 a n d Article 156 
uses singular: member of the group", 
c) the intent to destroy these groups required by the Convention is incorporated into 
the definition of Art icle 155 but not in Article 156. 
All the above show that the Hungarian legislator wanted to broaden criminal liability 
compared with the Convention.141 T h e s e arguments support the main objection that 
the interpretation of Article 156 s o that it should require an intent to destroy these 
136 "Racial Discrimination 
Article 157. A person who commits an act prohibited by international law in order to help some racial 
group to bring another racial group under its rule, or to keep up such rule, or systematically oppresses the 
other racial group, unless that act constitutes a more serious offence, shall be punished for a felony with 
deprivation of liberty from one to five years." 
137 Basic Documents on Human Rights, op. cit., 162-164. 
138 Article VI of the Genocide Convention (1948). See Basic Documents on Human Righ t s , op. cit., 32. 
139 Supra note 111, 418. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Bócz lists several other convincing details, the discussion ai which would extend beyond the limits of this 
article. BÓCZ: op. cit., 350. 
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groups is in the end judicial law-making, which is not permissible under Hungarian law. 
Such intent is not an element of the definition of Article 156 in the PC, even if it is part 
of genocide according to the Convention. 
I completely agree with most of the reasons the prosecution gave in this argument, 
but arrive at the opposite conclusion. In my understanding, the application of Article 
156 to hate crimes (in this context hate speech) would have been judicial law-making 
burdening the defendant, which is contrary to the constitutional principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege. Even if the Hungarian legislator intended to widen the spectrum of 
acts criminalised under Article 156, it clearly did not change its legal object, Crimes 
Against Humanity, additionally the crime became invalid in this respect because it had 
not been used at all, let alone in cases such as the one under discussion. Thus it seems 
that the widening of liability under Article 156 did not entail the changing of the 
protected interest allowing the usage of the crime in cases in which the threat to 
humanity was extremely remote. 
V. The Modification of 1996 
The application of Article 156 proved to be so controversial and problematic that, taken 
in conjunction with the limitation that the Constitutional Court ' s judgement placed on 
Sedition Against A Community (Article 269) by the abolition of its paragraph (2), even 
behaviour which could still have been criminalised fell outside the reach of penal law. 
Therefore the legislature decided to modify these sections of the Penal Code. 
The Ministerial Reasoning to the Bill, which later became XVII Act of 1996,142  
explains that whilst the previous Article 155 of the PC tried to meet the requirements 
of the Genocide Convention, it did not punish all behaviour punishable under that 
Convention. As discussed above, criminal conducts defined by Article II b) were 
incorporated in Article 156 of the PC—omitting, however, the general "intention to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group".143 The XVII 
Act of 1996 therefore abolished Article 156, and incorporated all the acts criminalised 
under Article II of the Genocide Convention, thus requiring a general intent to destroy 
specific target groups.144 
142 Reasoning of the XVII Act of 1996. 
143 Supra note 104. 
144 "Article 155 (I) Whoever - with the aim of the total or partial extermina lion of a national, ethnic, racial, 
or religious group — 
a) kills members of that group, 
b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, because of their belonging to that group; 
c) constrains the group to such living conditions as threaten the group or certain members thereof with 
death, 
d) takes such a measure, which aims at the impediment of births within the group, 
e) displaces the children belonging to the group into another group 
commits a felony, and is punishable with ten to fifteen years' or life imprisonment. 
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The new law also added another offence to the PC in Article 174/B, Violence 
Against Members of National, Ethnic, Racial or Religious Groups.us This new cr ime 
punishes assaults and threats motivated by bias, clearly differentiating these from the 
genocide-like acts criminalised in Article 155. 
The most interesting change, however, concerns the modification of Sedition Against 
a Community (Article 269).146 The modification widens the scope of punishable 
behaviour, in comparison with the previous offence, now additionally encompassing that 
fit to arouse hatred. This formulation is clearly most ambiguous, since it leaves 
questions open as regards the mens rea of the person performing acts fit to a rouse 
hatred: Does such a person need to have an intention to arouse hatred, or is it enough 
if he only intends to commit the specific act? The fitness of acts to arouse hatred a lso 
seems to be a somewhat vague concept, although not unknown to penal regulation, as 
discussed above.147 It appears that, whilst the legislature succeeded in clarifying the 
situation with respect to hate crimes concerning genocide-like acts, this is not the case 
as regards Sedition Against a Community. The basic difficulties of the criminalisation 
of hate speech, that is, the problem of necessary intent and the extent of such intent, 
have not been settled; neither has the problem of ' f i tness to arouse hatred ' been solved. 
It is true that, in the already abolished offence of Seditious Libel, the suitability of an 
act to arouse hatred was examined in an abstract (objective) fashion, as mentioned 
above;148 but as far as the predecessor of the presently valid Article 269—Affron t ing 
a Community—was concerned, finding an act "fit to excite hatred" caused grave practical 
difficulties, which were partly answered by using Seditious Libel as a point of 
'navigat ion ' . The result was that no specific intention to arouse hatred was needed to 
commit Affronting a Community, only an intention to perform the actual act ( fo r 
example, to say specific words in a speech). This confusing situation seems to have 
(2) Whoever commits preparation for genocide, is punishable for a felony with two to eight years' 
imprisonment." 
145 " Article 174/B (1) Whoever assaults another person because of his or her belonging or believed belonging 
to a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, or coerces him or her, by way efforce or threat, to do, not 
to do or bear something, commits a felony and is punishable with imprisonment up to five years. 
(2) The punishment is two to eight years' imprisonment, if the crime is committed 
a) armed, 
b) with a weapon, 
c) causing a significant injury to interests, 
d) by torturing the victim, 
e) in a group 
f ) in a criminal alliance." 
146 Sedition Against a Community: "Article 269. (1) Whoever in wide publicity incites to hatred or performs 
other behaviour fit to arouse hatred against 
a) the Hungarian nation, 
b) some national, ethnic, racial, religious group or certain groups of the population, 
is punishable for a felony with up to three years's imprisonment." 
147 See discussion of Affronting a Community, supra Chapter B. 
148 See supra Chapter II. 
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been re-created by the new legislation. However, it has to be said that future conceptual 
judicial interpretation of the Article in question may remedy the situation. 
VI. 'Libel and Slander' and 'Defamation' as Protection Against Hate 
Speech 
The Constitution declares the innate right to human dignity [Article 54 (1)] and the right 
to the protection of reputation [Article 59 (1)]. These rights are partly ensured in 
criminal law by the offences Libel and Slander (Article 179), Defamation (Article 180) 
and Profanation of the Deceased. In connection with hate speech we must examine the 
first two crimes.149 The basic difference between these two offences is that whilst in 
the case of Article 179 the conduct of perpetration has to involve a ' f ac t ' , when 
applying it Defamation (Article 180) covers any type of expression.150 'Fact state-
ments' are expressions which comprise an occurrence, state or phenomenon of the past 
or present.151 Additionally, in cases of Libel and Slander the act of perpetration has 
to be committed in front of another, whilst this is not a requirement of Defamation. The 
latter is a subsidiary offence in relation to Libel, and therefore it must be first 
established whether the expression violates Article 179. If this is not so, the test can 
then be applied to Article 180.152 
According to Hungarian criminal law a concurrence of offences occurs if one or 
more acts of the perpetrator constitute more offences, and these are judged in one pro-
cedure.153 One example (called formal heterogeneous concurrence) could be if 
149 Libel and Slander: "Article 179. (1) Whoever asserts or spreads facts fit to impair the honour of somebody 
in the presence of another or uses a term directly referring to such facts commits a misdemeanour and is 
punishable with deprivation of liberty up to one year, community labour or fine. 
(2) The punishment is deprivation of liberty up to two years if the libel or slander is committed: 
(a) for a base motive or purpose, 
(b) in wide publicity, 
(c) in a way resulting in significant harm." 
Defamation: "Article 180. (1) Whoever apart from the case defined in Article 179 
(a) in connection with the performance of the job, of the public mandate, or the public interest activity of 
the victim, 
(b) in wide publicity 
uses a term fit to impair the honour of the person or commits other such conducts must be punished for a 
misdemeanour with deprivation of liberty up to one year, community service, or fine. 
(2) Whoever commits defamation by assault is punishable as provided in paragraph (1)." 
Proving the Truth: "Article 182. (1) The perpetrator cannot be punished for the crimes defined in Article 
179-181 if the fact fit to impair the honour proves to be true. 
(2) Proving the truth is admissible where the assertion, spreading of facts or the usage of a term directly 
referring to such was motivated by public interest or by anybody's legitimate interest." 
150 Commentary, op. cit., 527, 536-537. 
151 Ibid, at 528. 
152 Ibid, at 535. 
153 PC Article 12 (1). 
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somebody shoots at another with the intent to kill, but misses and seriously wounds 
somebody else. In this case the perpetrator would be tried for two crimes: Attempted 
Murder and Serious Bodily Harm, resulting in an aggravated sentence. However, there 
are cases of apparent concurrence, in which one or two acts of the offender seem to 
qualify as several offences but actually only satisfy the requirements of one. Different 
principles help to establish the proper offence in such cases. Therefore-coming back to 
the issue of hate speech—the question in some cases is whether the act committed is 
invoking the crime Sedition Against a Community, or one of these offences. 
In practice it has been important to distinguish between the different forms of 
sedition—depending on the form which was in effect at the time—and Libel and Slander 
(Article 179), Defamation (Article 180). It was relatively easy to differentiate between 
Sedition (Article 148) [the first form of Affronting a Community, the old Article 269 
(1)], and Libel and Slander, Defamation, since if the aim of arousing hatred was 
established the crime could only be Sedition-, similarly, if the act was suitable to arouse 
hatred, it qualified as Article 269 (1). However, if such a purpose was lacking, and if 
the offensive or defamatory expressions or other similar acts were directed against 
individuals belonging to the protected groups, these acts could also have qualified as 
Defamation (Article 180) or Libel and Slander (Article 179). Usually under the principle 
of lex specialis derogat legi generali,154 if the acts were committed because of 
nationality, religion, race or socialist conviction, Affronting a Community had to be 
established.155 
Judicial practice also views offending and defamatory speech involving the person's 
nationality, religion or race as Defamation if it has no more serious reason than a 
person-to-person controversy. In these cases the legal object, being the public peace in 
the case of Sedition Against a Community (Article 269) (the same was true of Affronting 
a Community), is missing, and therefore Defamation is committed by the offender.156 
In connection with Sedition Against a Community (Article 269), there are two main 
cases in which the application of Libel and Slander or Defamation instead of Sedition 
has to be considered. In these cases the act qualifies, or under previous law qualified, 
as hate speech but still cannot be punished as that under the current regulations. The act 
plainly does not qualify as Sedition: 
A) if the speech which incited to hatred against the protected legal objects was not 
committed in wide publicity; 
B) if the speech was committed in wide publicity but it is 'on ly ' reviling (since 
Article 269 (2) was abolished by the Constitutional Court). 
The third case, which might cause problems of differentiation, would be when the 
speech is inciting to hatred in wide publicity and fits thus Article 269 (1), but is at the 
same time a fact statement suitable to impair honour, also satisfying Article 179. A 
154 "The special mle derogates the general role". See BÉKÉS—FÖLDVÁRI—GÁSPÁR—TOKAJI: op. cil., 302. 
155 Commentary, op. cit., ПЛ. 
156 Ibid, at 537. 
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statement, for example, in front of thirty people, that 'all rapes are committed by 
gypsies, and their population rises five times as fast as that of Hungarians, and, 
therefore, they should be deported' would satisfy both crimes; two false fact statements 
have been made and there is incitement to violence. Nevertheless, since Sedition Against 
a Community is the more serious crime (one indication of this is its grading as a felony 
and the imposed punishment of up to three years' imprisonment), the concurrence of 
Libel and Slander can only result in the sole application of Sedition. Even if no ' facts ' 
are involved, and the act would invoke Defamation (Article 180) [as the other offence 
instead of Libel and Slander (Article 179)], the situation would be the same. 
If the speech involved ' facts ' in the cases of A) and B) above, the mere fact that 
the speech was at least reviling invokes the qualifying circumstance of base reason, thus 
making such acts a crime under Article 179 (2) a), and if it was committed in wide 
publicity, also b).157 In the absence of references to ' facts ' , such an act will only 
qualify as Defamation if it is committed in wide publicity, or if the expression involves 
"the employment, of public mandate, or the public interest activity of the victim" under 
Article 180 (1) a). If neither of these two conditions, nor conditions set out before, are 
met, the hate speech will only involve a contravention punishable with a fine.158 
The ultimate problem with using Libel and Slander, or Defamation as a substitute 
for reviling hate speech is that these crimes do not give general protection to the 
members of the target groups. The passive subject (the victim) of these crimes must be 
recognisable as an individual, his person must be identifiable from the situation.159 
Thus general hate speech directed against the target groups—which is exactly the usual 
form of such behaviour-does not fall under these or any other crimes. 
The other important limitation is (or was160) that the present criminal law 
regulation is based on the assumption of the untruth of the facts stated by the 
perpetrator, and a defence of "proving the truth is [only] admissible where the assertion, 
spreading of facts or the usage of a term directly referring to such was motivated by 
public interest or by anybody's legitimate interest" [Article 182 (2)]. However, the 
Constitutional Court held in a decision in 1994 that "this deters the individuals from 
criticising the participants of public life even as regards facts which are true or are 
believed to be that. It depends on the discretion of the court involved in the process 
whether the defendant can try to prove the truthfulness of his statement. This 
undoubtedly reverses the basic principle of the presumption of innocence in the criminal 
157 Ibid. See how hate crime motivation establishes base reason in case of Bodily Harm under BH 1994. 299. 
sz. 
158 Act of 1968, Article 96/B. (1). 
159 BJD 1190. 
160 This question was addressed by the Constitutional Court in its decision abolishing the offence Affronting 
an Authority or Official (Article 232); however the Court only elaborated its opinion on the unconstitutionality 
of Article 182 (2) in the obiter dictum part of its decision, making their applicability dubious. 36/1994. (VI. 
24.) AB határozat (Decision of Ute Constitutional Court), 2517. 
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procedure."161 In consequence, the impossibility of proving the stated facts burdens 
the defendant; therefore, the Constitutional Court declared that the regulations of 
Proving of the Truth are unconstitutional, but seemed not to attach any consequence to 
this statement. 
VII. Conclusion 
The ultimate protection against hate speech is provided by Article 269, Sedition Against 
a Community, in cases where the speech creates a situation in which the danger of harm 
to public order is imminent. Not every inciting expression may be punishable, only 
those—and this is a quite vague distinction—which incite to violence, but only if 
incitement seems to succeed in causing an imminent danger of violent result.162 The 
speech also mus t have an audience of approximately 30 persons. 
Cases in which speech does not reach this level—mostly reviling speech—may be 
dealt with under Libel and Slander or Defamation with several conditions attached, of 
which the main limitation is that such an insult must be directed against an identifiable 
individual or legal entity, that is, an association of people. 
Finally, Article 155, the Crime Against Ethnic, National, Racial or Religious Group 
might be applied if the speech causes serious mental injury to the victim and was 
committed with a view to destroying the group in whole or in part. Similarly the new 
Article 174/B, Violence Against Members of National, Ethnic, Racial or Religious 
Groups, provides a effective protection against racist attacks, but is not suitable for the 
penalising of hate speech. 
In conclusion, one has to agree with the Constitutional Court that " f reedom of 
expression protects the opinion regardless of its value and truth. This freedom only has 
external limits; unless it collides against such a constitutionally drawn external limit the 
possibility of expressing an opinion, and the fact that someone has done so, remains 
protected irrespective of its content."163 
Whilst it may seem that the Hungarian legal system does not provide suff icient 
protection to groups which could be possible targets of hate speech, I believe that it 
does protect the exact values such speeches try to undermine. The majority of hate 
speeches thus receives the protection of the state instead of condemnation. Yet quite 
contrary to their purpose, they do not harm democracy, but instead strengthen the 
fundamental freedoms inherent to such a political system and the rule of law. 
161 Ibid. The presumption of innocence is declared in the Constitution: "Article 57 (2) In the Hungarian 
Republic no one can be regarded as guilty until his criminal culpability has been established by the final 
decision of the court."-, as well as in the Criminal Procedure Code: "Article 3 (1) No one can be regarded as 
guilty until his criminal culpability has been established by the final decision of the court. (2) Proving the 
culpability burdens the authorities acting in the criminal matters. The defendant cannot be compelled to prove 
his innocence." 
162 HALMAI: op. cit., 248. 
163 36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court), 2513. 
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Ilona GÖRGÉNYI T h e Protect ion of the Env ironment 
by Criminal Law 
As we approach the turn of the century, a great many environmental problems threaten 
us: the greenhouse effect, acid rain, extinction of animal species, etc. This new 
situation has created an increasing challenge for the legal profession. Since the Uni ted 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, many countries 
have been act ive in this field. The legal protection of the environment is a concern of 
different fields of legal science all over the world. The situation is the same in 
Hungary, where administrative law, civil law, criminal law, and even international law, 
ensure protection because environmental pollution does not recognise the state borders . 
Administrat ive and civil law must be the most important tools in the protection of the 
environment, but they are not enough. Criminal law also has a role to play, as the 
ultimate tool. W e often refer to the subsidiary role of criminal law. The last 
International Congress of Penal Law outlined in its Recommendation on Crimes against 
the Environment, that "Consistent with the principle of restraint, criminal sanct ions 
should be utilised only when civil and administrative sanctions and remedies a re 
inappropriate or ineffective to deal with particular offences against the environment".1 
However, it was not only this last congress of the International Association of 
Penal Law (A.I.D.P.) in 1994, but previously the Preparatory Colloquium of A.I.D.P. 
1 Resolution of Section I on Crimes against the Envi ronment Application of the general part, in XVth 
International Congress of Penal Law, Rio de Janeiro 4 - 1 0 September 1994, International Review of Penal Law, 
1995, Nos. 1 -2 , 50. 
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in 1992,2 that dealt with questions of environmental protection. The 12th International 
Congress on Penal Law in Hamburg in 19793 also discussed the problem. As for 
relevant activities of the Council of Europe, a Resolution4 and a Recommendation5 
have been worked out, and the Committee of Experts on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law has recently worked on a draft of the convention. 
The importance of the problem was illustrated by the United Nations Conference 
on the Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the Resolution 
of the 8th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders,6 and the 
fact that this topic was also on the agenda of the 9th UN Congress in 1995. 
A European Seminar on Criminal Law and the Environment was organised by the 
Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI) with the Max Planck 
Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law in Germany in 1992. The Model 
for Domestic Law for crimes against the environment proposed by the International 
Meeting of Experts on the Environment, which took place in Portland in 1994, should 
also be mentioned here. 
I. Environmental Protection at a Constitutional Level 
It is among the principles on environmental policy of the European Union that "[t]he 
right to a healthy environment which is worthy of the people is a fundamental human 
right."7 This is in accordance with the Article 18 of the Hungarian Constitution, which 
says that the Republic of Hungary recognises and validates the rights of everyone to 
a healthy environment. In addition to this. Act LUI of 1995 on the general regulations 
of environmental protection (Environmental Code) also mentions constitutional rights 
to a healthy environment. According to Article 70/D of the Constitution, (1) all citizens 
living on the territory of the Republic of Hungary have the right to the highest possible 
physical and mental health; (2) the right to the best physical and mental health is 
realised through labour safety, public welfare organisations, health services, body care 
and through an artificial as well as a natural environment of quality, in the Republic 
of Hungary." 
Regarding this regulation, paragraph (2) can be criticised on the grounds that it 
talks about the artificial environment first, and only after this about the natural 
2 Crimes against the environment. General Part. Preparatory Colloquium, Section I, Ottawa, November 2-6 , 
1992, International Review of Penal Law, 1994, No. 3—4. 
3 Xllth International Congress on Penal Law, Hamburg, 16-22 September 1979. Congress Proceedings, in 
JESCHEK, H.-H. (ed.): German National Group of the AIDP, 1980. 
4 Resolution 77 (28) on the Contribution of Criminal Law to the Protection of the Environment. 
5 Recommendation 88 (18) on Liability of Enterprises for Offences. 
6 Resolution on the Role cf Criminal Law in the Protection of Nature and Environment adopted by the Eight 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 1990. 
7 BAKÁCS, T.: "Glosszák az Alkotmány, a kömyezetjog és a jogalkotás köréből" (Commentaries on the 
Constitution, Environmental Law and Law-making), Magyar Jog, 1995, No. 5, 273. 
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environment . This is not in harmony with Act LIII of 1995 on the general regulations 
of environmental protection [Article 4 (a)], which paraphrases the Constitution, and 
with the amended Penal Code [Article 286/A, paragraph 1 (a)] which regulates 
concepts of environmental elements. In these two cases the elements are listed as 
follows: earth, air, water, living nature and the artificial environment created by man. 
When referring to its earlier decision, the Constitutional Court has stated that, 
based on the regulations set out above, the state is obliged to establish and operate 
those specific institutions which would ensure the right to a healthy environment. It 
pointed out that the right to the environment is different from all other fundamental 
rights. T h e right to the environment cannot be classed amongst the classic, protection 
type of fundamental rights, but is a so-called third-generation constitutional right, the 
features of which are still debated. Therefore, it is not a subjective primary right in this 
present fo rm, but neither is it simply a task or state interest determined by the 
Consti tution. On the other hand, the right to the environment cannot be compared to 
social r ights either, particularly because those entitled to social rights which refer to 
all cit izens can be defined. The specific feature of the right to the environment lies in 
the fact that mankind and nature is its object . 
The right to the environment bears the closest relationship to the right to human 
life. T h e Constitution talks about the obligations of the state to support the natural 
bases of human life as a separate constitutional right. However, if the right to the 
environment were not ensured by the Constitution—in a way that its meaning can be 
expanded—then the obligations of the state in connection with environmental protection 
could a lso be deduced f rom the right to human life. The right to the environment 
ensures the physical conditions necessary to the fulfilment of the right to human life.8 
II. The Historical Development of Environmental Criminal Law 
As far as environmental crimes are concerned, different countries have chosen different 
solutions: they either appear in the Penal Code, in general statutes on environmental 
protection, or they are included amongst different statutes on the environment, 
depending on whether the criminal protection of each element is to be regulated by that 
statute. 
With the first environmental Act in Hungary (Act II of 1976), one environmental 
o f fence was included in the Penal Code , replacing the previous o f fence of well 
pollution. At the time of the codification of our present Penal Code (Act IV of 1978), 
two types of criminal offences—environmental damage (Article 280) and natural 
damage (Article 281)—were introduced instead of just one, among the offences against 
public health in the section on criminal offences against public order. This criminal 
regulation took place in order to enforce the right on the protection of the human 
environment . 
8 28/1994. (V. 20.) AB határozat (Decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court). 
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Here we should refer to two groups of questions, in connection with the codifi-
cation mentioned above: 
a) Environmental protection is closely related to economic development, and 
environmental offences occur most often in the economic sphere, in connection with 
the activity of legal entity. Therefore, we can put the question of why environmental 
offences are regulated amongst the criminal offences against public health in the chap-
ter on public order, and are not amongst the economic criminal offences or offences 
against the environment, which are dealt with separately in the Penal Code. 
According to the ministerial motivation of the bill which became the Penal Code, 
economic development has its disadvantages in addition to its undeniable advantages. 
Specifically, environmental damage is amongst the disadvantages which endanger the 
whole population and might have a negative effect on it. 
The validity of this arrangement regarding the legal object of the environmental 
offences has been debated by some experts, and no unanimous position has emerged.9 
b) The second question is whether it is necessary to separate the protection of nature 
and the environment. According to the ministerial motivation of the Penal Code, nature is 
an extremely important part of the human environment, and nature and its elements (for 
example, some species of plants and animals) have to be protected above and beyond the 
human environment. As a consequence of such an attitude, a regulation was established 
in which—in addition to the more comprehensive environmental damage clause—environ-
mental damage directed against the different elements of nature are dealt with separately. 
The offence of natural damage was modified by the new Penal Code (Act 1П of 
1987) which came into force on 1st January 1988, and was in harmony with the obli-
gations which were consequent upon the ratification of the relevant international treaty. 
Preceding the amendment of the Penal Code in 1996, environmental damage was 
considered to be solely a material offence. This was because—on the one hand—of its 
internal contradictions, the difficulty in obtaining evidence, and other negative 
tendencies, and—on the other hand—because Act LIII of 1995 on the general regulation 
of environmental protection came into force, and Act LII of 1996 then modified the 
offence of environmental damage. In addition to the offence penalising a result, the 
danger of environmental damage was also made punishable. 
Article 280 of the Penal Code states that: 
"(1) Whoever damages the environment or any elements of the environment, or acts 
in breach of his obligations as defined in a statute, or in a decision of the authorities, 
in a way which is fit to damage the environment or any elements of the environment, 
commits a felony and is punishable by imprisonment of up to three years. 
9 TAMÁS, A.: "A környezetvédelem büntetőjogi szabályozásának egyes kérdései" (Some questions on the 
Penal Law Regulation of Environment Protection), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1978, No. 6, 336; MÁRKUS, F.: 
Az emberi környezet büntetőjogi védelme, környezetvédelem és jog (The Penal Law Protection of the Human 
Environment), Budapest, 1981, 185; ZOLTÁN, ö . : "Környezetvédelem és büntetőjog a nemzetközi összehason-
lítás tükrében" (Environmental Protection and Criminal Law in the Light of International Comparison), Magyar 
Jog, 1983, No. 4. 319-320. 
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(2) Whoever pollutes the environment or any elements of the environment, or acts 
in breach of his obligations defined in a statute, or in a decision of the authorities, in 
a way which is fit to pollute the environment or any elements of the environment 
significantly, is punishable according to paragraph (1). 
(3) The punishment is up to five years' imprisonment, if the offence mentioned in 
paragraph (1) has caused severe damage, or it is fit to damage the environment or any 
elements of the environment significantly. 
(4) The punishment is two to eight years' imprisonment if the offence has damaged 
the environment or any elements of the environment to such an extent that the environ-
ment or the element of the environment cannot be restored to its original state. 
(5) Whoever commits the offence of environmental damage through recklessness, 
in the cases mentioned under paragraphs (l)-{3), is punishable by up to two years' 
imprisonment, whilst in the case of paragraph (4), by up to three years' imprison-
ment." 
Certain elements of the environment are separately protected by criminal law 
through a criminal o f fence called 'Damage to Nature ' . Under the modification of Act 
LII of 1996, the criminal definition of 'Damage to Nature ' was slightly changed, and 
it became more rigorous both in basic and in qualified cases. 
Article 281 of the Penal Code goes as follows: 
"(1) Whoever 
a) illegally acquires, takes abroad, converts into money, or destroys any plant 
or animal, or any offspring of them at any stage of their development which is 
under increased protection, or comes within the remit of an international treaty; 
b) illegally changes the area of a protected natural environment to a significant 
degree 
commits a felony and is punishable by up to three years' imprisonment. 
(2) The punishment is up to five years' imprisonment if the damage of the 
environment has caused the destruction of plants and animals described in paragraph 
(1) point a) in great quantities, or in the case of point b), it has caused irremediable 
damage or total destruction of the area. 
(3) Whoever commits environmental damage mentioned here under paragraph (2) 
through recklessness, is punishable for a misdemeanour by up to two years' imprison-
ment." 
In addition to these two criminal offences above, Act LII of 1996 introduced a 
further environmental criminal offence called 'Illegal Disposal of Waste Endangering 
the Environment ' . Article 281/A of the Penal Code says that: 
"(J) Whoever, without permission defined in statute, or in breach of the obligations 
described in statute, or of the decision of the executive authority, collects, stores, deals 
with, disposes or transports waste containing material which is fit 
a) to endanger the life or physical well-being of the people; 
b) to pollute water, air, or soil, or to cause lasting changes in them; 
c) to endanger animals or plants 
commits a felony, and is punishable by up to five years' imprisonment. 
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(2) Whoever disposes of explosive, inflammable, or radioactive waste, endangering 
health and the environment, without permission described in the statute, is likewise 
punishable in accordance with paragraph (I). 
(3) Whoever commits the offences defined in paragraphs (l)-(2) through reckless-
ness is punishable by up to two years' imprisonment." 
Until 1996 this criminal offence had the form of an administrative offence (contra-
vention). 
In cases of criminal offences against public order, it is not only the three criminal 
offences against public health mentioned above (Penal Code, Chapter XVI, Title IV) 
which ensure the criminal protection of the environment, but also other criminal offences 
against public order (Penal Code, Chapter XVI, Title I), such as: 
a) Preceding the amendment of 1996: misuse of radioactive (Article 264) or 
poisonous material (Article 265).10 
b) After the amendment of 1996: misuse of radioactive material (Article 264), the 
operation of nuclear power stations (Article 264/A), and atomic energy (Article 264/B). 
Operation without permission given in the law, от different from that defined in the 
law, and the illegal use of the materials listed above, can also cause damage to the 
environment. However, according to the legislator, public security is the legal object of 
such misuse types of criminal offences. Therefore, the new criminal offences introduced 
by the modification were also placed among the criminal offences against public security. 
It appears, according to the Convention of the Council of Europe on the Protection 
of the Environment Through Criminal Law," that the acts which refer to these three 
new types of criminal offences belong to the group of criminal offences directed against 
the environment. Therefore, it would be expedient—in order to emphasise the ecological 
aspect—to separate the criminal offences of the Penal Code dealing with environmental 
protection and to regulate them all in one place. 
In our legal system contravention law exists separately from the Penal Code. Contra-
ventions are regulated in Act I of 1968 and in the Ordinance of Government No. 17 of 
1968 on Special Contraventions.12 These include several environmental contraventions. 
III. Basic Problems of Environmental Criminal Law 
Environmental criminal offences endanger the necessary conditions for human life, the 
prerequisites of the existence of mankind. 
10 PUSZTAI, L : "Gazdasági büntetőjog a változó társadalomban" (Crimes Against the Economy in the 
Changing Society), in PUSZTAI, L (ed.): Második német-magyar kollokvium (The Second German-Hungarian 
Colloquium), KJK-OKKrI, Budapest, 1994, 139. 
IX Convention for the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law (Draft), Explanatory Report. 
European Committee on Crime Problems, PC-EN(95) 4 (Strasbourg, 3 August 1994), 5. 
12 See for more details: BITTÓ, M.—FÜLÖP, S.: "Crimes Against the Environment", Crimes Against the 
Environment. General Part. Preparatory Colloquium, Section I Ottawa, Nov. 2-6,1992, InternationaI Review 
of Penal Law. 1994, Nos. 2-á, 974-976. 
The Protection of the Environment by Criminal Law 195 
1. The Method of Regulating Criminal Environmental Offences 
a) Immaterial offences 
For these offences to occur, it is enough if the perpetrator violates, with culpability, the 
obligations described in any other law or decision of the authorities. Culpable behaviour 
means disobedience to the regulations of the law or a decision of the authorities. T h e 
disobedience of these citizens is considered by the legislator to be of such a degree that 
they are punished without respect to the harmful effect of their actions. In these cases , 
there are no problems which emerge in connection with the definition of damaging or 
endangering effects. I intend to deal with this question in more detail below, that is, that 
immaterial offences only superficially create a simpler situation. 
b) Material offences 
In some cases the simple violation of a regulation does not constitute an of fence , 
because for the total fulfilment of the criminal offence a result is also required (damage 
to the environment, pollution of the environment, state of emergency). The Penal C o d e 
regards environmental damage as a material offence.13 It is very difficult to answer the 
question of when the "significant degree of pollution" can be defined as a result, which 
has been an element of the offence of environmental damage both before and after the 
amendment of 1996. 
Based on the Penal Code, that person commits the offence of environmental damage 
by pollution who pollutes the environment, or any elements of the environment, to a 
significant degree. For example, the pollution of the air as an environmental element, 
which exceeds the emission limit value, does not constitute this form of the criminal 
offence. The exceeding of the emission limit value is not a significant degree of 
pollution. 
The Supreme Court did not find a significant degree of pollution, and therefore, no 
environmental damage, in a case involving an offender, who poured insecticide into a 
well with the intention of killing his relatives. According to the Court , this act did not 
influence the purity of the water in neighbouring wells. Therefore, the pollution of the 
water in the well was not so significant as that which would have fulfilled the criteria 
of a criminal offence of environmental damage [Penal Code Article 280, paragraph 
(1)].M 
There are, however, uncertainties regarding the judgement and application of the 
criminal of fences of environmental damage, and some diff icult ies arise regarding 
the description of harmful effects . Even when Act IV of 1978 came into force, the 
question was being asked of whether, for the more effective criminal protection of 
13 A Büntető Törvénykönyv miniszteri indoklása a Btk 280. §-hoz (The Ministerial Motivation of the 
Criminal Code Concerning Article 280 of the PC), A Büntető Törvénykönyv magyarázata (The Ministerial 
Motivation of the Criminla Code), Budapest, 1986, 795. 
14 BH 1986. 87. (Decision of the Hungarian Supreme Court). 
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the environment, the immaterial and endangering offences should also have been 
applied.15 
People's productive, economic, or other activities are generally not guided by a 
direct intention (dolus directus) to damage the environment What is defined as 
pollution, in the case of environmental damage, is usually not directly intended by the 
perpetrator to pollute, but rather is intended to decrease the costs of production, and the 
intention appears, at the most, in the form of eventual intention (dolus eventualis). It is 
also important, in cases of dolus eventualis, to foresee the possible consequences of 
environmentally damaging behaviour. However, for environmental damage to have 
occurred, both time and place requirements must be concurrently met; that is, the 
fulfilment of only one of these constituents will not be sufficient for the offence of 
environmental damage to have been committed. The occurrence of this offence is also 
dependent upon continuing pollution of the given element of the environment, and its 
ability of self-purification. In certain cases, environmental damage occurs as an overall 
consequence of several acts or omissions because, independently of the perpetrator, or 
as a result of similar activities by others, the effect is cumulative. Such a cumulative 
criminal of fence is, for example, the pollution of water. Because of the complex 
connections (synergetic effects, etc.) it is often difficult to compile evidence. "It is not 
unusual either that the environmentally damaging effect can only be proved by scientific 
analysis."16 Consequently, one of the problems is that the direct intention to commit 
environmental damage is missing, whilst the other problem lies in the fact that the 
consequences of environmental damage cannot be entirely encompassed by human 
cognitive processes. 
Both in theory, and according to the Hungarian Penal Code, the offence of environ-
mental damage caused by negligence can be punished. As far as criminal responsibility 
is concerned, the examination of the question of the connection between criminal law and 
administrative law has acquired greater importance; that is, the decision on which area 
should be prioritised: activism for the independence of environmental criminal law, or the 
punishment of the perpetrator. 
To make criminal reaction and punishment possible to a wider extent, we have to 
reach a compromise. With regard to legal administrative regulations and demands, we 
can say that, if the prescribed obligations have been intentionally or recklessly broken, 
then the activity has to be punished (immaterial criminal offence). 
15 MÁRKUS, F.: "Az élei, a testi épség és az egészség védelméhez való állampolgári jog megvalósulása és 
a környezetkárosítás bűncselekménnyé nyilvánítása" (The Manifestation of the Fundamental Right to Life. 
Bodily Integrity and Health and the Criminalisation of Environmental Damage), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1979, 
No. 6., 326. 
16 TAMÁS: op. cit., 335. 
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2. The Relationship Between Environmental Criminal Law and Administrative Law 
In the area of environmental protection, criminal law and administrative law are 
generally linked.17 Günter Heine, in examining the relationship be tween environmental 
criminal law and administrative law, makes a distinction firstly, between cr iminal 
offences which are absolutely independent of administrative law, and secondly, criminal 
offences which are absolutely dependent on administrative law or, finally, cr iminal 
offences which are relatively dependent on administrative law.18 
Using Hungarian criminal law on a basic case of environmental damage, we can 
describe the following possibilities, when the perpetrator: 
a ( l ) damages the environment or any elements of the environment (Article 2 8 0 
paragraph (1) point 1); 
a(2) pollutes the environment or any elements of the environment to a significant 
degree (Article 281 paragraph (1) point 1). 
In fact, we are talking of material offences in these cases, which best proves their 
independence of administrative law. The immaterial danger of environmental d a m a g e 
was introduced by the amendment of the Penal Code in 1996 regarding both damaging 
and pollution, that is, when the perpetrator: 
b ( l ) by violating his obligations defined in law or by a decision of the authorit ies, 
acts in a way which is fit to damage the environment or any elements of the 
environment; 
b(2) by violating his obligations defined in law or by a decision of the authorities, 
acts in a way which is fit to pollute the environment or any elements of the environment 
to a significant degree. 
In these latter cases criminal offences take the form of an immaterial crime, that is, 
when the Penal Code expresses the danger indirectly in such a w a y as to refer to the 
likelihood of damage. Therefore, the criminal o f fence requires not only penalisation of 
disobedience, because the further feature of this behaviour- that is, the likelihood of 
damage—is also characteristic. 
In the Hungarian criminal law system we can find similar solut ions in connection 
with other criminal offences, for example, that the hostile, aggressive behaviour of the 
hooligan is fit to cause general uproar and public commotion [Penal Code Article 217 
paragraph (1)]. 
In cases of criminal offences against environmental protection introduced by the 
amendment of the Penal Code [b ( l ) and b(2)], criminal law omi t s a requirement of 
actual environmental damage, and by constraining administrative law and administra-
tive authorities provides a wider protection for ecological e lements by criminal legal 
means. 
17 Convention for the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law {Draft), op. cit., 3. 
18 GÜNTER, H.: "Environmental Protection and Criminal Law", in L O M A S , O. (ed): Frontiers of 
Environmental Law, 78 -79 . 
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The immaterial environmental offence only appears to be an easy solution; in fact, 
it is one of the most debated areas of criminal law. Whilst the acknowledgement that 
environmental criminal law is dependent upon administrative law is made for the more 
effective protection of the environment, it still gives the impression that environmental 
criminal law has only a symbolic function beside administrative law for overcoming 
environmental problems. 
Administrative law determines the extent of permissible pollution and acceptable 
risks in most environmental areas, frequently leaving to the administrative authorities 
the task of establishing the permissible level of pollution in individual cases. Therefore, 
a close relationship exists between administrative law and criminal law. Regarding 
administrative permission, several questions and variations emerge, such as: 
a) when administrative authority permission exists, and environmental pollution 
exceeds the limit defined in it, or it is correct formally but it was obtained by bribery 
or otherwise illegally, or 
b) there is no administrative authority permission, because the action of the applicant 
would be permissible, but the permission was not obtained, or because it would not be 
permissible. 
Focusing on the aims of environmental criminal law, we have to accept the fact that 
the absolute protection of the environment and ecological elements cannot be the object 
of criminal law, because certain forms of environmental risks (pollution) are per-
missible. However, the permission does not exclude the possibility that certain 
environmental acts could be punished by criminal law. Therefore, the principle to be 
followed is that "the compliance with environmental administrative law cannot always 
exclude criminal liability. A permission may legalise certain acts, but does not grant 
absolute rights to the polluter. Administrative consent must not be available or if 
granted, irrelevant in those cases where environmental use causes death or serious injury 
to any person or which creates a significant risk thereof'.19 
The inevitable and indispensable connection between environmental criminal law 
and the administrative law raises the problem that environmental offences will not be 
sufficiently definite, because they are also defined by the administrative law and by the 
actions of the administrative authority. On the other hand, it is a widespread notion that 
the establishment of environmental criminal law independent of administrative law is 
not likely to happen within a reasonable period of time. 
The description of a blanket offence is a generally accepted technique in the 
codification of criminal law. For example, in the case of immaterial offences, the 
commission is defined entirely or partly by an other law referred to in the definition of 
19 Convention for the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law (Draft), op. cit., 4. Compare 
FÜLÖP, S.: "A jogi személyek büntető jogalanyisága" (Legal Persons as Criminal Offenders), Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 1993, No. 6, 350; T1EDEMANN, K.: "Theory and reform of the environmental criminal law". Revue 
de Science Criminelle et de Droit Comparé, 1986, No. 2, translated into Hungarian by CSONKA, P.: "A kör-
nyezetvédelem büntetőjogának elmélete és reformja" (The Theory and Reform of Criminal Law Concerning 
Environmental Protection), Jogpolitika, 1988, No. 1, 16. 
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the crime. The latter example of environmental damage given above [points b ( l ) , b(2) ] 
applies this solution: the commission not only features disobedience, but also a violation 
of the regulations of administrative law. 
When the Hungarian Penal Code talks about disobedience described in the law, it 
does not refer to obligations described in the stronger legal rules in the first case. T h e 
obligations are generally defined even at a lower level by ministerial ordinance, and the 
Environmental Code also funct ions as a blanket-type of law. 
As far as possible, criminal offences should be defined by a criminal statute, and 
as far as possible the criminal law should function independently of administrative law. 
In the case of blanket offences—as Professor Imre Wiener writes—guarantees embedded 
in criminal law require that the administrative law referred to be de f ined -a s far as these 
guarantees are concerned—in the same way as a criminal law, notwithstanding the fac t 
that the effectiveness of penal principles should be upheld.20 
During the construction of environmental criminal law fur ther problems m a y 
emerge: in addition to the increased demand for criminal protection of the environment, 
there is also the rather difficult practical application of individual criminal responsibility, 
juxtaposed with the theoretical difficulties of introducing corporate cr iminal 
responsibility. In conclusion, it is interesting to note that even in 1922 Ervin Hacker , 
a scholar of Hungarian criminal law, could write thus: "The regulation of the cr iminal 
responsibility of legal entity will be one of the principal questions of criminal law in the 
future".21 
20 WIENER, I. A.: "Keretlényállások és büntetőjogi garanciák" (Frame Offences and Guarantees in Cr imina l 
Law), Cséka Ervin emlékkönyv, Szeged, 1992, 618, 628. 
21 HACKER, E.: "AZ egyesületek büntetőjogi cselekvőképessége és felelőssége" (Criminal Responsibili ty of 
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Henrik HÄGGLUND The Municipal School System 
in Finland—Some Legal a n d 
Administrative Aspects 
1. Introduction 
The municipal school system in Finland comprises a large variety of educational 
institutions ranging from the comprehensive school to vocational and voluntary 
education in different areas. In this presentation I will concentrate mainly on the 
compulsory education, i.e. the comprehensive school. I will start by giving a short 
historical review, moving to the present situation and finally paying some attention to 
a recent reform proposal of the legislation within the Finnish school system. M y 
presentation focuses on the legal and administrative aspects of the municipal school 
system, whereas aspects of the curriculum and educational me thods are not included. 
The financing of the municipal school system will only be ment ioned briefly. 
2. A Short Historical Review: From the Primary School Decree 1866 to 
the Comprehensive School Act 1968 
The first actual legislation about municipal schools was the P r imary School Decree of 
1866 (1866:12). There had been some earlier regulations, e.g. the Church Act of 1686, 
when Finland still was part of Sweden, which assigned elementary education as a task 
for the Church, together with the families. The elementary education given by the 
parishes was very narrow; it mainly contained only basic training in the skills of reading 
and writing. Before the Primary School Decree of 1866 several types of schools had of 
course existed in Finland, ranging from small, private elementary schools to secondary 
schools leading to university education. But a uniform system of primary education had 
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not existed, and creating such a school system was consequently the main goal of the 
first Primary School Decree. 
The Decree of 1866 contains several interesting features, some of which can still 
be seen as features of the present school system. First of all, the decree assigned the 
responsibility of primary schools to the municipalities. This was not a self-evident 
procedure at that time. In Sweden, for instance, the Primary School Act of 1842 had 
assigned elementary (primary) education as a task for the church parishes. This was 
of course in accordance with the principles of the Church Act of 1686. But in Finland, 
there was a fairly strong resistance against giving the central responsibility of elementary 
education to the Church. According to the opinions among leading educational politicians 
at that time, the Church was not interested in a broader general education of the people; 
basic skills in reading and writing were enough for the church. Since the first Municipal 
Decree had just recently been given (1865), it was only natural to entrust the munici-
palities with the task of primary education.1 This feature of the municipalities being 
responsible for elementary education in Finland still remains. According to the latest 
reform proposals, the municipalities shall have the main responsibility of elementary 
education. 
Entrusting the primary schools to the municipalities had some implications for the 
administration of the local school system. A municipal school committee, with powers 
to decide about the curriculum for the schools, recruitment of teachers and other 
important matters concerning the primary schools, was to be established. The decision 
to establish schools was made by a general meeting of the local taxpayers. Later on this 
decision was made by the municipal council. These general administrative features of 
the municipal school system have remained until today: A local committee responsible 
for school administration is still mandatory in every municipality whereas the municipal 
council is responsible for the most important decisions (especially in economical 
matters) concerning the schools. A central governmental body, T h e National Board of 
Education, was also created to supervise the municipal schools. This board had large 
decision-making and controlling powers in relation to the municipalities, and came to 
play an important role in building up the school system of Finland. The National Board 
of Education remained a strong supervising central authority until the beginning of the 
1990s. Today it functions mainly in the field of developing education in Finland and has 
no decision-making authority. 
The next important step following the Decree of 1866 was the School District 
Decree of 1898 (1898:20). This decree made it mandatory for the municipalities to 
establish a primary school when a certain number of pupils (30) within a school district 
registered for school. The decree obliged each municipality to divide its area into school 
1 A more detailed description of the introduction of the Primary School Decree 1866 is given in 
HÄGGLUND, H.: "Folkskolans organisation i Finland 1866 jämfört med läget i Sverige 1862", in 
BRAMSTÂNG, G. (ed.): Kommunalrätt i utveckling. Skrifter utgivna av Juridiska föreningen i Lund Nr 103, 
s. 41-53. Lund, 1988. 
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districts, in general limiting the distance to each school to less than five ki lometers for 
any pupil. Exceptions to this rule were naturally allowed, but it was a general, and for 
the future development, very important rule. The School District Decree of 1898 also 
created an obligation for the municipality to establish schools (and subsequently school 
districts) for both language groups, i.e. the Finnish-speaking and the Swedish-speaking 
inhabitants of the municipality. All these rules have remained important cornerstones 
for the municipal school system up to this day; the provision of five ki lometers as a 
maximum distance to each lower-stage comprehensive school was repealed as late as 
in 1993. Just recently (in April 1996), it has been proposed that the provision of school 
districts in its traditional form shall be repealed when the new school legislation comes 
into force. 
Even though the School District Decree had made it a mandatory task for the 
municipalit ies to establish schools, a system of compulsory education was not 
introduced in Finland until 1921. During the first decades of the 20th cen tury the 
school system of Finland grew rapidly as a consquence of the population g rowth , of 
the system of compulsory education and of the general need for better educated people. 
The municipal primary schools had the main responsibility of elementary educat ion, 
whereas secondary education was divided into two parallel systems. Some of the pupils 
completed their compulsory education within the primary school system, which 
eventually was extended to eight years of education. These pupils were not el igible for 
upper secondary school and thus not for university education. A large part of the pupils 
attended the municipal primary schools for a period only of four years, after which they 
attended lower secondary and upper secondary schools and were eventually el igible for 
academic or higher vocational studies. These secondary schools, based on four years of 
primary schools, were often private schools, to some extent also state schools, but rarely 
municipal schools. 
During the 1950s and 1960s this division into two parallel school sys tems was 
considered to be regionally, socially and educationally unsatisfactory and unequal . A 
Comprehensive School Act was therefore planned during several years and given in 
1968 (1968:467). A unified comprehensive school system was gradually introduced 
starting in 1970 and completed in 1977.2 This new comprehensive school system 
replaced the old primary schools and the secondary schools. The Comprehensive School 
Act required the municipalities to provide nine years of basic school instruction to all 
children from the age of 7 to the age of 16. It is important to note that through the 
Comprehensive School Act of 1968 (and the Comprehensive School Decree of 1970) the 
main part of the compulsory, comprehensive school system was made a responsibility of 
the municipalities. Most of the private schools in Finland became municipal during the 
period 1970-77, when the comprehensive school system was introduced. Since a great 
part of the upper secondary schools (i.e. the level before academic studies) also joined 
2 The comprehensive school system was introduced starting in Northern Finland in 1970 and comple ted in 
the Helsinki area in 1977. 
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the municipal school system, the municipalities in fact almost received a monopoly of 
basic, general education in Finland. 
The main goal of the comprehensive school reform in the 1970s was to create an 
equal educational system in Finland; equal without regards to social or regional 
background. In order to reach this goal a strong system of regulation was introduced. The 
freedom of the municipalities, in regards to the contents of education, was very little: The 
Ministry of Education and the National Board of Education strongly controlled and 
governed the school system in every municipality. A uniform administrative system was 
created; every municipality was to have a school committee and each school its own 
board. On the regional level, a new educational authority in connection with the County 
administration was created. The Comprehensive School Act and Decree, together with 
regulations issued by the National Board of Education and the state funding system, 
strongly ruled the municipal education system. 
3. The Comprehensive School Act of 1983 and its Amendments in the 
1990s 
The Comprehensive School Act of 1968 was originally given only for a transfer period. 
Since the introduction of the new comprehensive school system was completed by the 
end of the 1970s, a new, complete Act was being planned. The new Comprehensive 
School Act was given in 1983 (1983:476) and to begin with it brought only small 
changes into the municipal school system. At the time when the Act was given, the 
comprehensive school reform was completed, and the need of strong governance had 
therefore decreased. But larger reforms, giving more freedoms to the municipalities were 
not introduced until almost ten years later, in the beginning of the 1990s. I will now 
describe some legal aspects of the municipal school system according to the 
Comprehensive School Act of 1983, as it was amended in 1991 and 1993. 
The Finnish school system is described in figure 1 (see appendix).3 The domination 
of the municipal schools can be seen in numbers, too: In 1995 almost 700,000 (more than 
96 %) students attended municipal comprehensive schools or upper secondary schools, 
whereas the same figure for private schools was about 17,000 and for state schools about 
10,000." 
A basic rule for the Finnish School system is found in the Constitution Act of 
Finland, section 13. "Everyone shall have the right to primary education free of charge. 
Provisions on compulsory education shall be given by an Act of Parliament". This, of 
course, is a most important principle for primary education in Finland. The education is 
free of charge, which encompasses not only the education itself, but also all kinds of 
educational material such as literature and writing materials. According to the 
Comprehensive School Act, every student has a right to one free meal per day. Health 
3 Figure 1 is drawn from the outlines given in Committee Report 1996:4., 18. 
4 See Committe Report 1996:4., 20. 
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care and social service within the schools is free, too. If the distance to school is more 
than five kilometers, or less than that but the way to school is difficult or dangerous, the 
student has a right to free transportation. 
A main right for the student is expressed in the Comprehensive School Act 
(Sections 37 and 38): Every student belongs to a school district according to his 
domestic residence and his mother-tongue (Finnish or Swedish) , and he has a right to 
attend the comprehensive school within this district. The municipality cannot deny the 
student the right to attend his own school. On the other hand, the municipality generally 
has no obligation to allow the student to attend another school . Since only education, 
not a certain school, is compulsory in Finland, the student cannot be forced to attend 
a certain municipal school, but he or actually his parents may in some cases be obliged 
to pay for the costs themselves if they choose other than the municipal school for their 
child. A few private schools, mainly in the city of Helsinki, function on the basis of 
a contract with the municipality and thus "sel l" their services to the municipality. 
Attendance in these schools is, naturally, f ree of charge. There are also s o m e other 
private schools supported by the municipalities, and some special schools (often 
language-based) owned by the State. But to a great extent, the municipal school is the 
only existing alternative. In larger municipalities, students may choose be tween the 
school of their own district or some other municipal school, granted there is room in 
the other school. 
The curriculum of the comprehensive school is no longer drafted on a centralized, 
state level but in the municipalities and, as a matter of fact, separately in each school. 
A framework curriculum is approved by the National Board of Education and a general, 
minimum distribution of lesson hours in different subjects is approved by the Council 
of State. But in other respects the curriculum is approved by the municipalities and can 
be approved separately for each school of the municipality. This means that today there 
is a possibility of great variation between schools; the uniform, equal municipal school 
system is rapidly getting more and more diversified. 
A detail of certain legal interest is the regulation of the disciplinary punishment of 
students. The Comprehensive School Act (Section 42) and the Comprehensive School 
Decree (Section 58) contain detailed regulations of the disciplinary punishment of 
students. The most severe punishment is expulsion for a period of a minimum of one 
month and a maximum of three months. Even though the student is expel led, the 
municipality has an obligation to give him educational instruction. The student himself 
and his parents must be heard before the punishment decision is made. The power to 
make a decision of expulsion can only be held by a municipal school board or 
committee, not an individual teacher, principal or civil servant. An appeal can be made 
against the decision; this appeal is made to the county (regional) administrative court. 
The Comprehensive School Act was amended just last year (1995) in regards to the 
appeal; appeal must now be made to a court , whereas it used to be m a d e to the 
regional educational authority. The amendment was m a d e with reference to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and its provision (in Article 6) of a fair and 
public hearing. 
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In the Comprehensive School Act of 1968 (and Decree of 1970), the administration 
of and the decision-making within the municipal school system was strictly regulated. 
At first, the Comprehensive School Act of 1983 did not affect any real change on this. 
But the experiment with so-called "free municipalities" in the late 1980s brought in the 
autonomy of the municipalities as a strong feature for administrative matters. The 
Comprehensive School Act and the Act of Municipal School Administration were 
amended in 1991 and 1992 in a way which introduced great freedom to the municipalities 
concerning the administration of the school system. It is mandatory for every municipality 
to appoint a committee or a board responsible for matters concerning schools. But this 
committee does not explicitly have to be a school board; it may be concerned with other 
areas of municipal administration, such as culture, libraries or voluntary education as 
well. In bilingual (Finnish and Swedish) municipalities, it is mandatory to have separate 
committees for each language group or separate language-based sections of one 
committee.5 The Comprehensive School Act does not entrust obligations or powers of 
decision to certain authorities within the municipalities; it is up to the municipality itself 
to decide upon the distribution of powers between different authorities. Thus school 
administration in different municipalities may vary to a large extent. In some munici-
palities powers of decision may be concentrated to one committee; in other municipalities 
powers may be decentralized to the schools themselves, in which case local school boards 
may be appointed. 
The freedom of administration, since 1993, has been joined with a freedom of 
economical decision-making. The comprehensive schools and the upper secondary schools 
in the municipalities receive State subsidies. The percentage of State subsidies varies 
somewhat between the municipalities (45%—65%). Nowadays State subsidies are granted 
on a calculated basis, in which the number of students, transportation of students and 
the school network form the basis. The subsidies are granted without connection to the 
real costs and expenditures of the municipal schools. The municipalités are free to use 
the State subsidies as they wish; there is only a basic legal obligation to maintain 
comprehensive education in the municipality. 
A right to appeal is connected with most administrative decision-making in Finland; 
this is the case with the school administration, too. There are two types of appeal in the 
area of municipal school administration: administrative appeal and municipal appeal. 
The division between these two is quite clear today: Administrative appeal is mainly to 
be used in connection with individual decisions concerning students. These are decisions 
concerning admission of a student to a certain school, moving a student to specialized 
education and deciding on a student's participation in a certain subject. Appeals in these 
cases are made to the regional (county) educational authority. In the case of expulsion, 
appeals are made to the regional (county) administrative court. Typical for admi-
nistrative appeal is that only the person—in this case the student or his parents—affected 
5 This provision is stated in the Municipality Act of 1995, Section 16, as well as in the (present) Act of 
Municipal School Administration. 
The Municipal School System in Finland 207 
by the decision can challenge it. Other decis ions than those concern ing an individual 
student can b e subject to municipal appeal. Such decisions m a y concern e c o n o m i c 
support to a s tudent , the curr iculum of a school and general pr inc ip les of admiss ion of 
students. Accord ing to the Municipal i ty Act, every member of the municipali ty may 
appeal against a dec i s ion- th i s is a typical fea ture for municipal i ty appeal.6 
4. Reform Proposal in 1996 
In April 1996, a Committee within the Minis t ry of Education proposed some ra ther 
large reforms of the educational legislation in Finland.7 The main goal of the commi t t ee 
is to create a m o r e unified and less detailed legislation in the a rea of educat ion. T h e 
committee report contains proposals concerning education on all levels; from pre-school 
to university. A s far as the comprehensive school is concerned, the Comprehens ive 
School Act and several acts on specialized schools ( language-based such as the F rench 
School in Hels inki and the Russian School in Helsinki) will be replaced by one 
Comprehens ive Education Act . I will now briefly refer to some of the main proposa ls 
in the Commi t t ee Report (1996:4) . 
Comprehens ive Education will remain a resposibility for the municipali t ies. As 
already stated in the beginning of this presentat ion, this has been a feature of F innish 
Pr imary and Comprehens ive School legislation s ince 1866. O n e n e w feature, though , is 
an enlarged possibility for the municipalities to purchase educational services f rom other 
than municipal schools. This m a y be done not only on a contractual basis with a pr ivate 
school concern ing the whole education within a school, but a lso as a purchase of one 
or several sub jec t s to replace these subjects as produced within the municipal school . 
T h e right of pa ren t s (families) to choose a school for their chi ld will also be enlarged: 
T h e municipal i ty has an obligation to indicate a certain school (Finnish or Swedish and 
in certain areas of Lapland a l so in the Sami language) for every chi ld , but the parents 
m a y also choose any other school for their chi ld. The municipali ty will be obl iged to 
p a y the costs of education to the school of the paren ts ' choice. T h e r e will no longer be 
mandatory divis ion into school districts; a " h o m e school" must b e appointed for every 
chi ld by the municipality. This n e w system will probably increase competi t ion be tween 
schools and, at the same t ime, once again increase the number of private schools in 
Finland. 
The commi t t ee does not p ropose any changes in the durat ion of comprehens ive 
education — n ine years of comprehensive school will be given in the future, too. T h e 
division be tween the lower s tage ( i.e. the first six years of comprehens ive school) and 
6 A detailed description of appeal within the municipal school system is (in Swedish) given in HÄGGLUND, 
H.: Räussäkerhet inom kommunal skolförvaltning. En undersökning om rättsmedlens betydelse inom den 
allmänbildande skolan. SSKH Meddelanden 31. Helsingfors, 1994. especially Chapters 2 and 4. (In Swedish, 
SABBATAI: loc. cit.). 
7 Committee Repor t 1996:4. 
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the upper stage (i.e. the last three years of comprehensive school) will be abolished. One 
year of pre-school education, free of charge, is proposed to be offered to all children 
at the age of six years. Today, pre-school is free of charge if offered within the school 
system, but a monthly fee is paid by the parents if pre-school is arranged — as mostly 
is the case — within the day-care system. 
The administration of municipal schools and the municipal school system will no 
longer be regulated in educational law. The administrative structure will thus be based 
on the Municipal Act, which in Section 16 contains a provision to appoint separate 
school committees/boards (or other such authorities) for the Finnish- and the Swedish-
language group in bilingual municipalities. The Municipality Act also makes it possible 
to appoint school boards for each school, with representatives for parents and staff. It 
may be considered somewhat surprising that the proposal does not include any provision 
to appoint a principal (headmaster) for each school; only a sufficient number of 
directors within the school system will be demanded. 
5. Conclusions 
Although some major legislative changes can be expected in the near future,8 the fact 
still remains: Within the Finnish school system the municipalities are the main 
authorities responsible for comprehensive and secondary education. Over a long period 
of time, the autonomy of the municipalities did not play a strong part within the school 
administration; the municipalities only carried out the will of the State in the area of 
education. Today the situation is different: Both concerning administration and 
concerning the curriculum, the municipalities have quite a large independence and 
autonomy in deciding about the education within each municipality. There is, of course, 
a basic common structure to be carried out; but apart from this, municipal autonomy is 
an important element within the school administration. 
8 The new school legislation will probably come into force in 1998. 
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Figure 1: The Finnish School System (1996) 
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Sanna HEIKINHEIMO M o n e y - L a u n d e r i n g — 
a Controversial Issue 
1. Introduction 
The subject of my presentation today is a phenomenon which has prompted a great deal 
of discussion in recent years, namely money-laundering. I will begin by explaining the 
major reasons behind the growing international concern with money-laundering. I will 
then proceed by briefly examining the main international initiatives in this field. These 
initiatives can also be seen to have had an impact in Finland with the recent introduction 
of new laws on money-laundering. After describing the new obligations placed on 
financial institutions by the Finnish banking law, I will end by briefly focusing on 
banking secrecy. 
2. What is Money-laundering? 
In the money-laundering process illegally obtained money is transformed into "c l ean" 
assets; in other words, the existence, amount, source or ownership of assets is 
concealed. The schemes used to launder money are diverse, but the purpose of money-
laundering is always "to dissociate that capital received as a direct consequence of 
criminality f rom its illicit origin, so as to ensure that detection by reason of possession 
of such capital is avoided, whilst simultaneously providing the offender with reason for 
"being in possession of that capital".1 
1 MITCHELL, A . - H I N T O N , M . - T A Y L O R , S.: Confiscation, London, 1992, 218. 
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3. Reasons Behind the Growing Concern on Money-laundering 
Although the term "money-laundering" was already being used in the 1920's and 1930's 
to describe the Mafia laundromats in the United States,2 international measures against 
money-laundering were not adopted until the end of the 1980's. There are several 
reasons for the growing concern with money-laundering. 
3.1. The Escalating Nature of Drug Trafficking and Money-laundering 
In the recent past the growth in amounts of laundered money has been due to drug 
trafficking.3 Thus one of the major reasons for international interest in combatting 
money-laundering is due to the fact that enormous amounts of drug money are laundered 
worldwide." There are some rough estimates of the amount of money laundered, but just 
as it is impossible to determine the correct amount of criminality in a society, so it is 
also impossible to give a correct estimate of the amount of money being laundered. The 
Financial Action Task Force on Money-laundering (FATF) tried to estimate the amount 
of laundered drug proceeds in 1990. They came to the conclusion that in Europe and 
the United States about $85 billion of drug money could be used for money-laundering 
and investment purposes.5 The estimation was made using three indirect methods, 
namely estimated world drug production, consumption needs of drug abusers, and 
seizures of illicit drugs. 
In their 1995 report, the FATF suggested that the amount of money-laundered is 
hundreds of billions of US dollars each year.6 The correctness of this estimation is hard 
to evaluate, for it is based on a "general consensus". 
3.2. Increasing Emphasis on Money Trails 
In recent years, the law enforcement agencies of many countries have paid increased 
attention to the financial aspects of criminality. It is hoped that this will help in the fight 
against criminality in two separate ways: a) it has been pointed out elsewhere that " the 
best way to deter and punish drug traffickers is to hit them in their pocket".7 This 
means that money is seen as the motivation for much criminal activity. There are no 
reasons for drug barons to sell drugs other than to make money for themselves. There-
fore, if law enforcement is able to deprive criminals of these illegal earnings, this main 
2 Ibid.. at 218. 
3 Ibid,, at 80. 
4 G1LMORE, W., in GILMORE, W. (ed.): International Efforts to Combat Money-laundering, Cambridge, 
1992, ix. 
5 Financial Action Task Force on Money-laundering, Report of 6 February, 1990, 3 -5 . 
6 Financial Action Task Force on Money-laundering, Annual Report 1994-1995, 8 June 1995, 15. 
7 NADELMANN, E.: "Negotiations in Criminal Law Assistance Treaties", The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 1985, 492. 
Money-Laundering—a Controversial Issue 213 
incentive can be eliminated, b) The leaders of big criminal organisations do not take 
part in the physical acts of crime, and thus it is often very difficult for law enforcement 
agencies to convict them of any kind of criminal activity. A money trail is of ten the 
only way in which to connect the big bosses with the crimes committed. D. Chaikin has 
stated that money-laundering is "the lifeblood of organised cr ime", that is, organised 
crime cannot survive without laundering money,8 and thus the attention being focused 
on money-laundering operations can provide a line of attack for law enforcement 
agencies to apprehend the people most responsible for these crimes. 
3.3. The Necessary Protection of Financial Institutions 
At one point or another, money-laundering schemes almost always of necessity involve the 
use of banks or other financial institutions. The financial sector is now being exploited 
more and more by money-launderers who can pose serious threats to the functioning of 
this sector.9 The internationalisation of financial markets and the diminishing of barriers 
to the free movement of capital have made the task of the money-launderer easier. As 
moving money from one jurisdiction to another can be accomplished in a matter of 
seconds, and jurisdictional limitations make the task of law enforcement more 
complicated, banks must be protected against money-laundering. Furthermore, the 
financial sector can also be an effective deterrent against money-laundering by making 
it harder for launderers to use their services.10 
These are the main reasons for the growing concern with money-laundering. A so-
called "twin-track solution"11 has been adopted at international and national levels to 
fight this problem. It has been realised that traditional criminal justice measures, that 
is, criminalising money-laundering, must play a major role in this effort. Furthermore, 
it has been admitted that the financial sector must and can contribute to the fight against 
money-laundering.1 2 Finally, with the realisation that money-launderers operate not 
only nationally, but increasingly also internationally, it has become clear that national 
8 See CHAIKIN, D.: "Money-laundering as a Supranational Crime: An Investigatory Perspective", in ESER, 
A.—LAGODNY, O. (eds.): Principles and Procedures for a New Transnational Criminal Law. Documentation 
of an International Workshop. 1991 (Max-Planck-Institut für Ausländisches und Internationales Strafrecht, 
Freiburg in Breisgau), 1992, 420 
9 GILMORE: op. cit., x. See the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices. 
December 1988 Statement on Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money-
laundering. 
10 See the Preamble of the Measures Against the Transfer and Safekeeping of Funds of Criminal Origin: 
Recommendation No. R(80)10 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 27 June 
1980 and Explanatory Memorandum, where it was stated that "the banking sys tem can play a highly effect ive 
preventive role, while co-operation of banks also assists in the repression of such criminal acts by the judicial 
authorities and the police". 
11 GILMORE: op. cit., x. 
12 See GILMORE, W.: "International Initiatives", in PARLOUR, R. (ed.): International Guide to Money-
laundering Law and Practice, London, 1995, 21. 
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efforts in themselves are insufficient, and that effective international co-operation has 
become a necessity. 
4. International Measures Against Money-laundering 
As I commented above, in recent years we have witnessed a rapid growth in the number 
of international anti-money-laundering initiatives. The first major measure against 
money-laundering was the adoption of the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.13 Since the adoption of this convention, a number 
of initiatives have been undertaken to combat money-laundering both at European and 
international levels. These are also the initiatives that had an impact in Finland when 
the new laws against money-laundering were adopted. 
4.1. The Vienna Convention 
The Vienna Convention was adopted by an ad hoc conference on December 19, 1988 
in Vienna, Austria. The Convention entered into force in November 1990. Finland 
signed the Convention in 1989, and ratified it five years later, on February 15 1994. As 
of now, over 100 countries are party to the Vienna Convention. As the Preamble of the 
Vienna Convention states, the aim of this initiative is "to conclude a comprehensive, 
effective and operative international convention that is directed specifically against illicit 
traffic and that considers the various aspects of the problem as a whole". Member States 
are inter alia obliged to criminalise the laundering of proceeds from drug-related 
offences. Furthermore, the Vienna Convention sets strict obligations on the parties to 
promote and facilitate international co-operation in the identification, tracing, seizure, 
and confiscation of the proceeds of drug trafficking. The Vienna Convention is the only 
global instrument in the field of money-laundering, and has greatly influenced sub-
sequent initiatives. 
4.2. The Financial Action Task Force on Money-laundering 
The G7 nations and the European Community set up the FATF in July 1989, with a 
view "to assess the results of co-operation already undertaken in order to prevent the 
utilisation of the banking system and financial institutions for the purpose of money-
laundering, and to consider additional preventive efforts in this field, including the 
adaptation of the legal and regulatory systems so as to enhance multilateral judicial 
assistance".14 
13 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, signed in Vienna, 
Austria on 19 December 1988, U.N. Docs. E/Conf. 82/15, the so-called Vienna Convention. 
14 Group of 7 Economic Declaration of July 16 1989, point 53. 
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The membership of the FATF today comprises of twenty-eight jurisdictions and 
organisations, including Finland. The first of the series of FATF reports in 1990 issued 40 
recommendations, a imed at improving national legal systems, enhancing the role of the 
financial system, and strengthening international co-operation against money-laundering.15 
The work of the F A T F is on-going: each year the group issues an annual report focusing 
on three priorities. The first is an evaluation of the progress of FATF members in imple-
menting the Recommendations of the FATF. For example, the 1994 FATF report includes 
an evaluation of the situation in the money-laundering field in Finland.16 Secondly, it 
monitors developments in money-laundering trends and techniques and considers the 
necessary refinements to counter-measures. Thirdly, it undertakes an external relations 
programme to promote the widest possible international action against money-laundering. 
4.3. The Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
of Crime17 
The Council of Europe adopted the so-called European Convention on September 10 
1990, which entered into force on September 1, 1993. Finland signed the Convention 
in 1991, and it entered into force in Finland on July 1 1994. The purposes of the 
European Convention are very wide-ranging. By providing a complete set of rules as 
regards investigative assistance, search, seizure, and the confiscation of the proceeds of 
all kinds of criminality, the Convention aims to deprive criminals of the proceeds of 
crime.18 
4.4. The Directive on the Prevention of the Use of a Financial System for the Purposes 
of Money-laundering19 
On June 10 1991 the Council of the European Community adopted the EJ Directive on 
money-laundering, which is specifically aimed at preventing the use of financial 
institutions for the purposes of money-laundering. The Directive obliges Member States 
inter alia to prohibit money-laundering.20 Furthermore, the EJ Directive sets out 
several obligations for the banking sector: for example, the identification of customers, 
record keeping, and the reporting of suspicious transactions to the authorities.21 Under 
15 See Financial Action Task Force on Money-laundering, Report of February 6, 1990. 
16 See Financial Action Task Force on Money-laundering. Annual Report 1993-1994, June 16 1994. 
17 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime. Eur. Consult. Ass., Doc. No. 141. 
18 See the Explanatory Report on the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime. Convention opened for Signature on November 8 1990. Strasbourg, 1991, 6. 
19 Council Directive of June 10 1991 on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of 
Money-laundering. Council Directive 91/308/EEC, OJ L166/77 of 28 June 1991. 
20 Article 2 of the EJ Directive. 
21 See Articles 3 to 11 of the EJ Directive. 
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the terms of the Treaty on the European Economic Area, Finland was under an 
obligation to implement the money-laundering directive in its internal legislation. 
5. The Situation of Money-laundering Laws in Finland 
In Finland, in addition to drug proceeds, it is believed that traditional crime, such as 
bankruptcy offences, frauds, and embezzlements, also accounts for a substantial part of 
money-laundering. However, the biggest potential problem is the flow of funds from the 
former Soviet Union for deposit in Finnish financial institutions, or for the purchase of 
real estate or enterprises in Finland. It is suspected that these funds may include the 
illegal profits of the shadow economy which are being laundered and invested. In recent 
years Finland has equipped itself with virtually a complete set of new laws and 
regulations concerning money-laundering. These laws came into force at the beginning 
of 1994. The relevant international instruments, which I have briefly introduced above, 
were implemented in the Finnish legislation by being added to the relevant parts of the 
general banking and insurance legislation. Certain parts of the criminal law were also 
amended in order to criminalise money-laundering. Additionally, detailed guidelines 
were issued by the banking authorities. 
5.1. The Money-laundering Offence in Finland 
When criminal law was amended in order to criminalise money-laundering, the Vienna 
Convention, the European Convention, and the EJ Directive served as models for this 
criminalisation. Thus the criminalisation of money-laundering is clearly reminiscent of 
the definitions used in these instruments. The money-laundering offence is very widely 
drawn, covering all proceeds obtained through crime, and not only transactions related 
to drugs. The following acts constitute a money-laundering offence in Finland: 
1. The acquisition, conversion or transfer of assets or other property, knowing that 
such property is derived from a criminal offence or surrogate of such property, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting the 
perpetrator to evade the legal consequences of his actions, or 
2. The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition or 
rights with respect to the property set forth in paragraph 1, or the concealment of 
information on such matters which he is obliged to report under the law.22 
5.2. The New Obligations of Financial Institutions 
New obligations on banks and other financial institutions were introduced when the new 
money-laundering laws entered into force in Finland. These obligations include a stricter 
22 As an official translation was unavailable, this is my own free translation (S. H.). 
Money-Laundering—a Controversial Issue 217 
duty of customer identification, due diligence, and the reporting of suspicious trans-
actions. The provisions regulating money-laundering transactions cover the activities of 
credit and financial institutions, including insurance companies. In August of 1996 the 
provision was extended to activities carried out by exchange counters. Furthermore, a 
committee has been set up within the Ministry of Finance to determine the need to also 
extend the coverage of anti-money-laundering laws to real estate agencies, casinos, and 
dealers in precious metals. 
5.2.1. Customer Identification 
According to the Finnish banking law, financial institutions are under a duty to identify 
their customers. Since the amendments in the Finnish banking law came into force in 
1994, customers now have to be identified in the following circumstances: a) when an 
institution enters into business relations with a customer; b) if there is doubt that the 
customer is not acting on his own behalf, the institution in question is required to take 
reasonable measures to identify the beneficial owner; c) when an institution is asked to 
perform a large casual transaction; d) if there is a reason to suspect the origin of the 
assets. It has been argued that customer identification is the "most effective weapon 
against being used unwittingly to launder money".23 Efficient customer identification 
has the potential to reduce the risks of an institution being used for money-laundering 
purposes. On the other hand, its deterrent effects can be disputed: false identification 
is easily obtainable, and thus the identification requirements will not deter "serious 
fraudsters".24 The requirement of customer identification may also force institutions 
to question their clients in order to identify them and/or the possible beneficial owners . 
If customers resent these potentially prejudiced questions, they may turn to another 
institution to conduct business. 
5.2.2. Due Diligence and the Reporting of Transactions 
The requirement of due diligence means that financial institutions must pay special 
attention to dubious transactions. Under the Finnish law, if there is reason to suspect the 
origin of the assets to be unlawful, the transaction must then be either terminated or 
denied. During the preparatory work for the act, it was stated that suspicions should 
arise when, based on earlier banking experiences, it is clear that the transaction is out 
of the ordinary. In these circumstances, the institution is under an obligation to inform 
the Finnish banking authority about its suspicions and, moreover, to give all relevant 
information which may help to confirm the suspicion. Institutions are required to keep 
23 HARTE, В: "The Role of Banks", in PARLOUR, R. (ed.): International Guide to Money-laundering Law 
and Practice. London, 1995, 249. 
24 LEVI. M.: "Money-laundering, Legislation and Fraud", in NORTON, J. (ed.): Banks: Fraud and Crime, 
London, 1994, 39. 
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the matter confidential, and thus they are not allowed to inform the customer that 
information relating to him has been passed to the authorities. The use of the information 
forwarded to the banking authorities is restricted. The authorities are only allowed to 
register, use, and forward the information in order to fight money-laundering. Other use 
of the information is prohibited. 
5.3. Bank Secrecy and Protection Against Liability to Customers 
According to the Finnish banking law, banks have an affirmative duty not to disclose 
information concerning the affairs of their customers without the consent of the said 
customer. This duty is also emphasised in the criminal law: charges can be brought 
against a person who has breached customer confidentiality. Naturally there are 
exceptions to this rule. An institution, for example, is obliged to provide the public 
prosecutor and the police with information in order to solve crimes. Furthermore, the 
Finnish banking authority, as stated above, has been given the right to ask for infor-
mation relating to money-laundering. Thus the banking institutions cannot refuse to pass 
information to the Finnish banking authority, and because it is possible to bring charges 
against a person who has breached the duty of confidentiality, money-laundering charges 
can be brought against a person who has failed to provide the authorities with infor-
mation on suspected money-laundering. In order to protect institutions and their 
employees from liability to customers, the law provides that an institution, or its 
employee acting in good faith, is not liable to cover any harm which may be caused by 
the reporting of suspicious transactions. Institutions and their employees are thus immune 
from liability, even if the disclosure later proves unfounded. According to the preparatory 
work for the act, such a paragraph is necessary in order to avoid a situation where 
fulfilling the requirements of the law, that is, the reporting of suspicious transactions, 
could render the person financially responsible. Thus the objective of this paragraph is 
to encourage co-operation. 
6. A Few Words on Bank Secrecy 
Bank secrecy is being lifted as a result of their providing the authorities with information 
on customers and their transactions. It has been argued that, in particular, the institutions' 
duty to provide authorities with information on their own initiative is "directly contrary 
to the principle of customer privacy that has been a hallmark of the banking practice in 
the US and Europe".25 It is especially the growing concern with organised crime in 
general, and with money-laundering in particular, that has caused governments to re-
examine the scope of banking confidentiality. The recent legislation in many countries 
reflects law enforcement concerns rather than a perceived need to regulate the affairs of 
banking organisations. There is no pretence that the laws requiring customer disclosures 
25 HUBER: op. cit., 218. 
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promote such goals as the safety and soundness of banking. It cannot further be denied 
that secrecy has been an element of greater or lesser importance in many money-
laundering operations in the recent past. The focus on banks and other financial 
institutions is due to their central role in facilitating the movement of money. 
The importance of the issue of bank secrecy can be seen when the international 
instruments in this field are examined: the Vienna Convention, the European Convention, 
the recommendations of the FATF, and the EJ Directive on money-laundering all 
address this question by stating that bank secrecy must be lifted where money-
laundering is concerned. However, one should bear in mind that the desire for bank 
secrecy does not necessarily mean that a criminal activity is involved. Other reasons 
might be the political, business, or personal motives of the customer.2 6 Financial 
privacy can also be regarded as a fundamental right. Thus, financial privacy should be 
an individual liberty essential in, and protected by, democratic systems. 
How could a reasonable balance among the competing policy objectives of an 
efficient banking system, promotion of privacy, and effective law enforcement be 
achieved? The current situation in Finland as regards bank secrecy is that the main rule 
expressed in banking law is a strict obligation of customer confidentiality. As regards 
suspected money-laundering, an enormous exception is made to this main rule; it can 
be stated that, by criminalising a failure to report suspicious transactions, and by 
providing immunity from liability, the Finnish banking law reduces bank secrecy to 
nothing when there is a reason to suspect money-laundering. The potentially wide 
disclosure of information creates a danger that the confidential information of legitimate 
account holders might be released. It can be questioned whether the exception provided 
by the Finnish law is too large, for it does not seem possible to identify and report 
suspicious transactions in a way that would not also greatly affect the affairs of honest 
account holders. Furthermore, if applied with full force, this approach could result in 
banks constantly spying on their customers. So, are the banks eventually to be trans-
formed from being the servants of their customers to being spies for the government? 
2 6 HARTE: op. cit., 245. 
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Ari HIRVONEN The Rule of Justice and the Ethical 
Limits of Criminal Law 
I. The Rule of Justice 
In contemporary Western legal dogmat ism the rale of law is, a lmos t a lways, taken as 
a first pr inciple , as a basis or foundat ion of a legitimate state and legal order . It 
guarantees not only the legal o rde r ' s legit imacy but also, and even m o r e important ly , 
individual f r eedom according to the law. 
Without denying its validity and importance, I will, however , quest ion its f u n d a -
mental nature: is it really the ult imate rale or the ultimate principle of legal order? A n d 
if not, as I wou ld argue, what precedes the rale of law? What c o m e s before it? T h e n 
again, why is this question being asked? Why ask questions about something that d o e s 
not belong to the issues concerning the rale of law; that is b e y o n d , o r outside, o r 
exterior to it? W h y look after something that, perhaps, always precedes all legal systems, 
all legitimate states and communit ies? Why , in general, ask non-legal questions, a lmos t 
illegal ones? A n d why try to push things over the limits or borders of modern legal 
thinking by seeking after something that is beyond the principle, the idea and/or ideal of 
the just , democrat ic , legal, law-based society? 
Perhaps all these questions will turn out to be unanswerable. This will be the case if 
that which precedes (or is beyond, outside, etc.) the rule of law is—knowable; that is, 
something that cannot be defined and imprisoned in a concept, an essence, an idea, a 
principle, a rale. Perhaps, again just perhaps, what comes before the rale of law is the 
preceding presence itself; perhaps it is nothing else (or more) than both the progress ing 
ethical demand and the progressing as (N.B.) an ethical demand, as a demand fo r 
responsibility. 
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There seems to be no sense, no legal sense, in all these questions and 'perhapses*. 
Moreover, it appears to be useless to turn to God for a solution; He/She will not come, 
not anymore. He will not precede the rule of law neither as a sovereign law-giver, as 
a constitution, legal principles and basic norms, fundamental rights—as a legal positivist 
would argue—nor as universal moral principles or human rights, reason and rationality—as 
a natural law theorist would argue. 
Consequently again and again, this haunting question returns: What comes before ...? 
To answer that—and I will answer it whilst not answering it—I must start by making a 
distinction between two opposing terms: law (or nomos, lex, Gesetz, jog, laki) and 
justice (dike, ius, Recht, igazság, oikeus). And perhaps this other term (the 'other of 
law', rule of law, all legal orders) is something that demands to be remembered, 
something that leads us beyond law and, consequently, beyond the rule of law. 
Thus instead of concentrating on the rule of law, I will write—and also answer, respond 
to-about what comes before justice, before the rule of justice. But how to respond, how 
to be responsible towards the rule of justice? What does it demand from us? What does 
it demand from the rule of law, and especially, from the criminal justice system? 
Before answering this, I must, very briefly, 'define' the rule of justice. As I have 
already argued, the rule of justice is something that is beyond law, something that 
precedes or comes before the law and, consequently, it is—must be—the ultimate foun-
dation of all legal systems, all states under rule of law or Rechtstaats. 
What I have just said does not differ from natural law theories: justice (universal 
principles/reason) precedes positive rules and norms. But there is a major difference 
between those theories and my 'rule': the rule of justice cannot be universalised, syste-
matised, thematicised or conceptualised. One cannot reduce it to general and universal 
principles of natural law (justice). Therefore, it cannot be understood as any kind of 
system of coherent and stable norms, laws or principles. What comes before the rule of 
law, any organisation, institutionalisation, legalisation, is fundamental ethics. It is, and 
here I will follow Emmanuel Levinas (1981),1 an authentic relationship with the 'o ther ' , 
a response or responsibility before the 'other ' . Ethics, in this sense, signifies the fact of 
encounter, of the relation of myself with the 'other ' , a scission of 'Being' in encounter 
without coincidence. I must respond to all singular 'others' and take responsibility for 
all 'others ' . I, as a singular person, am responsible before and for you, as a singular 
other. And this responsibility I have before any legal arrangements and institutions, 
before any 'rule of law' or legal system. Here I am for the other. 
Such responsibility is the primary and essential structure of human subjectivity, of 
human relationships, of community, and, of course, of the rule of law. It is not the rule 
of justice but instead rules of justices that are synonymous with ethics in the sense of 
fundamental ethics. Justice, as responsibility in concrete situations and in singular human, 
legal, political, social acts is the fundamental part of the law. It is the ultimate ground 
for all just legal institutions, principles and rules. No just law without fundamental ethics! 
X LEVINAS, E.: Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Hague, 1981. 
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This demand requires nothing else than an answer, a response before a particular 
other, before a foreigner, stranger, different, deviant, criminal, the one who is imprisoned 
or condemned to death. The ultimate question of a condemned man, is why are you 
going to kill—or punish—me? Because the law says so, is no answer, not a response 
which has anything to do with responsibility, ethics and justice. 
II. Abolitionism 
Perhaps abolitionism—thinking and acting labelled as abolitionistic—by challenging 
the just if ication of the criminal justice system, thinks or remembers what c o m e s 
before the law, that is, ethical responsibility in concrete situations. But how does the 
rule of justice work through or in abolitionism? How does it demand ethical response 
and responsibility? 
A radical abolitionist would argue that the criminal law has nothing to do with the 
rule of justice and everything to do with the rule of force, violence, power and might . 
Instead of this kind of ' i l legal ' abolitionism, a legal (and here legal refers either to 
accepted thinking, as opposed to exiled, illegal thinking or to critical legal studies 
movement that works inside, or on the limits of law) abolitionist would argue that the 
rule of justice is a fundamental part of the rule of law, and all legal principles, rules and 
institutions and thus is also a fundamental part of the criminal justice system. 
Consequently, the criminal justice system is based not only on the rule of law but also, 
and more fundamentally, on the rule of justice, which limits all legal arrangements, 
criminalisations, punishments, etc. 
To answer this question more precisely, I will next try to clarify what abolitionism 
as a critical-ethical thinking means and how it challenges the criminal justice system and 
its justification. Firstly, I will give a general definition of abolitionism. Secondly, I will 
speak about what to abolish. And finally, I must say something about alternatives to the 
criminal justice system. 
The English verb ' to abolish' comes from Latin abolere, to grow out of use. It 
signifies that something (an institution, custom or practice) is demolished, destroyed o r 
annihilated. Initially the concept of abolitionism was used by anti-slavery movements 
in USA and England. At the beginning of the period of Enlightenment it was also used 
by those who fought against capital punishment and torture. From the 1960s onwards 
it has mainly signified the fight against prisons and imprisonment. More generally, 
abolitionism means, on the one hand, the radical critique of the criminal justice system 
and, on the other hand, the opposition to the state 's right to punish, ius puniendi. 
The term abolitionism refers to many different perspectives, goals and strategies. 
There at least four different interpretation what abolitionism is. Firstly, and mos t 
importantly, it can be an ethical perspective. This kind of abolitionism shows that there 
is no ethical justification for the criminal justice system in general and for punishments 
in particular. It is wrong to intentionally and systematically inflict pain upon o ther 
people even if they are labelled and classified as offenders or criminals. But the 
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criminal just ice system is not only morally wrong; it is also a failure since it cannot 
even achieve its own goals. It is an ineffective or dysfunctional system: it is not able 
to solve problems, it does not offer protection for people, general and special prevention 
cannot be supported with empirical data. In other words, it either does not work or, if 
it works, it has only negative and destructive effects (produces unjustified suffering 
divided unevenly between different social groups, labels and marginalises offenders, 
prevents real solutions, etc.). Consequently, the criminal justice system should be 
abolished. 
Secondly, abolitionism can refer to a social and humanitarian movement. In the 
USA, convicts and ex-convicts, their families and different church groups are engaged 
in a fight for prison reforms. These religiously-oriented grassroots groups also work as 
support groups for those imprisoned. 
European abolitionism has always been more politically oriented. Thus, thirdly, we 
can see abolitionism as a political strategy to abolish prisons or, more generally, all 
punitive and repressive modes of social control. The Norwegian penal pressure group 
KROM, founded in 1968 by left-wing intellectuals, convicts and ex-convicts, not only 
collectivised the struggle for prisoners' rights but also fought against the whole penal 
system as an instrument of state control. The same kind of politically oriented prison 
movements were also founded in Sweden, Denmark and Finland at the end of the 
1960's. In France GIP (Group d'Information sur les Prisons) produced counter-
information concerning the official criminal policy and conditions in French prisons. It 
also created for prisoners the right and possibility to present their points of view and 
organised protests against prisons. 
The main theorist of the KROM, Thomas Mathiesen (1974), has written about the 
strategy of negation: one must say a loud and clear no to the prison system by using 
negative reforms that will not give a new legitimisation to the penal system.2 These 
negative reforms must be of the abolitionist kind: in the long run the whole prison 
system will be abolished; in the short run all walls inside prisons, which are not strictly 
necessary, must be abolished. Mathiesen also wams us about positive reforms and 
alternatives to imprisonment since alternatives are quite often defined so that they 
become a functional part of the criminal justice system. And after reforms have lost 
their abolitionist (or destructive) effect they will do nothing else other than strengthen 
the existing penal order ( 'net-widening' and 'net-tightening' effects). 
From the 1980s onwards, abolitionists have been faced with prison expansion, and 
consequently, many of them have formulated abolitionism in more modest terms: the 
goal is now to prevent the expansion of the prison system and bring it to a full stop. 
This kind of defensive abolitionism fights for a permanent ban on prison building and 
not for the abolition of all prisons like offensive abolitionism did. It is also open for 
positive reforms.3 
2 MATHIESEN, T.: The Politics of Abolition. Oslo, 1974. 
3 MATHIESEN, T.: Prison on Trial. London, 1990. 
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Fourtly, abolitionism can be a critical legal strategy that, by using legal theory and 
dogmatics, fights against the criminal justice system and punishments. This kind of 
abolitionism limits the scope of criminal law by using human and fundamental r ights 
and legal principles. As an example, legal abolitionism would take the ultima-ratio 
principle seriously: firstly, it should be the principle of all criminalisations (are there 
less repressive and punitive ways to protect and ensure fundamental rights of other 
people—and protection of these is the only reason why we should have criminal law at 
all); secondly, it should also be a legal rule when norms are applied (even if the deed 
is criminalised), that someone (the judge) should consider if there are in a particular and 
concrete case, less repressive and punitive ways in which to solve the conflict; whether 
criminalisation and punishment is absolutely necessary?. 
As has been seen, there exists not just one abolitionism, but many different 
abolitionisms. The main object of abolitionism has been prisons and imprisonment. Bu t 
it is not enough to concentrate only on this one form of punishment, for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, there are other more inhuman and more cruel punishments—for example 
capital punishment, torture, corporeal punishments—than imprisonmenL Secondly, a risk 
always exists that alternatives to imprisonment will lead to a more repressive and 
effective control system: the medical treatment and hospitalisation of offenders, gene-
technology, technical prevention and control can all have 'net -widening ' and 'ne t -
tightening' effects. Consequently, abolitionism must question the justification and 
meaning not only of punishment, but also of all other kinds of control and disciplinary 
systems, institutions and technologies, by whatever name they are known. 
Abolitionism may also concentrate on abolishing certain kinds of criminalisations. 
In that case, it refers either to decriminalisation or de-penalisation. Decriminalisation 
means that certain offences (like victimless crimes) are abolished. More radically 
understood, decriminalisation means the total abolition of the whole criminal law. This 
total decriminalisation should be the long term goal for abolitionism even if it speaks 
for partial decriminalisation (and this is the main difference between abolitionism and 
a minimalist criminal policy). 
De-penalisation means that certain acts will formally remain illegal, but will not be 
prosecuted, or the offender will not be punished. (One may also speak about de facto 
decriminalisation when referring to this kind of de-penalisation). More generally, de-
penalisation does not reject the concept of crime as moral condemnation. It is more 
against the repressive and punitively-oriented way in which these cr imes are dealt with 
in the penal system. A radical de-penalisation would mean that w e would still have 
criminal law, but not penal law. But perhaps this is nothing else than taking the 
symbolic function of criminal law seriously. This kind of de-penalisation also recalls the 
true meaning of punishment: the English term comes from Lat in punitio which 
originally meant that which we would today call 'sanction'; that is, the ratification or 
hallowing of rules. A sanction guides us to find a regulation when a conflict arises. And 
norms of criminal law and their ratification in 'civil ' procedure could help, guide, 
instruct us to reflect upon the right and just direction in society: instead punishment 
(pain, suffering, harm) we need sanctions. 
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More theoretically-oriented abolitionism aims to abolish the concept of crime. This 
dangerous concept must be deconstructed by showing that no such thing as an 
ontological or natural crime exists. Crime is nothing else but a socially constructed 
product. And when this is understood any simplified reaction to it in the form of 
punishment becomes very problematic. 
III. Alternatives to the criminal justice system 
According to abolitionism, the criminal justice system is beyond repair. It cannot be 
reformed or made more efficient, just and humane. Therefore abolitionism must seek 
other possibilities to deal with unjust and morally wrong behaviour, with problematic 
situations and conflicts. Instead of offering a finished program for the future or an 
alternative Utopia, abolitionism opens our thinking to possibilities that lie beyond 
punishment-oriented criminal law. 
Increasing tolerance and the accepting of different ways of lives and morals is one 
relevant alternative. In these cases social control becomes unnecessary. Abolitionism 
does not always want to do away with all forms of social control since tolerance is not 
always an alternative. There are acts and cases that are morally wrong and harmful for 
other persons and when social control is necessary: anything does not go! More 
generally, one can argue that social co-existence would be impossible without some kind 
of control. In one sense, language already is a form of social control—and perhaps the 
most fundamental form of it. René van Swaaningen has argued that the problem is not 
social control in itself, but the repressive, punitive, and inflexible character of formal 
social control systems.4 And for this reason, abolitionism must adopt an informal, 
reflexive and participatory model of justice, and if in some cases penal intervention is 
indispensable, then civil liberties and human rights must be guaranteed. 
According to Herman Bianchi, the criminal law is still based on the ideas of 
inquisition and it lacks a moral foundation.5 He proposes a tsedeka-model. This ancient 
Hebrew notion of justice and righteousness is based on conflict resolution rather than 
punishment. In the reparative model of justice the conflicting parties themselves play 
the central role, and this enables people to experience law as being supportive of their 
lives and social interactions. It offers a chance to resolve conflicts and reach a non-
punitive solution. If the present system of criminal law is anomic and alienating, 
because it frustrates the main participants in a crime conflict; the new model of justice 
is eunomic and integrative, offering participants a way out. 
Bianchi also argues that the present system of punitive just ice has forgotten ideas 
of forgiveness and mercy. But mercy and justice are completely interwoven, the one 
4 VAN SWAANINGEN, R.: European Critical Criminologies. A Future for a Social Justice. Rotterdam, 
1995, 130. 
5 BIANCHI, H.: Justice as Sanctuary. Toward a New System of Crime Control. Bloomington, 1994. 
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non-existent without the other: "Mercy is just, and justice is merciful".6 Thus, mercy 
in the criminal justice system would mean a willingness for human interaction and help 
given both to victims and offenders in overcoming their conflict and restoring human 
relations and a right order. 
Louk Hulsman puts his trust in self-regulating mechanisms at the ' l ife-world level'.7 
He discards the criminal law's absolute definitions of reality and crime since they block 
the search for other and more productive solutions. The criminal procedure itself is 
non-communicative, since it categorises concrete situations and experiences. Without this 
reduct ionis t s way of thinking we are able to understand better the real, concrete and 
unique situations. Instead of the 'guilt-principle', punishment and anonymous penal 
reactions, Hulsman seeks the 'risk-principle' and non-institutionalised forms of 
correction. 
Nils Christie also argues for decentralised and autonomous methods of dispute 
settlement.8 The penal law steals conflicts from those directly concerned, and instead 
of solving conflicts it only labels an offender. An alternative is a dialogue which enables 
understanding of conflicts and produces solidarity between the parties involved. 
This already shows that the criminal law could, according to abolitionism, be 
replaced either by informal dispute settlement procedures or by civil law, and punish-
ments could be replaced by tolerance or by other forms of less institutionalised and less 
anonymous forms of social control, caring and restitution. 
I will now leave these alternatives unfinished, leave the problems attached to them 
un-answered (re-justification of social control, more efficient and repressive social 
control mechanisms without legal guarantees, the alternatives' inefficiency in cases of 
organisational, economical, environmental, etc. kinds of crimes) and open them for your 
own consideration by ending this part with a question: what would happen if the 
criminal law would be abolished tomorrow? 
IV. Ethical limits of criminal law 
Abolitionism challenges the criminal justice system. It questions criminal law's 
justification and efficiency. From this we can now proceed to the rule of justice, and 
discuss how it, f rom an abolitionist perspective, could be—on the one hand—an 
alternative model of just ice and -on the other hand—used to limit the scope of criminal 
law. 
The rule of justice demands ethical justification of the criminal justice system. One 
cannot avoid this fundamental demand by referring to the rule of law; in other words, 
6 Ibid., 48. 
7 HULSMAN, L : "Critical Criminology and the Concept of Crime", in BIANCHI, H . - v a n SWAANINGEN, 
R. (eds.): Abolitionism. Towards a Non-repressive Approach to Crime. Amsterdam, 1986, 25—41. 
8 CHRISTIE, N.: Limits to Pain. Oxford. 1981. 
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one cannot hide behind the positive norms: "because the law says so" is not an ethical 
response. 
This demand differs from traditional jurisprudence which works and thinks in the 
area of the rule of law by forgetting, or excluding, the rule of justice and its ethical 
demands. That being so, there is no real responsible response or pure ethical thinking. 
Instead of real justificatory discourse, an end (i.e. the criminal law and its existence) is 
taken for granted, and its justification is only a means to this end. The justificatory 
discourse is only used to justify what exists as a fact and what must exist. In other 
words, the justificatory discourse does not establish what it justifies, nor de-justifies 
what it does not establish. In that sense, it is just a technical justification. 
This utilitarian and teleological rationality means that all the general penal 
theories—be they absolute or relative, retribution-, deterrence-, moral- or utilitarian-
oriented—serve to justify penal intervention. At the same time, it is taken for granted, 
that criminal and penal law are indispensable and ethically just and correct from a 
utilitarian point of view. Legal knowledge is thus nothing else but dogmatics that 
provides final justifications. Consequently, jurisprudence has become a method of 
forgetting ethics and the genuine experience of civil life. 
The demand of the rule of justice means that one has to remember, and re-
remember, the forgotten and repressed. In order for there to be any justice in a 
democracy governed by the rule of law, one has to recognise the essential link between 
law and ethics. Abolitionism insists that they are, and must be, completely interwoven. 
This means that one has to justify penal intervention again and again. These justi-
fications have to be based, to be founded, and to be the ultimate ground for criminal 
law. One has to justify not only criminal law and the penal system in general but also 
special punishments (especially capital punishment and imprisonment), special crimi-
nalisations and penal interventions in individual cases. 
Every single time o n e - b e it a judge, a prosecutor, an advocate, a legislator, a criminal 
law professor, a criminologist-has anything to do with the criminal justice system, one 
has to remember the call of ethics and respond in a responsible way to the demand of 
justice, before the 'other ' . The rule of justice asks not only the general question—"Is it 
ethically right and just to criminalise and punish?"—but also the particular question in 
every particular and concrete situation—"Is it ethically right and just to condemn another 
in this particular situation?". And if one cannot properly justify the penal intervention in 
the particular case (or on the general level), it should not take place. 
Thus the question of justification is not only an abstract and universal question, but 
one which is also particular and concrete. Abolitionist responsibility consists of the 
constant and unremitting questioning of ideologies, theories, principles and foundations 
of criminal law and its application in concrete cases. And this perpetual questioning has 
its horizon in responsibility for an 'o ther ' . The thinking of the rule of justice means 
re-thinking of the 'other ' of legal knowledge, not only other laws or forms of legal 
knowledge or models or theories of justification. It demands re-thinking and remember-
ing the particular, concrete, existential responsibility before the singular 'other ' in 
his/her singularity and 'alterity' in the singular situation. 
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The rule of justice functions and operates both on the level of the legal system and 
concrete legal decisions. Not as a moral principle or as an abstract and formal rule but 
as an ethical particularity it always precedes procedures of legislation and 'univer-
salisation'; it always precedes laws and legal interventions; it always demands an ethical 
justif ication; it always returns to demand responsible responses. Henceforth, the ' ru le ' 
is something other than a rule: it signifies the moment of obligation, m y irreducible 
responsibility when I am obliged to respond to a particular 'other ' , and when I have to 
make a decision that touches him/her (like criminalising or tolerating his/her acts or 
punishing or forgiving him/her). Thus, the question that interrupts the continuity of legal 
posit ivism is "how to be just to a particular 'o ther '?" 
The rule of justice is in its concreteness an alternative model of just ice. And in its 
demand to justify it limits criminal law and penal interventions. All criminalisations 
(both in general and concrete cases) which are not in accordance with the demands of 
justice, or which do not promote justice, are unjust laws or decisions. Thus, abolitionism 
does not represent Utopian thinking. Instead it means inventing the fundamental ethics 
of the rule of justice again and again and extending it to all areas of criminal law and 
its practices and institutions. Even if a criminal-law-free society will never be present, 
will never come, abolitionism is still always, already working at the heart, at the core 
of criminal law; working there as an ethical demand, as the rule of justice. Abolitionism 
as the rule of justice practices an on-going interruption of the criminal law by ethics: 
legal knowledge must be at the service of fundamental ethics. A just 'cr iminal ' law is 
an ethically-grounded form of law, which is continually being called into question by 
asking for its justification and justification of its practices and institutions. 
All in all, abolitionism is just an effort or an unfinished task of an infinite 
responsibility. 
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Tibor HORVÁTH T h e P r o b l e m s of Const i tut ional 
Regulation of the Right to Life 
In the w o r d s of the Hungar ian Consti tut ion, "[the] right to l i fe is an inherent right of 
all human beings"; that is, to anyone wi thout distinction as to nationali ty, ethnicity, 
rel igion, polit ical convict ion, etc. This pr incip le also appears in several international 
documents , such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights issued by the United 
Nat ions (Article 3); the Uni ted Nations ' International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (Article 6); and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights a n d Funda-
mental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 [European Convention on Human 
Rights (Article 2)]. However , these international documents do not talk about the content 
and the extent of this right. 
Ye t the content of this right to human l i f e can be def ined. Its basis is in the ethical 
c o m m a n d "Thou shalt not ki l l" , thousands of years old, which obliges both individuals 
and the state to have respect for life. The re fo re it is an inherent right of a h u m a n being 
to have his right to life respected by everyone ; the state is a lso obliged to ensure this 
right with the power of the law. 
T h e importance of human life is a p r imary value which cannot be den ied by any 
phi losophical , ethical, or sociological system. It is also clear that the right to l i fe is only 
possessed by a human being. But it is unclear from what t ime the law should begin to 
protect human life, and for how long this protection should continue. When does human 
l ife begin: at insemination or at birth? Does it cease at the momen t of dea th , or can it 
even end be fo re this as the result of some k ind of state act ion, or as a consequence of 
the right of the individual to renounce l ife? 
T h e constitutional regulation of the r ight to human l i fe depends on the answers 
given to these questions. A s far as the beginning of life is concerned, the regula t ion of 
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abortion poses a problem, whilst in the case of the cessation of life, questions 
concerning capital punishment and euthanasia may arise, and require a constitutional 
solution. Also at issue is whether the right to human life should be an absolute value, or 
whether any other legal interest could limit iL Connected with this are then questions 
raised by justified defence and difficulties of the constitutional justification of the legal 
use of firearms by state organs. 
I. Abortion 
There has recently been a widespread ethical, political, and legal debate in Hungary on 
the topic of abortion. After the Constitutional Court had expressed its opinion1, 
Parliament passed a law on the protection of embryonic life (Act LXXXLX of 1992).2 
However, the law does not answer the question of whether the right to human life also 
includes the life of the embryo. During the debate in Parliament, there were several 
opinions expressed for and against the embryonic right to life. The law which entered 
the statute books did not change the attitude accepted in the Hungarian legal system, 
namely that an important element of the legal interpretation of the human state is the 
legal entity, which begins at birth. To put it simply, the right to life starts at the time 
of birth. I find it impossible at present to give a wider constitutional definition of the 
interpretation of being human—using the terminology of the Constitutional Court—whilst 
taking the vague nature of this interpretation and its legal consequences into 
consideration. It is essential to note, in connection with this issue, that neither the 
international documents nor the recognised European constitutions include any 
regulations regarding abortion. At present European legal systems, and what is more, 
even the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, still refuse to include the 
question of abortion in the genus of the right to life. 
II. Capital Punishment 
The Hungarian legal system today does not recognise capital punishment. Replying to 
a motion by the League Against Capital Punishment, the Constitutional Court of the 
Hungarian Republic, in its decision published on the 24th of October, 1990, declared 
that capital punishment is unconstitutional and repealed all the statutory provisions 
concerning the infliction and execution of capital punishment Soon after making this 
decision the Hungarian Republic became a signatory to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The Convention, together with its 8 additional Protocols, was ratified in 
l 
2 
64/1991. ( K . 17.) AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court). 
1992. évi LXXXDC. törvény (Act LXXXIX of 1992). 
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Act XXXI of 1993.3 As is well-known, Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 states that "[t]he death 
penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed." 
The question is whether it is still necessary to deal with capital punishment af ter this 
ratification, and whether there is anything yet to be done in the constitutional process 
in connection with this apparently already solved legal problem. To answer this question 
it is necessary to make a brief survey of the procedure by which capital punishment was 
abolished, the decision of the Constitutional Court, and the legal situation which 
followed. 
This method of abolishing capital punishment is unprecedented in international legal 
practice, and all the resolution of the Constitutional Court appeared to be an unexpected 
and surprising step to the Hungarian public. Questions often asked at the time, and still 
today, are what made this step possible, what were the reasons behind it, and why was 
the medium of the Constitutional Court used? 
In 1989, in the course of the change in political regime, and of the building up of 
a democratic and constitutional state, it was clearly seen that the preservation or 
abolition of capital punishment was a social, political, ethical, and legal di lemma which, 
sooner or later, society would have to face. In the 1980's it was mainly professional 
legal circles who were aware of, and influenced by, the European development of law 
based on social rationality and the recognition of human rights, which had already 
resulted in the banning of capital punishment f rom the arsenal of criminal law on the 
major part of the continent. 
The government which was developing the political strategies of the transition was 
undoubtedly sympathetic to the idea of abolition, although it never committed itself to 
it publicly. Neither of the political parties supported the unpopular idea of abolishing 
capital punishment. At the same time, as more and more of society learned about the 
misuses of political and legal rights in past decades, and particularly about the size and 
scope of the retribution after the uprising of 1956, the public came face to face with the 
ethical and political dilemma of the problem, and turned away from capital pun i shmen t 
It was due to this fact that Parliament carried the motion of the Minister of Just ice not 
to impose capital punishment for political o f f ences - in particular, offences against the 
state. 
In early 1989 lawyers and intellectuals established the League Against Capital 
Punishment, which planned to launch an extensive campaign for the complete abolition 
of capital punishment. However, at the same t ime as the idea of abolition was spreading 
among the members of Parliament, and there were adherents of abolition in every 
3 The Convention was transformed into the Hungarian legal system by X X X I Act of 1993; it became, 
however, effective with respect to the Hungarian Republic on 5 November 1992. See e.g. MAVI, V. : Az Európa 
Tanács és az emberi jogok (The Council of Europe and Human Rights), Budapest, 1993, 19.; BÁRD, К — B Á N , 
T.: "Az Emberi Jogok Európai Egyezménye és a magyar j o g " (The European Convention on Human Rights and 
Hungarian Law), Acta Humana, 1992, Nos. 6-7 ; GELLÉR, В.: "A 'büntetés' fogalma az emberi j ogok és alap-
vető szabadságok védelméről szóló Egyezmény 7. Cikkének t . bekezdésében" (The Concept of "Pun i shmen t " 
in Article 7(1) of the European convention of Human Rights), Magyar Jog, 1997. No. 2, 105-107. 
234 Tibor Horváth 
political party, the party leadership did not dare to address the issue of abolition, 
presumably for tactical reasons. Yet the amendments to the Constitution stated that "[I]n 
the Hungarian Republic all persons bave an inherent right to life and human dignity 
which no-one can be deprived of arbitrarily" (Act X X of 1949 modified by Act XXXI 
of 1989, Article 54). 
Considering all these factors, the League decided to take the case before the 
Constitutional Court, since they believed that capital punishment was irreconcilable with 
the principle of law expressed in Article 54 of the amended Constitution. In January 
1990 the League submitted its petition to the Constitutional Court, and moved that the 
Constitutional Court should declare capital punishment to be unconstitutional. 
The reasons for this petition were presented in a study which set forth in detail the 
European traditions of the movement against capital punishment, offered a survey of the 
present state of capital punishment in Hungary, and discussed the reasons for and 
against its abolition. 
The League developed its position against capital punishment by relying on the 
experiences of both Hungarian and international criminal research. According to the 
standpoint of the League, the problem has an ethical issue at its centre: capital 
punishment cannot be ethically justified; it is irreconcilable with the constitutional 
appreciation of the right to life; and the state cannot justify its right to deprive its 
citizens of life by any legal title. All the other arguments and counter-arguments judged 
the efficiency, expediency, or inexperience of this particular punishment f rom a 
utilitarian point of view. 
On the 16th of October 1990, the Constitutional Court discussed the petition of the 
League in a full public meeting. Subsequently the Constitutional Court decided to 
abolish capital punishment by a vote of 8 to 1. 
It is important to emphasise that the Constitutional Court based its decision not on 
political, historical criminal law, or on criminological arguments, but exclusively on the 
natural legal conception of human life which can be deduced from the statements of the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court, in justifying its decision, reasoned as follows. 
Comparing Articles 8 and 54 of the Constitution, we can say that the right to life 
and human dignity—irrespective of citizenship—is an inherent, inviolable, and inalienable 
fundamental right of every human being in Hungary. Human life and human dignity 
constitute an inseparable unity and are the highest value, preceding everything else. The 
right to human life and human dignity is a fundamental right, constituting a unity which 
is the source and precondition of several other fundamental rights. The right to human 
life and human dignity as absolute values represent a limitation on the punishing power 
of the state. 
Pursuant to the decision of the Constitutional Court, the prohibition of Capital 
Punishment is absolute: it covers military and civil justice, as well as in time of war or 
any other state of emergency. 
After the abolition of capital punishment, opinions were voiced frequently and 
regularly claiming that the increase in criminal cases, especially serious murder cases, 
could be attributed to the lack of capital punishment. Following certain particularly cruel 
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cases which caused public indignation, the demand to restore capital punishment gathered 
force among the public. In the present constitutional dispute some political groups are 
pressing for the restoration of capital punishment. 
However, it is important to emphasise that it is not possible to find a direct 
relationship between the abolition of capital punishment and the increase in crime. The 
reasons for the considerable increase in crime after the change in political regime should 
be attributed to other factors. It can be demonstrated, even without a comprehensive 
criminological analysis, that the change in political regime and its social and economic 
side-effects are among the main factors. The change in regime destroyed several old 
values, along with the respect for norms developed under the old regime, and the new 
regime has managed only very slowly and with contradictions to build up new forms of 
value and norms. Additionally, the difficult economic situation, the decline in living 
standards, together with the opening of the country's borders and the appearance of 
international crime, have resulted in an increase in criminal cases. The same phenomenon 
can be experienced in all the former socialist countries, independently of whether or not 
capital punishment has been abolished. During the process of political changes, capital 
punishment was abolished by presidential order in Romania and Czechoslovakia; it 
remained as a legal sanction in the former Soviet Union and the states of the former 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Poland. 
Taking all these factors into consideration, I cannot find any reasons which would 
make it necessary to review the decision of the Constitutional Court due to public 
pressure, or any other emotional or political opinions. I believe that 
— abolition of capital punishment in Hungary was a both ethically and legally 
justified move; 
— the abolition of capital punishment proved, and continues to prove, the democratic 
and constitutional commitments of the Hungarian Republic; 
— the dilemmas caused by the abolition of capital punishment can be handled 
legally, for example by introducing life imprisonment to replace capital punishment; 
however, these dilemmas—because of their extremely complex social, economic, and 
socio-psychological character -can be solved only in the long run. 
Turning back to the efforts to restore capital punishment, the following must be 
noted. Act XXXI of 1993, mentioned above, which ratified the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the wording of its Protocol No. 6, compels the Hungarian 
Republic to abolish capital punishment. In international law it is not impossible to 
withdraw from obligations already accepted, but it may have further political and 
international legal consequences. 
It has been proposed that capital punishment should be restored by means of a 
referendum. However, I have to say that this is a rather naive and legally impossible 
idea. Without going into details I will refer very briefly to Act XVII of 1989, Article 
6, paragraph 1, point c, which sets out the legal regulations of a referendum, and which 
excludes the possibility of a referendum "in the case of internationally accepted 
obligations". Since this obviously applies to Act XXXI of 1993, the legal conclusion 
is quite clear: the question of capital punishment cannot be decided at a referendum. 
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Having dealt with these introductory questions, it should now be examined whether 
it would be necessary, or indeed possible to include any regulation on the abolition of 
capital punishment into the new Constitution. 
For my own part, I cannot see any reasons why the new Constitution should not 
regulate the right to human life. We have to suppose that the present 8th and 54th 
Articles of the Constitution will also be included in the new law. It is not impossible 
that the paraphrasing of the new Articles may be modified, with respect to certain 
structural and stylistic aspects, but this does not imply substantial changes. The starting 
point is that the new paraphrasing should lay down that the Hungarian Republic accepts 
the inviolable and inalienable fundamental rights of the human being without restriction, 
and it statutorily regulates the right to human life. 
As a consequence of including these regulations in the future Constitution, there 
seem to be two legislative possibilities as far as capital punishment is concerned. 
The first possibility appears to be the more satisfactory. As the content of the 8th 
and 54th Articles will presumably not change, it is possible to adopt a position which 
says that, due to the previous decisions of the Constitutional Court regarding capital 
punishment as unconstitutional, it is unnecessary to have separate regulations in the 
Constitution. This position can be supported by the fact that the Constitutions of several 
European countries do not mention the prohibition of capital punishment, although these 
countries are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights and have 
accepted the recommendation of Protocol No. 6. The advantage of this solution is that 
it may spare Parliament from actual debate—which would probably strongly divide the 
political parties—and from taking a public position on either side. However, this 
advantage is at the same time a disadvantage. The public would have difficulty in 
understanding why Parliament had tried to hide behind the Constitutional Court, and 
why it does not take ethical and political responsibility for the decision. Additionally, 
the danger would still remain that later any political force could take advantage of the 
"hidden" prohibition of capital punishment for the purposes of a political attack, thus 
mobilising the public, for example, into collecting signatures in favour of a referendum, 
against the constitutional institutions. 
No matter which side this solution is seen from, its possible advantages and 
disadvantages, my firm opinion is that this way should not be attempted. 
There is still a second possibility: the Constitution should state that, in accordance 
with the European Convention on Human Rights and other international documents, the 
infliction and adoption of capital punishment is prohibited both in time of peace and of 
war. This solution was chosen by European countries which recognised the inhuman, 
brutal, and cruel nature of capital punishment, and its inconsistency with human rights 
after breaking the traditions of a dictatorial system. That was the way that was followed 
by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 (Fundamental Law, Article 102), as well 
as by Austria in 1955 (Constitution, Article 85), by Spain in 1978 (Constitution, Article 
15), and by Portugal in 1976 (Constitution, Article 24). It is natural in this situation to 
debate in Parliament, and to openly confront the public and other political forces. This 
is the only solution which would create an unambiguous situation, and would 
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additionally demonstrate without any doubt the ambitions of the Hungarian Republic to 
integrate fully into Europe in the field of human rights. 
As far as the structure is concerned, the constitutional prohibition of capital 
punishment should be included in the paragraph containing the rights to life, in the 
catalogue of fundamental laws. 
III. Euthanasia 
The problem of euthanasia was first addressed in Hungarian legal literature in the inter-
war period, under the influence of European—mainly German—literature. After the 
Second World War, as the actions of German fascists in carrying out "merciful death" 
became well-known, the question of euthanasia was quietly dropped, and it did not 
appear even in legal literature. This changed in the 1970's, partly because of the sudden 
developments in medical science, and partly because of the increase in activities in 
favour of legalising euthanasia, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Since the beginning of the 1980's, the movement to legalise euthanasia has appeared 
in newspapers and magazine articles, in deontological literature, and a legal doctoral thesis 
was even written on this problem. This author argued that "easy death" should be 
controlled as a human right, and that the statute on the right to human life should be ex-
tended by the "right to death". However, Hungarian criminal and civil legal literature had 
traditionally opposed legislation on euthanasia. There is a mutual understanding in the 
literature that euthanasia goes beyond criminal law, its appearance is the result of medical 
science, and its approval or disapproval is a deontological, medical, and legal dilemma. 
What sort of answers can be given to the questions which emerge in connection with 
euthanasia f rom a criminal and constitutional point of view? A brief historical review 
is necessary. 
According to the evidence of Mommsen, the principle of volenti non fit iniuria did 
not prove effective in Rome in the Imperial period. At that time murder was considered 
to be a cr ime not against the individual, but rather against the community. In the early 
Middle Ages, with the influence of Christian religious ethics, a new principle was 
established according to which the right to life is inalienable and does not belong to the 
area of f ree will of the individual. However, in the 17th and 18th centuries views were 
already appearing which considered euthanasia and the potential generosity with which 
it could be employed—for the purposes of compassion, sympathy, and the relief of 
unbearable pain. Euthanasia was regarded as being distinct from any other kinds of 
murder, and it was proposed that it should merit a lighter sentence. That is how a new 
criminal act was bom in the 19th century, namely "mercy killing", which was a form of 
murder liable to a lighter sentence. This phenomenon can be found in the Criminal Code 
of the German Empire in 1871, and then later, in the first half of the 20th century, in 
several European penal codes, such as the Italian, Swiss, Danish, Norwegian, and Polish. 
In Hungary the first mention of "mercy killing" can be found in the Criminal Code 
of 1843, and then later in the Criminal Code of 1878. Article 282 of the Csemege Codex 
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states that "Anyone who is caused by the firm wish of someone else to kill him" 
commits the act of "mercy killing". This provision was valid until 1961, although whilst 
the law was in force, hardly any such cases were taken to court. The Criminal Code of 
1961 rejected the idea of "mercy killing", and ever since then the judgement of 
euthanasia comes under the general regulations referring to premeditated murder. 
When dealing with the present debate on euthanasia, I have to emphasise that 
different forms of euthanasia should be treated in different ways. There is not, and 
should not be, any dispute about the fact that non-voluntary or forced euthanasia should 
be excluded from this area. To be more precise, the only possible response to this type 
of euthanasia should be to punish it as an act of murder. 
Criminal judgement of voluntary euthanasia should be differentiated from that of 
involuntary euthanasia. Unfortunately, there is no common reaction among doctors and 
legal professionals, as regards the judgement of actions of this kind; this is proved by 
the confusion in the terminology, and the inconsistency in the legal literature on this 
problem. 
There is talk of "euthanasia in practice" even in cases where a doctor tries to ease 
the suffering of a terminally ill patient with narcotics, without the intention of hastening 
the patient's death by this action. I firmly believe that such actions cannot be either 
legally or ethically censured. Easing the suffering in a state of agony without hastening 
death—that is, making possible a more humane and easy death—is not unacceptable. 
Rather, it is one of the responsibilities of doctors. No problem emerges from a legal 
point of view, because death has occurred in natural circumstances, and there is no 
connection between the use of narcotics and the occurrence of death. Therefore, I 
personally do not regard this case as one of euthanasia, and it is irrelevant f rom a legal 
point of view. 
However, this case described above should be strongly distinguished from cases 
where an overdose of narcotics is given to the patient, and as a consequence it leads to 
death. Here the dilemma is the following. The normal dose of painkiller does not ease 
the pain of a patient suffering from a painful and terminal illness, and the doctor 
increases the dose of the drug. Although the doctor is aware that this will ease the pain, 
he is also aware that it can hasten death. If the patient subsequently dies, as a 
consequence of the increased dose of the drug, then the doctor has actually shortened 
his life and hastened his death. Western ethical literature exonerates the doctor from this 
responsibility by the principle of "secondary effect", and considers that the aim of the 
doctor was not to shorten life, but rather to ease pain. 
However, from a legal point of view this case is not so simple, since the increased 
dose of painkiller has actually shortened the life of the patient. In other words, it has 
a causal connection with the patient 's death. The question is whether the doctor's act 
was legal from a criminal point of view. My opinion is the following: the illegality of 
the doctor's action is precluded, on one hand, by the principle of risk-taking, and on the 
other, by the principle of professional responsibility. That is, the doctor has to take 
responsibility for hastening death by giving painkiller immediately. And, as in the case 
of dangerous operations, the actions of a doctor in taking a risk are not considered to 
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be illegal, because this same principle of permissible risk-taking exonerates the doctor 
of responsibility and blame. 
However, it is also legally accepted that it is the doctor 's professional responsibility 
to ease pain as well as to protect life. In certain cases, where the two rightful individual 
interests contradict each others the law should show the way out of the dilemma. In the 
case of such a collision of responsibilities, this would be if the doctor can freely choose 
between responsibilities based on his scientific and ethical convictions, and he cannot 
be censured for his choice. 
In any other cases when active euthanasia is carried out at the request of either the 
patient or any of his relatives, it is considered to be illegal from the point of view of 
criminal law; it can be partially explained by the humane motivation of the doctor, but 
cannot be excused. 
The question is whether this rather inflexible position is right, or whether a change 
in the regulations on the criminal evaluation of active euthanasia would be jus t i f ied. 
All those who argue for the legalisation of euthanasia in fact commence f rom the 
utilitarian idea of the value of life. They attribute a smaller value to life when its 
usefulness is declining or approaching its end. That creates the idea that the preservation 
of life in the case of a terminal and painful illness, or in the final period of agony, is 
not in the interests of the patient, his family, or society. This conclusion is encapsulated 
in the concept that the individual has the right to life and to death. Those demanding 
a more active participation by medical science also deduce from this conception that in 
addition to preserving life (by curing the patient), provision of an easy death, or in 
certain cases the shortening of agony, is also among the responsibilities of medical 
science. 
In m y opinion, this reasoning is not acceptable to consistent ethical or legal 
thinking. Not acceptable firstly because the law regulates the protection of life by a 
general norm. 'Thou shall not kill" was made into law because this ethical regulation 
was turned into a general legal term. A criminal prohibit ion's guaranteeing function 
results partly from its successful application as a general demand. And the generality 
of the principle is, at the same time, the most important guarantee of its success. It is 
the guarantee that the lives of all citizens, without distinction as to nationality, sex, 
condition of health, and age, should be protected by the power of the law. Article 54 
of the Constitution talks of the right to life in the same sense. 
W e are not speaking of the fact that the respect of life by any means and in any 
circumstances, and the autonomy of the individual, the fundamental acceptance of f ree 
choice as a basic value, contradict each other. However, the main obligation of a 
constitutional state is to ensure the right to life against any attack, abuse, or unnecessary 
risk. 
Mos t doctors share the same opinion without distinction as to ideology or religion. 
The official position of the Ethical Board of the Hungarian Chamber of Doctors, dated 
12th July 1993, expresses the same idea: 
"The doctor who carries out euthanasia brings death closer than it would naturally 
be. Doctors take an oath to cure patients and not to take their lives. Any actions which 
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may lead to the taking of life are in contradiction to both the medical profession and to 
deontology. The Hungarian Chamber of Doctors rejects either form of euthanasia." 
To summarise, my opinion is that, even today, active euthanasia contradicts the 
principle of the fundamental protection of life, and is not consistent with the ideas of 
medical profession. It is not acceptable to include it in the Constitution, that is, to 
acknowledge it as the "right to death". It is not accidental that European constitutions 
do not accept the "right to death", a position shared by the international human rights 
institutions in Strasbourg. 
The case of passive euthanasia is quite different Since the 1960's, the development 
of medical science and technology has shaped new medical practices and attitudes. With 
the increase in transplantation and improved artificial feeding, the uncertainty regarding 
passive euthanasia has grown both among doctors and in the legal literature. 
Firstly, it must be pointed out that in the case of passive euthanasia we are talking 
of a particular deontological problem, about an inner conflict of conscience. The 
question is how far and with what kind of equipment should a doctor keep a patient 
alive whose life is naturally approaching its end. Is he obliged to utilise anything, that 
is, any medical equipment currently available, to maintain the patient 's life? Or, based 
on his professional knowledge, is he permitted to cease using any artificial equipment, 
and thus by this action permit nature to take its course? 
According to generally held opinion, doctors should employ increasingly 
sophisticated technical and scientific techniques, but they must not take advantage of 
them. The doctor does not have the right to take a humane and easy death away from 
the patient on account of a false, one-sided interpretation of a doctor's responsibility. 
The artificial, almost aggressive sustaining of human functions does not mean that life 
is lengthened, but rather that the agony of death is extended. Delaying or hastening 
inevitable death are both considered to be a criminal offence—an opinion which is 
increasingly widespread in the medical community. 
In vindication of my previously expressed opinion, I would contend that in the case 
of dissociated brain-death the re-animator should have the right to be assured not to be 
kept alive with the help of medical equipment. That is, if restoring self-supporting life 
without medical equipment is not possible. When this point is reached can only be 
decided by taking all the conditions of the case into consideration. If this point has 
arrived, and the doctor decides to dispense with any further employment of medical 
equipment, the doctor cannot be censured for his "negligence". The principle of lege 
artis defines the legality of "negligence", which means that the doctor has acted in a 
way which both observes the regulations of the medical profession and at the same time 
is in the patient 's favour. 
This opinion corresponds to the position of the Ethical Board of the Hungarian 
Chamber of Doctors, as quoted above. 
Taking all these factors into consideration, my opinion is as follows: passive 
euthanasia is justified in the group of cases discussed above, and it should be 
acknowledged as a moral and legal action, for which the doctor cannot be censured, and 
for which he does not bear a moral and legal responsibility. Carrying out passive 
The Prob lems of Constitutional Regulation of the Right to Life 241 
euthanasia will a lways be a dilemma of medical knowledge and the individual 's 
conscience, and all bureaucratic solutions have to be excluded from this question. 
IV. An Exception to the Statute of the Right to Life 
According to the Constitution, the right to life ensures absolute protection for human 
life—in the sense of the legal interpretation of "human"—from birth to death. This 
fundamental right cannot be limited by the state, and its effectiveness has to be ensured 
by law with regard to both individual and state actions. However, those provisions have 
existed in European legal systems, as well as in Hungary, for centuries, which makes it 
possible for any individual as well as for organs of the state to prejudice the right to life 
of any citizen in favour of certain rights and legal interests. There are two groups of 
cases relevant here. One is the legally justified defence and state of necessity known in 
criminal justice; the other is the legally justified use of firearms by organs of the state. 
In the former case, the law allows for the elimination of a person who is illegally and 
aggressively attacking another or, in cases of necessity, the disregard of others' rights by 
a person in an emergency situation (Penal Code, Article 29, Article 30). In certain cases, 
where the state is carrying out actions in order to maintain public security, law, and 
order, the law empowers the executive forces of the state to use firearms to kill indi-
viduals. These cases are, for example, those where serious crime is being countered, 
where a person who has committed a serious criminal offence is being apprehended, or 
to prevent an attempt at escape (c.f. 1994 Act on the Police Force, Articles 52-57) . 
Almost the same legal regulations can be found in the legal systems of all European 
states. 
It is important to point out that there is a serious contradiction between the 
fundamental Constitutional law on the right to life, and the above mentioned statutes. 
This because although these statutes establish exceptions to the law in force regarding 
the right to life, these exceptions are not acknowledged by the Constitution. 
This contradiction is not a characteristic only of the Hungarian Constitution. I have 
no knowledge of any other European Constitution which contains regulations overruling 
this contradiction. This legal problem is well-known in the international legal literature 
which deals with human rights, and several solutions have been suggested. The only 
international document—which also concerns Hungary—which gives guidelines for the 
solving of this problem is the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 2(2) 
states that "Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this 
Article when it results f rom the use of no more force than is absolutely necessary: 
a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
b) in order to effect a lawful arrest, or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
c) in action lawful ly taken for the purposes of quelling a riot or insurrection." 
There is no doubt that point a) of the Convention refers to the situation of just if ied 
defence, whilst points b) and c) refer to actions carried out by organs of the state which 
observe legal regulations. All these cases eventually imply exceptions to the general 
242 Tibor Horváth 
prohibition on violating the right to human life. When the Hungarian statute mentioned 
above is compared to these regulations set out in European Convention on Human 
Rights, the Hungarian situation essentially measures up to the expectations of European 
norms. However, it is still questionable whether the exceptions to the law on the right 
to life should be included in the Constitution. 
Opinions which refer to the practice of other European Constitutions are also 
possible. This would allow the question to be regulated by statutes outside the 
framework of the Constitution, and the possible contradictions would then be overruled 
by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, the present uncertain and contradictory situation 
would remain unchanged. However, if we accept that the Constitution regulates the right 
to human life as well as prohibits capital punishment, then we can hardly be averse to 
stating that the Constitution should define or should refer to exceptions to the existing 
law on the right to life. The legal solution would be the following: the last paragraph 
of the regulation referring to the right to life would encompass the directions of Article 
2(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. If this paraphrasing is found to be 
too lengthy, then the last paragraph of this regulation could refer in general terms to the 
exceptions: "the exceptions to the law on the right to life are regulated by a separate 
statute." For my part, I would recommend this solution, which is in accordance with the 
method employed by the Constitution when referring to exceptions. 
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Heikki KULLA The Municipal Staff: the Manager 
and Officials 
I. Introduction 
1. The structure of municipal administration 
Local autonomy in the Finnish system is a concept referring basically to municipal self-
government and to administration through the municipalities. At present, there are about 
455 municipalities. In addition, there are some two hundred municipal joint authorities 
that constitute the basic form of cooperation between the autonomous municipalities. 
The part of the local administration for which autonomous municipalities are responsible 
for forms quantitatively today the largest section of in the whole public administration.1 
At the end of the 80's, the Government made the reform of public management 
major focus of concern. The ensuing reform aimed at strengthening the democrat ic 
system and municipal self-government, and increasing public service and opportunities 
for participation among citizens. 
1 MODEEN, T.: L'Administration communale de la Finlande. Âbo, 1971; MODEEN, T.: Die Entwicklung 
der Kommunalverwaltung und des Kommunalrechts in den skandinavischen Staaten. Universität des Saarlandes. 
Europainstitut 113. 1988; OULASVIRTA, L (ed.): Finnish Local Government in Transition. Finnish Local 
Government Studies 4/1995; MÄENPÄÄ, О.: "Administrative Law", in PÖYHÖNEN, J.: An Introduction to 
Finnish Law, Helsinki, 1993, 295-344. ; MÄENPÄÄ, O.: "Constitutional Aspects of Local Autonomy in 
Finland", in S A K S L I N , M. (ed.): The Finnish Constitution in Transition. Helsinki, 1991, 121-131.; T H O R S , 
A. : "Local Government in Finland", in MODEEN, T. (ed.): Public Administration in Finland, Helsinki, 1994, 
37-47. ; RYTKÖLÄ: Finnisches Gemeindeverwaltungsrecht. Helsinki, 1961; STÄHLBERG, К. : Finnish Local 
Government in the Postwar Period. Âbo, 1990. 
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The committee pondering the status of local authorities submitted its report on a new 
Local Government Act in 1993 (Committee report 1993:33). In 1994 the government 
submitted a proposal (192/1994) for a new Municipal Act, which was then passed, taking 
effect on 1.7.1995 (365/95). The scope, competence and structure of the municipal 
administration are determined by this Act. According to the Act, administration is or-
ganised more flexibly than in the preceding Act of 1976.2 
The Local Government Act presupposes a somewhat modified division of powers 
within the municipal organisation. The decision making powers are exercised by the 
council whose members are directly elected in municipal elections. The executive 
functions are carried out by the municipal board and the administrative organs controlled 
by it. The judicial control of the decision-making is the task of independent courts, that 
is, the Provincial Administrative Courts and Supreme Administrative Court.3 
Municipal administration is based on representative democracy. The representative 
organ of the municipality is the council. The members of the council are elected every 
four years. The council 's main duties include the making of all politically important 
decisions, adopting a budget, general steering and controlling of the other municipal 
organs, and passing local by-laws. 
Responsible for the administration in general, as well as for the implementation of 
municipal decisions, are the municipal board, the committees, and the administrative 
staff. The municipal board is composed of persons elected proportionally by the council. 
Its main duties include supervising and steering the activity of the committees and 
municipal staff, drafting the council's decisions, and implementing them. 
Under the new legislation, municipalities have been given quite extensive powers 
to organize their own structure. Within the framework of the law, each municipality may 
decide on the details of its administrative machinery. The administrative and executive 
staff are subordinate to the council, the board, and the committees. 
Committees are responsible for the administration of one of the main areas of 
municipal activity. Even the committees are elected by the council by proportional vote. 
All the committees are formally subordinate to the board but especially the statutory 
committees enjoy considerable freedom in their decision-making within the municipal 
organisation.4 
2. The administrative staff 
Personnel working for local authorities are employed either in an employment 
relationship under public law or in an employment contract relationship under private 
2 RYYNÄNEN, R.: 'Trends in Municipal Legislation Reform", in Finnish Local Government in Transition, 
291-295. 
3 MODEEN, T.: "The Principle of Administrative Legality. The Control System", in Public Administration 
in Finland, 87-96. 
4 NIEMI-nLAHTI, A.: "The Structure and Finances of Finnish local Government", in Finnish Local 
Government in Transition, 272-285. 
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law. According to Section 44 of the Local Government Act, public offices are established 
for administrative duties, i.e. those that involve the exercise of public authority, including 
the preparation and implementation of decisions, or that involve particular financial 
responsibility. In practice, however, offices have also been established commonly to 
handle work other than administrative duties.5 
The standardizing of the position of officeholders and other employees has been 
under consideration for a long time. When the 1976 Local Government Act (953/1976) 
was being dealt with in Parliament, the Second Law Committee took the view in its 
report that a study should be made of the ways of eliminating the discrepancies 
between the employment relationship under public law and the employment contract 
relationship. 
The matter was also dealt with by the working group set up in 1989. This working 
group pointed out in its memorandum (1990) that municipal administration was subject 
to strong pressure for change. The shift to a more service-oriented administration 
demanded a reassessment. Local government needed to be more flexibly organized and 
it was felt that personnel should be used more freely for a wider variety of tasks. The 
working group and later the Local Government Committee (Committee Report 1993:33) 
preparing the new Local Government Act of 1994 proposed that personnel in municipal 
administration should be employed under contract. 
In contrast, the starting point of the government proposal to Parliament in 1994 
(192/94) was for the traditional division. Personnel working for local authorities were to 
be employed either in a civil service relationship under public law or in an employment 
contract relationship under private law. Parliament passed the bill as such but emphasized 
that a reform to standardize the position of officeholders and other employees was still 
necessary. However, the important reform of employment security will be put into effect 
by the Act on the Employment Security of an Municipal Official (484/1996, effective 
date 1.7.1996). 
Salaried employees in both the state and municipal sector are governed by labour law. 
The most important laws on general labour markets are the Employment Contracts Act 
and the Collective Agreement Act.6 
The number of the public sector personnel in Finland is on average at the European 
level. The Finnish public sector grew fast during the 1980's but the serious recession in 
the national economy and the budget deficits have forced Finland to cut down personnel 
in the public sector. The greatest personnel cuts has been made in the municipalities, 
especially in health care, social services and education.7 
5 M O D E E N , T.: "Politicians—Professional—The Power" , in Finnish Local Government in Transition, 
286-90 ; K U L L A , H.: "La fonction publique territoriale". Annuaire des collectivités locales, Paris , 1993. 
401-404 . 
6 B R U U N , N.: "Labour Law and Non-discrimination Law", in An Introduction to Finnish Law, Helsinki, 
1993, 119-159 . 
7 M E T S Ä P E L T O : "Public Sector Personnel", in Public Administration in Finland, 65-71 . 
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M u n i c i p a l S t a t e 
Officials Employees Civil servants Employees 
1987 250,000 200,000 132,000 82,000 
Total 450,000 214,000 
1994 410,000 190,000 110,000 48,000 
Total 400,000 158,000 
The total of wage and salary earners was 1,800,000-total labour force was 248,000 
—unemployment rate was 18.4 % (456,000). 
II. The Standing of the Officials 
1. Main principles 
The basis of their standing is in the Local Government Act, Section 44. According to this 
section a service relationship is an employment relationship under public law in which 
the municipality is the employer and the official the employee. 
Consistent with the principle of self-administration, every municipality is enpowered 
to give service regulations, which are by-laws. The most important regulation is the office 
regulation, as it is called, and it is compulsory in law. These regulations contain the main 
rules with respect to the general duties of officials. The differences between municipalities 
are not significant, because the Municipal Employers' Office has drawn up a model 
regulation for municipalities. 
The important reform of employment security will be put into effect by the Act on the 
Employment Security of the Municipal Official (government proposal 44/1996, Statute Book 
484/1996). Up to the present, employment security has been regulated by the municipal 
service regulations. The main reason for this reform derives finom the low hierarchical level 
of the service regulations. The International Labour Organisation Convention (1982) 
concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer requires that the 
basis of employment security is in general law enacted by Parliament. 
The concrete background factors of the reform are connected with the new constitu-
tional rules on the fundamental rights (the Constitution Act, chapter II).8 According to 
section 15 of the Constitution Act no one can be dismissed from the service unless on 
8 SCHEININ, M.: "Minorities, Human Rights and the Welfare State-the 1995 Fundamental Rights Reform 
in Finland", in POHJOLA1NEN, T. (ed.): Constitutionalism in Finland—Reality and perspectives, 30-47. 
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grounds of law. Therefore, the special Act on the Employment Security of an Municipal 
Official passed by Parliament was necessary. 
The general grounds for the official responsibility of officials are the provisions of 
Sections 92 and 93 of the Constitution Act. Official responsibility is heightened through 
a special system of consequences. The forms of liability are penal liability and liability 
to pay damages. The disciplinary responsibility of the officials is no longer in force, 
because it was abolished by the new Local Government Act. 
The general duties of the officials are prescribed principally in the municipal service 
regulation. The most important is the obligation to perform official duties. There are 
also provisions on, for instance, not taking bribes, the obligation to maintain secrecy, 
taking an ancillary job, health checks and the obligation to live in an official residence.9 
The retirement age for officials varies from 63 to 65 according to the retirement 
legislation. 
2. Economic terms of employment 
Salaries and other terms of employment of officials were decided unilaterally up to 
1970. Since then, salaries and other conditions of employment have been determined by 
collective agreements (the Collective Agreements for Municipal Officials Act 1970/669). 
Collective bargaining is to a large extent the same as in the private sector. The 
agreements are made at both the central and local level. The municipalities as the 
employer are represented at the central level by the Municipal Employers ' Office. The 
officials are represented by the central trade union organizations.10 
Municipal officials have the right to strike, and municipal employers are authorized 
to impose lock-outs. Strikes and lock-outs are not allowed while collective agreements 
are in force. 
3. Employment security 
An official 's employment relationship can be terminated by notice given on either side, 
by cancellation, by dismissal from office by criminal law, or when he reaches retirement 
age. 
According to the Act on Employment Security (6 §), notice can be given by an 
official or by a municipality so that an employment relationship will end following a 
given period of notice. However, a municipality may not give notice of termination of 
an employment relationship for a reason deriving from the official unless this reason is 
9 MÄENPÄÄ: op. cit. 315-321. 
10 BRUUN: op. cit. 142-151. 
248 Heikki Kulla 
especially weighty. The model for this regulation is used the Employment Contracts Act, 
Section 43, and the State Civil Servant's Act, Section 25." 
In any case, none of the following reasons may apply: 1) sickness, incapacity or 
injury on the part of the official, unless the consequence thereof is a substantial and 
permanent deterioration in working capacity, 2) participation of the official in a strike or 
other industrial action decided on and implemented by an association of officials, 3) the 
official's political, religious or other opinions or his participation in social or associational 
activities. 
A municipality may not give an official notice on grounds of pregnancy. If a munici-
pality gives a pregnant official notice, this shall be viewed as due to pregnancy unless 
other grounds are shown.Tbe municipality may not give an official notice during special 
maternity, maternity, paternity or parental leave or other leave of care. 
The grounds for giving an official notice on financial and production-related grounds 
(Section 7) are much the same as in the Employment Contracts Act and in the State Civil 
Servant's A c t A municipality is entitled to give an official notice if the officials duties 
substantially decrease other than temporarily. However, a municipality is not entitled to 
give an official notice if he can be reasonably relocated in view of his professional skills 
and capabilities, or can be trained for new duties. 
When an official gives notice, the period of notice is f rom 14 days to two months, 
and when a municipality gives an official notice, the period of notice is from one month 
to six months, depending on the duration of the employment 
The employment relationship of an official appointed for a fixed term ends without 
notice when the said fixed term comes to an end unless it is terminated before then 
because notice has been given. 
An official 's employment relationship can be cancelled immediately without the 
period of notice if he grossly violates or neglects his official obligations. An official can 
cancel the empoyment relationship, for instance, when the salary agreed upon is not paid. 
A lay-off is a situation in which the service relationship otherwise remains in force, 
but the work and payment of salary are discontinued indefinitely or for a fixed term. 
Formerly, the collective agreement contained provisions on unilateral lay-off by the 
employer. At present the lay-off is ruled by the new Act on Employment Security. The 
maximum time for a lay-off is 90 days. 
An official can be suspended from office for the period of a criminal prosecution or 
of a trial (Local Government Act, 47 §) and for the period when an official cannot 
perform his duties properly for personal reason. 
Rectification of a decision on a matter concerning employment security can be 
requested from the municipal authority which has made this decision. A decision in the 
light of such request can be appealed to the Provincial Administrative Court and after that 
to the Supreme Administrative Court. 
11 BRUUN: op. cit. 138-140; State Civil Servant's Act (with legislative drafts). Ministry of Finance, Helsinki, 
1995, 13-31. 
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4. Relations to politicians 
The new Local Government Act emphasizes flexilibility of municipal organization. There 
are only a few statutory committees. In practice, decision-making has been delegated to 
the officials more widely than previously. In this respect, a considerable part of the 
political power has been devolved on the officials. 
As a counterbalance to this, the new Act limits more than previously the opportunities 
of officials to take part in political life at the municipal level. This is a question of 
eligibility for membership of the municipal council, the municipal board and committees. 
The leading officials are not eligible for membership of those organs, and the off icials 
subordinated to the board are not eligible for membership of the board and an off ic ial 
subordinated to a committee are not eligible for membership of this committee. 
Political favouritism in appointments is hardly an unknown phenomenon in municipal 
life.12 On the one hand, the municipal council can choose the new officials fairly freely 
according to the principle of self-government. On the other hand, the rules for qualifica-
tions and procedural rules decrease the arbitrary elements in decision-making. The 
provincial administrative courts and, as the highest instance, the supreme administrative 
court control as appellate courts the legality of appointments. 
In the Finnish legal order, there also are many new rules against discrimination 
consequent on international treaties. The most effective rules are in the Act Concerning 
the Equality between Women and Men (309/1986). The new Act on Employment 
Security contains a general rule against discrimination. A municipality may not 
unjustifiably place a person in a different position to other persons, for instance, because 
of his race, religion, age, political or union activities, or other comparable basis.13 
III. The Special Status of the Municipal Manager 
Reform of the municipal management system has been the focus of attention in draft ing 
and passing the new Local Government Act. The key issue has been the position of the 
municipal manager.14 
According to the new Act, the manager is still the chief professional administrator 
of a municipality. The manager is an official and often also a political appointee chosen 
from persons enjoying the confidence of the leading political parties. 
The main task of the manager is to lead the administration, the management of the 
finances, and other activities of the municipality. 
Under the Local Government Act, the status of the manager as an official is in certain 
respects a special one. The manager is always elected by the municipal council. The 
12 MERIKOSKI, V.: "The Politicizatioa of Public Administration", Annates Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae. 
В 162. Helsinki, 1969. 
13 B R U U N : op. cit. 152-59. 
14 M O D E E N : "Pol i l ic ians-Profess ionals-The Power", op. cit. 287-289. 
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manager is elected for an indefinite period or for a limited period (during which he 
cannot be dismissed). A manager taken for a limited period can be elected by the 
municipal council to be chairman of the municipal board. 
Nowadays, the manager is the official presenting proposals to the municipal board. 
Until 1977 the manager was the voting chairman of the executive board. 
The manager 's employment security and the protection against summary dismissal 
are rather weak. The council may by a resolution carried by 2/3 majority of all members 
give notice to the manager or transfer him another tasks if the manager has lossed the 
confidence of the council. 
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Criminal Law Reform 
I. The Concept of the Rule of Law 
The relationship between the rule of law and criminal law has been discussed in the 
Hungarian-Finnish Criminal Law Seminars on several occasions since 1979. For 
example, Professor Eero Backman (from the University of Turku) presented a paper on 
the Rechtsstaat and criminal law in Hungary in 1990.' His main arguments can serve 
as a starting point for this article. 
Professor Backman referred to the doctoral thesis of Dan Frände2 (who is now the 
Swedish-speaking professor at the University of Helsinki) and, in particular, to the 
division of the legality principle in criminal law into the following four sub-clauses: the 
rule that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty (nullum crimen sine 
lege scripta); the rule that criminal law must not be applied by analogy to the accused's 
detriment; the prohibition of the retrospective application of the criminal law to the 
accused 's disadvantage (nullum crimen sine lege praevia); and the rule that a criminal 
offence must be clearly defined in the law (nullum crimen sine lege certa). This kind 
of classification of the main contents of the legality principle is generally accepted inter 
alia in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.3 
1 B A C K M A N , E.: "Rechtsstaat und Strafrecht", in LAHTI, R . -NUOTIO, К. (eds.): Towards a Total Reform 
of Finnish Criminal Law, Helsinki, 1990, 7 -20 . 
2 See F R Ä N D E , D.: Den straffrätlsliga legalitetsprincipen, Ekenäs, 1989. 
3 See, fo r example, the recent case of the Eur. Court H. R., C. R. v. United Kingdom Judgment of 22 
November 1995, Series A. no. 355-C. 
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For Professor Backman these rules were only formal aspects of the legality 
principle. The requirements of Rechtsstaatlichkeit (the constitutionally governed state) 
included several additional criteria. Accordingly he listed firstly, anticipatory guarantees 
such as the general limiting preconditions for criminal liability and the principles 
concerning the organisation of the judiciary. Secondly, the procedural rules regarding 
the different phases of criminal proceedings; and, thirdly, the methods of appeal in 
criminal proceedings and the supervision of the administration of justice. 
Another Finnish scholar, Professor Kaarlo Tuori, has distinguished four models of 
the Rechtsstaat in his theoretical analysis: the so-called liberal Rechtsstaat; the model 
of the substantive Rechtsstaat, the formal concept of the Rechtsstaat, and the model of 
the democratic Rechtsstaat.* According to Tuori, this last model presupposes a consti-
tution based on democracy and fundamental rights but, in addition to this constitutional 
demand, requires an active and independent civil society. 
The democratic model is constructed with the presumption that democracy and 
fundamental rights must be regarded as complementary principles rather than opposing 
or rival ones. The Finnish legal system seems to correspond to this model with respect 
to, among other things, the means of reviewing the constitutionality of laws: there is 
neither judicial review nor a constitutional court, but rather a preventive and an abstract 
control of norms; that is, the conformity of a bill to the constitution is reviewed only 
during the legislative process.5 
Any examination of the concepts of the rule of law and Rechtsstaatlichkeit reveals 
how vague or open to various interpretations they are, although their doctrines are very 
central to the Western liberal democracies. Backman's analysis indicates that the idea 
of the rule of law includes requirements for both the substantive rules of the system 
and the procedural rules which govern adjudication and enforcement in individual 
cases. 
II. Finland and the Ratification of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 
Remarkable changes in Finnish legal ideology have taken place since 1990, as far as the 
concepts of the rule of law and Rechtsstaatlichkeit are concerned. 
In May 1990 Finland ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), accepted the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Human Rights, and recognised the right of individual petition. Before that an in-depth 
study on the compliance of Finnish legislation with the ECHR and Strasbourg case-law 
4 TUORI, K.: "Four models of the Rechtsstaat", in: SAKSUN, M. (ed.): The Finnish Constitution in 
Transition, Helsinki, 1991, 31^11. 
5 JYRANKI, A.: 'Taking Democracy Seriously. The problem of the control of the constitutionality of 
legislation. The case of Finland", in The Finnish Constitution in Transition, 6 -30 . 
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was conducted. Several Acts of Parliament were amended, for example with respect to 
pre-trial investigation and aliens' rights.6 
The ECHR and other important human rights conventions have been incorporated 
through an Act of Parliament in bianco. Because of the predominance of the incor-
poration method, Finland can be said to represent dualism in fo rm but monism in 
practice when implementing international law in the domestic legal order. This method 
of implementation affects the application of human rights treaties. The Parliamentary 
Constitutional Law Committee has confirmed the following principles: the hierarchical 
status of the domestic incorporation act of a treaty determines the formal rank of the 
treaty provisions in domestic law (that is, their rank is normally that of an Act of 
Parliament); incorporated treaty provisions are in force in domestic law in a fo rm 
corresponding to their representation in international law; and the courts and authorities 
should resort to "human-rights-friendly" interpretations of cases which have domestic 
status, in order to avoid conflicts between domestic law and human rights law.7 
Before the Finnish ratification of the ECHR there were no references to international 
human rights conventions in the case-law of the Finnish Supreme Court, although the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman had systematically applied international human rights law 
in his decision-making in the years leading up to ratification. The first cases where the 
Supreme Court expressed its willingness to apply international human rights norms were 
decided in 1990, and dealt with the extradition of persons accused of hijacking an 
aeroplane in the former Soviet Union. In all of these four cases, the Supreme Court 
informed the Ministry of Justice that, in its opinion, there were no legal obstacles to 
extradition, stating meanwhile that a rule of non-refoulement, directly binding on Finnish 
authorities, could be drawn from, inter alia, Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 7 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR).8 
Since these extradition cases the Supreme Court has mostly applied human rights 
norms in issues concerning criminal procedure, that is, using Article 6 of the ECHR and 
Article 14 of the CCPR. These treaty provisions have been applied directly in order to 
fill certain gaps in the Finnish legislation on criminal procedure. Such an approach is 
in line with the "human-rights-friendly" interpretation.' 
6 See PELLONPÄÄ, M.: "The Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights in Finland", 
in ROSAS, A. (ed.): international Human Rights Norms in Domestic Law, Helsinki, 1990, 44-67. 
7 See in more detail SCHEININ, M.: "Incorporation and Implementation of Human Rights in Finland", in 
SCHEININ. M. (ed.): International Human Rights Norms in the Nordic and Baltic Countries, The Hague, 1996, 
257-294. 
8 See H ANNIKAIN EN, L : "How to Interpret, and What to Do to, the Treaty on Aircraft Seizures with the 
Soviet Union", Finnish Yearbook of Iniernational Law, Vol. II, 1991, 538-558 . 
9 It should be mentioned here that a government bill concerning criminal procedural matters in the first 
instance courts is currently under Parliamentary scrutiny; this law will comply with the provisions and case-law 
of the ECHR and CCPR. 
254 Raimo Lahti 
III. Constitutional Reform in Finland 
New provisions on basic rights were incorporated into the Finnish Constitution in 
199510 which, compared to previous legislation, are much more detailed. For example, 
these provisions not only discuss fundamental rights in the traditional sense—that is, 
concerning personal security and liberty—but also discuss social rights, having been 
inspired by international human rights. From the point of view of criminal law, there 
are important new provisions, such as one regarding the legality principle in criminal 
law (corresponding to Article 7 of the ECHR and Article 15 of the CCPR), and the 
provision according to which a punishment entailing deprivation of liberty can only be 
imposed by a court. 
Several of the enacted constitutional rules make reference both to constitutional and 
to human rights, thus giving semi-constitutional status to human rights treaties." The 
travaux préparatoires of this reform emphasise the point that constitutional provisions 
are also directly applicable in the administration of law by judges and authorities, and 
so their binding effect is not restricted only to law-making. In addition to the "human-
rights-friendly" interpretation of the law, a similar "basic-rights-friendly" interpretation 
is recommended, although the prohibition on courts examining the constitutionality of 
Acts of Parliament has been maintained. 
As a result of these comprehensive legislative reforms the significance of 
fundamental rights has been strengthened, and a certain change in the relationship 
between democracy and fundamental rights, as well as between different state powers, 
has taken place. For example, some critics of this development have been concerned 
about the weakening of the position of Parliament at the cost of an emerging 
"Richterstaat". On the other hand, a proposal has been made for a constitutional 
amendment which would explicitly authorise the domestic courts to review, at least in 
certain respects, the conformity of laws to the Human Rights Treaty provisions and the 
Constitution.12 
IV. Towards European Criminal Law 
Another major trend is towards internationalisation and European integration and, 
accordingly, towards universal or at least increasingly harmonised laws.13 Dr. Károly 
Bárd already sees certain possibilities for the birth of a European criminal law. Bárd's 
analysis perceives a process of unification in the field of European criminal law. It is, 
10 For a compilation of the provisions on the basic rights, see The Parliament of Finland et al.: Constitutional 
Laws of Finland, Helsinki, 1996. 
11 So SCHEININ: op. cit., 276. 
12 See e.g. JYRÄNKI: op. cit., 15. 
13 See generally DELMAS-MARTY, M. (ed.): What Kind of Criminal Policy for Europe? The Hague, 19%, 
passim. 
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however, continuing in two opposite directions: on the one hand, there is a tendency 
towards the extension of the threat posed by criminal law (for example, through the 
broadening of the scope of the European instruments); on the other hand, the organs of 
the ECHR will continue to fix the minimum standards of a fair administration of 
justice.14 
Becoming a member of the European Union (EU)—a supranational regional organi-
sation—was for Finland a dramatic event, not only politically, but also from a const i -
tutional point of view. For example, the directly applicable parts of EC law mus t 
operate within each member state as a legal system in its own right, that is, according 
to a monistic (and, to Finland, strange) model. 
As to the future, there is increasing pressure for more harmonised (administrative) 
criminal law in the EU and "European judicial space".15 The regulation and convention 
to be used in the fight against European Community fraud (1995) are the first c lear 
examples of this development.16 
V. Finnish Criminal Law Reform and the Rule of Law 
I have presented a long introduction to the theme of "The Rule of Law and Finnish 
Criminal Law Reform". Information on these general legal developments is important 
for an understanding of the on-going shift in legal ideology, and possibly also for an 
understanding of some of the other Finnish contributions to these proceedings. This 
ideological change, with its greater emphasis on human and basic rights will, to m y 
mind, increasingly influence both Finnish criminal law theory and criminal policy. 
As to the recodification of the Finnish Penal Code of 1889, preparation had already 
started in the 1970's, before the emergence of human and basic rights thinking. 
Nevertheless, two basic principles have governed Finnish criminal law reform: the 
legality principle, and the principle of culpability (Schuldprinzip) . These principles a re 
justified primarily on the basis of their compatibility with the values of legal certainty 
and predictability. At the same time, those principles are defended with reference to the 
utilitarian argument of general prevention. A necessary prerequisite for the persuasive-
ness of such a parallel or complementary justification is that general prevention means 
so-called integration prevention, in other words, the effect that criminal law has in 
maintaining and strengthening moral and social norms. It must be kept in mind that 
those basic principles are significant, not only when reforming criminal law, but also 
in its actual application. 
14 See BÁRD, К.: "European Criminal Law?" in LAHTI, R. (ed.): Towards a Rational and Humane Criminal 
Policy. Dedicated to Inkeri Anttila. 29 November 1996, Helsinki, 1996, 241-253 . 
15 See the recent proposal by DELMAS-MARTY, M.: "Vers un espace judiciaire européen", Corpus Juris 
1996. 
16 As for these instruments on the protection of the EC's financial interests, see the Act of the Council of the 
EU of 26 July 1995 (convention) and the Council Regulation No. 2988/95 of 18 December 1995. 
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The legality principle includes the requirement that criminal law must be certain. The 
aim of limiting judicial discretion is predominant in the reform. Whilst, for example, the 
Swedish Criminal Code of 1965 was criticised for using overly vague definitions of 
criminal offences, those responsible for drafting Finnish law have striven to describe the 
offences as clearly as possible: by reducing, for example, the use of value-laden or other-
wise ambiguous terms in the definition of crimes. On the other hand, the objective of 
more precise crime definitions collides with another aim of the Finnish reform work, 
namely the effor t to synthesise these; in other words, to write them in a more abstract 
form and, amongst other aims, to facilitate a progressive development of the criminal law 
through judicial law-making. A reasonable balance between these conflicting aims must 
be sought. 
An accommodation may also be required between the principles of comprehensibility 
and certainty. Although clarity is a function of both comprehensibility and certainty of 
language, the maximisation of one may be detrimental to the other.17 
Other means to curb judicial discretion have also been used. Thus in many cases the 
existing offences have been split into sub-categories (for example, basic assault, 
aggravated assault and petty assault), and the definition of an aggravated offence has 
also been based on an exhaustive list of criteria (always allowing, however, for a less 
severe evaluation). Additionally, the amount and range of penal scales (punishment 
latitudes) have been generally reduced. 
In accordance with the legality principle and the values underlying it, the basic 
concepts and principles governing the general preconditions of criminal liability will be 
defined in the general part of the Criminal Code to a greater extent than is the case 
now. It is obvious that, inter alia, the concepts of intention and negligence as well as 
the preconditions for liability for omissions will be defined in the new Code, which is 
not currently the case. 
One way to strengthen the legality principle will be the effort to reduce and specify 
the use of the so-called blanket provision technique. The new provision on the legality 
principle in the revised Constitution should oblige the legislature and courts to take a 
strict course of action in this respect, because the acts must be punishable under an Act 
of Parliament in force at the time when they were committed. 
This new constitutional provision on the legality principle, according to its travaux 
préparatoires, and the tradition of transforming international treaties requiring the 
penalisation of certain acts, appears to lead to the conclusion that the Finnish courts are 
not allowed to sentence for an act which only constitutes a criminal offence under 
international law (cf. Decision 53/1993 (X.13) of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, 
where individual responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity was 
17 See COLVIN, E.: "Criminal Law and The Rule of Law", in FITZGERALD, P. (ed.): Crime, Justice & 
Codification, Toronto, 1986, 125-152 (135). 
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established irrespective of their punishability under domestic law, but was based on the 
general cogency of the relevant international law).18 
VI. European Dimensions of the Rule of Law 
The demands for accessibility and foreseeability, which are essential criteria of the rule 
of law, are particularly challenging in the more unified Europe, where the increasing 
interdependence of nations compels them to harmonise their criminal justice sys tems 
in order to combat effectively transnational and international crime. One example of 
this is the requirement of double criminality, which induces harmonisation in inter-
national co-operation concerning penal. Régionalisation and sub-regionalisation of 
crime prevention and control is an increasing tendency, especially in the member-states 
of the European Union. 
When the concept of the rule of law is understood in a wider sense as "a design 
which maximises the capacity of legal rules to function as guides for behaviour and 
hence to shape social order on the basis of voluntary compliance with the standards of 
conduct which they express",1 ' then the challenge to a more unified Europe is even 
greater, because then it is difficult or even impossible to keep to the democrat ic 
legitimacy of the legal order. 
VII. The Impact of Human and Basic Rights on the Theory of Criminal 
Law 
As stated above, the increasing emphasis on human and basic rights will obviously be 
reflected in Finnish criminal law theory and criminal policy.20 In the work on a new 
Finnish Criminal Code the theoretical discussion so far has primarily concentrated on 
the arguments of moral and political discourse. This is also true in relation to m y own 
theoretical pieces in this field: for example, when I have argued for a more eff icient , 
just and humane criminal law.21 
The arguments based on human rights or constitutional theory will certainly be put 
forward more insistently in the coming years. For example, the moral and polit ical 
arguments of justice and humanity can now be firmly fastened to human rights and 
constitutional law; accordingly, they have strong institutional support as legal 
principles. Nevertheless, the tension between, on the one hand, utilitarian a rguments 
18 See MOHÁCSI , P.—POLT, P.: "Estimation of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity according to the 
Decision of the Constitutional Court of Hungary", Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, 1996, 3 3 3 - 3 3 9 . 
19 See COLVINÉ: op. cit., 128. 
20 See, in particular, the contribution of NUUTILA, A. -M. : "The Reform of Fundamental Rights and the 
Criminal Justice System in Finland", to these proceedings. 
21 See LAHTI, R.: "Recodifying the Finnish Criminal Code of 1889: Towards a More Efficient, Just and 
Humane Criminal Law", Israel Law Review, 1993, 100-117. 
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of social de fence and, on the other, arguments of just ice and humanity (a tension that 
can be found throughout the history of criminal law) cannot be resolved. A s Stole 
Eskeland has put it, international human rights permit an o f fens ive and not only a 
defensive criminal policy.22 In a similar way, a tendency towards a functional criminal 
law cannot be rejected with arguments based so le ly on the legality principle. In the 
future the forum should also be open to balancing different types o f legal, political and 
moral arguments. 
22 See ESKELAND, S.: "Criminal Law and the International Human Rights", Scandinavian Studies in 
Criminology, 1995, 204-221 (220). Cf.; JAREBORG, N.: "What Kind of Criminal Law Do We Want? ' , in 
SNARE, A. (ed.): Scandinavian Studies in Criminology, 1995, 17-36. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 
1995/96 37 №3-4, pp. 259-271 
1216-2574 / 9 6 / S 5.00 
<S> 1996 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
Miklós LÉVAI T h e R u l e o f L a w 
and Criminalisation—Theoretical 
Considerations 
and Hungarian Criminal Law* 
1. Introductory Notes 
The topic of my paper is the issue of criminalisation: that is, for what purpose, and 
according to what values, is a conduct declared punishable, and what kind of limits and 
consequences does this social labelling process have. Before going into the issue in 
detail, w e should consider some preliminary thoughts. 
According to an old Hungarian proverb, "... where there are many laws crime will 
grow".1 Apparently those who thought up this proverb did not display a deep 
knowledge of criminology; all the same, contemporary events justify their judgement 
and their wisdom. 
A marked cultural characteristic of the end of our century, however, is that in a 
majority of countries the scope of criminal justice is expanding more and more due to 
the increase in criminal laws; parallel with this, crime is also increasing. 
* This paper is a result of the research work carried out in July 1996 at the School of Law, University of 
Warwick, based on the project of Comparative Criminology and Criminal Justice—An Anglo-Hungarian Study. 
The project is sponsored by the "Hungarian British Inter-governmental Co-operation in Education, Research, 
Culture and Art". The project number is No. 122. 
1 T Á R K Á N Y SZŰCS, E : Magyar jogi népszokások (Hungarian Legal Folk Customs), Budapest, 1981, 781. 
260 Miklós Lévai 
Those in authority today seem to consider criminalisation an adequate answer to any 
social problem. Today criminal law and its threat is a significant instrument of social 
control. The tendencies observed in the field of other elements of criminal political 
intervention, such as sentencing policy, law enforcement, and criminal procedure also 
demonstrate in a wider sense the expansion of the scope of criminal law. 
If we compare contemporary subjects of criminalisation with the relations protected 
by criminal law previously, we can see that the paradigm based on the ultima ratio role 
of criminal law is being reinforced. In other words, it should be re-emphasised that 
these laws should be used as a reaction to a phenomenon only when the application o f 
other elements of social control do not seem to be effective. 
Let me illustrate this with the following, as put by Adler, Mueller and Laufer in 
their textbook: 
"Among the pre-Columbian Incas of Peru, one o f the most serious wrongs was the 
destruction of a bridge ... Among the ancient Germanic tribes, theft of a beehive 
was one of the most serious public wrongs. Beehives provided honey, which then 
was the only source of sugar for food and drink ... Neither the Roman Law of the 
Twelve Tables (451-450 ВС) nor the Babylonian Code of Hamurabbi (about 1700 
ВС) lists homicide or ordinary theft among crimes. Nor can we find these crimes 
among the listings of other very early legal systems. On the contrary, homicides 
appear to have been in a category of wrongs that could be righted by compensation, 
or by the surrender of the perpetrator to the injured clan as a substitute worker for 
the slain victim."2 
We can therefore say that in previous times the prevailing practice was to use 
punishment and criminal law only with regard to acts which fundamentally endangered 
the life and operation of the society. 
Today, however, the crime which receives the most serious punishment, excepting 
murder, is drug-trafficking. Governments try to apply the instruments of the criminal 
justice system against either petty property crimes, or drug abuse, or different problems 
of child-rearing, or certain marital anomalies, as well as non-violent sexual abuse at the 
workplace, or a slight violation of civil responsibilities. Scientific and technological 
development has also increased the authority of criminal law, mainly by ways of 
enacting "endangering offences" in criminal codes. 
In parallel with the above process, the structures of criminal acts have changed, as 
well as the basis and scope of responsibility of criminal law. Whereas in the late 19th 
century, the period of legal codification in Europe, the typical criminal offence was 'a 
crime of culpable causing of harm', this is now only one group of crimes. 
In addition to the responsibility based on guilt, in certain fields (for example, in 
environmental protection) there now seems to be an effort to introduce 'strict liability', 
2 ADLER, F . -MUELLER, G. O. W . - L A U F E R , W. S.: Criminology. New York, 1991, 7 -8 . 
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and connected with this, to expand criminal responsibility by including not only natural 
persons (human beings), but also corporate bodies. 
Thus the scope of criminal law has grown significantly in the recent past due to the 
increase in conducts declared to be criminal, and the change in the condit ions and 
subjects of criminal responsibility. "Today", as Matti Joutsen puts it in his paper on this 
much debated topic, 
"some Western European countries appear to be fol lowing the approach pioneered 
in the United States in declaring war on crime. All of these [are] pluralist countries, 
where there are serious conflicts over many of the values underlying the criminal 
just ice system ... As a result, the danger is constantly present that such countries 
wil l expand the scope of criminalised behaviour, expand enforcement and increase 
the degree of intervention without stopping to total up the financial, human and 
social costs."3 
On the basis of the above, w e can assert that even the civilisational development of 
El ias seems to be dominant; that is, whilst the sanctions of the criminal just ice system 
are becoming more humane, contemporary trends in criminalisation prove, however, that 
the role o f criminal justice and criminal law is not decreasing, but is rather increasing 
in the field of social control. That is why it is justified to regularly discuss issues of 
criminalisation; this is additionally in the interest of maintaining the delicate equilibrium 
between the civil right to security and the right to liberty and personal freedom. 
In this paper I will deal with the main problems of the issues mentioned above; that 
is, criminalisation or rather the inflation of criminalisation, from the point o f v i e w of 
criminology, criminal law policy, and the criminal law and the constitutional law. With-
in this framework, after mentioning some criminological aspects of the problem, I will 
mainly discuss the standards, objectives, reasons and limiting principles of cr iminology 
discernible in some criminal political models, that is, questions related to the legitimacy 
o f penal law. Following this, I will discuss current issues o f the topic in Hungary, 
primarily on the basis of the related resolution of the Constitutional Court of Hungary. 
2. Some Criminological Issues of Criminalisation 
In criminology it was due mainly to the work of Edwin Sutherland that the topic of 
criminalisation was given attention. Today this subject has grown so large that there is 
an author who calls criminology "the discipline of criminal sanctions".4 
3 J O U T S E N , M.: Legitimation and the limits of the criminal justice system, European Journal on Criminal 
Policy, No. 1, 1993, 23. 
4 S H E R M A N N , L W.: "Kriminológia és kriminalizálás: dac és a büntetó szankcionálás tudománya" 
(Criminology and Criminalization: Defiance and the Science of Penal Sanctioning), in GÖNCZÖL, K. (ed.): 
Válogatás a 11. Nemzetközi Kriminológiai Kongresszus előadásiból (Selected papers of the 11th International 
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Criminological research related to our topic is primarily directed towards the 
examination of the following two aspects of criminalisation: 
— the analysis o f social factors which exert an influence on criminalisation; 
— the evaluation of the e f f i c iency of penal sanctions. 
Analyses of social factors have pointed out that "the soc io-economic circumstances 
o f a society determine which forms o f behaviour that society considers to be wrongs 
serious enough to be controlled by criminal law".5 
With regard to the components o f socio-economic circumstances, Matti Joutsen, in 
his study quoted above, based on McGarrel's and Castellano's work, states that the 
factors influencing criminalisation can be examined at the fol lowing levels: 
— the structural foundations (such as the heterogeneity of the society; social , 
economic and political inequality; economic crisis; cultural factors); 
— the actual and perceived experience of crime in a social system; 
— the immediate triggering events of crime and justice legislation (such as "the role 
played by political and moral entrepreneurs, campaign politics, media campaigns, 
interest group activities, the criminal justice bureaucracy, reform groups and sensational 
crimes reported by the media in demanding reform of law and policy").6 
A s a result of the research quoted above, the conclusion has been drawn that the 
reason for criminalisation is not necessarily the seriousness of the punishable act, and 
furthermore, that value-based criminalisation is of ten displaced by objective-oriented 
criminalisation, which is mainly interest-based. 
Another approach to the current topic must be mentioned here, that is, the analysis 
o f norms, and especial ly that of the criminal norms from the point o f v iew of interests. 
The two dominant v iews with regard to this are the consensus model and the conflict 
mode l . According to the representatives of the former approach, "certain acts are 
deemed so threatening to the society's survival that they are designated as crimes. If the 
vast majority of the group shares this view, w e can say the group has acted by 
consensus." The mode l assumes—as Adler, Mueller, and Laufer state—that "members of 
society by and large agree on what is right and wrong, and that law is, in essence, the 
codification of social values..."7 
This view reflects Durkheim's definition of the punishability of an act. According 
to him, "We can ... say that an act is criminal when it offends strong and defined states 
o f collective conscience."8 
However, the supporters of the conflict approach say that "criminal law expresses 
the values of the ruling class in a society, and the criminal justice system is a means o f 
controlling the lower classes."9 
Congress on Criminology), Budapest, 1993, 26. 
5 ADLER—MUELLER—LAUFER: op. cil., 7. 
6 JOUTSEN: op. cit., 10-11. 
7 ADLER—MUELLER—LAUFER: op. cit., 11. 
8 DÜRKHEIM, E.: Rules of Sociological Method, Glencoe, Illinois, 1958. 64. 
9 ADLER—MUELLER—LAUFER: op. cit., 11. 
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In v iew of today's pluralist and, in many respects, heterogeneous societies, we can 
say that criminalisation according to the consensus approach is an ideal to be aspired 
to. 
However, the critical analyses of the representatives of the conflict model help us 
on the one hand to understand why the lower classes are over-represented amongst 
apprehended criminals, and on the other hand they highlight the necessity of the 
enforcement of the point of view of social justice during criminalisation.10 This last 
means that the acts of those with authority which are seriously harmful to the society 
must also be criminalised. The research results analysing the formation of criminal 
norms on the basis of the conflict model and similar approaches (for example, the 
labelling theory) are essential from the point of view of the issue under discussion, 
because they remind us to be careful when we automatically want to consider legitimate 
a criminal law which is fully in compliance with the principle of legality, or to use the 
Hungarian terminology, with the principles of 'nullum crimen sine lege' and 'nulla 
poena sine lege'. 
The other main research field of criminology related to criminalisation is the 
evaluation of the eff ic iency of penal sanctions. The subject of research as it is defined 
by Lawrence W. Shermann is as fol lows: "... to discover the actual impact of penal 
sanction on the criminalised behaviour from the point of view of both the individual 
person punished and the society. This means not only determining when criminal 
sanctions prove to be effective or ineffective but also when they have a reversed effect 
and create more crimes."11 
Amongst the results of research on the topic, the new theoretical approach to the 
relationship between the intensity of informal control and the eff iciency of 
criminalisation is worth mentioning. Essentially this approach states that "the efficiency 
of the penal sanctions depends on the foundations created by informal social control. 
If this foundation is undermined normal sanctions can ... fail, moreover they can 
backfire ... Thus the more the informal social control decreases the more careful and 
cautious we have to be when applying criminal sanctions and we must not overuse 
them."12 
We can consider the criminological analysis of the above-mentioned aspects of 
criminalisation essential because the research results can supply us with arguments for 
the reasonable criminalisation of an act or behaviour. From among the relevant 
statements in the special literature let me once again quote Shermann, with whom I fully 
agree: "The question whether the criminalisation of a behaviour is reasonable or not 
depends on two criteria: is there a wide social consensus in condemnation of the act and 
10 See, for example, QUINNEY, R.: Crime and Justice in Society, Boston, 1969. 
11 S H E R M A N N : op. cit., 26. 
12 Ibid. 31. 
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does empirical research show that the penal sanction is efficient in an increased 
application of the rule in question."13 
We can therefore say that the legitimational criteria of criminalisation from a 
criminological aspect are social consensus and rationality. 
In the process of declaring something a crime we have to respect some values and 
principles of criminal law, constitutional limits, and the final result embodied in the 
criminal policy. In the fol lowing part of this paper I wil l deal with these questions. 
3. Questions of Criminalisation from the Point of View of Criminal Law, 
Criminal Law Policy and Constitutionality 
The range and contents of problems of criminal law, criminal law pol icy and 
constitutionality with respect to criminalisation are basically determined by the political 
system and the form of government in the given state. Questions related to criminali-
sation in a dictatorship are different to those in a state governed by the 'rule of law'. 
At the same time, the approach to and practice of criminalisation might b e different in 
states of the same political system with regard to the difference in criminal law policy. 
I will n o w turn to the questions and di lemmas of criminalisation and the basic models 
of reactions and solutions in a state governed by the rule o f law. 
Before discussing all this, however, I would like to state that the notion o f "the rule 
of law" wil l be used be low with a wider meaning, in compliance with its use in recent 
English and American constitutional literature. 
The term "rule of law" is used by the scholars writing in this area not only as a 
legal category denoting a country governed through laws, but also as a political doctrine. 
Bradley, Ewing and Bates write the fo l lowing about this: 
"It is not possible to formulate a s imple and clear-cut statement of the rule of law 
as a broad political doctrine ... If the law is not to be merely a means o f achieving 
whatever ends a particular government may favour, the rule of law must g o beyond 
the principle of legality ... As society develops, and as the tasks o f government 
change, lawyers, politicians and administrators must be prepared to adapt the 
received values of law to meet changing needs. . . . it deserves to be remembered [as 
the authors assert with regard to the contents of the rule of law as a political 
doctrine] that law, like the democratic process, may be used to protect the weak and 
unprivileged sections of society against those who can exercise physical, economic 
or industrial force."14 
13 Ibid, 38. 
14 WADE. E C. S . -BRADLEY, A. W.: Constitutional and Administrative Law, New York. 1993. 107, 109, 
110. 
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This approach quoted above is otherwise very similar as regards its contents to the 
case of a 'social jural state' in continental constitutional scholarship. 
From a constitutional point of view, criminalisation means the conflict of personal 
rights to liberty and freedom, because the state must guarantee the rights of its c i t izens 
to personal security in a way that it limits the prevalence of other human rights to a 
certain extent. The generally accepted constitutional criterion corresponding to the "rule 
of law", with regard to the extent of , and reason for the limitation, is "that government 
should inhibit freedom only as much as it has to in order to serve important needs."1 5 
A s McCloskey remarks, "various attempts have been made to formulate a rule or a test 
that would implement this premise. The 'clear and present danger' concept (that speech 
can be restricted only when it threatens an immediate and serious ev i l ) represents o n e 
such attempt, the 'balancing test' (that speech can be restricted when the state interest 
in suppression outweighs the private interest in freedom) represents another. But [the 
author adds] insofar as 'rules' are not merely tautological, they are shorthand phrases 
for a large number of alternatives that must be considered before a reasonable 
conclusion is reached..."16 
A s for the role of criminal law from a constitutional point o f v iew, with regard to 
the above we can say that it is nothing else but the indication o f the limits o f the 
criminal justice system. The most significant principle related to the limits of substantive 
criminal law in compliance with the "rule of law" is the legality principle which unites 
the fol lowing principles: the principle of non-retroactivity, the principle of m a x i m u m 
certainty, and the principle of strict construction of penal statues.17 The content o f the 
principle is wel l -known, so I wil l not discuss it here. 
The function of criminal law, however, does not end with the marking out o f the 
limits of intervention. The role of criminal law, in addition to this, is to protect 
communal and individual rights and to realise social values. 
Criminalisation is in compliance with the requirements of the "rule of law", as far 
as the legislator takes into consideration this double function. 
In the countries regarded as states governed by the rule o f law we can find a 
number of differences in the extent of criminal justice and criminalisation, even though 
there are several similarities as regards the group of punishable conducts. The disparities 
basically stem from social and cultural differences, but the differences in the object ives 
of criminal policy and the criminal law theories related to criminalisation play a 
significant role in what is declared to be a crime in a certain country. 
I will now discuss the basic approach to theory and types o f ideals of criminal 
pol icy existing in the latter of the fields mentioned above. 
15 McCLOSKEY, R. G.: "Civil Liberties", in SILLS, D. L. (ed.): International Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences, Vol. Ill, The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968. 310. 
16 Ibid., 310. 
17 ASHWORTH, A.: Principles of Criminal Law, Oxford, 1995, 67; in the Hungarian literature on this s ee 
NAGY, F.: "A nullum crimen/nulla poena sine lege alapelvr51" (On the Principle of nullum crimen/nulla 
poena), Magyar Jog, No. 5. 1995. 257-270 . 
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Joel Feinberg18 defines the following four legitimational principles of criminali-
sation: 
— 'The Harm Principle': this means that "It is always a good reason in support of 
penal legislation that it would be effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm 
to persons other than the actor ... and there is no other means equally effective at no 
greater cost to other values." 
— 'The Offence Principle': according to this principle, "It is always a good reason 
in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it is necessary to prevent serious 
offence to persons other than the actor and would be an effective means to that end if 
enacted." 
— 'Legal Paternalism': under the terms of this principle, "It is a good reason in 
support of a prohibition that it is necessary to prevent physical, psychological, 
economic, or moral harm to the actor him/herself." 
— 'Legal Moralism': this means that "It can be morally legitimate to prohibit 
conduct on the ground that it is inherently immoral even though it causes neither harm 
nor offence to the actor or to others."1 ' 
Following the views of John Stuart Mill—that is, "the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, 
is to prevent harm to others"20—Feinberg is of the opinion that criminalisation can 
primarily be based on the principle of "harm" and its supplement, the principle of 
"offence". The supporters of the so-called minimalist approach of criminal law, and of 
the tendency of criminal policy called 'defensive criminal law policy' by Nils Jareborg, 
are essentially of the same opinion.21 
The representatives of the minimalist approach, as described by Ashworth, accept 
"the need for criminal law in order to safeguard the interests of individuals, the state 
and collectivities, but it emphasises the protection of individuals from the abuse of 
powei^whether by state officials or by groups or other individuals ... the minimalist 
approach emphasises respect for the rights of individuals as suspects and defendants ... 
and it insists that the criminal law should be used only as a last resort or for the most 
reprehensible types of wrongdoing. Thus minimalism has no difficulty in accepting the 
criminalisation of direct, victimising wrongs that harm individuals, but as one moves 
away from those clear cases, it demands stronger justification for criminalising rather 
than dealing with the problem in another way."22 
As for effectiveness, the followers of minimalist criminal law emphasise that "the 
criminal law should not be used if it cannot be effective in controlling conduct, and/or 
causes consequences at least as bad as non-criminalisation, and ... that the criminal law 
18 FEINBERG, J.: The Moral Limits of Criminal Law, Vols. 1-4, Oxford, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988. 
19 FEINBERG, J.: The Moral Limits of Criminal Law, Vol. 4, Oxford, 1988. xix-xx. 
20 MILL, J. S.: A szabadságról (On Liberty), Budapest, 1994. 18. 
21 JAREBORG, N.: "What Kind of Criminal U w Do We Want", in SNARE, A. (ed.): Scandinavian Studies 
in Criminology, 1995. 17-36. 
22 ASHWORTH: op. cit., 31. 
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should be used if it is the mos t efficient and cost-effective means of controlling 
conduct."23 
In contrast to the minimalists, scholars who emphasise the so-called wel fa re 
principle and communal interests consider the other two principles of Feinberg, that is, 
' legal paternalism' and ' legal moralism' to be the legitimational principle of cr imi-
nalisation. Their representatives do not refute the significance of individual autonomy, 
but they consider solidarity and the importance of communal a ims and values to b e of 
equal rank, alongside the active participation of the state in the solution of social 
problems. 
As Nicola Lacey, one of the theoreticians of this approach, writes, "the principle of 
welfare as including the fulfi lment of certain basic interests such as maintaining one ' s 
personal safety, health and capacity to pursue one ' s chosen life plan."2 4 
Based on this principle, the scholars of this approach can accept criminalisation of 
any conduct that has, respectively, harmful consequences for community interests, and 
endangers the autonomy of an individual (such as drug abuse) . In the words of 
Ashworth, "The principle of welfare recognises the social context of the law", and 
criminalisation on the basis of this principle "is likely to favour the use of criminal law 
to reinforce collective interests rather than private interests and private property ... ' ,25 
With regard to the legitimational principles of criminalisation, w e can also speak of 
a third tendency. In practice the tenets of both approaches are acceptable to the 
minimalists, as well as to the moderate supporters of the 'principle of welfare' . So this 
means that there may be an approach to criminalisation from the aspect of theoretical 
penal law which "would recognise the position of individuals in their social context and 
thus the need in some circumstances to use the criminal law to prevent incursions on 
some collective goods as well as on individual rights".26 
The ideas of another ideal type of criminal law policy, called the "of fens ive 
approach" in Jareborg's terms, represent a markedly different standpoint to those of the 
previous approaches, as far as the principles of legitimation are concerned. According 
to Jareborg, the "offensive approach" of criminal law policy "regards the criminal 
justice system as an at least repertoire method for solution of social or societal problems 
... The central feature of the offensive approach is fast action in 'social p rob lem ' 
situations".27 In consequence, "a threat against or a violation of a legitimate interest 
or value"—as Jareborg puts it—"is a sufficient reason for criminalisation ..."; furthermore, 
" to an increasing extent, the criminalisation concerns potentially dangerous deeds or 
deeds that are otherwise peripheral in relation to caused harm, which means that a 
violation of or a manifest threat to a legitimate interest or value is not required ... T h e 
2 3 Ibid., 33 -34 . 
2 4 LACEY, N.: State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values, Routledge, 1988. 104. 
25 A S H W O R T H : op. cit., 28, 32. 
26 Ibid.. 32. 
27 JAREBORG: op. cit., 25-26. 
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threat of penal sanctions is used, not as a last resort or for the most reprehensible deeds, 
but often in the first place for minor transgressions of peripheral regulations. The 
criminal law"—in the sense of the 'offensive approach'—"is used for didactic, socio-
pedagogical and paternalistic purposes".28 
At first sight it may seem that Jareborg regards the criminal law policy behind the 
criminal law of totalitarian systems to be the offensive approach: "the possibility of 
power abuse is not completely forgotten: a Rechsstaat ideology is still the background. 
But the important thing is to show results".29 An effective means of achieving these 
results in the area of finding solutions to social problems is the criminal justice system 
and criminalisation contained therein. 
From this review it is clear that criminalisation can be centred around several 
principles of legitimation and criminal policy approach, which may sometimes greatly 
differ in content from each other. The existing differences give a good explanation of 
the differences discernible amongst countries as regards the extent of criminalisation. 
At the same time, it would be difficult to claim that it is only this or that principle, or 
criminal law policy, which complies with the ' rule of law'. However, we can say that 
it is mainly the views on criminalisation of the defensive model of criminal law policy, 
and of the minimalists, as well as of the moderates of the 'principle of welfare ' , that 
comply best with the contents of the 'rule of law' discussed above, and with the social 
purpose of criminal law as developed over the course of history. 
Instead of an evaluation of the approaches and principles, I feel it is more important 
to emphasise that one of the key issues of criminal law is that criminalisation be based 
on principles and values and be properly justified. That is to say, only with justified 
criminalisation based on principles can arbitrary criminal legislation which merely 
reflects the current parliamentary majority, and which does not comply with the rule of 
law, be avoided. 
Now I will turn to the characteristics of criminalisation since the fall of communism 
in Hungary—what we refer to as the 'change of system'. Which of the previously 
mentioned approaches can be discerned behind our present criminal law policy? 
4. Criminalisation and the Rule of Law in Hungary after 1989 
The total transformation of the political system between 1988 and 1990 has wholly 
changed the character and contents of the Hungarian legal system, and within this our 
criminal law. This change basically stems from the fact that the amended Constitution 
states that "The Republic of Hungary asserts itself to be an independent democratic jural 
state".30 
28 Ibid.. 26. 27. 
29 Ibid., 25. 
30 Article 2.1. 
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W e have become a country governed by the rule of law and, what is more, a 
country with a fully functioning constitution. Consequently, only those statutes may 
remain in force which comply with the Constitution. It is the Constitutional Court, a 
body set up in 1989, which safeguards the rule of law. 
W h a t is the consequence of this as regards criminalisation? 
Between 1989-1996, 16 laws modified the Special Part of the Hungarian Criminal 
Code.31 Former criminal offences that did not meet the requirement of "jural state" 
(rule of law) and the characteristics of the new state order were re-regulated (for 
example, political crimes) and decriminalised (for example, work-shyness as a public 
danger). 
However, most of these modifications have created new criminal offences; 41 of 
these have been included in the Criminal Code. 
If we look for the limits and basis of legitimation of criminalisation in the 
Hungarian legal system, we find ' the legality principle ' and the formula of 'social 
endangerment". As far as ' the legality principle' is concerned, Article 57 paragraph 4 
of the Hungarian Constitution states that "No-one shall be declared guilty and sentenced 
for an act which is not a criminal offence under Hungarian law at the time of its 
perpetration." 
The content of ' social endangerment ' is defined in the Criminal Code3 2 in the 
following way: 
(1) "An act of cr ime is an act perpetrated intentionally o r - i f the law also punishes 
negligent perpetration—by negligence, which is dangerous for society and for which 
the law orders the infliction of punishment." 
(2) ' T h a t activity or omission shall be an act dangerous for society, which violates 
or endangers the state, social or economic order of the Republic of Hungary, the 
person or rights of the citizens." 
Based on the articles of the Criminal Code referred to above, we can conclude that 
the underlying principle of criminalisation in our criminal law is one of 'wel fa re ' . 
However, if we take into consideration the Constitutional Court ' s practice, in 
relation to the reasons for criminalisation, we can find another approach. 
Point IV.4 of the reasoning of the 30/1992 (V.26) AB Resolution of the 
Constitutional Court states that 
"Criminal law is the ultima ratio in the system of legal responsibility. Its social 
function is to serve as the sanctioning foundation of the overall legal system. The 
31 KERTÉSZ, I,—STAUBER, J.: "Magyarország Európa bűnügyi térképén" (Hungary on Europe ' s Map of 
criminality), Magyar Jog, No . 9. 1996, 523. 
32 Section 10. 
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penal sanction, the role and function of punishment, is the preservation of legal and 
moral norms when no other legal sanction can be of help. 
A substantive requirement springing from constitutional penal law is that the 
legislature may not act in an arbitrary fashion in defining the scope of behaviour 
subject to punishment by law. The necessity of making of any behaviour an offence 
punishable by law must be scrutinised strictly: in protecting certain relationships, 
legal and moral norms, the system of instruments of penal justice—which perforce 
restrict human rights and freedoms—may only be applied when absolutely necessary 
and only as justified by proportionality, if the constitutional or constitutionally 
derived state, social or economic values and goals may not be protected through any 
other means." 
On the basis of this resolution of the Constitutional Court, which has been 
reinforced in later resolutions, we can say that the body regards the defensive approach 
of criminal law policy to be constitutional. In compliance with this, it is the concept of 
minimalist criminal law that can be found in the decisions in the field of criminalisation: 
the Constitutional Court emphasises respect for individual autonomy, and the role of 
criminal law as the ' last resort'. 
As we can see, there is a difference between the approaches to criminalisation found 
in the legislation and the decisions of the Constitutional Court. I would suggest that 
these two approaches should be harmonised on the basis of the notion of the rule of law 
discussed above; that is, in the process of criminalisation we should take into 
consideration the community's values, interests, and social justice. However, we should 
at the same time test the 'necessity', 'proportionality' and 'rationality' of the creation 
of new criminal offences. 
5. In Conclusion 
In this paper I have dealt with a few theoretical questions and the Hungarian practice 
related to criminalisation. In lieu of a summary and a moral I would like to raise some 
more questions and dilemmas with regard to this subject which have not been covered 
here but are related to the topic and may be worthy of our consideration. 
I hope that it has been made clear that I do not regard the increase in criminalisation 
as a positive development. It must, however, be mentioned that there are favourable 
reasons amongst those which have led to the expansion in the numbers of criminalised 
acts. The first of these is the changing and ever-widening content of the concept of 
human dignity. This explains the ever-increasing criminalisation of stalking and child 
abuse. A similarly positive process occurs when the means of criminal law are used as 
some kind of protection against the side-effects of scientific and technological 
development. Naturally, the question remains as to the proper extent of this legal 
intervention. 
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This leads to another problem, the role of criminal law as ' las t resort ' . In the case 
of eliminating those acts from the criminal code which cause lesser harm to society—in 
the interest of the reinforcement and rehabilitation of this principle—without actually 
decriminalising them, they would still remain transgressions. The difficulty with this is 
that it would entail serious problems from the point of view of guarantee in countries 
where the authorities dealing with transgressions are not under judicial control. Hungary, 
for example, is one such country. 
Finally, there is another problem: can we reach a consensus a s regards principles 
legitimising criminalisation in a pluralist world where opposing values and tendencies 
exist side by side? For example, the effort to achieve integrity whilst at the same t ime 
enforcing national interests. With regard to this, the words of Professor Terttu Utriainen 
are worth recalling: "... where a conflict arises between values, it becomes necessary to 
either establish a compromise or choose in favour of prevailing values. In this sense, 
society no longer has a single system of values, rather there are several truths. In a 
democratic society, discussion and legislation determine the procedures followed, the 
prevailing social values and their priority".35 
I believe that our field of study can assist legislation, in finding appropriate values 
and priorities by stating proper principles with regard to the bases of criminalisation, 
and the expected consequences of declaring certain behaviours punishable. If legislation 
takes this into consideration then criminal law may not simply become legal, but a lso 
legitimate. This may become a significant element in law-abiding behaviour, or keeping 
within the laws, especially in countries in transition, where informal control cannot 
really be relied upon. 
3 3 UTRIAINEN, T. : "Social Changes, Cr ime and Police-lhe Pol ice in Society", in V l G H , J . - K A T O N A , G . 
(eds.): Social Changes, Crime and Police, 1993, 151. 
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Tore MODEEN The Institution of Self-government 
in Finland 
The term: "self-government" in the Constitution 
The term: "self-government" (in Finnish: "itsehallinto", in Swedish: "självstyrelse") is 
used in the Finnish Constitution Act 1919:94 in two connections. In Art. 51. 2 . it is 
stated that the administration of municipalities shall be based on self-government of the 
citizens according to specific acts of parliament on this matter. The manner and ex ten t 
of the application of self-government of the citizens to administrative districts larger 
than the municipalities shall l ikewise be prescribed by law. 
In this context, self-government means that territorial units are administered by 
persons elected by and from their inhabitants. A certain amount of autonomy is thus 
demanded when the term "self-government" is used. If a body is to be characterized as 
self-governing, it cannot be subject to complete guardianship by the State. A se l f -
governing unit mus t have the right to command a certain field of jurisdiction where it 
acts on its own responsibility and uses its own resources. In Finland the self-governed 
units, the municipalities, have been given quite substantial powers by law. 
The Constitution uses the term "self-government" in another context, concerning the 
managment of the state University of Helsinki-Helsingfors. In A r t 77 . 1. it is stated that 
the right of self-government of the University shall be maintained. 
In 1919, when this article was written, there was only one state university in Finland, 
the University of Helsinki-Helsingfors. The reason for giving it a certain amount of 
independence was to ensure the freedom of study and of learning in the institution. 
The University used to be administered by its professors under the supervision of its 
Chancellor, appointed by the State from among candidates put forward by the professors. 
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Today the Finnish universities are administered by bodies composed of other "members" 
of the university: as well younger teachers, other personnel and students. 
Because of its different structure and activities, it is obvious that the self-
government enjoyed by a university is very different from that of a municipality.1 
Self-governing institutions 
As has already been mentioned, the Finnish municipalities (in Finnish "kunta", in 
Swedish "kommün") enjoy very broad autonomous powers. Mos t of the local govern-
ment functions have been entrusted to the municipalities. The State itself takes care of 
only a limited amount of local tasks such as the administration of justice, presidential 
and parliamentary elections, taxation (even municipal taxation), and the construction and 
maintenance of the more important roads. 
In this connection, the National Insurance Institute ("Kansaneläkelaitos, Folk-
pensionsanstalten") should also be mentioned. This institution functions with a certain 
amount of autonomy in the fields of compulsory social and health insurance and 
assistance to the unemployed. The National Insurance Institute is mentioned in the 
Parliament Act (a constitutional statute complementing the Constitution Act) not as a 
self-governing institution but as an independent body under parliamentary control. In 
reality, however, it is often regarded together with the National Bank of Finland 
("Suomen Pankki, Finlands Bank, also mentioned in constitutional law) as a self-
governing institution.2 
The following survey will mainly concern the local government of the muni-
cipalities. 
Self-government of the municipalities 
According to Art. 51. 2. of the Constitution Act, the jurisdiction of the municipalities 
shall be prescribed by law. This means that the functioning of the municipalities is 
regulated by statutes adopted by Parliament. 
The President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers thus cannot decide on 
the rights and duties of the municipalities without the approval of Parliament. Only the 
implementation of the municipal statutes may be regulated by decree. 
1 About the notion of "self-government", see MODEEN, Т.: От de sjähständiga offentligrättsliga anstalterna 
1 Finlandsßrvaltningsorganisation. Abo Akademi. Abo, 1965; MÄENPÄÄ O.: "Constitutional aspects of local 
autonomy in Finland", in SAKSLIN, M. (ed.): The Finnish Constitution in Transition, Helsinki, 1991. 
2 See MODEEN, T.: L'administration communale de la Finlande. Âbo Akademi, Abo, 1971; MODEEN, T.: 
"Les compétences du pouvoir local en Finlande", Annuaire européen dadministration publique 3. Paris, CNRS, 
1980; MODEEN, T.: "Local Government in Finland: scope and functions", Finnish Local Government Studies 
9. 1981; MODEEN, T.: "Le médecin et le droit: aspects de droit administratif finlandais", Journées de la 
Société de droit comparé. Paris, 1987; MODEEN, T.: "Historische Einführung in das nordische Kommunal-
recht", Stadt und Gemeinde, 1993, 2. 
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Of the statutes regulating municipal actions the mos t important one is the Municipal 
Act 1995:365. According to Art. 2. of this statute, the jurisdiction of the municipality 
consists of two parts . The first part concerns activities in which the municipality 
engages entirely on its own initiative. The second part (the main scope of action of the 
municipality) consists of its statutory tasks. There are several special statutes charging 
the municipalities to carry on certain activities. 
Examples of such special statutes are the Comprehensive School and the High 
School Act, the Social and Health Care Acts, and the Planning and Building A c t 
The special statutes vary greatly as to their construction and content. Often they do 
not go into detail concerning the management of the task in question. T h e municipality 
usually enjoys a large amount of f reedom in deciding on the organization and the 
running of these activities. 
In this case the term "frame statute" is used. 
In the case of statutory provisions concerning municipal services to the citizens, 
the statutes normally regulate the conditions for rendering such services to the clients 
and the judicial and administrative control of the municipal action. 
The result of this legislative policy is that the municipali ty funct ions with a great 
deal of autonomy even in most areas of its statutory competence. 
There are even cases where a special statute has been given not to oblige the 
municipali ty to carry on a duty but to provide for guidelines in the case the 
municipality wants to engage in such an activity. If these guidelines are complied with, 
the State will part icipate in the financing of the activity. 
Examples which may mentioned are statutes concerning the management of certain 
cultural activities such as adult education or public libraries. 
A s a general rule, a municipality can count on State grants for services offered to 
the citizens under special legislation. 
The situations where the municipali ty 's action is regulated by special statutes 
should not be considered "delegated State activities", as in some foreign local 
government systems. Even if these activities fall under the Municipal Act, they 
belong to the responsibili ty of the municipalities, as the management is entrusted to 
bodies chosen by it. The costs are paid by the municipality, even if partly subsidized 
by the State. All these activities must thus be observed in the municipal budgetary 
planning. 
The special statutory activities are supervised by municipal committees . The 
commit tees normally appoint the off ic ia ls who are responsible for the day-to-day 
management of the service. The management of these activities is a lways submitted to 
the (mainly financial) control of the central municipal bodies: the counci l and the 
board.3 
3 Sec MODEEN, T.—KALI MA. К : The general competence of the municipality. University of Helsinki 1982 ; 
M O D E E N : "Historische Einführung.. .", op. cit. 
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The limits of the general competence of the municipality 
The municipality decides with a great amount of autonomy on the management of the 
affairs not regulated by special statutes. It may thus engage itself in various activities of 
interest to its members or give financial help to private bodies engaged in such activities. 
A municipality may thus financially subsidize privately run cultural and social 
activities in the municipality which benefit its citizens. 
An obvious restriction, however, is that the municipal activity is confined to the 
territory of the municipality except for a situation where there exists a bi- or multilateral 
agreement on municipal cooperation. 
Another limitation concerns the municipality's role as a body under public law which 
disposes over tax money. It must on all occasions observe the principle of objectivity and 
impartiality in its dealings with the citizens. A municipality should concern itself with 
government and not engage into private commercial or industrial activities. 
The limits of the municipal jurisdiction based on its general competency will, 
however, be subject to control only in the case of an appeal made against a decision 
taken by a municipal body (usually the municipal council). In order to have a municipal 
decision annulled, the appellant must show that it is contrary to law, i. e . , is in conflict 
with the general principles a public body has to follow. 
Any member of the municipality has the right to appeal a decision taken by the 
municipal council or another municipal body on the grounds of exceeding the limits of 
the general competence of the municipality. Not only a physical person domiciliated in 
the municipality but also a legal person and, furthermore, every person engaged in 
business or owning real estate in the municipality, is regarded to be a member . 
In most cases of appeals, the case concerns the use of public money for activities 
the appellant considers as unacceptable for a municipality to engage in. 
It often happens that municipalities decide to encourage private firms to start doing 
business, hoping to increase the commercial and industrial activities in the district and 
thereby to improve the financial situation of the municipality by receiving more tax income. 
The municipalities also interfere with financial and other aid to private business in 
situations of unemployment and to prevent a bankruptcy situation. 
When appealed against, such decisions may be approved by the Supreme Admi-
nistrative Court only if good social reasons can be shown for the investment of the 
taxpayers' money in private firms. 
There have thus been many cases of municipal securities given for loans taken by 
private firms which have resulted in considerable financial losses for the municipalities. 
The Government tried to introduce into the new Municipal Act a provision 
restricting municipal guarantees to private firms. But Parliament did not approve of this 
"restriction of the municipal freedom".4 
4 See also MODEEN, T.: "The industrial policy of the communes", in LINDMAN, S. (ed.): Problems in 
Finnish Local Government, Abo, 1964. 
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The Court also takes a restrictive attitude towards municipal grants to political 
parties or to activities concerning foreign countries. 
But, as has already been stated, if a municipal decision is not appealed against, the 
decision will remain valid. The State authorities do not interfere in municipal actions 
on their own initiative. 
The special (statutory) competence 
The legislative policy in recent years has been to increase the autonomy of the 
municipalities in the field of statutory competence as well . Earlier a considerable 
number of municipal decisions had to be submitted to State authorities before they could 
become valid. Today this occurs only in exceptional cases (for instance, certain physical 
planning measures).5 
In m o s t situations where the State grants financial aid to the municipalities for 
activities regulated in special statutes, the subsidies consists of so-called "state shares". 
A "state share" means a lump sum, calculated according to the size and other criteria 
(such as the financial strenght) of the municipality. The municipality disposes the grant 
quite autonomously. 
The only condition is that the municipality is able to maintain an acceptable level 
of services. In the case of investments, however, the municipality has to ask for the 
money and commit itself to more detailed control of the use of the money. 
The "state share" system is applied in such important areas as health and social care 
and schools. 
The national policy a ims at creating equal social, health and schooling conditions 
for the citizens irrespective of the municipality in which they reside. Therefore, more 
generous State grants are given to poor districts than to municipalities enjoying better 
financial conditions. 
The uneven standards in providing public services among the municipalities have, 
consequently considerably diminished in recent years, thanks to this "state share" policy. 
The Finnish system, based on large municipal autonomy, does not, however, allow too 
great uniformity. 
The legal security of the citizen 
A question often raised in connection to providing public services in the welfare state 
is to what extent the citizen enjoys legally secured social rights. Does the present system 
allow for efficient control of the local authorities in this respect? 
5 See MODEEN, T.: "Submission and appeal: two means of Stale supervisions of the communes in Finland", 
International Review of administrative Sciences, 1970; MODEEN, T. : " T o w n and country planning law in 
Finland", in J . F. G A R N E R - N . P. GRAVELLE (eds.): Planning law in Western Europe, Amsterdam, 1986. 
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As has already been mentioned, the standards of social services depend on the 
available resources. The same is true concerning health services. 
Appeals of municipal decisions concerning social care are thus very rare, since the 
clients understand that "the legal way" seldom brings results. Instead, they prefer less 
formal methods of calling the attention of the authorities to their needs. 
The municipalities also usually act with efficiency when it comes to giving help in 
difficult situations. Even in recent years, when many municipalities have encountered 
financial difficulties, the schools function fairly satisfactorily. The municipalities have 
in many cases even taken loans in order to fulfil their duties in these respects. 
According to a certain opinion, the legal rights of the citizens are not satisfactorily 
protected under the present system, however. Today there exists a prohibition to appeal 
against the Provincial Administrative Courts' decisions in matters concerning social 
care. This restrictive policy does not comply with the principle of legally protected 
social rights. If the Supreme Administrative Court were given the power to control the 
municipalities' social care practice, the possibility to arrive at a more equal system in 
the country should be created. Today there are thus no court decisions on the national 
level to be referred to. 
Only in the field of assistance to severely handicapped people (Act 1987:380) is the 
Supreme Administrative Court authorized to deal with appeals. The Court has in some 
cases taken a favourable position to patients' claims for assistance and has obliged 
municipalities to give more substantial assistance than they had agreed to. 
It is unavoidable, under the present system based on municipal autonomy, that the 
citizen's social rights depend, to some extent, on the financial situation of the 
municipality. 
In the field of health services, it is obvious that an appeal system does not work. 
The medical authorities decide which cases demand treatment There exists, on the other 
hand, a well-developed control system. 
In 1995, the whole municipal health system was subject to a four-week-long nurses' 
strike. Many of the hospitals had to close. The municipalities were quite helpless, as the 
wages are decided on a national level. The State authorities did not interfere in this 
situation. 
The autonomy of the individual municipality is thus restricted by the system of 
central collective wage agreements. The municipality has got only limited possibilities 
to decide on the wages in certain cases. 
The right of a patient to receive health care from the municipality is guaranteed by 
law (Act 1992:785), but was not secured in this case. This is a serious grievance, 
especially since there are so few private hospitals in Finland. 
The financial autonomy of the municipality 
The Finnish municipalities have the power to tax their members (the mos t important 
municipal taxes are the income tax and the real property tax). The level of the income 
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tax is decided individually by each municipality, and, within certain limits, a lso the real 
property tax. 
The municipality en joys a lot of f reedom as to the use of State grants. 
The State has the power to interfere only when a municipality has proved itself 
unable to handle its finances. The municipality will then be put under a kind of State 
guardianship (Act 1994:658). This very rarely happens. 
Municipal co-operation 
Finland does not know of any bigger autonomous territories than the municipality. An 
important exception, the Aaland Islands, enjoy internationally and constitutionally 
recognized home rule.6 
There are, on the other hand, a great number of local federations ("kuntayhtymä", 
"samkommun") . Some of them are entrusted with important powers, in the field of 
health care, for instance. 
The local federations are administered by bodies appointed by the member 
municipalities and financed by the members . They enjoy a distinct legal personality. 
There exist small voluntary local federations with two or three members (running 
an institution of social care, for example). But there are also some quite big federations 
concerning a great number of municipalities. 
The municipalities also cooperate by means of agreements. 
Not all local federations depend on the f ree decision of their members. For instance, 
in the fields of specialized hospitals and physical panning, the municipalities are obliged 
to cooperate within districts set up by the State. There are thus 21 specialized hospital 
federations and 18 regional panning federations decided by the State. 
The local federations function with the same kind of authority as the municipalities 
and thus belong to the municipal administration area 
The self-government of the parishes 
There are two national religious communities in Finland enjoying special rights: the 
Evangelic-Lutheran and the Orthodox Church. The communit ies are organized as 
corporations under public law enjoying a legal personality, as are all local parishes 
belonging to these communities. About 90% of the Finns belong to the Lutheran Church 
and only 1 % to the Orthodox Church. The special rights are consequence of Finland's 
earlier attachment to Russia . 
The Lutheran and Orthodox parishes have the power to raise taxes. Their 
constitutions are based on statutory law and their bishops are appointed by the President 
of the Republic. 
6 M O D E E N , T.: "The International protection of the national identity of the Aland Islands", Skandinaviern 
Studies of Law, Uppsala, 1973. 
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Originally the local parishes were entrusted with most of local government tasks in 
the rural districts. In the 19th century, however, the municipality was separated from the 
church parish. Since then, the parish administers only church matters concerning the 
church personnel and the administration of the church property (also the graveyards). 
Some social work is, however, also executed by social workers hired by the church. 
The limits of the church parish always follow that of the municipality, although 
several perishes can exist in the same municipality. Most parishes, for instance, are 
monolingual even in bilingual districts, but they still cooperate in financial matters. 
There are also many "free churches" and other religious communities in Finland. 
They do not enjoy the privileges of the above mentioned communities and must be 
regarded as associations under private law. 
Other self-governing bodies 
A number of other self-governing corporations exist under public law. Their importance 
is much more limited than the one enjoyed the above-mentioned bodies. 
The owners of real property thus must belong to associations for the maintenance 
of roads and must pay fees for this purpose. Fishermen and hunters are also organized 
by law, as are attorneys-at-law, who belong to a corporation under State control. 
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Péter MOHÁCSI International Co-operat ion 
in Criminal Matters, with Special 
Reference to Extradition 
/ . Introduction 
International co-opcration on criminal matters in Hungary used to be regulated by the 
Penal Code,1 in the general part as "Validity of a Foreign Sentence", "Taking Over and 
Surrendering the Execution of Punishment", " T h e Offer to Institute Criminal 
Proceedings", and "Extradition and the Right to Asylum". The procedural part of the 
forms mentioned above, in addition to mutual assistance, were governed by the Criminal 
Procedure Code.2 
Another source of law on co-operation in criminal matters are bilateral treaties; 
reciprocity may also be regarded as a source of law. According to the Acts mentioned 
above, these regulations were based on, and were to be applied to, international treaties. 
Extradition could similarly be granted on the grounds of reciprocity. In this sense these 
rules provided a framework. They covered the general principles of the forms of co-
operation—undeservedly, very briefly. Furthermore, there are unwritten principles in this 
field, which exist as customary law. 
The Act on International Co-operation in Criminal Matters w a s adopted by the 




Act IV of 1978. 
Act I of 1973. 
Act XXXVIII of 1996. 
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felt need. When it entered into force, the Act annulled the Articles of the Penal Code 
and the Criminal Procedural Code which have been described above. 
In the chapter of the General Provisions of the Act, there is a very important and, 
in my opinion, insufficient paragraph that states that the Act can be applied unless an 
international treaty indicates otherwise. I would prefer a solution without this paragraph, 
one that regulates the forms of co-operations in general, according to the relevant 
Conventions ratified by Hungary. In this case the Act could be based on higher and 
accepted values, and it would be easier to circumvent the contradictions that can be 
found between the treaties and the Act. 
The hierarchy of the sources in this field is undoubtedly an interesting, but 
contradictory, and controversial issue, because it is an open area in Hungarian law. I 
would suggest the following solution: 
1. International law 
According to Article 7 of the Constitution, ' T h e legal system of the Hungarian Republic 
accepts the universally recognised rules and regulations of international law, and 
harmonises the internal laws and statutes of the country with the obligations assumed 
under international law". Is it the task of the judicial practice to define what the 
universally recognised rules are? Is there any ius cogens norm related to human rights? 
It seems to me that there must be: for example, the prohibition of torture, the right to 
a fair trial, etc. In this sense, I believe, these ius cogens norms of human rights are 
undoubtedly part of the sources of Hungarian law. The Constitutional Court stated in 
its Decision of 53/1993 (X. 13)4 that rules relating to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity are ius cogens norms of international law. Such ius cogens norms are by their 
nature to be applied independently of domestic law or of any convention. 
2. National law 
The Constitution is at the top of the hierarchy of domestic laws. According to the rules 
of the Constitution mentioned above, the universally recognised rules and regulations 
of international law are superior to the Constitution. The Constitution and other 
regulations related to co-operation in criminal matters must be harmonised with these 
rules. Regulations on criminal matters must be passed by Parliament. Reciprocity and 
judicial practice are also part of the sources. 
I would suggest the following hierarchy of relevant sources is acceptable: 
1. general principles of the international community; 
2. European Conventions based on those principles; 
3. domestic Acts based on the Conventions and on the Constitution; 
4. international treaties based on the Act XXXVIII of 1996. 
4 53/1993 (X.13.) AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court). 
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For example, in the European Convention on Extradition, Article 28 provides that 
the Convention shall supersede the provisions of any bilateral treaties, convention, or 
agreements governing extradition between any two Contracting Parties. 
Article 2 of the 1996 Act encompasses a public order clause, according to which a 
request cannot be granted nor submitted if it jeopardises the safety, or infringes upon 
the public order of the Republic of Hungary. Article 5 (a) contains the principle of 
double criminality, as the request can be granted or submitted if the conduct is a 
criminal offence and the perpetrators are punishable according to the law of both the 
Hungarian and the foreign state. Article 5 (b) gives another condition which applies to 
the granting or submitting of a request: if the legal assistance between states does not 
concern a political or a military offence. The of fence is not regarded as political if, 
considering all the circumstances of the perpetration, the character of the offence is 
predominantly ordinary, as opposed to political. Murder, or crimes involving murder, 
a lways qualify as ordinary crimes according to the Act. 
Article 7 of the Act finds a strange solution to the procedural requirements. 
According to this, the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General may ask fo r 
sufficient guarantees to grant the request, or may deny the granting of the request if 
those guarantees are refused, if it is to be presumed that the procedure abroad, or the 
probable punishment, or its execution, is not in harmony with the relevant regulations 
and/or the principles of the Constitution, of international law, and of human rights. This 
is a very wide definition without any exactitude in its details. It would be preferable to 
g ive details of the requirements with special reference to ad hoc tribunals, fair trials, o r 
other bars to extradition based on due criminal procedure, and so for th . 
II. The Substantive Law on Extradition 
A s mentioned above, the Penal Code gives brief regulations on extradition. These are 
the following: 
a) citizens of the Hungarian Republic cannot be extradited to another state; 
b) non-Hungarian citizens should be extradited under the provisions of international 
treaties, and when such is lacking, they should be extradited on the grounds of 
reciprocity; 
c) a request for extradition cannot be granted if the conduct for which the 
extradition was requested does not constitute a criminal offence, or the perpetrator was 
not punishable either under Hungarian law or under the law of the requesting state; 
d) the extradition of a person granted asylum should be denied. 
The Second Part of the 1996 Act regulates extradition. A foreign citizen can be 
extradited to the requesting state for criminal procedure, for the carrying out of a sentence 
of imprisonment, or under a detention order. The provisions of extraditable offences are 
the same as with the Council of Europe Convention of Extradition (No. 24), but with the 
difference that the period of the punishment awarded must be at least six months, not four. 
According to the Act, the request should be refused if 
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a) the punishment, or the conduct for which the extradition is requested, becomes 
obsolete because of the lapse of the statutory limitation period whether in the requesting 
state, or in Hungary; 
b) the person whose extradition is requested, is granted a pardon for that o f fence or 
punishment; 
c) the private complaint or similar statement necessary to institute criminal pro-
ceedings in the requesting state was not submitted; 
d) in a case of res iudicta (non bis idem), by a Hungarian court 
A Hungarian citizen cannot be extradited unless the Paris Peace Treaty (Act XVIII 
of 1947) renders such extradition obligatory, or the person whose extradition is 
requested is also a citizen of another state and his permanent place of residence is 
abroad, and if in a similar case the requesting state ensures reciprocity. There is a very 
short and insufficient provision in the Act on persons granted asylum: they should not 
be extradited to that state from which they sought refuge. In my opinion, the legal 
position of a refugee needs to be regulated in a more detailed fashion, specifying for 
which offences he cannot be extradited, what guarantees are required, etc. The Act does 
not make any distinction between the person granted asylum and a refugee, although 
this should have been clarified. 
If the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death penalty 
under the law of the requesting state, the Minister of Justice may refuse the extradition 
unless the requesting state gives such assurance that, in the case of a sentence of capital 
punishment, the death penalty will not be carried out. The Act contains the rule of 
speciality and rules of conflicting requests, in accordance with the Convention. 
There are no provisions either for fiscal offences, life imprisonment, or extradition 
of children, juveniles, or elderly persons. According to the Penal Code, a person under 
14 years of age is not subject to punishment. There is no obstacle to the extradition of 
elderly persons or juveniles, but these cases may be judged on the basis of judicial 
discretion. 
III. Extradition Procedure 
The Criminal Procedure Code formerly regulated the procedure of extradition. 
According to that, 
— the court issues a warrant against the perpetrator who is abroad, and whose extradition 
can be granted; the arrest warrant must be submitted to the Minister of Justice; 
— in the case of a request for extradition with a foreign arrest warrant, or sentence, if 
extradition can be granted, then the court will order the arrest of the requested 
person (extradition custody); 
— the police may place the person whose extradition was requested in detention for 72 
hours in order to allow access to the court; 
— it is the Metropolitan Court's duty to proceed in the case of a request for 
extradition, to examine the request, to question the person, to ask for the statement 
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of the prosecutor, and to submit the brief to the Minister of Justice, w h o will decide 
on the request; the person requested must be informed of the decision; 
— the person in remand custody may only be released by a decision of the Minister 
of Justice. 
According to the Act on International Co-operation in Criminal Matters, the 
procedure is more detailed. The Metropolitan Court holds a bearing on the questions of 
extradition, and informs the prosecutor and the defence attorney of the date and time 
of the hearing. The hearing may proceed even in the absence of the de fence attorney. 
Extradition custody may last for six months, and can be prolonged once for a further 
six months by the Metropolitan Court. 
There is no separate chapter in the 1996 Act concerning human rights. The regu-
lations of the human rights conventions, of the relevant Articles of the Constitution, and 
of the Penal Code, mus t be applied in a fashion which will fulfil the requirements of 
human rights. 
In summary, the Act has filled in holes in the legislation, and its regulations give 
detailed procedural and material guidance on the subject . In my opinion, its main 
deficiency is the secondary nature of the application of the Act, as any international 
treaty created on the subject will take precedence over it. Its usefulness in practice, 
however, remains to be seen. 
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Kimmo NUOTIO * The Difficult Task of Drafting Law 
on Principles 
The idea of the rule of law brings to mind a specific conception of law which fulfils a 
whole set of demanding conditions. T h e law has, on the one hand, to be abstract and 
general but, on the other hand, to be well-defined in advance. The preciseness of the 
law has to allow for the law to be applied in a predictable manner. The law—when it is 
applied—has to be understood as a set of general rules, not merely as an enormous 
collection of individual decisions. The law has to be systematic, but not blindly: the 
rules should be capable of picking out the relevant aspects of individual cases. 
T h e idea of the law being a legal order also entails presuppositions concerning the 
normative coherence of legal materials. This again shifts the emphasis on to elements in 
law which can possibly serve this purpose by securing at least a minimal amount of 
coherence between different elements of the legal system. The methods of legal 
interpretation are of course here of special importance if we look at the law from the 
point of view of the court . Another source of coherence has to do with the legal values 
themselves. This is where legal principles come into the picture. 
The topic of this article is the discussion of the problems of general legal principles 
from the point of view of the legislator. The task of the legislator differs radically from 
that of the courts. The legislator does not apply and interpret the law as it already exists. 
His role is much more constitutive in relation to the legal system. Although his own 
activities are also legally framed by , for example, the constitutional norms of 
* I wish to warmly thank researcher Markus W a h l berg for his u se fu l comments, especially on the Hegelian 
terminology, with which I am less familiar. 
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competence and binding international law, there is still a wide area left open for the 
creation of new norms, which for the courts—when passed as valid law—are then "pre-
existing law". Legal reforms also have a profoundly constitutive nature with regard to 
the legal system. 
It is typical of modern law that its legitimacy is often understood to be dependent 
upon the positive influences it has on the life of the community. The norms of criminal 
law not only restrict and sanction randomly chosen forms of behaviour, but are also 
thought to protect vital interests of the community by diminishing the damages and 
social costs brought about by the forms of behaviour in question. In Finnish penal 
legislation and criminal law doctrine, conceptions of general prevention are quite 
dominant even if a growing number of expressions of individual preventive thoughts in 
some of the latest reforms of the system of penal sanctions can be pinpointed (such as 
wide experimentation with community service as a sanction, treatment programs for drug-
addicts and alcoholics as an alternative to unconditional imprisonment, etc.). 
The values of the rule of law are closely linked with the belief (or disbelief) in the 
general preventive effects of penal prohibitions, especially when the actual practice of 
effective application supports the prohibitions. Jonathan Schonsheck speaks about a 
certain "assumption of compliance" adopted—often highly problematically—by many 
jurists and legal philosophers. To prohibit means to attempt to prevent, when people are 
regarded as being law-abiding in general.1 
The idea of general prevention carries within itself an interesting contradiction 
between the general and the individual. Unlike the legislator, the courts only decide on 
individual cases, but it is usually a very complex matter to speak of any measurable 
general preventive effects of individual court decisions; only some very exceptional 
cases can attain such an importance through the accompanying publicity given to them 
by the mass media. On the other hand, these cases are in themselves highly 
troublesome, because the publicity makes of an individual case an exceptional one, a 
feature which should again be adequately taken into account in the decision-making 
process. 
It is clear that the stress laid on general prevention has meant that one should 
always pay more attention to court practice as a practice which deals with typical cases, 
instead of the individual decisions themselves. When this penal policy point of view is 
taken as a starting point, we are in a way moving from the level of individual decision-
making one step backwards, in the direction of the law-giver and the values of the rule 
of law values. Only firm court practice is really interesting and valuable f rom the point 
of view of general preventive effects. 
From the point of view of general prevention we are interested in crimes as they 
represent certain types of acts, which is actually also the point of view of the legislator. 
Individual criminalisations in a way specify types of acts, whilst court practice is seen 
1 See SCHONSHECK, T.: On Criminalisation. An Essay in the Philosophy of the Criminal Law, 
Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, 8-12. 
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as best furthering the goal of general prevention by forming generally followed rules 
which inform the public of the underlying criminalisation each time, when an act is 
regarded as exemplifying the criminalised act-type. T h e message in the individual 
conviction is transformed, so that wha t is important in the case is its typicality (the 
general), and not its exceptionality ( the particular). In this way general prevention 
theories emphasise the first half of the general principle of equality: treat the like alike; 
but they pay less attention to the second half: treat the different differently.2 
The rule of law concept thus has a very close connection to theories of general 
prevention. One could even claim that they also historically belong together. The 
Hobbesian theory of the rule of law state, headed by a sovereign monarch, emphasised that 
the citizens' guarantees against the abuse of public authority only required predictability 
in legal decision-making. However, the citizens profited when they complied with the rules 
set by the sovereign governor. Therefore it was in their own interest that they should 
accept their being subordinated to the rule-setting authority.3 
T h e concept of the rule of law is in itself extremely ambiguous, as is its German 
counterpart , "Rechtsstaat". The rule of law refers to fo rms of organisation which use 
state authority, as well as to the sphere of legitimate activities of public powers. The 
rule of law actually means a form of organisation which employs social relationships 
as legal ones, thus connecting legal rights and duties with social posi t ions and forms 
of act ion. 
T h e state under the rule of law has often been understood as a state governed by 
a system of rather mechanically applicable rules. Rule of law ideals of predictability 
and legal certainty require or stress the importance of formal values in the legal 
system. The legal sys t em ' s main task is to avoid surprises and randomness in legal 
application. 
Af te r Hobbes, the rationalistic natural law theories adopted another version of the 
rule of law, in which the democratic element in legislative activity became an important 
part of the rule of law. Here the citizens not only have an interest in the fo rms of public 
authority that may be exercised over them—promulgated rules in par t icular-but in 
addition to this they want to participate in the enacting of statutes. The Kantian version 
of the rule of law contains the idea of legislation as self-legislation of the people. The 
peop le ' s private autonomy is morally and legally defined, but the required legitimation 
for positive law's ability to create obligations can be found in the following explanation: 
public authority gets its democratic legitimacy because political will-formation in a 
democratic state connects public authority with the publ ic autonomy of the individual. 
Kan t ' s theory of a state under the rule of law clearly belongs to the genus of social 
contract theories. The possibility of a positive law separated from natural law is created 
by the democratic element , allowing for the creation of new binding law. 
2 S e e e.g. LUHMANN, N . : Das Recht der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt a m Main, 1993, 1 1 0 - 1 1 4 . 
3 See HOBBES, T.: Leviathan (ed. in German. 1984), 237-244. See also (he discussion in NORRIE, A.: 
Law, Ideology and Punishment, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1991, 15 -38 . 
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Even Hegel could be characterised as one of the founding fathers of the rule of 
law ideology. Hegel wants to restrict the use of contract metaphor in the legitimation 
of state authority. He discusses questions of law at two different levels. Firstly, 
abstract right or law contains three philosophically based categories: property (in a 
limited sense), contract, and wrong. Law is presentness of free will, and in a deeper 
sense the actualisation of freedom. Crime already gets its abstract legal definition at the 
level of an abstract right: crime is a specific will which contradicts the rational will of 
the actor.4 
The right as law has also to be dealt with at the other, more concrete, and tradition-
bound level of the so-called "Sittlichkeit". The abstract right alone is not the whole story 
of law. Law as positive law is part of Sittlichkeit, which comprises of three entities: 
family, civil society, and the state. In Hegel 's legal philosophy positive law has a 
connection with human needs, but it is less relative than the human needs themselves. 
In Hegel-Sprache the objective actuality of the law consists, on one hand, of its being 
present to the consciousness, that is, "becoming" in some way "known". On the other 
hand, it is a real and powerful force and validity, and therefore is also "becoming 
known" as universally valid.5 
There is a certain reason for my having chosen this particular line of historical 
argument in order to be able to put the question of principles in modern legislation in 
a meaningful context. It is crucially important to grasp that the principles' value in a 
legal system is very much connected to the position of the principles at the borders of 
the legal system. The principles mediate between the level of abstract r ight or law and 
the system of positive law. According to Hegel, the positive law's advantage over 
abstract right or tradition lies in its conceptual concreteness, but its disadvantage is the 
emergence of the possibility of a conflict between the demands of the positive law, and 
the demands of the abstract right. 
In general Hegel—as well as presumably most of us—sees the positivity of law as a 
very useful quality. The legislature and the whole political apparatus of a state work in 
order to ensure the high qualitative standard of the law. The positive law is not just 
posited in the sense that it could be totally arbitrary as far as values and principles are 
concerned. Quite the opposite, in fact: legal principles grow in weight in a system of 
positive law, because the laws enacted are general. Thus they are also more consciously 
set as the often unreflected norms of tradition and custom which, according to the 
historical school of Savigny, represent the law in its ultimate authenticity. 
It is not only the position of the legislator which is affected by the double character 
of law. In a system of positive law the difficulties of legal application become 
apparent: the authority of positive law has to be recognised in legal interpretation as 
an authentic if not exclusive source of legal knowledge, but the law still cannot be 
reduced to the enacted law. As is well known, the general law of a modern state does 
4 See HEGEL, L. G.: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, Sections 82-104. 
5 Ibid., Section 210 et seq. 
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not fully determine questions of legal interpretation; the application must in a way 
bridge the gap between the general demands of law and the particularities of the 
individual case. 
One way to do this is to develop scholarly theories which will help this application 
by giving support to certain practices of legal application, just as we saw at the beginning 
of this article: general prevention theories could shift the problem of efficiency, and that 
of what is an acceptable use of criminal law, from the level of an individual case to the 
level of standardised legal practices. 
From the point of view of the courts, general legal principles are a somewhat 
ambiguous phenomenon: the principles seem to belong to the level of legislation, but 
they are not very explicitly handled there. W e could perhaps say that the principles 
are located—at least in some respects—on a meta-level above the penal code . The 
principles have a connection to the level of abstract right or natural law that Hegel 
spoke of. They also have to do with the l aw ' s pragmatic functions. And as a third 
location the doctrines of legal application and interpretation could be ment ioned, 
where general legal principles take on the role of fundamental legal values of the 
legal system. 
I will now turn to the problems directly relevant to the modern legislator. The Finnish 
Penal Code of 1894 adopted a very restricted and cautious manner in dealing with 
questions of principles. According to the then prevailing classical school ideology, it was 
better not to tie the hands of legal practitioners in issues concerning the general doctrines 
of penal liability with questions which were not supported by widespread opinion in the 
scholarly community. From my point of view the most interesting provisions are the ones 
in Chapter 3 of the Finnish Penal Code, which bears the title "On grounds which abolish 
the punishability of an act or mitigate it". This Chapter contains 12 sections which cover 
a wide variety of situations and factors worth taking into account when questions 
concerning the culpability of an act or an omission are to be decided upon. 
In a state which respects human rights and the principles of the rule of law, the 
border between punishable and non-punishable acts should be defined as clearly as 
possible; this of course stresses the importance of including provisions guiding the 
public (including the so-called "bad man"), as well as the courts in their legal adjudi-
cation. The rules and principles setting these limits have a different function with regard 
to different actors in the legal society. The "bad man" (or the "good" one), interested 
in the limits of lawfulness of his former or future actions, and of the sanctions 
connected to various types of actions, uses the information he can get about the law in 
the discretionary process of deciding how to a c t The rational planning of o n e ' s own 
activities presupposes this to be possible. The court, on the other hand, uses the legal 
norms as a measuring stick, as a source of legal values. 
Before going into details on the Finnish Penal Code and its proposed reform, I 
would like to point out that the general doctrines in a Field of law are a web of 
interlinked legal principles and legal concepts, which makes the task of the legislator 
a great deal more difficult here than in questions which deal purely with the definit ions 
of the special part. 
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The system of norms defining penal liability is constructed in scholarly discussion 
in a highly conceptual form. The conditions of penal liability, conditions of pun-
ishability, are described by compact concepts—such as intent (Vorsatz), negligence 
(Fahrlässigkeit)—and those concepts again define the normative substance inherent in 
basic penal categories: the correspondence to the elements of a c r ime ' s definition 
(Tatbestandsmässigkeit), the unlawfulness of an act (Rechtswidrigkeit), and culpability 
(Schuld). However, this conceptual system is closely tied to the values and goals of the 
legal system in general, and so issues of principle therefore become involved. And issues 
of principle are again not easily reduced to issues of mechanically applicable rules 
without the loss of some important dimensions. 
Even though the doctrines at first sight look like a very fine and well-defined set 
of instruments for ex post evaluation of various acts, a closer inspection reveals the need 
to go behind the general conceptual logic of these doctrines and to connect them to the 
values and policies which have to be used in shedding light on the different legal 
institutions in question. But if this is necessary in the scholarly work on general 
doctrines, it must also be of concern to the legislator. 
How deeply is it possible to explain basic legal institutions in the general part of the 
Penal Code; indeed, how deep do such explanations need to go? How should the rule 
of law values of predictability, etc., with their emphasis on the exactitude of the norms, 
and their guaranteeing of the exercise of rights by individual members of society, be 
balanced with the demands of justice, which requires a very fine-grained way of 
expressing societal values through deciding of individual cases, which are understood 
"in their uniqueness"? Again, how should prevention theories be taken into account? If 
we are to refer to them in applying the norms of the general doctrines, should we not 
let this show in the formulation of the provisions? 
It is easier to start with the latter complex of questions. Chapter 3 of the current 
Finnish Penal Code does not explicitly refer to criminological or penal policy theories 
of prevention, except in Section 5 where two sub-sections give the court discretionary 
powers to mitigate the otherwise prescribed punishment, or to refrain from imposing 
punishment at all. Preventive interests and some value elements are in these cases 
"hidden" in the general clause "unless the general interest demands otherwise".6 
This is typical of the other parts of the Finnish Penal Code as well as of the special 
laws dealing with the system of sanctions. General clauses expressing the needs of 
society to obtain protection, which in some cases restrict the discretionary powers of the 
judge, have only been expressly written down in law when sentencing problematics is 
6 Despite the fact that Matti Joutsen translates the term "public interest", I will here use the term "general 
interest", because this, in my opinion, expresses more precisely the content of the original term. Public interest 
seems to me to be closer to the interest of the state than the term "general" in itself presupposes. The term 
"general interest" again is more neutral, and could be interpreted to mean also the interest of the civil society. 
As can be seen, we constantly fall back on problems having to do with the deeper understanding of the 
demands of the state under the rule of law. 
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on the agenda.7 General prevention arguments as well as arguments of justice can be 
seen as generally speaking in favour of effectiveness and punishing, whereas individual 
concerns usually speak in favour of the accused. 
W e have already seen that the general doctrines, at least on the level of the current 
Penal Code, are practically f ree of this type of limiting discretion. This can be seen as 
a positive feature. We could easily imagine provisions regulating the preconditions of 
penal liability following the same logic: "An act of an insane person or an act by 
someone mentally deficient due to senility or some other such reason shall remain 
unpunished, unless the general interest demands otherwise." Fortunately, we do not have 
such provisions. They would open legal decision-making to pressures which could ruin 
the legal system's task of guaranteeing individual citizens their use of legal rights. There 
must not be any general preventive reasons heavy enough to legitimate punishing insane 
persons or those innocent. 
We may here leave open whether we have really proved that general prevention 
cannot be the only justification for letting innocent or insane persons go unpunished. It 
could tum out to be true that people 's law-abidingness is somehow connected to the 
law's ability to make this type of differentiation. 
So far, we have concluded that preconditions of penal liability should not be 
constructed in such a way that general interests could allow for the overriding of the 
structural limits of liability in order to serve public demands. But this is still not to 
claim that issues of general prevention have no role whatsoever in the system of 
preconditions of penal liability. 
To my mind, the really difficult question is, to what extent are prevention theories 
needed in the legitimation and making concrete of the components of penal liability? 
As we all know, this topic is far from being a new one. In Germany the goal-rational 
school, spear-headed by the work of Claus Roxin, was distinguished by its emphasis on 
the necessity of determining the normative structures on penal liability, using prevention 
theories as a foundation. The basic categories which made up the concept of ' c r ime ' 
were connected to the penal policy functions of each category. The legality principle—also 
regarded as a principle of penal policy—was satisfied mainly through the category 
correspondence to the elements of a crime's definition (Tatbestandsmässigkeit), unlaw-
fulness (Rechtswidrigkeit)—which was understood as having the function of social conflict 
se t t l ing-and culpability (Schuld)—which again should serve, among other things, the 
potential general or special preventive need for neutralising the bad example given by 
the perpetrator.8 
7 It is of course a little problematic to speak here about restricting discretionary powers when the court itself 
has to interpret whether or not the general interest exists. 
8 ROXIN. C : Kriminalpolitik und Strafrechtssystem. Berlin, New York, 1973, 30. See also the addit ion to 
s e c t 218 in H E G E L (supra note 4) which nicely puts forward the argument of the relative nature of the need 
to meet the bad example exemplified by the crime with a counter-example. 
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We can clearly see that functionalist legal thinking has during the few last years, 
been modified in the direction of greater respect for rule of law principles than before. 
The cores of ideas on restricting punishability inherent in some legal concepts are no 
longer subsumed under the penal policy functions of the concept. In the case of guilt, 
this point is easily highlighted. In his impressive text-book Roxin emphasises the reason 
for putting such a condition of guilt in the first place. According to him, the reason lies 
in the setting of limits to the exercising of sentencing powers by a state. These limits 
in particular restrict the influence of interests of the public needs of prevention in this 
respect.' 
As I see it, the general doctrinal work in the criminal sciences very often threatens 
to remain "begri f fs jurisprudent ial" for the reason just mentioned. Bernd Schiinemann has 
called that style of dogmatic work "non-consequential dogmatics".10 It would, however, 
be quite depressing if this were what the rule of law was all about: an imperative to be 
formalistic, and in a way only unconsciously to further the ideals of a rule of law state, 
in order not to be forced to compromise those ideals. Then we should actually have to 
doubt the Hegelian claim that the value of positive law lies partly in its having been 
reflected upon. 
To my mind, one way out of this dilemma is to see the norms of criminal law in 
the context of the legal system as a whole, and especially in the context of fundamental 
rights. Penal prohibitions not only qualify actions or omissions as crimes. They also 
construct a f ramework wherein people may act and thus enjoy their rights, without the 
fear of intervention by the organs of the criminal justice system. The legal system 
qualifies different modes of action and omission with various legal sanctions. T h e 
contemporary legal system differs radically from that of the days of formal rule of law 
ideology. The best example of this is the growing importance of social roles and 
positions when the rights and duties of persons are determined. One could also call this 
a sort of sociological influence in law and jurisprudence. The legislator has in many 
fields of law broken the formalistic—we could call it bourgeois—concept of abstract 
legal personhood, and filled it with specific rights and duties differentiated according 
to various social roles and positions. Contract law could here be given as an 
example.11 
This development must of course also have influenced modern criminal law. 
Questions of legal imputation have to be put in the right context, which to my mind is 
the socially just manner of distributing rights and duties in a given society. I would not 
be in favour of reducing the idea of a rule of law to the kind of model of law which 
9 ROXIN, C.: Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil. Band I. München, 1992, 541. 
10 Goltdammer's Archiv, 1995, 30-33. It is actually not totally fair to claim it as a defect in research that it 
is conceptual. The real reason for this is of course that it does not reach the level of reflection, that is, the level 
of so-called theoretical jurisprudence. 
11 See, amongst others, Thomas Wilhelmsson's critical work on contract law. W1LHELMSSON, T.: Critical 
Studies in Private Law. A Treatise on Need-Rational Principles in Modern Law, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 
1992, 80-100 and passim. 
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conceives of law as an abstract system of rights and duties only, anchoring them directly 
to the concept of a legal person, and thus to abstract role-concepts. Quite the opposite. 
I do not at all think that it would be somehow Utopian to claim that this general 
development of law has to be reflected upon in the doctrine of criminal law. If we look 
at the normative system of criminal law as a whole, it is in many ways profoundly 
dependent upon other fields of law, such as when the content of norms of conduct are 
given their precise meaning. The criminal law of a modem rule of law state cannot be 
adequately described as a system of rules which would be totally universally applicable. 
The rule of law state has to be seen not only f rom the point of view of the safeguarding 
of pre-existing rights, but the active transformation of the legal system by the legislator 
has additionally to be understood as being constitutive to the whole idea of the rule of 
law. 
This is precisely what causes the di lemma for the legislator. Modem legislation 
should take into account this development, but on the other hand there is no easy way 
of determining the correct amount and direction of "materialisation" of conceptual 
elements in the general doctrines of criminal law. 
It could be useful here to refer to an analysis of different normative e lements in 
criminal law, which has been proposed by Paul H. Robinson.1 2 He emphasises the 
importance of choosing one particular distinction as the crucial one when analysing 
normative materials of criminal law: the distinction between rules of conduct and 
principles of adjudication. 
He stresses that rules of conduct should seen as being addressed directly to the 
common people. The rules of conduct "should be stated in simple, brief, and commonly 
understood language that can be widely disseminated".13 The rules of conduct have to 
describe what is prohibited and what is punishable, and they have to be in a form which 
allows for an easy application in various unexpected situations in life. 
The principles of adjudication are again addressed to the legal professionals who are 
supposed to have more competence and time to study the cases they have to decide. The 
norms that they should and can use must be much more complex than the rules of 
conduct. The principles of adjudication have quite another function than the rules of 
conduct. The rules of conduct are guidelines for the public in their actions, whereas the 
principles of adjudication are required in order to reach just decisions in legal decision-
making. 
According to Robinson, legislation should recognise these differing functions, and 
therefore strive towards different ideals in the respective two parts of criminal 
legislation. Criminalisations should be as c lear as possible, whereas most of the so-
called general part can be seen to belong to the other group, having primarily to do with 
evaluation of actions ex post facto. 
12 ROBINSON, P. H.: "Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication", The University of Chicago Law 
Review. 1990, 729-771 . 
13 Ibid., 765. 
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It is clear that Robinson actually stresses the need to recognise the importance of 
rule elements in the criminalisations of criminal law. I do not disagree with that view. 
I would in any case use the same argument in the opposite direction: the principles of 
adjudication—which according to Robinson are dealing with questions of culpabi-
l i ty-cannot be transformed into rules. The legislator should understand why the 
principles of adjudication inevitably have to be vague, and at best only to set a f rame-
work for a concrete decision. In the words of Robinson, "[t]he principles of adjudication 
should be made as complex or discretionary as is necessary to properly capture the 
community 's evaluation of blameworthiness, without the constraints that might be 
imposed on a document designed for unsupervised, lay application."14 
To my mind, the feature of vagueness is a consequence of the task of the legal 
system to guarantee certain rights for the people and other legal entities, and of the fact 
that the system of rights cannot be defined as a system of rules. Robinson 's analysis 
allows for the interpretation that I am proposing, but I do not speak of it only in 
functional terms. I want to connect this set of problems with the general development 
of law and the modem legal way of thinking about people's obligations in different 
kinds of social activities. Role-concepts cannot be abstract, and the division of rights 
and duties has to reflect the differences in the legal demands we put on various actors 
with differing qualities and abilities, in concrete situations where they act. 
To take one example of this: traffic rules. It should be rather obvious that different 
actors' breaches of rules must be measured differently. A truck driver's or other 
professionals' acts cannot be directly evaluated using the standards which apply to 
average road-users.15 Professional status affects, for example, the culpability judgement 
The role-concept is normatively stricter than the average, and it establishes the normative 
expectation that a person in that role has the relevant attitudes and abilities needed in the 
activity to safeguard others' legitimate expectations. Of course specialisation-a kind of 
progressive division of labour-is also partly connected to the need of society to operate 
stricter control over certain important and potentially risky activities. 
The same kind of development can also be seen in questions having to do with the 
authorised use of force. The classical liberal state knew basically only the rights of the 
individual to defend him or herself in the case of an unlawful attack. The relevant 
justifications and excuses were applied in typical situations where dangers had to be 
battled. Acting in self-defence was prima facie fulfilling the definitional elements of a 
crime, and thus only the exceptional ground of self-defence could erase from this act 
the quality that it in principle violated the demands set by the law. State authorities, 
private guards, and others were also judged on the basis of these general regulations. 
Now the situation has changed a great deal. The authorities or guards do not have to 
legitimate their use of force in this way, as a justified exception to a normally unlawful 
14 Ibid., 765-766. 
15 Ibid.. 763. Robinson speaks about the need "to individualise the reasonable person standard, if it is to 
accurately reflect the normative expectations by which the community assigns or withholds blame". 
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action. They have no rms of competence of their own today, which directly authorise 
their use of force under certain circumstances. This has led to the narrowing of the 
sphere of application of the original sections dealing with defence. 
Even if aspects such as the division of labour affect the possibility of abstract and 
general regulation, there is also a kind of force of resistance to the development towards 
the differentiation of normative standards in criminal law. This has to do with a 
criticism often levelled against criminal law: the sin of becoming too modem, especially 
in those fields of criminal law which deal with economic and environmental crimes. 
Generally speaking, cr imes performed by rationally planned and directed organisations 
which belong to the economically and technologically powerful sectors in society have 
grown in importance since the 1970's. This legal development has led to a kind of 
anachronism with regard to the classical doctrines of penal liability. The impossibility 
of combining the requirement of the personal guilt of the perpetrator with the possible 
consequences of the act was a weighty argument which supported the penal liability of 
legal persons for some crimes, and in Finland the relevant legislation recognising this 
new type of corporate liability was passed last year. 
I think that it is not too difficult to see where the roots of these anachronisms lie. 
If the general doctrines are constructed upon a conception of human action which stems 
purely from the heritage of moral philosophy, and as such is almost historical, it could 
be doubted whether this picture is accurate as a starting point when the planned actions 
of rationally acting organisations are to be evaluated. T o my mind, not even the work 
of the Criminal Reform Project in Finland has really tackled this question, which 
becomes even more diff icul t when basic concepts of penal liability are to be defined in 
the text of the law. 
The preparatory work for the Criminal Reform Project has advanced—slowly but 
steadily—and the proposals of the project dealing with provisions on the general doctrines 
should be made accessible to the public in a few months. The solution presented to this 
problem mentioned above, that is, dealing with the anachronisms, will be one of the 
points of interest to be evaluated when the new proposals have been published. 
I want to give one example of a question which will be difficult: the choice of 
formulation of the definition of criminal intent. One problem lies in defining the sphere 
of dolus eventualis, and whether the border-line between intent and recklessness is settled 
by using volitional theories of intent, or probability theories, or by somehow combining 
the two. The probability version is clearly better suited to cases where the act is based 
on rational calculation—such as in most so-called m o d e m criminality—whereas the 
volitional theories perhaps give better tools for the handling of traditional cr imes such 
as violence between two individuals. 
This choice comes first. But the second choice can be even more difficult : if a 
probability conception is chosen, should the required probability estimate be exactly the 
same in all constellations of imputation, that is, in all crimes and in the case of all 
perpetrators? Should we not be willing to think that a person functioning in a pro-
fessional organisation with specific duties to undertake measures to guard against 
breaches of the law, will understand the nature of the l aw ' s demands much earlier than 
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an average citizen without any special knowledge? Can we really say that we only have 
one standard? 
The same could be said of grounds for justification and excuse. Can we find a way 
of taking into account both sides of our needs: the norms have to be relatively general 
so that they cover a sphere wide enough? But, on the other hand, they have to be 
flexible enough so that the rights and duties of the parties can be evaluated in a socially 
just manner, that is, so that the party's social role can adequately form one basis of the 
evaluation? 
One of the leading general legal principles in the field of criminal law is the 
principle of legality. As seen above, the principle of legality is very fundamentally tied 
to values and ideas of the rule of law. Therefore, I would like once again to discuss the 
importance of this principle, this time from the point of view of the law-giver. 
The principle of legality has the characteristics of a meta-principle in the legal 
system. On the one hand it binds the legal application of criminal law to the wording 
of the written legislation, but on the other hand it also restricts the legislator 's alter-
natives in how to pursue criminal political goals. The written law may not be too vague 
in nature, retroactive criminalisations may not be tolerated, and so on. Viewed from a 
wider perspective, the principle of legality can be seen amongst other things, to limit 
the creation of ad hoc courts. It is not only norms of conduct and sanctions, but also the 
organisational side of the legal system which has to be clear at the moment of the deed. 
To my mind, the different norm-contents of the legality principle very strongly 
emphasise that the principle is not, strictly speaking, "part o f ' criminal law. It is a 
constitutional principle which affects the system of criminal law in many ways. Its 
function is to guarantee that the construction of criminal law will be carried out in a 
manner which does not threaten the fundamental rights of the citizens. This makes the 
task of formulating the norm system of penal law a delicate matter. When specific forms 
of conduct are made punishable by sanctioning the breach of those norms, the sphere 
of the legitimate enjoyment of fundamental rights is thereby affected. The principle of 
legality not only demands that this limit has to be clearly defined at the time of the act, 
but also that breaches of the norm have to be dealt with according to the law. The law 
not only has to manage to determine what is lawful and what is unlawful, but the law 
has to have a system of judging and convicting unlawful actions in a lawful manner. 
The need to protect the rights of the individual is not of lesser importance when the 
accused is being convicted. 
I do not want to go through the whole spectrum of issues which have to do with the 
principle of legality. The particular issue I wish to discuss here concerns the importance 
of the principle of legality with regards to the quality of preciseness of the general 
doctrines of penal liability.16 
16 See Robinson's remarks on the other rationales supporting application of the legality principle to doctrines 
of adjudication rather than to the rules of conduct, ibid., 770. According to him, not only notice is important, 
as it is in the case of rules of conduct The legality rationales include: "increasing uniformity of application to 
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It seems to me obvious that the importance of the principle of legality is most crucial 
when the rules of forbidden conduct - the definitional elements of various types of 
crimes—in the special part of criminal law are set. There is much reason to worry about 
the present situation in this respect, but this is not my foremost concern here. The point 
I wish to make is that if we regard the principle of legality as being a constitutional 
principle, then its importance is much more easily recognisable, when compared with 
the alternative that it is just seen as one particular rule, or element, within the general 
doctrines. 
Only if the principle of legality is seen in the context of fundamental rights can the 
intimate relationship between that principle and the principle of guilt be fully 
demonstrated. W e could say that the principle of guilt is the specifically material 
element guaranteeing the maximum protection of the rights and interests of the accused 
and convicted person when criminal cases are to be decided. It is therefore of crucial 
importance that law-drafting practice respects the differences in the culpability of the 
act, in order not to one-sidedly over-emphasise the value of dangerousness and 
harmfulness of a certain act referring to utilitarian goals.17 
The position of the legality principle was strengthened in the reform of the Finnish 
Form of Government , when the Sections concerning the fundamental rights of the 
citizens (often generally applied also to cover foreigners) were renewed.18 Section 6a 
concerns some aspects of the principle of legality. According to the Government Bill 
(309/93), the section contains "the most important elements of the legality demands in 
criminal law".19 
I still think, however, that the principle of legality is also understood in this reform 
of the Form of Government and in the Finnish doctrine20 in an overly formalistic 
manner. If we were to see it as the legislator's duty to build the whole totality of criminal 
law in a way which safeguards individuals' full enjoyment of their rights, it would always 
be important to stress the culpability principle as a supplement to the perhaps more 
formal principle of legality. Therefore, it would have been better if the legality principle 
had also been understood to cover criminal responsibility's limits of culpability. 
similar cases, l imit ing the potential for abuse of discretion, and minimising the improper delegation of 
criminalisation authority from the legislature to the courts". 
17 See also Robinson ' s remarks on the primacy of utilitarian concerns at the level of the rules of conduct , 
whereas the justice reasons dominate the level of principles of adjudication. Ibid., 770. 
18 Act 969/95; in force since August 1, 1995. See also the article LAHTI, R. : "Perusoikeusuudistus ja 
rikosoikeus" ("The Reform of Constitutional Rights and Criminal Law"; with a summary in English), in 
Lakimies 5 - 6 , 1996, 930-939. In the summary Lahti asserts that the increasing emphasis "on human and 
constitutional rights will obviously affect the Finnish criminal law theory and criminal policy. For instance, the 
moral and political arguments of justice and humanity, which play an important role in criminal law theory, 
have now a strong institutional support as legal principles, too, when being firmly attached to human rights and 
constitutional l aw." 
19 Government Bill. 50. 
2 0 E.g. F R A N D E , D.: Den straffrättsliga legalitetsprincipen, (Criminal Law Diss., with a S u m m a r y in 
German, Ekenäs, 1989), passim. 
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From my point of view—and from the point of view of the protection of funda-
mental rights and human rights-the general part of the Penal Code should also contain 
provisions defining the more specific degrees of culpability, which the individual 
definitions of the special part could then refer to. I would like to defend the view that 
the norms of criminal law not only have as their addresses the courts authorised to 
enforce the law, but also that citizens should be able to know at least the outlines of 
the system created in the general doctrines. This is important not only with regard to 
the general doctrines of criminal liability, but also with regard to the general formation 
of the system of sanctions.21 As we all know, questions concerning sentencing mainly 
just elaborate further the same principles already present in the doctrines of penal 
liability. 
I would now like to turn back to the issue of whether we really can have the general 
doctrines' generality demand satisfied under modern conditions, when the special part 
covers a variety of totally different types of prohibited acts. This is now where the 
dilemma arises. The legality principle encourages us to be as pedantic as possible in the 
definition of the general doctrines, but the variety in the regulations in the special part 
does not allow for it without our neglecting important aspects concerning the object-
adequacy of the field in question. 
This discrepancy can only be handled if we properly understand the nature of the 
problematic. Here one important aspect is to take into account the differentiation that 
has occurred on the level of the activities which form the object field of legal 
regulation. I feel that this requires that the point of an individual person's rights and 
duties is seen in the context of the social activity in question. Therefore the principle 
of legality, properly understood, cannot be seen to demand the generality and specificity 
only of the formulations of the general doctrines in the general part of the Penal Code. 
The principle of legality in itself demands the adequacy of the content of the norms 
defining the culpability of the act, in relation to the legitimate and normatively 
supported expectations connected with activities in legal roles and positions. This will, 
in my view, demand a certain flexibility in the definitions of the general doctrines of 
liability, and the possibility in the legal application of the norms of securing the object-
adequacy of the interpretative result in this respect. 
I have tried to prove my thesis that the legal theoretical framework is of crucial 
importance when the true meaning and validity of general legal principles in the 
legislative work of the law-giver is being discussed. The traditional conception of the 
rule of law state leads to an unnecessary formalism in the presentation of the contents 
of the principle of legality, which again somehow isolates matters concerning the 
legitimate construction of norms defining the area of criminal law from the context of 
fundamental and human rights. This also leads to a kind of polarisation of penal law 
thinking with respect to the discussion concerning the role of the state. I refer of course 
21 See the valuable article by ROBINSON, P. H.: "Legality and Discretion in the Distribution of Criminal 
Sanctions", Harvard Journal on Legislation, 1988, 393—460. 
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to the two faces of the state: it is conceived of either as a rule of law state or as a social 
welfare state, but it should be conceived of as fulfilling both expectations.22 
In my opinion, this goal is best served by stressing the importance of material 
legitimation of the constructive elements of penal liability, with regard to the different 
legal positions of the actors, and in the light of constitutional law. I even see here one 
possibility of emphasising one point where the system of penal law has an advantage, 
when compared with most other branches of legal studies. Criminal law, unlike most 
of civil law or public law, deals in a very direct way with social activities, which gives 
penal law a dynamic context. It is the change in social activities, and the concomitant 
development of the system of rights and duties, that brings about the need to review the 
constructive elements of penal liability. 
To my mind, much of this development happens without our being conscious of it. 
The courts ' decisions already reflect this dynamism, which for the courts is something 
quite natural. Traditional dogmatic apparatus has not prevented developments in this 
respect, just as the development of constitutional law is very seldom "led" only by 
constitutional law. Legal dogmatical research should be able to "mediate" between the 
different levels and poles of law and legal actors, and to take the necessary distance to 
the norms and practices which are to be evaluated by referring to materials which 
belong to another pole or level. 
However, constitutional rights and values should not be forgotten in the work of 
developing new constructive models for prerequisites of criminal liability. I would wish 
in fact to see criminal law doctrines profiting from this very connection to dynamic 
aspects of life. W e could see that the general principles of criminal law are very much 
at the roots of constitutional rights-also historically. They are an expression of the 
individual 's need for protection limiting the powers of the public authority. The level 
of legal application is where the individual's interests are most concretely at stake. This 
level is also the place of birth of legal principles. The general doctrines in the criminal 
law should therefore be seen as having gained their specificity mainly because the needs 
for protection are of a particular kind when the state pursues its goals by threatening to 
enforce penal sanctions. 
Of course, constitutional law not only deals with the state 's obligations and rights 
to punish. That is only one tiny facet of the tasks of the state as defined at the level of 
the constitution. But that does not make the connection between the rules and principles 
of criminal law and constitutional norms less interesting. W e actually need only the 
correct perspective on law that will allow us to conceive of this connection. I hope I 
have been able, at least in a sketchy fashion, to draw a picture demonstrating this to be 
possible. 
22 One eminent author who has tried to re-organise the struggle between these two types of legal paradigms 
is of course Habermas. He has sought the way out of the dilemma by constructing a third way of thinking about 
the foundation of the individual's rights. His solution is the so-called procedural paradigm of law. See 
HABERMAS, J.: Faktizität und Geltung, Frankfurt am Main, 1992, 468-537, esp. 493. 
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1. The Revision of Fundamental Rights in Finland 
The r e fo rmed Chapter II of the Constitution Ac t of Finland c a m e into force last year.1 
This Chapter on fundamental rights can be seen as the first comprehensive "Bi l l of 
Fundamental Rights" in the Finnish Constitution. The previous catalogue of fundamenta l 
r ights had little influence on the criminal jus t ice system for several reasons.2 
1. Fundamental rights only had the function of limiting the powers of the State. T h e 
idea was that the State could not violate the fundamental rights of the individual through 
an ordinary law. Fundamental rights were not rights which could also have had 
relevance in legal relationships between cit izens. This effect—which is covered in 
Germany by the concept of Onf/wi/Lung—included only legislat ion in the fields o f , for 
example, cr iminal law and the law of damages . 3 In practice, this meant that c r imina l 
legislation was hardly ever considered to be related to fundamenta l rights. T h e l imi-
tations on the f reedoms of individuals which criminal legislat ion entails cou ld be 
formulated as ordinary law. Quest ions such as those regarding the extent to which the 
1 Act no. 969/1995. 
2 For the broad outlines of the reform see, e.g., SCHEININ, M.: "Minorities, Human Rights and the Welfare 
S ta te - the 1995 Fundamental Rights Reform in Finland", in POHJOLAINEN, T. : (ed.): Constitutionalism in 
Finland-Reality and Perspectives, Helsinki, 1995, 30, 31 et seq. 
3 Even in Germany, where there has been a far-reaching system of fundamental rights since the 1950 's , the 
discussion of Drittwirkung is normally limited to private law relationships between individuals. Only in the 
1990's has the interest shifted to cover the criminal justice system as well. 
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State is allowed to restrict the freedoms of individuals by criminal legislation, or the 
general requirements criminal legislation must fulfi l in order to be constitutional, were 
hardly ever raised. In any case, if these questions were raised, the answers were not 
based on the fundamental rights and the Constitution, but rather on the so-called 
principles governing criminal provisions. I will return to these principles in section 2. 
2. The courts had not normally seen themselves as being permitted to examine the 
constitutionality of the Acts of Parliament In fac t fundamental rights have not had much 
relevance for the courts at all. In some cases, the Fmnish Supreme Court has referred, 
for example, to the principle of equality,4 but normally laws have been interpreted 
without taking into account fundamental rights of individuals, and without reference to 
the Constitution. Fundamental rights have been relevant solely for Parliament, not for the 
courts; on the other hand, international human rights conventions have been applied in 
the courts. 
The reasons for this special feature are obvious in Finland. There is no Constitutional 
Court, and the general courts may have found it difficult to apply provisions of the 
Constitution. In addition to this, the general opinion has been that if the courts had the 
right to apply the fundamental rights and rule on whether ordinary laws are in conflict 
with fundamental rights, then this would mean that an important part of the powers of 
Parliament would have been transferred to the courts. 
3. The domestic catalogue of fundamental rights was rather old-fashioned and 
limited to the so-called "negative liberty rights", that is, human rights of the so-called 
first generation. The Constitution did not take into account the European Convention on 
Human Rights or other international human rights instruments. For example, the right 
to a fair trial or social rights were not present in the written Constitution of Finland. 
Most economic, social, cultural and environmental rights were not included in the 
Constitution Act. Furthermore, there were not even explicit constitutional provisions 
concerning all the traditional basic rights. For example, provisions relating to the right 
to personal integrity were lacking in the Finnish Constitution. 
After the total reform of Chapter II of the Constitution Act the situation in Finland 
is wholly different. The domestic discussion began as early as 1974 when the 
Constitution Act Committee suggested a total reform of fundamental rights provisions. 
The Working Group on Fundamental Rights, appointed by the Ministry of Justice, made 
the same proposal in a more elaborate way in 1982. In the domestic discussion, the role 
and function of fundamental rights has been one of the core issues in the scientific 
discussion of constitutional law in the last ten years. Additionally, the international 
discussion, especially Robert Alexy's theory of fundamental rights,5 has had an impac t 
The reform of Chapter II of the Constitution Act in 1995 had two main goals. 
1. The function of fundamental rights is no longer only to limit the powers of the 
State. On the one hand, the State must respect the fundamental rights of individuals, 
4 See decision KKO 1973 II 73. 
5 See ALEXY, R.: Theorie der Grundrechte, Frankfurt am Main, 1986, 224 et seq. 
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and, therefore, Parliament is not allowed to enact criminal legislation which is not in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. For example, the principle of legality 
may under no circumstances be breached.6 But on the other hand, the State is also 
obliged to protect and ensure fundamental rights in the relationships between individuals. 
This concept entered the Finnish discussion particularly after Finland had become a party 
to the European Convention on Human Rights. The international discussion of these three 
functions of fundamental rights also had an impact on this new emphasis. In practice 
these changes are analogous to the doctrine applied in the European Court of Human 
Rights and at the domestic level imply the following. 
Firstly, there are some so-called absolute prohibitions in the reformed Chapter II of 
the Constitution Act of Finland; the most obvious of these is Section 6(2), according to 
which "(n)o one shall be sentenced to death, tortured or treated in a degrading manner" . 
Additionally, the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege—which is 
stipulated in Section 6a—may not be violated under any circumstances. These provisions 
obviously caused no major changes in the existing Finnish criminal justice system. 
Secondly, in other cases the principle of proportionality should be given a central 
position in the argumentation concerning new criminal justice legislation. The State 
must, for example, protect the life and health, personal integrity and liberty, property 
and privacy of individuals f rom the violations of other individuals to some degree.7 
This requirement is already traditionally fulfilled by the provisions in the criminal law.8 
But at the same time the State must also take into account the fact that punishment 
in itself means the deprivation of personal liberty and property. In addition to this, the 
threat of imprisonment or fines, and the limitations which the criminal provisions 
indicate, must be in proportion to the value of the fundamental rights protected by these 
provisions. Restrictions of fundamental rights must meet the criteria of proportionality. 
The importance of the desired goal, and the extent to which the fundamental right is 
infringed in pursuit of its protection, must be duly proportional. 
Thirdly, restrictions of fundamental rights must also be necessary to protect and 
ensure the rights of individuals. Limitations on fundamental rights may be allowed only 
if the protection of individuals is not possible by means that do not violate the rights 
as much as the threat or actual implementation of the punishment. The State may not 
restrict a fundamental right except when the protection or implementation of another 
fundamental right or protection of another constitutional value cannot be secured by 
other means. This means, for example, that if a proposed criminal provision will not 
6 According to Section 6a of the Constitution Act "(n)o one may be found guilty of a criminal o f fence or 
sentenced to a penalty on account of some act for which no penalty had been prescribed by Act of Parl iament 
at the time of its commission. No greater penalty shall be imposed for a crime than that which was prescribed 
by Act of Parliament at the time of its commission." The Constitution of Finland is published in English in The 
Parliament cf Finland & Ministry For Foreign Affairs & Ministry of Justice, Constitutional Laws of Finland, 
Procedure of Parliament, Helsinki, 1996. 
7 Sections 6(1), 8(1), and 12(1) of the Constitution A c t 
8 Chapters 21, 20, 25, 28, 27, and 24 of Finnish Criminal Law deal with these relevant fundamental rights. 
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have enough preventive impact, it should not be used. In practice, however, evaluations 
of proposed criminal provisions are made far too seldom in the Finnish Parl iament 
2. The reform also meant opening up the possibility for the courts to apply funda-
mental rights. This is only natural, since the courts have already applied provisions such 
as those of the European Convention on Human Rights in their individual decisions. It 
seems probable that in the future there will be no special Constitutional Court in Finland, 
although the final decision on this has yet to be made. 
However, the courts in fact very seldom find themselves in a situation in which they 
have to declare an ordinary law to be invalid because it contradicts the Constitution. 
They will probably not have this right even after the reform. Questions as to whether 
it is possible to restrict the rights of the individual with criminal legislation, and under 
which conditions, will very seldom arise in courts. 
Of greater importance for criminal justice is the new emphasis on the interpretative 
weight of fundamental rights. It is more common that the fundamental rights of both the 
accused and the victim may be used in courts as arguments in different kinds of 
interpretative questions left open in the legislation. In this interpretative influence of 
fundamental rights, the rights of individuals function in the same way as traditional legal 
principles. They have a "dimension of weight" which, although it may differ according 
to context, ought to be taken into account in legal reasoning. When a provision in an 
ordinary law gives rise to several interpretative possibilities, the court should choose the 
interpretation which fulfils the requirements of fundamental rights in the best possible 
way. The courts are, according to the prevailing doctrinal understanding, under an 
obligation to resort to a "constitutional-rights-oriented" or a "human-rights-friendly" 
interpretation.9 
2. The Principles Governing Criminal Provisions 
2.1. The Inviolability of Human Dignity 
Instead of discussing the relationship between fundamental rights and criminal justice, 
in Finland there has traditionally been much discussion on the so-called principles of 
governing criminal provisions and their impact in criminal legislation. 
I consider the principle of the inviolability of human dignity to be the first principle 
of governing criminal provisions. In the Finnish discussion, the principle has not been 
considered to be of this kind, but after the reform of fundamental rights it has been 
codified in Section 1(1) of the Finnish Constitution Act10, and I see no reason why it 
should not be the most central normative principle of the criminal justice system. The 
9 See SCHEININ: op. cit., 32. 
10 According to the Constitution Act, "Finland is a sovereign Republic, the constitution of which shall 
guarantee the inviolability of human dignity and the freedom and rights of the individual as well as promoting 
justice in society". 
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The principle of the inviolability of human dignity refers to the rights of the offender 
that the State must respect. The principle has at least the following aspects. 
Firstly, the principle can be understood in a way that categorically prohibits strict 
liability in criminal law. This is the interpretation that the principle has, for example, in 
Germany where the inviolability of human dignity is also a part of the Constitution." 
Secondly, the degrees of guilt must be in proportion to the interests protected. The 
principles governing criminal provisions not only apply to the questions of what we may 
protect by the criminal law, but also to the question of the way in which we may protect 
fundamental rights. The legislator should use negligence as the minimum requirement 
to establish culpability only when important interests are at stake. This can be seen, for 
example, by the fact that life and health are protected against negligent acts12, but theft 
and other crimes against property require intentionality.13 
Thirdly, one can also argue that because of the principle, the forms of criminal 
guilt—intentionality, gross negligence and negligence—may not be based solely on 
general deterrence but must, in addition, meet the requirements of the individual 's 
ability and opportunity to conform to the law.14 This question has relevance especially 
in the formulation of negligence. In contemporary criminal justice textbooks it is not 
uncommon to def ine negligence in a way that does not necessarily take into account 
the individual 's abilities and opportunities to act carefully. 
More precisely, if we define the subjective requirements of negligence solely on the 
basis of what the so-called "normally careful person" or bonus paterfamilias would have 
11 See, e.g., WOLTER, J.: "Menschenrechte und Rechtsgüterschutz in einem europäischen Strafrechtssystem", 
in SCHÜNEMANN and DIAS (eds.): Bausteine des europäischen Strafrechts, Coimbra-Symposium für Claus 
Roxin, Cologne, Berlin, Bonn, Munich, 1995, 3, 4, 5-6 . See also T1EDEMANN, K.: Verfassungsrecht und 
Strafrecht, Heidelberg. 1991, 4 -5 , 9 -10 . 
12 See Finnish Criminal Law, Chapter 21, Sections 8-11. 
13 See Finnish Criminal Law, Chapter 28. 
14 See WOLTER: op. cit., 11. See also-slightly more cautiously—LAGODNY, O.: "Grundrechtliche Vorgaben 
f ü r einen Straf tatbegriff ' , in A R N O L D - B U R K H A R D T - G R O P P - K O C H (eds.): Grenzüberschreitungen. 
Beiträge zum 60. Geburtstag von Albin Eser, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1995, 27, 31. 
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done in the corresponding situation, and do not take into account, for example, the youth, 
the lack of knowledge or lack of intellectual or physical capabilities of the offender, then 
this may cause problems with respect to the traditional principle of guilt and the 
constitutional principle of the inviolability of human dignity. It is another matter, of 
course, if the objective standard of due care is formulated on the basis of how a normally 
careful person would have acted in the situation. My point is that violation of this 
objective standard should never alone be sufficient as a requirement for criminal 
responsibility. 
2.2. The Interests that May be Protected by the Criminal Law 
Another classic principle to be taken into account is that criminal provisions may be 
used only to protect those interests which are vital to the community.15 In the German 
discussion, the concept of Rechtsgut defines the interests to be protected by the criminal 
law in the same way. The principle has at least the following five consequences. 
(a) The sources of interests to be protected. Previously the problem central to this 
principle was that the scope of interests to be protected by the criminal law was very 
vague. In its classic form, the concept of Rechtsgut was formulated on the basis of 
morals. The source for the catalogue of Rechtsgüter was legal literature. In modern, 
goal-rational criminal justice, however, the catalogue of Rechtsgüter can be derived 
either directly or indirectly from the constitution and human rights.16 The interests that 
may be protected by the criminal law would not only be defined in the minds and 
theories of criminal law scientists, but also in the political discussions in Parliament and 
the international human rights conventions.17 
(b) The principle as a limitation on criminal law. The second problem has been that 
the principle has been used as a positive principle, that is, it provides permission for the 
use of criminal law every time an acceptable interest is to be protected. The traditional 
meaning of the principle was the opposite. Parliament may use the criminal law only 
when the State is obliged to protect certain interests because of fundamental or human 
rights.18 The criminal law is not a list of actions which are "bad in nature" (mala in se)', 
15 For an overview of the principles governing criminal provisions, see LAHTI, R.: "Die Gesamtreform des 
finnischen Strafgesetzes: Zielsetzung und Stand der Reformarbeit bis 1991: insbesondere im Blick auf die erste 
Phase der Gesamtreform", in LAHTI, R—NUOTIO, K. (eds.): Criminal Law Theory in Transition, Helsinki, 
1992, 27, 38 et seq. 
16 See, e.g., ROXIN, C.: Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil. Band I. Grundlagen, Der Aufbau der Verbrechenslehre., 
Munich, 1994, 14-17; SCHÖCH, H.: "Entkriminalisierung, Entpönalisierung, Reduktionismus. Quantitative 
Prinzipien in der Kriminalpolitik", in ALBRECHT—EHLERS—LAMOTT—PFEIFFER—SCHWIND—WALTER 
(eds.): Festschrift für Horst Schüler-Springorum zum 65. Geburtstag, Cologne, Berlin, Bonn and Munich, 1993, 
245, 253. 
17 See also in the Swedish discussion JAREBORG, N.: Straffrättsideologiska fragment, Uppsala, 1992, 101. 
18 See especially TAPIO, L.-S.: "Om straffrättssystemets (externa) berättigande", in B E R G L U N D - F R Ä N D E -
H Ä G G B L O M - S E V 0 N (eds.): Skuldfrihel och ansvarslöshet. En hälsning tili Alvar Nelson pd 75-drsdagen av 
Ane den garnies barnbarn, Helsinki, 1994, 71, 79 et seq. 
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it seeks rather to protect individuals f rom violations of fundamental rights committed 
by other individuals. Only in cases where the protected Rechtsgut involves such matters 
as State security, public order, and so on, does the criminal law not need a direct 
background in constitutional fundamental rights. 
In practice the Finnish Parliament has not taken this principle at all seriously. A 
typical example of the principle is the area of sexual offences.1 9 The legitimate 
interests to be protected are those involving personal integrity20 and the special 
protection of children and young people. Public morals, for example, do not form an 
interest which could be protected by the criminal law with reference to fundamental 
rights in the Constitution. 
In Finland the Criminal Law Project proposed a reform of the provisions relating 
to sexual offences in 1993. According to this proposal, public encouragement of homo-
sexuality would no longer be a crime. It was additionally proposed that voluntary incest 
between adults over 18 years of age should not be a crime. This would be a logical 
result of the interests to be protected according to the Constitution, but in practice, 
however, it is not clear whether these reforms will be implemented. Many voices have 
been raised—not only f rom the churches and other religious groups—insisting that the 
criminal law also be used in the future to protect public morals. 
Another example taken from the field of sexual offences is the question of 
pornography. Criminal provisions ought to be limited to situations in which the interests 
of personal integrity, the protection of children and the young people or other 
constitutional values require the use of the threat of punishment. In practice this aim is 
not easily achieved. On the contrary, there are currently many political pressures in 
favour of toughening the legislation on pornography. 
(c) The principle and the protection of new fundamental rights. If we trace the 
interests that may be protected by the criminal law to national fundamental rights and 
international human rights, a possibility such as the protection of the environment by 
criminal law becomes evident. The fact that the Constitution strongly emphasises 
environmental protection is one argument for using the threat of punishment in this area. 
Legislation concerning crimes against the environment was reformed last year21 as 
part of the second phase of the total reform of the criminal law.22 Many scholars in 
Finland have seen major problems in the use of the criminal law in such relatively new 
areas as the environment. The critics are right in saying that only such criminal 
provisions as can have enough preventive influence on behaviour should be used, and 
that purely symbolic criminal provisions cause more problems than they solve. The role 
of the criminal law in these new areas mus t also be restricted to a subsidiary one.23 On 
19 Chapter 2 0 of Criminal Law. 
20 Section 6 of the Constitution AcL 
2 1 See the new Chapter 48 of Finnish Criminal Law. 
22 Act no. 578/1995. 
23 See Section 2.4 below. 
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the other hand, why should protection of the environment with the help of the criminal 
law be any more problematic than that of the traditional fundamental rights, especially 
when fundamental rights and international treaties require States to implement legislative 
measures to protect the environment?24 
(d) The balancing of interests in the legislative process. Taking into account the 
reform of fundamental rights, the principle could also be understood in a way that 
presupposes proportionality between the protected interest, the deterrent effects of the 
criminal provision, and the limitations that these provision impose on the freedoms of 
individuals. In Figure 2, this relation is not solely the protection offered to the victim 
by the State; it also represents the protection of both the offender 's and the victim's 
rights. When the State protects, for example, life, personal liberty, and the property of 
individuals by means of criminal law, it must at the same time take into account that 
the threat of punishment in itself constitutes a limitation on the freedoms of individuals. 
The threat of imprisonment or fines must be in proportion to the value of the 
fundamental rights protected by the criminal provisions. 
This argument may be relevant to, for example, the question of how much we should 
use endangerment instead of concrete effects as the basis for criminal provisions. The 
intensity of society's response must be proportional to the danger represented by the 
offender. The total reform of Finnish criminal law in the 1970's had as one of its 
emphases dangerous conduct as such, and not the effect caused. In the last two decades, 
however, many critics, both in Finland and abroad, have questioned the rationality of 
punishing dangerous behaviour without requiring concrete effects, such as on life or 
health. For example, Felix Herzog25 points out that the offences based on endanger-
ment "endanger the whole criminal justice system". 
(e) The balancing of interests in the general principles of criminal justice. The same 
kind of balancing of interests has obvious applications in many interpretative questions 
of the general principles of the criminal law. This line of thought is especially evident 
24 See also STRATENWERTH, G.: "Zukunftssicherung mit den Mitteln des Strafrechts", Zeitschrift fúr die 
gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, 1993, 679, 692. 
25 See HERZOG, F.: Gesellschaftliche Unsicherheit und strafrechtliche Daseinsvorsorge. Studien zur 
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in the German goal-rational or functionalist schools. For example, such recent questions 
as the scope of allowable risk-taking, or the relevance of the consent of the endangered 
person, can be dealt with in a more consistent manner than previously, if we ask 
whether the protection of the interests of the victim really require the punishing of the 
of fender . 
In effect we are speaking of the same thing as the principle of proportionality in 
constitutional law.26 The protection of Rechtsgüter must be proportional to the 
importance of the desired goal. I could mention dozens of examples of this approach; 
here one will suffice. In Finland one typical problem has been the definitional elements 
of the crime of "negligent receiving of stolen property".27 If, for example, a salesman 
has "reasons to suspect" that the property he or she is buying is stolen, he or she shall 
normally be sentenced to pay a small fine. If we understand the question as also being 
of relevance to fundamental rights, we are obliged to ask how far must individuals 
investigate the origins of the goods they are buying? How wide may the limitations on 
normal economic transactions be in order to provide sufficient protection of property, 
without, at the same time, placing too great a limitation on the freedoms of individuals? 
In addition to this, in many questions of the general principles of criminal law, one 
may ask whether the victim is in need of protection. This question can be also 
understood as one aspect of the constitutional principle of proportionality. For example, 
today in Finland the relevance of the consent of the endangered person is very unclear. 
Again, one example will here suffice. Let us suppose that two persons are travelling in 
a car. The passenger urges the driver to drive faster in order to catch a plane. In the 
ensuing accident the passenger is injured. Traditionally the situation has been seen as 
falling within the area involving the problems raised by the "consent of the victim". 
This justification does not apply if the victim has not consented to the effect, but only 
to the endangerment. But is the vict im's health really in need of legal protection, if he 
or she has personally urged the offender to drive faster?28 
2.3. The Comparison Between the Advantages and the Disadvantages of Criminal 
Provisions 
The traditional interpretation of this principle has been that, although the criminal 
provision would have passed the two previous tests, it still must bring about more 
advantages than disadvantages to society as a whole. In this respect, the reform of 
fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality may mean an improvement, 
although this question had already in Finland in the 1970's been seen as a central one. 
I cannot here go into the details of this principle. The advantages of a certain 
criminal provision are, of course, the preventive effects from the point of view of the 
26 S e e section 1 above. 
27 Chapter 32, Section 4 of Criminal Law (my translation). 
28 For more details on the different situations, see NUUTILA, A-M.: Rikosoikeudeltinen huolimattomuus 
(Fahrlässigkeit als Verhaltensform und als Schuldform), Helsinki, 1996, 639-43, (Zusammen fassung) . 
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protected interests. We should at least have some well-reasoned conception of what the 
preventive effects of the criminal provision will be before defining behaviour as 
criminal. A criminal provision which we know will be inefficient ought not to be 
enacted. 
The disadvantages of criminal provision are also obvious. Punishments mean that 
the convicted suffer. The disadvantages to the State are financial. The costs of a control 
policy, the courts and the prison system should not be taken for granted. There is yet 
a third disadvantage in the use of the criminal law: it restricts the liberties of in-
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Raimo Lahti29 and all other Finnish criminal law scholars and criminologists have 
emphasised the evaluation of the overall effects of criminal provisions- in an important 
way. In the first place, they say, we should seek to decrease the relative role of the 
criminal justice system in comparison with other societal means of regulating human 
behaviour. Imprisonment rates in particular have been decreasing significantly in 
Finland: in 1994 there were 64 prisoners per 100 000 inhabitants, which is one of the 
lowest rates in the Western world. 
2.4. Ultima Ratio 
Even if we respect the inviolability of human dignity, argue carefully about the interests 
that may be protected by the criminal law, and objectively compare the advantages of 
criminal provisions with their disadvantages, we must still meet the requirements of the 
ultima ratio principle. We must ask whether a criminal provision is the only solution 
that will ensure the protection of fundamental rights. If there is another way of 
responding to the problem which has approximately the same deterrent effect, and which 
it is possible to implement without incurring high financial costs, we should choose this 
29 See, e.g., LAHTI, R.: "Scandinavian Criminal Policy: Trends and Interactions", Kansainoikeus—Ius 
Gentium. 1987, 128 et seq. 
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way instead of the criminal law. Ultima ratio means, as we all know, that the criminal 
law must be the last resort. 
In Figure 4 ultima ratio requires that the State ensure the fundamental rights of both 
the potential offenders and the potential victims. In addition to this, the principle can 
be seen as an application of the so-called necessity test.30 The State should not use the 
criminal law except when the protection or implementation of fundamental rights or 
values cannot be secured by other means. 
F igure 4 
The State 
to ensure the criminal law 
as the last resort 
to ensure 
T h e (potential) 
o f fender 
The (potential) 
victim 
This is not the place in which to enter into a detailed discussion of the ultima ratio 
principle; it is sufficient to point out that the principle very often clearly contradicts 
what the Finnish Parliament does. For example, when Parliament responds to the 
problem of drunken driving, it does not consider whether improvements in the health 
care and the treatment of alcoholism would produce better road safety than a more 
dynamic control policy or more severe punishments for drunken driving. The criminal 
law ought to be left to play a subsidiary role in social politics. 
O n the other hand, if we look at the ultima ratio principle in the light of funda-
mental rights, the criminal justice system is not automatically the worst option simply 
because it is criminal justice. In many countries, certain minor of fences have been 
decriminalised and transferred to the area of administrative law. In effect these reforms 
may have produced problematic, repressive systems compared with the criminal justice 
system. This may be seen in the replacement of fines by administrative payments which 
may result in weaker legal protection, fewer possibilities to complain about sanctions, 
and so on. 
3. The Common European Basis of Criminal Justice? 
The emphasis of this article has been on pointing out how fundamental rights and 
human rights can function as a background to criminal legislation and as a background 
to the interpretations made in courts. In the last few years, scholars such as Jürgen 
30 See section 1 above. 
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Wolter31 and Bernd Schünemann32 in Gennany have seen in this development new 
hope for a common basis for a European criminal justice ideology. To summarise, four 
points are of interest. 
Firstly, the ultimate limits of European criminal justice can be read in the absolute 
prohibitions of national fundamental rights and international human rights in the way 
described in section 1 above. The principle of inviolability of human dignity has also 
meant an absolute prohibition on strict liability, at least in most parts of continental 
Europe and in the Nordic countries. 
Secondly, within these limits, criminal provision and interpretations should be in line 
with the emphasis on fundamental rights or other constitutional values. This concept has 
both a national and an international basis in fundamental rights and human rights doctrines. 
Criminal provision must stand in proportion to the interests protected and sacrificed. 
What we need here is a balancing operation in which we can compare the preventive 
advantages with the disadvantages from the point of view of the offender and the 
society as a whole. This kind of balancing model takes into account both traditional 
liberal criminal law ideology, and the functions of the modern welfare State. 
Thirdly, the balancing model is not restricted to the policies of parliament. It can 
also be used to some extent in many questions concerning the interpretation of the 
general principles of the criminal law in the courts. Interpreting the definitional elements 
of crime in this way takes the traditional doctrine of Rechtsgüterschutz seriously, is 
teleological, and open to new interpretations in new societal circumstances. It also sees 
criminal law in a clearly functional manner. According to this way of thinking, a crime 
is not seen as a form of disobedience against the legislator, and the criminal justice 
system is not a mythical system for punishing those we blame. Rather, a crime is seen 
primarily as a conflict between individuals and an offence against their constitutionally 
protected interests. This development is, however, only in its initial stages. 
Fourthly, this kind of interpretative connection between fundamental rights, human 
rights, and criminal justice could also form a uniform basis for international discussion 
of European criminal justice systems. Georg Küpper33 has previously argued that goal-
rational or functional criminal justice systems cannot form the basis for international 
discussion, since national legal systems and ways of thinking about criminal liability 
differ so markedly from each other. But, after all, Europeans are to some extent thinking 
about fundamental rights and the use of the criminal law in a similar way. Nevertheless, 
in an international discussion of criminal liability which is based on conceptions of 
fundamental rights and human rights and their relation to criminal justice, we are talking 
the same, international language. 
31 See WOLTER: op. cit., 3 et seq. 
32 See SCHÜNEMANN, В.: "Einführung in das strafrechtliche Systemdenken", in SCHÜNEMANN, B. (ed.): 
Grundfragen des modernen Strafrechtssystems, Berlin, 1984, 1, 8, 64. 
33 See KÜPPER, G.: Grenzen der normativierenden Strafrechtsdogmatik. Berlin, 1990, 1%. 
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Zoltán PÉTERI Problems of Regionalism 
in Hungary 
I. Some general remarks concerning regionalism in Europe 
The problem of regionalism may be held as a special aspect of a more general 
phenomenon, i. e. the interdependence between social and other groups, itself a product 
of the technical progress and development in contemporary societies. 
T h e need to preserve the identity of separate groups has been felt with increasing 
intensity throughout the world. The "Europa of Regions" has become by now from a 
dream of the believers in the ideas of self-government and federalism an integral part 
of the ideology and practice of a new Europe. The creation of a European Committee 
of the Regions in the Maastricht Treaty may be held as a further step on the way 
towards new institutional forms for dealing with an old but evergreen problem. 
However, on the way towards these goals several obstacles have to be surmounted. 
O n e of the main difficulties in this field seems to be that most of the European 
countr ies have no identical federative or regional structures. It is rather difficult to see, 
therefore, what kind of territorial organization could be imposed on a unified Europe. 
A s far as the terminology itself is concerned, it is a well-known fact that there exist 
various meanings of the words "region" and "regionalism". The word "region" has been 
in use with various meanings, e.g. as denoting a merely geographic unit with identical 
or similar natural conditions extending beyond national frontiers, or, on the contrary, 
identified with the dwelling-place of a cultural or ethnic group inside the territory of a 
State; its meaning can be connected with the economic demands of production or traffic, 
sometimes it can be a remnant from past centuries, moreover a symbol of historical 
traditions, etc. In this paper the word "region" will be used in its political-legal meaning, 
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i: e. denoting the level between, on the one hand, communities, and the central authorities 
of the State, on the other; or, more precisely, according to the official wording, the level 
existing immediately below that of the Central State. 
The "Committee of the Regions" created by the Maastricht Treaty to ensure the 
representation of "regional and local bodies" will, by all probability, not settle all these 
difficulties and even it can be also a source of further ones. Namely the combination of 
local and regional bodies adds much to the confusion besides each state will be repre-
sented in the Committee by the same members of delegates that it has in the Economic 
and Social Committee, irrespective of whether or not has a real regional structure; 
moreover, the members of the Committee will appointed by the Council of Ministers on 
the proposal of the member states which makes it possible for national governments to 
appoint that the regions would not regard as their own representatives, etc. 
Another source of difficulties seems to be connected with the demands of the modem 
"post-welfare State". By now, the principle of subsidiarity, declared by the Assembly of 
the European Regions as the basis for European Union, has become a "commonsense 
rule" for most democratic societies. Borrowed from the social teaching of the Roman 
Catholic Church, where it is used to denote the leading principles governing primarily the 
relationships between State and society, it has become characteristic demand for the 
theory and practice of any democratic exercise of power. In dividing powers between the 
various levels in State and society, the realisation of this principle results in precedence 
being given to action at the level closest to citizens, with the upper levels only being 
called on to intervene if their action is made necessary by the nature of the problem to 
be resolved. 
Subsidiarity therefore presupposes an allocation of decision-making powers within 
a State or within a larger Community according to certain criteria designed to ensure 
that decisions are taken at the appropriate political level. The allocation of the decision-
making power to a higher level than the lower or lowest one might be made primarily 
on such grounds as subject matter, efficiency or necessity or some combination of these 
elements. 
This demand for the realization of the principle of subsidiarity as one of the key 
objectives of the Assembly of European Regions put forward in the resolution of the 
General Assembly of the Assembly of European Regions on 5 and 6 December 1990 
recognized was in Art. В and Ar t 3b of the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union: 
"The Community shall only exert the authority vested in it by this Treaty, if and insofar 
as the action of the Community is necessary to effectively achieve the aims stated in 
this Treaty and for which actions taken by the individual member States and, in 
particular, by the Länder, Regions and Autonomous Communities as territorial 
authorities existing immediately below the level of the central States are insufficient". 
So the principle of subsidiarity may be held as that of protecting and guaranteeing the 
autonomy of the Länder, Regions and other autonomous communities. 
However, though the principle itself may be held as a subject of a broad consent 
everywhere, it seems to be a rather difficult task to specify the rules for its implemen-
tation. The principle of subsidiarity is based on the hypothesis that one can identify, in 
Problems of Regionalism in H u n g a r y 317 
the light of the functions assumed by modern states, the tasks which have to remain on 
community (i. e. the lowest) level as closest to the population, while some others have 
to be dealt with on the regional and the State level where they can be solved with 
greater effectiveness by higher authorities. Unfortunately, the fact itself that in some 
discussions concerning the application of this principle and Art. 3b of the Treaty on 
European Union, mention is not always made of the regional level, gives rise to the idea 
that the principle of subsidiarity will apply exclusively to the relations between the 
European Community and national level. It seems therefore to be a well-established 
claim that the principle of subsidiarity has to be defined in a more precise manner. 
II. Historical and legal problems of regionalism in Hungary 
1. Historical aspect of constitutionalism in general 
In present-day Hungary the problems connected with a future membership in the 
European Union present themselves in a period of substantial changes after the decades 
of Communis t regime. A s a consequence of these changes the previous structure of the 
State and public administration have to be replaced by a new system meeting the 
requirements of a pluralistic parliamentary democracy. However, due to the peaceful 
character of the transformation, the new institutions could not be established and 
confirmed right away; on the contrary, the transformation may be characterized as a 
development going along step by step, and the results of which have yet be improved 
in almost every field of social life. In this process also a return to the old traditions of 
pre-war Hungary has repeatedly been claimed so for the understanding of the present 
situation both the demands of modernization and those of traditionalism have to be 
taken into consideration. 
In pre-war Hungary there existed, similarly to England, no written constitution. The 
so-called "historical constitution" of the country consisting of some basic or "cardinal" 
laws (e.g. the Golden Bull of King Andreas II. issued in 1222 and seembling the Magna 
Carta of England) could survive until the middle of the 20th century as the symbol of 
the f reedom and independence of the Hungarian Kingdom. 
The first written constitution in Hungarian history, if we leave aside the constitution 
of the short-lived Hungarian Councils' Republic issued in 1919, was enacted in 1949 
based on the model of the Soviet constitution issued in 1936. This Constitution of the 
Hungarian People's Republic (Act of Parliament No. XX. of 1949) was modified several 
times, the most important changes having been made in the years 1972, 1989 and 1990. 
Due to the amendments added recently to the original text, the Hungarian constitution 
lost its fo rmer character as the basic document of a "socialist" State, inasmuch as both 
its basic principles (e.g. those concerning the monopoly of State power, democratic 
centralism and dual subordination, the leading role of the Communist Party, etc.) and 
the institutional framework established by it have undergone to substantial changes. As 
a result, the Hungarian Republic could be characterized in the amended text of the 
constitution as an independent and democratic State of Law (Rechtstaat). 
318 Zoltán Péteri 
Plans to establish a new constitution were suggested repeatedly also in the Com-
munist period and especially in its last years when a draft constitution was completed 
but because of the starting of negotiations between the Hungarian Socialist Workers ' 
Party and its opposition, could not have been tabled. In the recent period, however, 
the realization of these endeavours seems to be postponed to future Parliamentary 
terms. 
2. Traditions of regionalism 
The idea of local self-government rooted deeply in Hungarian history throughout the 
thousand-year existence of the Hungarian State. The territorial division of the country 
was established by the first King of Hungary, St. Stephen (1000-1038) in the form of 
the county (megye)—system which could survive, with modifications required by the 
changing political conditions, until our days. 
Without going into details, one can set the historical role of the Hungarian counties 
in its proper light by pointing out its two characteristic features. On the one hand, more 
than once in Hungarian history, the counties proved to be real centers of the nation's 
resistance against foreign influence and could be held reasonably as the depositaries and 
symbols of national independence and identity. On the other hand, however, their 
struggle against the centralizing tendencies in the years of Habsburg enlightened 
absolutism resulted also in some harmful consequences in the form of a conservative 
attitude towards any efforts for modernization in general and of sheltering obsolete 
feudal traditions. Hereby the nation's interests connected with modernization and 
progress came, more than once, into a tragical conflict with the legitimate feelings of 
patriotism on the part of big masses of the population. 
This conflict, rooted in the historical circumstances, had a lasting influence not only 
upon the development of the Hungarian system of local self-government but also upon 
its contemporary and subsequent appraisal until now. 
In post-war Hungary the counties as biggest territorial units of State power and public 
administration formed an integral part on a strictly centralized and hierarchical structure. 
This system based on the Soviet model and characterized by the principles of "democratic 
centralism" and "dual subordination" offered a large scope for centralization and practi-
cally excluded the lower levels from the decision-making process. 
After the downfall of the Communist regime a new law on local self-government 
(Act of Parliament No. LXV. of 1990) was enacted by a freely elected Parliament and 
the new representative local organs established throughout the country as a result of 
local elections set about their activities. However, the law as a result of many 
compromises between parties with different goals and interests, has been appraised and 
criticized several times both by scholars and practicians and on the basis of these 
experiences initiatives were taken for drafting a new law on local self-government. 
Unfortunately, the realization of these plans had to be postponed to coming parliamen-
tary terms. 
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3. The present system of local self-government 
The law in force on local self-government, following the progressive traditions of 
Hungarian history and taking into account the requirements of the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government, has acknowledged and protected the rights of local communities 
to se l f -government As a consequence of this, the local government is al lowed, within 
the limits of the law, to regulate and administer freely the local affairs within its range 
of tasks and scope of authority. 
The autonomous bodies elected in Hungary on the basis of the law can be ranged 
into two categories: on the one hand, the local self-governments of communit ies i. е., 
villages and towns, the capital and its districts elected directly by the citizens, and those 
of the counties (megye) elected indirectly i. e. by the deputies of the towns and villages, 
on the other. There exists no hierarchical subordination between the various kinds of local 
self-government, however, their tasks and competencies may be stipulated differently by 
law. Accordingly, distinction is made between obligatory and facultative tasks and 
competencies with the principle of subsidiarity as a general rule, prevailing. As stipulated 
in the law, the municipal self-government shall ensure healthy drinking water supply, 
primary education, basic health care and social service, public lighting, the maintenance 
of local public roads and public cemeteries, it shall ensure the enforcement of rights of 
national and ethnic minorities. Other tasks of local self-governments (e.g. local develop-
ment, protection of the built and natural environment, local mass transport, public security 
etc.) specified in the law, can be taken voluntarily by them. The self-government of the 
county has to fulfil the tasks not belonging to the obligatory scope of activity of the 
municipalities. Local self-government are entitled to co-operate and to make an alliance 
with each other, to establish nation-wide or regional associations, to co-operate also with 
foreign autonomous bodies and to be members in international associations of local self-
government. 
Furthermore, the law may lay down mandatory (obligatory) tasks and functions for 
the local self-government, and the Parliament is obliged to ensure the financial conditions 
for their implementation. Also the local self-government may undertake other local affairs 
not referred to by law to act freely in that scope provided that the law is not violated. 
The autonomy of local self-governments concerning the allocation of their budgets 
and f inances is recognized and protected by law. They are assigned proprietary rights 
and in order to cover their expenses, they are allowed, with the except of the counties, 
to impose local taxes. On the other hand, their expenses are covered most ly by State 
budget. 
The powers allocated to local self-governments are concentrated with their elected 
representative bodies (general assemblies) led and represented by the mayor (towns and 
villages) or the president (counties). The representative body (general assembly) may 
establish standing committees for furthering the decision-making process and for 
controlling the fulfilment of tasks and decisions. Administration is carried out by the 
office of the local self-government with a clerk (greffier) as its head appointed by the 
representative body for an indefinite period. 
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The decisions taken by the representative bodies of self-governments may be 
overruled only by the courts or by the Constitutional Court only in case of violation of 
positive law. The control over their activity is performed, in the name of the 
Government, by the Minister of Interior. Besides, in order to control the legality of the 
activities of local self-government, new administrative officers called Republic's 
delegates were appointed in the capital of the country, in its districts and in eight, newly 
established territorial units of State administration, with the name "region". The 
Delegates appointed, upon the proposal of the Prime Minister, by the President of the 
Republic, for the duration of his own term (i. e. 5 years) were generally held as a set-
off to local autonomy both in legal and in administrative matters. As a guardian of 
legality, the Republic's Delegate could attack any act of the local self-governments 
before the Constitutional Court or the ordinary courts and in administrative matters he 
could act as public authority of second instance in dealing with appeals against the 
decisions of local self-governments. 
As a new tendency in Hungarian political life, steps were repeatedly taken by the 
central government in order to broaden the sphere of competence of the Republic's 
Delegates. Taking advantage of the not entirely clear stipulations of the law, they were 
authorized to control and influence the activities of State organs in their regions on the 
pretext of "co-ordination", reducing substantially the competencies of the local auto-
nomous bodies. 
These new tendencies had been criticized sharply by some local self-governments 
(pre-eminently on the level of the counties) as a violation of their autonomy and a proof 
of the concealed ambitions of the government aiming at further centralization. As a 
result of these critical attitudes, the post of the Republic 's Delegates was abolished. 
III. Perspectives for the future 
Taking into consideration Hungary's desire to be full partner to the newly established 
European Union her problems connected with federalism and regionalism have to be 
dealt with in this sense. As it was declared several times, the doors to participation in 
the European house on equal terms must also be opened for the young democracies of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, their endeavours in the field of moderni-
zation in general and in the re-establishment of their State structure must be in 
conformity with the European model. 
As far as this model is concerned, the new European cooperation presupposes, as 
first of all, the attachment to some basic values having their origin in democratic 
traditions of development, (e.g. the rule of law, protection of fundamental rights, etc.) 
Therefore, institutions and procedures structured on this foundation will present, with 
slight differences, basic similarities among countries with various historical traditions, 
too. 
The future European regionalism is a question of setting up the European construction 
at three levels, i. e. the European Union, the member States and the regions. In this 
connection, points of reference are the division of authority amongst the various bodies 
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but also models for delineating powers between the central State and the member States 
at regional level. Consequently, the principle of subsidiarity should not only be limited 
to relations between the European Union and member States, but should also be applied 
in connection with their regions and municipalities. In this spirit also the reforms 
concerning the administrative structure of member States have to be realized. As a logical 
consequence of these insights, also in Hungary it has been repeatedly declared as one of 
the most important tasks of the new freely elected Parliament to enact a new law on local 
self-government fulfilling the demands of European development. 
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Raimo RYYNÄNEN The N e w Finnish Municipal i ty 
Act—The Changes in Comparison 
with the Old Act 
The new Act on Local Government (No. 365/1995),' which came into force on 1. 7. 
1995, gives to the local governments more room for operation and decision-making 
competence than the previous Act of 1976. The unity of the administration and the 
elimination of differences were typical of the period of the previous Act.2 T h e new Act 
enables local governments to organise their administration and their operation in better 
accordance with local conditions than previously. 
I will limit my discussion to the fields of the municipal local self-governments of 
Finland, which are also extremely relevant today within the European modernisation 
process. These are the relationships between state and community, and the relationship 
between citizen and community. The relationship state—community and the relationship 
community-ci t izen has developed to a great extent during the past years. The new Act 
on Local Government also contributed to the increased recognition of these themes in 
administrative praxis. 
Background—New Paths In Public Administration 
An inter-cultural comparison shows that principles, which can be described by a meta-
concept of "New Public Management", developed especially in the states of Australia, 
1 For an overview, see Main Content of the Local Government Act, Ministry of the Interior, Helsinki, 1995. 
2 See f o r more detai l V A T A J A , P.: "Self-government of Local Communit ies in Finland", 
Kunnallistieteellinen aikakauskirja, 3/1982, 2 5 9 - 2 8 3 . 
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Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA. Important considerations here are the 
orientation towards a professional and responsibility-conscious management; the de-
velopment of standards and methods of measuring the efficiency of administrations; the 
emphasis on output-controls; desegregation; the establishment of independence between 
and decentralisation of administrative units; the strengthening of the idea of competition; 
the deployment of private sector management-instruments and management-practices; and 
greater discipline and thrift in the use of resources.5 
Finnish local governments have to function under difficult conditions, which are also 
regarded as challenges in other European countries: 
— the construction of an efficient and citizen-friendly administration; 
— the thrifty handling of dwindling financial means; 
— the systematic promotion of the economy; 
— an innovative employment policy. 
The Scandinavian states have carried out a considerable reform process in the public 
sector during the past few years in order to, amongst other things, put the welfare state 
back on a level which can be financed. With reference to this matter, issues of the reform 
of tax concepts, organisational and personnel reforms, and deployment programmes are 
in the foreground.4 
What should be changed in order that more can be handled and taken care of? Firstly, 
the obstacles to handling must be disassembled. It is precisely this development that has 
for a few years been under way in several countries, especially in Scandinavia, where the 
subject of the so-called "Free Commune Experiments" has been the abolition of centrally-
imposed guidelines and standards for the organisation of decisions, or the use of means 
for the benefit of the individual creative freedom of specific local administrations. These 
"Free Commune Experiments" are especially instructive for the Federal German and 
European debate: in the last few years, in all four states, on demand, certain statutes and 
regulations for the municipalities have been repealed, in order to enable these mu-
nicipalities to carry out structural and performance reforms. This room for manoeuvre, 
and the opportunities for experimentation, has considerably increased the drive to 
innovate of the municipalities; indeed, there have been amazing reforms in the last 
decade. Moreover, the relatively "soft" implementation style, with which the management 
reforms have been carried out in public administration in Scandinavia, should be 
emphasised.5 
3 HILL, H.—KLAGES, H.: Quality- and Success-oriented Administration Management, Berlin, 1993, 25. 
4 For more detail, see The World's Best Public Sector?, International Public Management Comparison 
Project, Ministry of Finance, Finland, Helsinki, 1993.; NASCHOLD, F.: The Modernisation of the Public Sector 
in Europe, A Comparative Perspective on the Scandinavian Experience, Ministry of Labour, Helsinki, 1995.; 
MODEEN, T. (ed.): Public Administration in Finland, Finnish Branch of the International Institute of 
Administrative Sciences, Helsinki, 1994.; OULASVIRTA, L (ed.): Finnish Local Government in Transition, 
Finnish Local Government Studies, Special Number 4/1995. 
5 REICHARD, С.: Re-thinking in the Town Hall. 1994, 27-28. 
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The financing of the local governments has been carried out since 1993 on the basis 
of a globalised subsidy system. This reform, with several modifications of the Act, was 
a very important step in the direction of the strengthening of municipal self-government. 
The reform of the system of state balance payments for the municipalities is continuing, 
with the aim of making the bases for calculation more transparent, and to promote the 
more economical organisation of service-production. The municipalities recently orga-
nised themselves according to the model of the "Gewahrleistungsverwaltung" (guarantee 
administration).6 
The new task which Finland faces today requires significant re-thinking, which is 
being undertaken only in a preliminary fashion by the political élite of the country, and 
for which the population seems to be only scantily prepared. The end of the economic 
boom in the 1980's—at that time, in the face of great economic growth, Finland was 
prematurely described as the "Japan of the North"—and the current economic crisis, 
makes it diff icul t to perform the necessary internal policy reforms.7 
The so-called "lean administration" is also not in Finland a miracle cure-all pill. 
However, if it means modern organisational principles which have found their way into 
private industry, and provide for more profitability, reliability, and customer service, 
then local governments additionally do not need to be fearful of taking it over.8 It 
provides the opportunity to set new priorities: for example, when building kindergarten 
places (in Finland there has been a kindergarten place guarantee in effect since 1990). 
It is certainly important when reading foreign municipal constitutions to get 
acquainted with the historical background. Finland has been, since ancient times, a 
unified state. This fact also leaves its mark on legislation. Modern municipal self-
government can be traced back to the Municipality Order of 1865. At that time the tasks 
of the church and secular municipalities were divided. 
Although the role of local governments in society later changed significantly, the 
historical heritage still lives on in the legislation, if fundamental principles are at issue.9 
Finland has f rom the beginning belonged to the centralised state tradition of European 
history. The concept of German and Swedish municipal self-government provided 
models. Our first rural local government Act in 1865 was, for example, prepared by 
following the Swedish model . 
6 See also RYYNÄNEN, A.: ' T r e n d s in Municipal Legislation Reform", in Finnish Local Government in 
Transition, Finnish Local Government Studies, 4/1995, 291-295 . 
7 For an overview, see HUBEL, H.: "Finland After the East-West Conflict . From the Peripheral State to 
Stability Factor", Europa-Archiv, Folge 15/1993, 443-450 . 
8 RÜTTGERS, J.: "The Role of the Municipalities in a Changed Wor ld" , City and Local Community, 
1/19%, 10. 
9 Finland and Sweden have the same historical background, compare The Development in Municipal 
Legislation After 1977 in Sweden... See also MODEEN, T. : "Historical Introduction to Nordic Municipal i ty 
Law", City and Local Community, 2/1993, 69-77.; and MODEEN, T.: "National Report of the Nordic States", 
in KNEMEYER, F.-L. (ed.): The European Charter on Local Self-government, Baden-Baden, 1989.; compare 
BRENNER, J.: " N e w Municipality Constitution in Hungary", Archiv für Kommunalwissenschaften, 11/1991, 
296-301. 
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Today, Anglo-Saxon "New Public Management"-and managerialistic ideas—are 
especially strong in the Scandinavian countries, and also in Finland. An important model 
for the new regulations on direct democracy of our Municipality Act was the local 
government ordinance of Schleswig-Holstein, which dates from 1990. 
Citizen-friendly Administration Through the Strengthening of Municipal 
Self-government 
The relationship between the citizen and the state has changed at all its levels. The 
performance expectations of the citizens towards the administration have increased 
further. At the same time, administrative decisions are not accepted at face value. 
Appropriate explanations and, moreover, participation in decision-making is expected. 
What has been described since the 1980's by the concept of "WertewandeT (value 
change) also touches the relationship between a state and her citizens. "Service-
orientation", "user-friendliness" of the administration, "participation of the citizens in 
the administration", and so on, are demands uttered with increased frequency lately. 
This is for the betterment of the image of public administration, which wishes to change 
from the old subject-master relationship to an individual "administered" set-up.10 
Particularly in Finland, with her long tradition of the rule of law, several information 
and help services have established themselves in addition to the codified procedural 
rights of the participants in the administrative process; these aim to make the "jungle" 
of the administration transparent to those affected by it. The Finnish legislator has also 
reacted to this need. 
Citizen petitions, citizen demands, and citizen decisions have found their way into the 
new Municipality Constitution (Chapter 4). Substantially, it is concerned with reasonably 
small steps. For example, a referendum has, in the end, merely a consultative character. 
At least 5% of the eligible citizens can, through a so-called "Citizen Demand", petition 
for a referendum (Paragraph 31). The majority of the local government representation 
decides, however, whether or not a referendum should be initiated. A referendum is 
always only advisory (Paragraph 30). 
These new regulations of the Municipality Act are important steps; however, I do not 
think that they are already sufficient. The opportunities for participation in the formation 
of community life must develop further. That means especially that people must not 
experience municipal policy decisions as decisions of their masters.11 
Therefore, it would be very important that citizens' assemblies in particular should 
be regarded and utilised as democratic opportunities. Citizens' and residents ' 
assemblies, as institutions, could serve very different aims. In part they facilitate 
mutual exchanges of information between the administration and the citizens, and 
10 See also MODEEN, T. (ed.): The Status of the Citizen In the Face of State Power, Societas Scientarium 
Fennica, Helsinki, 1995. 
11 RÜTTGERS: op. cit., 1/1996, 9. 
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between the citizens and the administration. In other respects they promote a direct 
democratic effect, in the form of immediate advice and votes which form such advice. 
For example, in Bavaria12 it is the mayor who prepares the citizens' assembly, defines 
the agenda, and calls it together, as well as chairing and safeguarding the carrying out 
of its resolutions, by placing final decisions of the citizens' assembly on the agenda of 
the council within the following three months. 
The ci t izens ' assembly leaves the counci l ' s responsibility for the decisions (in a 
legal sense) untouched. Its political and factual binding force is, however, not to be 
underestimated. In Finland the citizens' assembly has not yet attained its deserved 
importance and is not yet rooted in local government life; therefore it has not yet made 
possible a close empathy between the citizens and the local government administration. 
Our Municipality Act does not, unfortunately, regulate the institution of the ci t izens ' 
assembly. 
It is also certainly interesting to observe that the new Municipality Act additionally 
affords to the citizens a general municipal right to make a complaint (actio popularis) 
(Paragraph 92). All members of the local community have had the right, since the first 
Municipality Act of 1865, to file an appeal against a decision of the municipal authorities. 
It is important that only the legality of the decision can be questioned (Paragraph 90). The 
consideration of a complaint is an adjudication separate from the administrative process; 
that is, administrative adjudication. The basic units of this are the Provincial Administrative 
Courts (12); the Highest Administrative Court exercises the final adjudicatory authority in 
matters of administrative complaints. The Highest Administrative Court decides whether 
or not a debated decision is legal. 
The Local Community Complaint (Gemeindebeschwerde) provides not only an 
effective method for the realisation of state supervision, but it is also an important form 
of control, which the members of the local community 's self-government bodies may 
exercise f r o m below for the safeguarding of the general welfare.1 3 
Citizen-friendly administration in Finland means especially the strengthening of 
municipal self-government. 
The Meaning of the New Act 
Analysis of the new Act shows that it bui lds on tradition as well as on renewal . 
Completely new are, for example, the regulations concerning the municipal budget 
(Chapter 8), which came into force only on 1st January 1997. One of the reforms which 
is important from the point of view of principle is primarily that the use of columned 
commercial accounting replaces centralised state (kameralistisch) accounting in local 
communities. 
12 See K N E M E Y E R , F.-L.: Citizen Participation and Municipal Policy, München -Lands berg, 1995, 
122-127. 
13 R Y T K Ö L Ä , O.: Finnish Local Community Administration Law, Helsinki, 1961, 104. 
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As regards our local communities, just as, for example, in Sweden and in Germany, 
they have in principle been endowed with a general local competence, the limits of 
which will be decided in judicial practice. The tasks of the local communities are of a 
general character. They are defined through the "universality principle" (Universalitäts-
prinzip)I.14 The local communities have a general range of competence, which is based 
exclusively on their self-governance (this has been maintained by the new Municipality 
Act, paragraph 2.1). The local communities provide basic services for their citizens.'3 
Even though local communities were long ago put under supervision through state 
legislation regarding the range of issues of their self-government, the realisation of these 
tasks being regulated in detail in a variety of ways, a remarkable principle of de-
centralisation of public tasks can be observed, which, with a view to the fundamental 
radicality of the general presumption of competence, finds its parallel only in other 
Scandinavian countries and in Germany.16 
Of greater importance also are its special tasks, which are defined in greater detail 
in special Acts. Until the beginning of the 1990's these special Acts presented a great 
problem for the municipal self-governments. From the viewpoint of the unity of living 
conditions, one can always recognise centralising tendencies in the relationship between 
state and local community. In the interest of greater mobility of the citizens, every place 
should, if possible, provide an, in many ways identical offer of similar performances. 
Corresponding to these unificatory tendencies, the legislator forms increasing numbers 
of tasks as task orders, with the consequence that when performing these tasks the 
municipal bodies are subordinated not only to legal but also to extensive professional 
supervision, and by that are limited in their freedom to act and to make decisions. 
The net of the regulations tightened the room for manoeuvre of the municipal self-
governments too greatly in the 1970's and 1980's. The development, as a rule, was 
that the local communities first took over a task voluntarily, within the framework of 
their self-government. Then later the legislator turned these tasks into duties within the 
framework of the special competence.17 
14 RYTKÖLÄ: op. cit., 4. 
15 The local communities are responsible for general education and vocational schools, and offer services in 
the fields of adult education, libraries, culture and leisure. Part of the local communities' tasks is kindergarten 
care, geriatric care, and care of the disabled, the lowest priority being help for income support and social 
housing support. The local communities are also responsible for health centres which provide preventive health-
care, the treatment of simpler illnesses, and dental treatment Local communities have competence in planning 
and building supervision, water supply, refuse and sewage disposal, the energy supply and environmental 
protection. For more detail, see, for example, HAKAMÄKI, S.-HARISALO, R.-HOIKKA, P.: "An Introduction 
to local government activities, administration and finance in Finland", Institut für Kommunalwissenschaften der 
Universität Tampere. 1/1988. 
16 REICHARD, С.—WOLLMANN, H.: Municipal Administration in the Push for Modernisation, Basel, 
1996, 4. 
17 In my thesis (Kunnan tehtävien lakisääteistäminen, with a summary, Legislative Regulation of Municipal 
Tasks, Tampere, 1986), I have discussed the development of this flood of statutes. 
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Thanks especially to the "Free Commune Experiments" (from 1989 to 1996), the 
reform of the Act b e g a n . " Its idea is to dismantle through decentralisation the over-
organisation of the welfare state. The full potential of the experiments has unfortunately 
not yet been realised. Maybe, however, the experiments reached fur thest quantitatively 
and qualitatively in F in land ." This experiment was extremely important in connection 
with the reform of the Municipality A c t 
It is interesting to remark that such experiments are now used through the 
"experiment clauses" of the new Municipality Acts of the German states.20 Following 
the decisions of the Parliament and the Government, it is believed that the new local 
community Act will serve as a "model" for the further reform of these special Acts.21 
A Freer Hand in Matters of Organisation 
The fundamental starting-point in the drafting of the new Act was that local communities 
should have a free hand in organisational matters. The internal organisational freedom of 
local communities was enlarged as a result of the new Act.22 Nevertheless, the legislator 
regarded it as necessary that, for example, the council's size should be precisely regulated 
(Paragraph 10): Finnish local community representations have more members than in 
several other states (in local communities under 2000 inhabitants, 17 members; in local 
communities with 2001-4000 inhabitants, 21 members; and, for example, in local commu-
nities with 8001-15 000 inhabitants, 35 members). The administrative committee (Ver-
wallungsausschuss) of the Finnish Parliament has in this regard particularly emphasised 
that the large number of mandate-holders is important for municipal self-government 
The free organisation of committees is an extremely important principle in the new 
Municipality Act. The large number of committees (20-30) was previously an important 
18 S e e for more detail RYYNÄNEN, A.: "The Strengthening of Municipal Se l f -Government -Curren t 
Reforms" , Archiv für Kommunalwissenschaften. 1/1994, 114-124; RYYNÄNEN, A. : "Municipalities as 
Pacemaker for Comprehensive Modernisation of the Public Sector in FinlandT' in W O L L M A N N , R.: Municipal 
Administration in the Push for Modernisation, 1996, 308-319; and RENNER, A.: "Competence Transferred 
to Below. The Free Community Experiment in Finland", АКР Fachzeitschrift für Alternative Kommunalpolitik, 
6/1995, 44—45. 
19 As Renner writes, c f . А К Р op. cit., 6/1995, 44. 
20 For example, Paragraph 133, the Hessan Local Government Regulation of 21. 12. 9 4 (Experiment of N e w 
Tax-models , Experiment Clause). 
2 1 See, for example, Government Decision-in-principle on Reforms in Central and Regional Government 17. 
6. 1993 (in English: Ministry of Finance, Helsinki 1993): 
"The way in which local authorities arrange and organize their operations will be founded more distinctly 
on municipal self-government. The relevant rules will be repealed at the beginning of 1994 at the latest, unless 
legal safeguards or some other justifiable cause requires otherwise. T h e ministries will prepare the necessary 
Government bills so that they can be placed before Parliament during 1993. The Ministry of the Interior will 
coordinate preparations." 
22 See also MODEEN, T. : "Politicians-Professionals—the Power Structure of Finnish Local Government", in 
Finnish Local Government in Transition, Finnish Local Government Studies 4/1995, 2 8 6 - 2 9 0 . 
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problem. Its special feature was its strong, in several cases, statutory competence. 
Several committees functioned as if they were state authorities, whilst being under state 
supervision. It was also not necessary that the committee members should be members 
of the council. This was one of the reasons that the standing of the council was 
weakened during the 1970's and 1980's. 
The new Municipality Act gives further possibilities to elect as members of the 
committees people other than council members. The Act (Paragraph 18) also now 
provides the possibility that the council may decide that members of the council should 
be the members of the municipality's board or of the committees. 
The theme of the appropriate chief municipal organisation is again being discussed. 
The current question in several European countries is the standing of the executive and 
chief organisation of the local community.23 The important purpose of the Finnish 
Municipality Act is to improve the decision-making possibilities of the municipal 
representation (the Council). Nevertheless, one can say that we still have a "strained" 
relationship between politics and administration. 
From the above it is clear that, as far as local community administration is 
concerned, the separation of the decision-making and the executive powers has been 
aimed at, by the application of a principle of duality. The local community board is the 
administrative organisation which is primarily entrusted with the executive power in the 
local community (Paragraph 23). 
The Finnish Municipality Act does not yet know the institution of the mayor (as for 
example it is known in Germany and in Hungary). During municipal political 
"weekdays", the chairperson of the council, as well as the chairperson of the local 
community board (with the Vice-Chairperson), holds an important position. One of the 
reasons for this is the Finnish multi-party system: the most important parties in the local 
community require leading positions. The Finnish local communities therefore have a 
"many-headed" political leadership. A step in the direction of an organisation with a 
"single-headed" political leadership is now the possibility of electing the same person 
as council chairperson and chairperson of the local community board (the new 
Municipality Act no longer prevents this alternative). For party political reasons this 
possibility is certain to remain only on paper. 
The local community director leads the local community under the collégial 
municipal board (Kommunalvorstand) (Paragraph 24). The status of the Municipal 
Director has in the last few years been de iure24 considerably weakened; de facto, 
however, it has not been. The local community director previously functioned (until the 
beginning of 1977) also as chairperson of the local community board. The new 
Municipality Act again makes it possible that the local community director should be 
able to work as the chairperson of the local community board, if he is elected only for 
23 See, for example, SCHIMANKE, D. (ed.): City Director or Mayor, Basel, 1989. 
24 Since 1993 a two-thirds majority of the Council can relieve him of his duties (Paragraph 25). 
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four years (Paragraph 24.2). It is quite possible that this opportunity will only rarely be 
utilised. 
Most certainly the question of the mayoral system with direct elections will also be 
become an issue in Finland in the next few years. 
The Enterprise City 
Today Finnish local communities and cities are like a politically-governed service-
providing enterprise. Of the output created by the local communities, 9 0 % is not 
agency-typical (behördentypischen), but instead is services. These performances are 
provided in different organisational forms: through the core administration, with their 
offices and departments, through participating enterprises in the form of self-owned 
firms and companies, or through communal , and often local community subsidised, 
private entities. The new Municipality Act, in this respect, gives a free hand and more 
room for movement than previously (Paragraph 2.3). 
The agencies of the state and those of the local community, in a similar fashion to 
other public agencies, can transfer their tasks to the common public of f ices (Act No. 
802/1993). 
In view of this development, to speak of an erosion of municipal self-government 
is not an overstatement.25 In order to realise the public aims, the performances of local 
government have to be guided. The required guiding instruments are already in place 
(in the new Municipality Act) and have only to be applied. 
The local communities have to develop a policy of participation which, deriving 
from the enterprise character of the city, understands the core administration and its 
"daughter" as a political and economic unity for the fulfi lment of municipal tasks. 
A Freer Hand for Municipal Co-operation 
Since in Finland there are no self-government associations at government district 
level,26 the legislator perceived it as necessary to oblige local communities to provide 
for certain activities which are seen as being extremely important through compulsory 
municipality associations.27 There are cases in which the individual municipalities 
either are not in charge of necessary resources, or are too small as a region to deal with 
the matter alone, but the state does not want to take over the activity herself either, 
because it is regarded as belonging to the self-government of the local communities. 
25 H I L L - K L A G E S : op. cit.. 59. 
2 6 Local self-government in Finland is not fundamental ly separated in to two instances, contrary to such 
regulations of the Basic Law of 1919 (Paragraph 51). Circuits (as in Germany) or departments (as in Hungary) 
d o not exist, and the state provinces have been, s ince 1993, endowed only with little competence. 
2 7 There are 272 Municipality Associations (1994). 
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The fundamental regulations of the municipality associations are to be found in 
Chapter 10 of the Municipality Act. A municipality association can now be formed by 
a basic contract voluntarily entered into between the local communities concerned. The 
goverment district off ice (county) has only to be notified of the basic contract in order 
to bring it into effect.28 The principle of voluntariness in the co-operation is also an 
important step. The new regulations on municipal co-operation in the new Municipality 
Act give the local communities a stronger possibility of steering the municipality 
associations. 
A municipality association is a legal entity. Since, however, a municipality 
association has no tax-raising power, its members are financially responsible for the 
actions of the association. 
The Endangerment of Municipal Self-government 
State supervision over municipal agencies is more limited in Finland than in most other 
countries. The endangerment of self-government lies especially within the legislation 
concerning the area of obligatory tasks. 
The principle of municipal self-government is naturally also recognised in Finland. 
This recognition means in fact that local communities enjoy a certain protection of their 
independence. The range of this protection is, however, in no way unambiguous.29 
According to the Finnish Basic Law (Regierungsform) of 17th July 1919, municipal 
administration has to build on the self-government of citizens, as prescribed by the 
relevant statutes (Paragraph 51 Section 2). There are different opinions on the content 
of this concept of self-government. Generally recognised is the opinion that self-
government encompasses at least the right to organs elected by the people, the right to 
raise taxes, and general competence on tasks of self-government. 
It is now to be aspired to that certain fundamental principles which are incorporated 
in the European Charter on Local Self-government of 198830 should be incorporated 
into the Basic Law; for example, the Finance Principle. This reform has not yet been 
accomplished despite several proposals. The reform of the complete Finnish Constitution 
(Basic Law 2000) started in January 1996, and it can be assumed that the modernisation 
of the provision concerning municipal self-government (Paragraph 51) is going to be 
decided on only in this context. 
The legal protection of the municipal regional bodies as regards the free exercise 
of their competence and the observance of the municipal self-government's basic laws 
is in Finland (as in other Nordic states) hardly elaborate. For this reason it is difficult 
28 MODEEN, T.: "The Administration of Regional Development in Finland", Hallinnon tutkimus (Ad-
ministrative Studies), 3/1995, 216-220. 
29 MODEEN: "National Report...", op. cit., 175. 
30 Finland ratified the Charter in 1991. 
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to gauge where the limits of self-government lie.31 F o r the protection of rights, local 
communities in Finland cannot turn to the Constitutional Court (as, for example, in 
Hungary3 2 or in Germany). 
Therefore, it is not sufficient to give new regulations only in the new Municipality 
Act concerning the relationship between state and local community, even though these 
are also modem. One has to concede that the principles of the European Charter on 
Local Self-government have been observed in Finland. A few years ago, there were still 
contradictions on three points: organisational superiority, state supervision only 
concerning legal issues, unassigned state subsidies, and legal recourse in cases of 
breaches of municipal self-government law. 
In the words of Professor Curt Riberdahl:33 
"It seems to me, as a Swedish observer, as if they had attained more in Finland with 
respect to this question. I am thinking of the suggestions in Paragraph 8 of the new 
Finnish Municipality Act, in which the Interior Ministry receives a role in which it 
should generally monitor and supervise municipal activities and economy, and in 
cases of the drafting of statutes which concern municipalities, it should safeguard 
the principles of municipal self-government. The discussion between state and 
municipality has also been normatised." 
The customary reform strategy, of reforming f rom the top downwards by means of 
instructions and orders, has been reversed in Finland in recent years. Strategies should 
be developed in situ in order to find suitable initial solutions to the existing problems 
under differing conditions. 
There is no "best way", no ideal organisational form. An important pre-requisite in 
this new administration culture is, however, good co-operation, deep trust, and new 
working methods ("partnership") between state and local community.3 4 Whether this 
3 1 M O D E E N : "National Report...", op. cit.. 182. 
3 2 The Hungarian Municipality Constitution is certainly a good model for further Finnish reforms, because 
the Hungarian reform has by all means put forward a model which is capable of funct ioning in the sense of 
a municipal self-government. As SZABÓ, G. has written in Public Administration in Hungary (1992, 57.): " T h e 
Hungarian M P ' s tried to establish a system of local government that is rather non-hierarchical and rather 
decentralized similar t o the British or Scandinavian experiences (but not so decentralized and independent as 
it is in the United States), than a more centralized, a more hierarchical and less independent as it is the case 
of France or Germany or the former Hungarian solutions." 
3 3 RIBERDAHL, С.: "The Development of Municipal Legislation After 1977 in Sweden" , Die Gemeinde 
5/1995. 
3 4 This possibility is being discussed in Finland: see HAUTAMAKI, A.: T o w a r d s the Joint Responsibility 
of Local and Central Government", New Directions for Local and Central Government Relations, Ministry of 
the Interior 3/1995: 
"Central government creates within its economic responsibility administrative and economic conditions fo r 
local governments for them to be able to bear the responsibility for services and to develop competitive regional 
infrastructure. Organisation of production and development of infrastructure in municipalit ies are governed by 
Local Government Act which defines democratic procedures and institutions. Municipalities are not bound b y 
the legislature except regarding few earlier mentioned (minorities, etc.) exceptions. A long with representative 
democracy, channels of direct interaction will be developed and citizens activeness a s residents and users of 
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will be achieved cannot yet be seen. All things considered, the new Municipality Act 
provides a good tool for this development. 
Modernisation of the Administration as a Permanent Process 
Decisive for every reform process is stamina and a deep breath. It has to be made clear 
from the start that the reform of municipal administration is no short-term campaign, 
no phenomenon which will be got through in a couple of months. Results and successes 
need time. A desirable and effective strategy in order to torpedo undesirable changes 
is, as is generally known, that "noticeable" changes and results should be demanded as 
early and as often as possible, and in the case that these cannot be convincingly 
demonstrated, that the sense and purpose of the entire enterprise should be questioned.35 
This article is based on the premise that a local community regulation able to 
perform has to sufficiently consider the interests of the citizens of the local community, 
the local community itself, and of the state. Whoever compares the performance of 
different municipal constitutions has to be open about his or her standards. He or she 
by that makes a value judgement which will have to face criticism. The chosen standard 
should be called self-government performance. It is derived f rom the idea of civic self-
government transformed into norms in the Constitution, and local community consti-
tutions and regulations, the aim of which is the welfare of the municipality and its 
citizens, and not the interest of functionaries or parties. Its two main elements are 
correctness of the decisions, and citizen-orientation.36 
The new Finnish Municipality Act takes several important steps in this respect, even 
though the Finnish model differs in several details from the German and Hungarian 
local community regulations. It is too early to say whether the new Act is timely in the 
face of the requirements of a modern municipal policy. 
services will be leaned on. The base standard of services is to produce the services in a satisfactory way with 
respect to the national level. For this we need to develop extensive information steering, i.e. neutral data on 
services, their impact, quality and costs. Obtained comparative information would be used by citizens, municipal 
representatives and managers as well as producers. Information steering will be the central mean of steering 
according to the joint responsibility model." 
35 HILL-KLAGES: op. cit., 80. 
36 Thus BANNER, G. in SCHI MAN KE, D. (ed.): City Director or Mayor, Basel, 1989, 41. 
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Imre A. WIENER The Necessity Test Relevant 
to the Codification of Criminal Law 
With respect to all fundamental constitutional rights, the question arises of whether it 
is possible to restrict those rights, under what conditions this should occur, and what 
criteria should be used for establishing a priority of rights in case of their collision. 
In one of its decisions, the Hungarian Constitutional Court has made the following 
points: the Constitutional Court should continue its work of interpretation in order to 
predicate the conceptual bases of the Constitution and of the rights embodied in it, and 
to create a coherent framework of its judgements, which is intended to serve as a 
reliable measure of constitutionality. This would provide an "invisible constitution" 
standing above the Constitution, which is still often amended out of daily political 
interests. This "invisible constitution" will, therefore, not be expected to come into 
conflict with the new Constitution, or any other constitutions which may be adopted in 
future. In this procedure the Court will have freedom of action as long as it remains 
within the bounds of the notion of constitutionality. 
Bearing in mind this guiding concept, the decision of the Constitutional Court is 
deliberately subjective and is historically determined. Even if the Court declares certain 
values to be absolute, it thereby lays bare the meanings they convey for its own era, 
and, therefore, its judgements on the questions of, for example, capital punishment or 
abortion, have no claim to eternal value even in principle.1 
In the course of preparing the new Constitution the decisions of the Constitutional 
Court must inevitably be taken into account, because they bring strong influence to bear 
X 23/1990. (X. 31.) AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court) , 2180. 
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on the exercise of the State's criminal jurisdiction. This is despite the fact that the 
questions considered by the Court are not covered, or are treated inconsistently, by the 
text of Hungary's Constitution. However, it is a requirement that questions of criminal 
law should be governed by express provisions of the new Constitution, and should not 
only be addressed by the "invisible constitution". I believe that this desideratum is not 
in conflict with the rule of law. 
Article 8 of the Constitution states that "the Republic of Hungary shall recognise 
man 's fundamental rights inviolable and inalienable, and it shall be a prime duty of the 
State to respect and protect those rights. The rules establishing fundamental rights and 
duties shall be laid down by Act of Parliament", but the essential content of 
fundamental rights must not be subject to restrictions. 
The State may not resort to restricting a fundamental right except when protection 
or implementation of another fundamental right or freedom, or protection of another 
constitutional value cannot be secured by other means. So, for the restriction of a 
fundamental right to be constitutional, it is not sufficient for restriction to be required 
by the protection of another fundamental right or freedom, or in the interest of another 
constitutional goal. Instead, restriction should also meet the criteria of proportionality, 
namely that the importance of the desired goal and the extent of prejudice caused to a 
fundamental right in pursuit of that goal should be duly proportional. In imposing a 
restriction the legislator must use the least intrusive means to attain the given goal. 
Restricting the content of a right is unconstitutional if done without an imperative cause 
or in an arbitrary manner, or if the extent of restriction is disproportionate to the desired 
goal.2 
The Hungarian Constitution uses the expression "fundamental rights" as a generic 
term covering the rights referred to in the European Convention as human rights and 
freedoms.3 Member States thus have a certain margin of appreciation concerning the 
necessity of restricting these rights and freedoms in a democratic state. The European 
Court of Human Rights controls the need for restriction by using the so-called necessity 
test.4 Application of a criminal sanction necessarily means restriction of a fundamental 
right. The framework for protection by criminal law is therefore created as a result of 
deliberation. In using the necessity test it should be established whether there is a need 
for restriction, that is, for regulation by criminal law, and whether restriction is 
proportional to and appropriate to attaining the purposes of punishment In this context 
judgement is influenced by the existence or absence of social consensus in declaring an 
act to be a criminal offence, and by the group of people affected by and opposed to 
criminal responsibility. On the international level, it should be established whether there 
is a generally held view in this matter, and whether the related community interests are 
2 31/1992. (V. 26.) AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court), 1910. 
3 BÁRD, К.—BÁN, T.: "Az Emberi Jogok Európai Egyezménye és a magyar jog", Acta Humana, 1992, No. 
6-7 , 9. 
4 B Á R D - B Á N : ibid., 125-126. 
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at least similarly protected in a similar cultural environment. It is necessary to examine 
the moral content of an act, which may differ f r o m the average with respect to, fo r 
example, professional negligence. It is necessary to consider the extent to which a 
restriction is capable of achieving the purpose of punishment under criminal law ( for 
example, abortion, alcoholism, drug addiction). Finally, it is necessary to consider the 
ultima ratio nature of criminal law, that is, whether other means are sufficient.5 
While the Constitution in force does not expressly state an obligation to prosecute 
crimes, several of its provisions refer to the obligation to protect values, even by 
exercising criminal jurisdiction: 
a) under Article 35 (1) the Government mus t protect the constitutional order, and 
protect and ensure the rights of citizens; 
b) under Article 50 (1) the courts must protect and ensure the constitutional order, 
as well as the rights and legitimate interests of citizens, and must punish the perpetrators 
of criminal offences; 
c) under Article 51 (1) the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Prosecutor 's Office m u s t 
be concerned with the protection of the rights of citizens, and must consistently 
prosecute any acts violating or endangering the constitutional order, national security, 
and independence. 
These brief provisions of the current Constitution are counterbalanced by the 
"invisible consti tution's" explanations of the sanction of criminal law. Accordingly, the 
role and function of criminal law sanctions consists of the upholding of the integrity of 
legal and moral norms when the sanctions of other branches of law are insufficient; 
a) The punishment intended to protect the integrity of law has a symbolic funct ion . 
Mos t notably, the commands of criminal law must not be violated even if one has a 
cause to do so or if the punishment fails to achieve, or is unfit to achieve, any particular 
purpose. The purpose of punishment is in itself, namely in the public declaration of the 
integrity of law, in retaliation regardless of purpose. 
b) The principle of proportional punishment is the only possible one in a 
constitutional state for the added reason that it alone is consistent with the idea of 
equality before the law. Any other consideration would mean the declaration of 
inequality, for the individual would regard his personal status, rather than the act, as the 
yardstick for punishment.6 
In another concurring opinion, Justice János Zlinszky, observes that the cr iminal 
jurisdiction of the State undoubtedly restricts man ' s freedom of decision, thus operating 
to a certain extent as a limitation upon human dignity, whilst it allows scope for mak ing 
a new positive moral decision—inasmuch as legal norm may be freely accepted and 
observed—such a decision has a moral value. It is nevertheless a fact that, just as human 
freedom is both a limit to, and a precondition for, social existence, a State-protected 
norm is a limitation to a moral value and is therefore in place only where necessary, and 
5 KREMNTTZER, M.: "Constitutional Principles and Criminal Law", Israel Law Review, No. 1-2, 87 et seq. 
6 23/1990. (X. 31.) A B határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court), 2186. 
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to the extent required, for the protection of the life and freedom of individuals (life 
being understood here as comprising all pre-conditions for social existence). It 
follows—and Zlinszky's opinion points this out—that punishment is acceptable only in 
this goal-directed sense, and loses its justification as soon as it becomes unsuitable for 
achieving its purpose. 
Since the criminal jurisdiction of the State is not uniformly interpreted even by the 
members of the Constitutional Court, this in itself, or the limitations of jurisdiction do 
not lend themselves to deducing the admissibility or inadmissibility of capital punish-
ment. For centuries it has been an implicitly accepted principle of criminal law that 
punishment has a preventive purpose which serves to suppress attacks on protected 
social values. Punishment can only be effective where, and to the extent that, it is 
suited to its purpose; it loses its legal basis when it is unable to serve that purpose, or 
when it is only able to serve it at the cost of a greater injury than the one it is mean t 
to prevent.7 
What has been stated in connection with the purpose of punishment, regardless of 
whether there is a consensus among the members of the Constitutional Court on this 
issue, it can at most be considered as a scholarly opinion which seeks to assist the 
transition to a constitutional state. However, I do not believe in the existence of a 
principle of punishment which serves as the basis for "the only possible punishment in 
a constitutional state". There is a voluminous literature on the purposes of punishment, 
and the proportional or educational trends change according to place and time.8 Indeed, 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights is concerned with the quality 
of punishment applied, rather than with the purpose of punishment pursued, and it gives 
no positive wording on punishment, but merely prohibits acts of inhuman and degrading 
punishment. Therefore, I am of the view that formulation of the purposes of punishment 
is not a question for the Constitution to cover. 
In one of its decisions' the Constitutional Court uses the term "constitutional 
criminal law", and the use of this term probably accounts for the failure to duly separate 
questions of constitutional and criminal law in analysing the problems that have 
emerged. Yet it is necessary for both constitutional and criminal law to resolve problems 
of codification and interpretation of law by using the terms specific to their respective 
systems. During the period of transition it may be acceptable that, in the course of its 
work, the Constitutional Court takes a broader view when interpreting the Constitution, 
and such an interpretation may be of help in elaborating the concept of a new 
Constitution. Once the new Constitution has been adopted, it will be necessary to 
interpret that Constitution instead of the "invisible" one. Delimitation of problems 
affecting constitutional and criminal law assumes particular importance for the added 
7 Ibid.. 2187. 
8 Interesting studies on this subject are contained in a volume edited by LAHTI, R.—NUOTIO, K. (eds.): 
Criminal Law Theory in Transition. Finnish and Comparative Perspectives, Helsinki, 1992. 
9 42/1993. (VI.30.) AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court). 
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reason that the Constitutional Court has recently handed down decisions addressing 
questions of criminal law not only f rom the standpoint of constitutional law. 
In examining restriction of the freedom of expression by means of criminal law, the 
Constitutional Cour t has maintained that constitutionality should be considered in 
conjunction with observance of the constitutional precepts relating to the entire system 
of criminal law. The source of those precepts lies in the concept of constitutional 
criminal law, and in the set of requirements which derive from the principle of the rule 
of law as a fundamental value for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the State, 
which includes the limitations on substance and the formal requisites of criminal 
legislation. In this context the decision referred to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights—adopted by the 21st Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly on 16 December 1966 and promulgated by Law-Decree N o . 8 of 1976 in 
Hungary—which embodies freedom of thought [Article 18 (1)] and the right to f reedom 
of expression [Article 19 (2)]. Furthermore, the court pointed out that exercise of the 
rights contained in the freedom of expression carries with it special duties and 
responsibilities. Hence it may be subject to certain limitations, but these must only be 
sucb as are provided by law and are necessary for 
a) the respect of the rights or reputations of others or 
b) the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or 
morals . 
The decision additionally quoted Paragraph 2 of Article 20, under which "any 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimi-
nation, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law". Then it referred to the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which 
carries a legal obligation for the Hungarian State and was promulgated by Law-Decree 
No. 1 of 1969. Under Article 4 of the Convention, State Parties must declare propagation 
of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred to be an offence punishable by law. 
To sum up the position of the Constitutional Court , limitations on the freedom of 
expression and the freedom of the press are required and just if ied both by the 
historically proven harmful effect of hatred against specific group of people, and by 
protection of constitutional fundamental values and fulfilment of the international 
obligations of the Republic of Hungary.10 In consequence, the conduct penalised by 
Article 269 (1) of the Criminal C o d e " also threatens individual rights, and the Cour t ' s 
10 30/1992. (V. 26.) AB határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court), 1912. 
11 "§ 269. (1) Whoever in wide publicity incites to hatred against 
a) the Hungarian nation or some nationality, 
b) some nation, religion or race, furthermore certain groups of the population, commits a felony and is 
punishable with deprivation of liberty up to three years. 
[(2) Whoever in wide publicity uses an expression offensive or degrading to the Hungarian nation or some 
nationality, nation, religion or race, or commits other such conducts, is punishable for a misdemeanour with 
deprivation of liberty up to one year, community service or fine.)" (Paragraph 2 was abol ished by the decision 
of the Constitutional Court [30/1992. (V. 26) AB határozat)). 
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decision thus gives such weight to the direct object of the public peace, that restriction 
of the freedom of expression can be viewed as necessary and proportional. 
The Constitutional Court held that, in codifying Article 269 (2) the Criminal Code 
had built on the fact that use of derogatory expressions with respect to national or 
religious communities was generally contrary to the desirable tranquillity of society. 
This definition of the immaterial facts of the offence protects, therefore, public order, 
the public peace, social peace in themselves, in an abstract fashion. The crime is also 
deemed to be committed when the derogatory expression does not, under the 
circumstances, carry the danger of prejudice to individual rights. Such an abstract threat 
to the public peace is an insufficient argument in favour of constitutionally restricting 
the freedom of expression by punishment under criminal law. 
The decision further states that the right to the freedom of opinion protects opinion 
without regard to its value-content and truth, yet Article 269 (2) places no external 
limitation on expressions, but qualifies on the basis of the value-content of opinion, to 
which disturbance of the public peace is only linked by assumption and statistical 
probability. 
Maintenance of the public peace does not inevitably require the law to threaten with 
punishment under criminal law the use, in the presence of others, of insulting or 
derogatory expressions with respect to the Hungarian nation, a nationality, a people, a 
religious or a racial group (or the pommission of other similar acts). This statutory 
definition of the pertinent facts unnecessarily, and in a manner disproportionate to the 
desired goal, restricts the right to freedom of expression. An abstract, eventual threat to 
the public peace gives insufficient cause for the Criminal Code to place limitations, as 
determined by Article 269 (2), on the fundamental freedom of expression, which is 
indispensable to the functioning of a democratic, constitutional state.12 
The decision of the Constitutional Court furthermore stated that "racial" incitement 
is prohibited by criminal law in all democratic countries of Europe with a continental 
system of law and, in the territories of Anglo-Saxon law, in England and Wales, 
Canada, and New Zealand. However, drawing the appropriate boundaries between 
incitement, hatred and the freedom of expression is also a source of considerable debate 
in the international arena.13 For this reason it is also not certain that Article 269 (2) 
will stand the necessity test. The Constitutional Court proceeds from the assumption that 
the right to freedom of expression protects opinion without regard to its content of value 
and truth. 
This statement—in my opinion—not only runs counter to the provisions of Covenant 
Article 20 (2), but para. (1) thereof spells out that any propaganda for war must be 
prohibited by law. In that case, freedom of expression cannot be independent of any 
value-content. Moreover, freedom without a content of truth is open to doubt on the 
basis of the arguments advanced in the Constitutional Court decision discussed below. 
12 Supra note 10. 1913-1915. 
13 Ibid., 1909. 
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Manifestation of opinion expressing a value-judgement apt to injure the honour of 
an authority or an official, or a politician acting in the public view in its/his capacity, 
is not constitutionally punishable. Allegation or spreading of facts fit to impair honour 
or use of a term directly referring to such facts is punishable only if the person alleging 
or spreading facts fit to impair honour, or directly referring to such facts was aware that 
his allegation was untrue in content or was unaware of its untruth because, under the 
rules of his profession or occupation, he failed to show the diligence that could be 
expected of him with respect to the object, means and target of his allegation.14 
According to the decision, the constitutional boundaries of the freedom of expression 
should be established by taking into consideration, along with the subjective right of the 
person expressing opinion, the interest attached to the formation or f ree creation of 
public opinion which is indispensable for democracy. The right to the freedom of 
expression is not only a fundamental subjective right, but is also a recognition of its 
objective, institutional aspect, whilst serving as a guarantee for public opinion as a 
fundamental political institution. 
Although the special role of the right to freedom of expression does not imply that 
this right is unrestrictable, as are the rights to life and to human dignity, it certainly 
means that this f reedom actually has to yield to a very few rights; therefore the laws 
placing limitations on the freedom of expression should be interpreted restrictively. A 
restrictive law, when considered against freedom of opinion, carries a greater weight if 
it directly serves to ensure observance and protection of another fundamental subjective 
right; it has a smaller weight if it protects such a right only indirectly, through the 
med ium of an "institution"; and its weight is smallest when it serves nothing but an 
abstract value in itself. 
The right to the freedom of expression protects opinion without regard to its value-
content and truth. It is subject to external limitations only. Unless it exceeds such 
constitutionally imposed, external limits, it is the very possibility and fact of expressing 
opinion that is af forded protection without regard to its content. In other words, what 
en joys constitutional protection is expression of individual opinion, public opinion 
shaped by its own laws and, in interaction with the former, the possibility of forming 
individual opinion based on as wide a range of information as possible. The Constitution 
ensures free communication (individual conduct and the social process), and the 
fundamental right to the freedom of expression is unrelated to the content thereof. In 
this process there is a place for every opinion, good and harmful, pleasant and offensive 
alike, especially by reason of the fact that the qualification of opinion is itself a product 
of this process. 
The criminal law means of protecting honour restrict the freedom of expression in 
defence of the constitutional values of the rights to human dignity and to reputation. 
Under Article 54 (1) of the Constitution, every human being has the inherent right 
to l ife and dignity. Since Decision No. 8/1990. (IV.23.) of the Court was handed down, 
14 36/1994. (VI. 24.) A B határozat (Decision of the Constitutional Court), 2511. 
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the practice of the Constitutional Court has accepted the right to human dignity as a 
"general personality right". The general personality right is a "parent right", that is, a 
subsidiary fundamental right which both the Constitutional Court and the ordinary courts 
may always invoke in defence of the individual's autonomy if none of the qualified 
fundamental rights can be applied to the pertinent facts of a particular case. 
This statement—in my view-affects questions of detail explicitly of criminal law and 
is in conflict with the dogmatic system of the relevant part of criminal law. The 
dogmatic system functions well only if free from contradictions. 
In this decision15 the Constitutional Court touches on specifically criminal law 
issues with which it cannot concern itself, and not only under the current Constitution, 
but also under the "invisible" and, hopefully, the new Constitution which is now in the 
making. 
As is stated in this decision, the perpetrator's acts include alleging or spreading, 
in the presence of others, facts objectively apt to injure honour, or using terms directly 
referring to such facts (henceforth called "statement of facts"), or using terms, or 
committing acts, objectively apt to injure honour (henceforth called "value-
judgement"). 
The act can only be committed with intent: commission through negligence is not 
punishable by law. For wilful commission to be established it is necessary that the 
perpetrator be mindful that the statement of facts or the value-judgement is made in the 
presence of others, refers to an official or one representing an authority, and is 
objectively apt to injure the honour of that official or, through insulting him, that of the 
authority. Guilt is not conditional on intent to insult, and the motive of the act can be 
judged, not in the establishment of guilt, but in the meting out of punishment. 
In examining the constitutionality of regulation by criminal law, it is of particular 
relevance that the untruth of facts apt to injure honour is not a pertinent element of the 
criminal offence, so statement of facts, whether true or untrue, is deemed to be a crime. 
Establishment of guilt does not require awareness of the untruth of facts, so error 
concerning the truth of facts is indifferent to criminal law. Likewise indifferent to the 
commission of the crime is the perpetrator's "good or bad faith", his diligence or 
negligence in ascertaining the truth of facts. The perpetrator is not relieved of criminal 
responsibility either by due foresight or by "bona fide error". 
Protection of the honour of officials is an aspect of the inalienable and unrestrictable 
right to human dignity. Among the fundamental rights relating to the person's social 
appreciation Article 59 (1) of the Constitution mentions only the right to reputation, but 
there is no doubt that honour, which emanates from the parent right to human dignity, 
similarly enjoys the protection of a fundamental right under Article 54. Although only 
an official representing an authority can have human dignity, an authority may also lay 
claim to a favourable value-judgement or appreciation by society. 
15 Ibid., 2511-2513. 
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Its consideration with a view to their inter-relationships, of the constitutional 
protection of human dignity, honour and reputation, of the right to the f reedom of 
expression and of the constitutional interest attaching to the f reedom to discuss publ ic 
affairs, has led the Constitutional Court to conclude that f reedom of expression may 
only be subject to a smaller degree of restriction in defence of the exercise of publ ic 
power. For the protection of the honour of authorities and officials, the means of 
criminal law that are strictest in the system of sanctions may not be used consti-
tutionally, except in cases outside the sphere of the freedom of expression. 
According to the decision, the Constitution makes no express distinction between 
statements of facts and value-judgements in safeguarding freedom of expression. This 
freedom is basically aimed at enabling individuals to shape the opinion of others, and 
to convince others of their own position. Therefore it generally includes the f reedom to 
communicate anything, regardless of the manner and value of communication, its moral 
quality, and usually its content of truth. Statement of a fact may itself qualify as 
opinion, for opinion may also be reflected by the circumstances of communication, that 
is, the constitutional fundamental right to express opinion is not limited to value-
judgements. In drawing the boundaries of f reedom of expression, however, one is 
justified in making a distinction between value-judgements and statements of facts. 
Freedom of expression always includes value-judgements, that is, the personal 
opinion of individuals, irrespective of whether they are valuable or worthless, true or 
false, or are based on emotion or reason. Nevertheless, human dignity, honour, and 
reputation, which are equally protected by the Constitution, may place external 
limitations on the freedom of expression as manifested in a value-judgement, and give 
rise to criminal responsibility in the interests of protecting them. Therefore criminal 
responsibility cannot, on the whole, be regarded as disproportionate and hence un-
constitutional. 
Yet the Constitutional Court maintains that the Constitution accords increased protection 
to value-judgements voiced in conflicting views on public affairs, even if such views may 
be exaggerated and extravagant Again, protection of society's peace and democratic 
development does not need the intervention of criminal law against criticisms of , or 
negative judgements on, the activities of authorities and officials that are manifested in 
the form of insulting or defamatory statements or conduct The view, set out in Consti-
tutional Court Decision No. 30/1992. (V. 26.), that shaping public opinion and the 
political style by criminal law penalties is a paternalist approach also holds true for this 
case. 
All the above may be viewed and disputed within an analysis of the necessity test, 
but the points to be made below concern problems of criminal dogmatics which, given 
the subjective aspects involved, are not matters of constitutional law. 
In the view of the Constitutional Court, f reedom of expression does not include 
statements of untrue facts apt to injure honour if the person uttering a libel is positively 
mindful of the untruth or if, under the rules governing the exercise of his profession or 
occupation, he could have been expected to ascertain the truth of facts, but he failed to 
use diligence in his responsible exercise of the freedom of expression. 
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The Constitutional Court has held that the unconstitutionality of criminal law is not 
ruled out by the possibility of proving the truth of a particular statement. Regulation by 
criminal law is based on the presumption of untruth.16 My comment on this line of 
reasoning is that regulation by criminal law is based, not on the presumption of untruth, 
but on the objective, not subjective, criteria of aptness to injure honour. 
The Constitutional Court maintains that the admissibility of a defence by proving 
the truth under the burden of proof not only means prohibition of deliberate utterances 
of falsehood, but is also apt to discourage persons from criticising the activity of those 
exercising public power. The possibility of proving the truth does not counterbalance 
unnecessary and disproportionate limitations on freedom of expression and the press, 
and is not a substitute for constitutional protection where facts are stated which are 
either true or reasonably believed to be true, but which are apt to injure the honour of 
an official. 
In cases of this defence, the general rule for evidence, following from the pre-
sumption of innocence, a constitutional basic principle of criminal law, is turned around: 
the burden of proof is borne by the person against whom proceedings are being 
undertaken. The perpetrator's punishability is excluded by nothing but the proven truth. 
His guilt must be established if the proceeding authority has not satisfied itself that the 
fact stated is true in content. The consequences of the impossibility of proving the truth 
of facts are suffered by the person against whom criminal proceedings have been 
instituted, and the presumption of innocence does not prevail in this case. 
The decision of the Court stated that, with respect to the exercise of public power, 
or to participants in public life, disclosure of true facts should always be deemed to be 
in the public interest even if such disclosure is apt to damage the social appreciation of 
those persons, and appraisal thereof cannot be left to the authority proceeding in 
criminal cases.17 
The statement made in the dissenting opinion on the question of constitutionality 
points out the following: the ordinary courts may, by relying on the present set of 
conditions for proving the truth, constitutionally decide whether a particular case 
involves the freedom of expression, or involves an act violating the private sphere and 
dangerous to society. The content of "public interest" and "anyone's lawful in-
terest"—concepts which serve as conditions to communicate offensive facts even if 
true—evolved through the practice of ordinary courts. According to them, the closer the 
sphere of civil relations affected by a statement of facts is to public life, the wider is 
the protection of the public interest or of lawful private interests, on the basis of which 
16 "Proving the Truth 
§ 182. (1) The perpetrator can not be punished for the crimes defined in Articles. 179-181 (Libel and 
Slander. Defamation, Profanation of the Memory of the Deceased) if the fact fit to impair the honour proves 
to be true. 
(2) Proving the truth is admissible where the assertion, spreading of facts or the usage of a term directly 
referring to such was motivated by public interest or by anyone's lawful interest." 
17 Supra note 14, 2516-2518. 
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the truth can be said; and the closer it is to private life, the smaller is the possibility 
of proving the truth. 
Moreover, it is up to the system of criminal law to regulate the objective and 
subjective elements of responsibility, and for criminal procedure to j udge individual 
cases. T h e unlawfulness of defamation (and insult) may be excluded on an objective 
basis if social appreciation attaches greater importance to the statement of fact or the 
expression of opinion than to the protection of the injured person's honour. The 
provisions of Article 17 of Statute XLI of 1914 provide a statutory example of this.18 
Contemporary judicial practice has excluded the unlawfulness of defamation and insult 
in connection with numerous circumstances (for example, expert or scientific opinion, 
the giving evidence of to authorities, the fulfilment of educational dut ies ) . " In these 
cases the only limit to statements of facts or expressions of opinion is set by the 
punishment of the use of defamatory terms, because use of such terms, insulting in 
themselves, is also punishable in these cases. 
If the Constitutional Court had wished to attach similar importance to public or 
political activities, it would have had to invite the legislator or the ordinary courts to 
regulate the causes excluding similar cases of unlawfulness, because the causes 
excluding unlawfulness come into play in the stage preceding the institution of criminal 
proceedings. Aptness to injure honour as well as the circumstances in which facts are 
stated or opinion is expressed can be objectively considered before the institution of 
proceedings, such consideration needing no hearing. 
Failure to show diligence, or negligence as indicated in the Constitutional Court 's 
decision, can only be examined within the framework of criminal proceedings. Since 
proceedings in such cases are usually instituted on a private complaint, effective 
protection for the critic can only be accorded by a criminal law solution that does not 
allow criminal proceedings to be taken against the critic. It is commonly known that, 
in a case liable to prosecution by private complaint, what is important for the private 
prosecutor is not the punishment, usually minimal, but the fact that the cri t ic can be 
brought into a defendant 's position. Since that position is by itself necessarily an injury 
to the personality right—which is conditional on the particular conduct being a criminal 
offence—the rules of criminal law should be formulated in such a way as to prevent such 
injury as well. It is this objective situation for which a circumstance excluding 
unlawfulness can be created by applying the necessity test. 
In m y view, systematising and applying the conditions of criminal responsibility in 
substantive and procedural law is not a matter of constitutional law. It would therefore 
18 "(1) Establishment of defamation or insult shall be excluded if the statement of a fact or the use of a term 
directly referring to a fact occurred orally or in a document during the hearing of the case before the authority 
in relation to the case and the party thereto. 
(2) This same rule shall apply to other similar declaration made by the party to the case or by his 
representative orally or in a document during the hearing of such a case, provided that the declaration is 
related to the case and was necessary in the interest of the party." 
19 Cf. A Büntető Törvénykönyv magyarázata (Commentary to the Penal Code), Budapest, 1986, 532-533. 
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be advisable to separate problems affect ing constitutional law and the internal systems 
of other branches of law. As such separation concerns both legislation and adjudication, 
it would seem reasonable to empower the Constitutional Court to examine the consti-
tutionality of judicial decisions as well. Such practice might prevent an intermingling 
of matters pertaining to constitutional and criminal law and ensure reversal of the 
proportion of majority/minority views in the decisions handed down by the C o u r t Given 
its lack of competence, the Constitutional Court may not examine the constitutionality 
of judicial decisions, but this is no sufficient cause for its annulling a law or regulation 
that may be applied in harmony with or contrary to the Constitution. 
M A G Y A R  
RUDOMÁNYOS AKADÉMIA 
KÖNYVTÁRA 
PRINTED IN HUNGARY 
Akadémiai nyomda, Martonvásár 

HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Vol. 37 1995/96 № 1 - 4 
A K A D É M I A I K I A D Ó , B U D A P E S T 

ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA, Vol. 37 
C O N T E N T S 
STUDIES 
EEROLA, Risto: Comparat ive Aspects of the Cr imina l Responsibility 
of Government Members in Western Eu rope 129 
FARKAS, Ákos-RÓTH, Erika: T h e Constitutional Limi ts of the Ef f i c i ency 
of Criminal Justice 139 
FEHÉR, Lenke: European Integration: The Legal Situation of the Vic t im 
in Criminal Procedure 151 
GABOR, Francis A.: Quest for Globa l Harmonization of Private 
International Law from the American Perspect ive 6 3 
GELLÉR, Balázs József: Hate Speech in Hungarian Criminal Law 159 
GÖRGÉNYI, Ilona: The Protection of the Envi ronment by Criminal L a w 189 
HÄGGLUND, Henrik: The Municipal School Sys tem in Finland -
Some Legal and Administrative Aspects 2 0 1 
HEIKINHEIMO, Sanna: Money-Laundering—a Controversial Issue 2 1 1 
HIRVONEN, Ari: T h e Rule of Just ice and the Ethical Limits 
of Criminal Law 2 2 1 
HORVÁTH, Tibor: The Problems of Constitutional Regulation 
of the Right to Life 231 
KULLA, Heikki: T h e Municipal Staff : the Manager and Officials 243 
LAHTI, Raimo: T h e Rule of Law and Finnish Cr iminal Law R e f o r m 251 
LÁB ADY, Tamás: Constitutional Protection of Pr ivacy 
(Protection of Marriage and the Family, R igh t to Privacy) 2 3 
LÉVAI, Miklós: T h e Rule of Law and Criminalisation—Theoretical 
Considerat ions and Hungarian Criminal L a w 2 5 9 
MODEEN, Tore: T h e Institution of Self-government in Finland 273 
MOHÁCSI, Péter: International Co-operation in Cr iminal Matters, 
with Special Reference to Extradition 2 8 1 
NUOTIO, Kimmo: T h e Difficult Task of Drafting L a w on Principles 2 8 7 
NUUTILA, Ari-Matti: The Reform of Fundamental Rights 
and the Criminal Justice System in Fin land 303 
PÉTERI, Zoltán: Problems of Regional ism in Hungary 315 
RÁCZ, Attila: The Binding Force of Legal Rules- thei r Validity, 
Effectiveness and Applicability 37 
RYYNÄNEN, Raima: The N e w Finnish Municipality Act—The Changes 
in Comparison with the Old Act 323 
SAJÓ, András-SÁNDOR, Judit: Legal Status of the 'Terminal ly Ш" 
under Hungarian L a w 1 
SÓS, Vilmos: The Constitutional Paradigm 49 
TOKARCZYK, Roman A.: A New Current in Jurisprudence 85 
WIENER, Imre A.: Preface: Finnish-Hungarian Seminars on Criminal Law 
and Administrative Law 125 
WIENER, Imre A.: The Necessity Test Relevant to the Codification 
of Criminal Law 335 
KALEIDOSCOPE 
Diversion and Mediation in Austria 
(Lenke FEHÉR) 9 7 
BOOK R E V I E W 
István DIÓSZEGI: A hatalmi politika másfél évszázada, 1789-1939 
(Károly Kisteleki) 1 0 9 
Imre VORÓS: Az önkormányzatok tulajdona és gazdasági tevékenysége 
(Viktor Páricsi) 1 2 0 
Arthur KAUFMANN: G r u n d p r o b l e m e der Rech t sph i l o soph i e 
(Vilmos Peschka) 1 0 5 
M T A K ö n y v t ü r » 

Only original papers will be published and a copy of the Publishing Agreement 
will be sent to the authors of papers accepted for publication. Manuscripts will 
be processed only after receiving the signed copy of the agreement 
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
A U T H O R S : 
Risto EEROLA, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Turku, 
Turku 
Akos EARKAS, Associate Professor, University of Miskolc, Faculty of Law, 
Miskolc 
Lenke FEHÉR, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Legal and Administrative 
Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest 
Balázs József GELLÉR, Adjunct Professor, Loránd Eötvös Universi ty of 
Sciences, Faculty of Law, Budapest 
Ilona GÖRGÉNYL Associate Professor, Universi ty of Miskolc, Faculty of 
Law, Miskolc 
Henrik HÄGGLUND, Rector, Swedish School of Social Science, University 
of Helsinki, Helsinki 
Sanna HEIKINHEIMO, Assistant Professor, Universi ty of Helsinki, Helsinki 
Ari H1RV0NEN, Research Fellow, University of Helsinki Faculty of Law, 
Helsinki 
Tibor HORVÁTH, Professor of Law, University of Miskolc, Faculty of Law, 
Miskolc 
Heikki KULLA, Professor of Administrative Law, University of Turku , Turku 
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Raimo LAHTI, Professor of Law, University of Helsinki, Facul ty of Law, 
Helsinki 
Miklós LÉVAI, Associate Professor , Director of the Institute of Criminal 
Sciences, University of Miskolc, Faculty of Law, Misko l c 
Tore MODEEN, Professor of Administrative Law, University of Helsinki, 
Helsinki 
Péter MOHÁCSI, Research Fellow, Institute for Legal and Administrat ive 
Sciences of the Hungar ian Academy of Sciences, Budapes t 
Kimmo NUOTIO, Acting Associate Professor of Criminal and Procedural 
L a w , University of Helsinki, Helsinki 
Ari-Matti NUUTILA, Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, Universi ty of 
Turku , Turku 
Zoltán PÉTERI, Professor of Comparative Law, Institute for Legal and Admi-
nistrative Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapes t 
Erika RÓTH, Adjunct Professor , University of Miskolc, Facul ty of Law, 
Miskolc 
Aimo RYYNÄNEN, Doctor of Law, Institute for Local Administration 
University of T a m p e r e , Tampere 
Imre A. WIENER, Professor of Law, Head of Criminal L a w Department, 
Loránd Eötvös Universi ty of Sciences Faculty of L a w , Budapest 
HU ISSN 1216-2574 
